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 Preface and Acknowledgments 
 This book has a very personal beginning. After my wife and I fi nished 
graduate school, she was hired to work as a diplomat for the U.S. State 
Department. After the initial excitement that accompanies one’s fi rst 
grown-up job (better said, vicarious excitement, because I was unem-
ployed, having been beat out for that very same job by this wonderful 
woman I had married), I realized that I had absolutely no earthly idea 
what Nina would be doing. She was similarly clueless, having received 
the same apparently inadequate Ph.D. education I had. How could it be 
that after six years of graduate school at Berkeley we had no real under-
standing of what comprises most of interstate relations—communicating 
via diplomacy? I noted this as a future research topic. Ten years later, this 
is the result. 
 When I fi nally started looking into diplomacy as a concept and a phe-
nomenon, I felt better. No one else seemed to have any idea either. I 
found a half-dozen reviews of the literature on diplomacy, all complain-
ing that no one had studied it and no one knew how it worked. They 
provided a few requisite quotes from diplomats who claimed that their 
brilliant skill was simply intuitive and inexplicable and then went onto a 
list of the various functions of the diplomat—smiling at cocktail parties, 
acting pretentious, and so on. Yet, frustratingly, none of these works re-
ally did anything about this enormous gap in our scholarly knowledge. 
 To make progress, I fi rst had to understand that diplomacy was, at least 
conceptually, very different from foreign policy. Diplomacy is not the for-
mulation of foreign policy interests; it is the pursuit of them without re-
course to force. This can be done in different ways. State leaders can 
engage in coercive bargaining, pragmatic statecraft, or reasoned dialogue. 
There are different diplomatic styles used to pursue the same goals. 
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 I had the perfect laboratory to test these arguments—1920s Europe. I 
had been interested since graduate school in this somewhat neglected 
period in great power politics. After I published my fi rst book, I turned 
back to it, hoping to make the case again that parties defi ned the national 
interest differently. In hindsight, this would have been a mistake, a mere 
retread of my fi rst book. And it would not have worked in any case. The 
defi nition of the national interest was not in dispute in the domestic poli-
tics of France, Britain, and Germany between the wars. This had frus-
trated me when I fi rst took up the topic, but when I reopened it, I saw 
that this fact served my new theoretical purposes. Foreign policy goals 
were not contested, but diplomatic style was. 
 It indicated, yet again, that important elements of state behavior are 
not structurally determined. Diplomacy is the exercise of agency. Those 
with different diplomatic styles take the same interests and go about 
achieving them in very different ways. Indeed, it is hard to think about 
diplomacy in any meaningful way if it is simply endogenous to attri-
butes of the environment such as the position of a state in the distribu-
tion of power. If the powerful always get what they want, then the neglect 
of diplomacy in the international relations literature is forgivable. Yet 
they don’t, and it isn’t. 
 It is not enough, however, simply to show that diplomacy matters. I 
wanted to say something about what diplomatic styles we could expect 
states to pursue. Here I drew again on psychological attributes of deci-
sion makers, in particular social and epistemic motivations. These two 
factors combine to produce a number of diplomatic styles that we fi nd 
implied in different schools of international relations theory. In 
other words, not only do we have realist and liberal scholars, we also 
have realist and liberal practitioners, and we can predict who they are 
likely to be. Scholarly debates are replicated in the real world with real 
consequences. 
 I envision this book as the last in a triptych of books that one might 
think of as neo-idealist in character. They are idealist in that a major take-
away from all of them is that we are not destined to a competitive world 
of power politics; leaders exercise considerable agency in their foreign 
policy choices. In  Partisan Interventions , I contend that states often inter-
vene with military force for humanitarian purposes. In  Trust in Interna-
tional Cooperation , I show they are capable of trusting other states to 
effectively create multilateral security institutions. And in this book,  Di-
plomacy’s Value , I demonstrate that liberal and realist diplomacy enables 
states to reach win-win outcomes that they would otherwise not have 
achieved through coercive bargaining. The books are neo, however, in 
the sense that they are neither naïve nor normative. All three are based 
on rigorous objective analysis with a careful research design. The last 
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two make the case that decision makers can reach cooperative outcomes 
even when motivated primarily by egoistic ends. But also, always, there 
are opponents of humanitarian intervention, multilateralism, and rea-
soned diplomacy. These outcomes are by no means predetermined. Par-
ticular political parties favor them, while others do not. I do not think 
that we are on a long march to a liberal paradise. 
 I was fortunate enough to be put through the fi re by Iain Johnston, 
Todd Sechser, Wayne Sandholtz, Jacques Hymans, Mark Haas, Jon Mer-
cer, David Welch, Vincent Pouliot, Robert Trager, Paul Sharp, Jennifer 
Mitzen, Marcus Holmes, Mark Trachtenberg, Jordan Branch, Arthur 
Stein, Andrew Moravcsik, Burcu Bayram, Aaron Rapport, Mai’a Davis 
Cross, and audiences at Princeton University, the University of Texas–
Austin, UCLA, and McGill University. Any remaining mistakes I blame 
on them for not catching. 
 Heather McKibben helped me immensely in situating my argument 
against the alternatives and showing how they are often more comple-
mentary than competitive. Dustin Tingley greatly infl uenced my thinking 
about case selection. Ron Krebs was instrumental in helping me distin-
guish foreign policy from diplomacy. Andrew Moravcsik made me deal 
with the role of interests and beliefs in isolating the causal importance of 
diplomatic style. Nina brought me down to size repeatedly by saying, 
“Yes, of course,” to every insight I thought I had generated about the dip-
lomatic process, as diplomats will do. Robert Jervis was one of the review-
ers for Cornell University Press. His endorsement was one of the highest 
points of my professional career. Another anonymous reviewer was also 
superb. Anyone who has worked with Roger Haydon at the press knows 
how he combines humor with professionalism to make publishing a book 
painless. It was great fun to do this again with him. I thank my graduate 
student Mark Paradis for research assistance. The Center for International 
Studies at the University of Southern California and the Social Sciences 
and Humanities Research Council of Canada were generous in providing 
me with research support. 
 A theme in this book is that by combining efforts one can create value. 
This is also true in my life. Nina and I have done this with our two sons—
Max and Luc. These precious little boys make me want to be a better 
person, father, and scholar, although with various degrees of success. If 




 The Value and Values of Diplomacy 
 What is the value of diplomacy? How does it affect the course of for-
eign affairs independent of the distribution of power and foreign policy 
interests? Despite the centrality of diplomacy to international affairs, lit-
tle is known about how it works. The notion that diplomacy matters 
probably strikes most as intuitively obvious, yet most accounts of diplo-
macy are personalistic accounts of the triumphs of particular state repre-
sentatives, with little effort made to disentangle the effects of their actions 
from the broader environment or to offer a general theory about the ori-
gins of their choices (Sharp 2009: 1–2; Sartori 2005). 
 Diplomacy is given little attention in international relations scholar-
ship because of the structural bias of the discipline. Diplomacy is a pro-
cess that individuals engage in. A theory of diplomacy must be a theory 
of agency (Cross 2007). If its successes or failures are merely a function of 
the larger geopolitical environment, then diplomacy per se is essentially 
unworthy of study. If power is the only currency in international politics, 
a focus on diplomacy adds little value to our understanding of interna-
tional affairs. 
 International relations theorists are not good at theorizing about 
agency. Books and articles on international relations tell us more about 
what states cannot do or must do than what they can do or choose to do. 
By reducing important outcomes to structural features beyond agents’ 
control, such as the ability to send costly signals, prominent traditions in 
international relations theory have long treated diplomacy implicitly or 
explicitly as automatic, unproblematic, and ultimately unimportant 
(Fearon 1994, 1995; Gartzke 1999; Schultz 2001). This raises an obvious 
question: If diplomacy lacks value, why do states spend so much time 
engaging in it? 
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 A theory of diplomacy would offer a set of propositions about how 
states go about communicating and pursuing their interests, which in 
turn affects their ability to successfully negotiate agreements. Demon-
strating that diplomacy matters in international relations requires show-
ing two things. First, diplomats must have a choice about what to do. If 
those in a position of leverage always adopt coercive bargaining, then 
diplomacy matters little. Second, decision makers’ actions must have an 
effect on outcomes independent of other factors. If the strong always get 
their way, diplomacy is not important. If states fi nd agreement merely 
because their interests are closely aligned, then diplomacy does not de-
serve the credit for pushing on an open door. 
 Decision makers choose from a variety of  diplomatic styles —coercive 
bargaining, pragmatic statecraft, and reasoned dialogue—in predictable 
ways. These different conceptions of diplomacy are found, generally im-
plicitly, in the international relations literature, but we need to identify 
those who are predisposed to using them. I argue that they are the prod-
uct of different psychological motivations revealed in decision makers’ 
ideological predispositions. 
 The particular combination of diplomatic styles used by state leaders 
gives way to interactions of a certain character, what I will call the pre-
vailing  spirit of negotiations. Parties might engage in  value claiming nego-
tiation behavior, using leverage to extract the greatest benefi ts possible. 
Alternatively, they might engage in  value creating behavior, an exchange 
of concessions and honest information in the pursuit of mutual benefi ts. 
Value creating is most likely when all parties embrace reasoned dialogue. 
A dialogue is not a monologue. Coercive bargaining not only makes 
value creating more diffi cult but also induces coercive bargaining on the 
part of those otherwise inclined toward integrative negotiation. Whereas 
value creating takes two, value claiming can be brought on by only one. 
 Most important, the spirit of negotiations has an effect on international 
outcomes independently of the distribution of power and interests. Be-
havioral research on negotiation in economics and psychology shows 
that, by holding their cards close to their vest, those engaged in value 
claiming are harder pressed to reach mutually benefi cial outcomes, even 
in situations of potential integration, in which each side can obtain what 
it values most provided it concedes on items of less importance. Value 
creating helps avoid this dynamic by revealing the existence of joint 
gains in the fi rst place. And individuals vary in their preference for dif-
ferent negotiating strategies, even given the same set of incentives. Ne-
gotiating behavior is not endogenous; negotiating outcomes are not 
epiphenomenal. 
 I fi nd the same applies to international relations. Diplomacy cannot 
bring about agreements where there is no outcome that both sides prefer 
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to the status quo. It can, however, frustrate or facilitate agreement where 
there is the potential for success based on the underlying distribution of 
preferences. Diplomacy allows states to reach outcomes that might have 
been unexpected but also to miss out on opportunities that are within 
their grasp. This is the added value of diplomacy in explaining interna-
tional events. And, as is the case in psychological experiments, individu-
als in the same strategic setting approach diplomacy differently. Their 
behavior is not reducible to their environment. 
 In this book, I demonstrate the role played by diplomacy using a hard 
case—relations among France, Germany, and Britain in the 1920s, in the 
aftermath of World War I. As is well known, the Germans deeply re-
sented the punitive peace that, in addition to requiring reparations, dis-
membered their territory, permanently demilitarized the Rhineland, 
saw the country occupied in the west by tens of thousands of foreign 
troops, and disarmed the vanquished state to the point that it could have 
been easily overrun by Poland, not to mention France. Despite the con-
dition of Germany, France was terrifi ed of an eventual  revanche by its 
more economically and demographically powerful neighbor and sought 
in the immediate postwar years to hold Germany down through every 
legal means possible in the Versailles Treaty. French fear was a “seem-
ingly insuperable obstacle” to reconciliation in the 1920s (Stambrook 
1968: 234). The French military even marched into the Ruhr area of Ger-
many in 1923, seizing its industrial assets to force Germany to pay its 
reparations. 
 Yet it was in this environment, when the European powers were, in 
Lord Curzon’s words, “relapsing . . . into the deepest slime of prewar 
treachery and intrigue,” that Germany made a remarkably successful bid 
for reconciliation with its wartime adversaries (in Jacobson 2004: 17). The 
German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, announced what he called 
a “peace offensive on a grand scale,” proposing a treaty of mutual guar-
antee in which France and Germany would each renounce the use of 
force to change their mutual border. Britain would come to the aid of ei-
ther country should it fall victim to aggression by the other. Stresemann’s 
proposal refl ected his pragmatic statecraft. He believed that Germany in 
its weakened state had to seek mutually benefi cial accommodations with 
its former adversaries. 
 His proposal found a favorable reception in Britain, whose foreign sec-
retary was similarly pragmatically inclined, and in France, led by a lib-
eral government that favored reasoned dialogue. The value creating 
negotiation that ensued yielded success in the Treaty of Locarno, signed 
and ratifi ed in October 1925. The three protagonists identifi ed an out-
come that left them all better off. Despite its total lack of military power 
or any other type of bargaining leverage, Germany was able to achieve 
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all its aims. The agreement was followed by a signifi cant alleviation in 
the occupation conditions of the Rhineland. To account for this unlikely 
success, a theory of diplomacy is necessary; this forms the bulk of the 
empirical focus of the book. 
 This case is not only theoretically hard for diplomacy; it is empirically 
important. An analysis of the 1920s corrects the often-mistaken impres-
sion that the period was simply a prelude to a second world war that 
was inevitable given the distribution of power and the outstanding 
grievances between France and Germany. In fact, the diplomacy of the 
1920s offered the possibility of a lasting peace among the European 
powers. Only the twin tidal waves of the Great Depression and the rise 
of Nazi Germany overturned this new state of affairs. As Arthur Bal-
four, the elder statesman who had served as both prime minister and 
foreign minister of Britain, states, “the Great War ended in November 
1918. The Great Peace did not begin until October 1925” (quoted in 
Grayson 1997: 35). 
 I also apply the argument to Israeli-Palestinian negotiations from the 
late 1980s to the early 2000s, focusing on the rise and fall of the peace 
process that began in Oslo, with a particular focus on the Israeli side. 
The ability of my psychological theory of diplomacy to explain the initia-
tion, consolidation, and subsequent decline of talks between the two 
sides demonstrates its relevance for a contemporary and still ongoing 
confl ict. 
 The Argument 
 Although the existing international relations scholarship does not 
offer anything close to a theory of diplomacy as agency, we do fi nd dif-
ferent conceptions of diplomacy, alternative styles that policymakers 
might use to realize their interests. Rationalists highlight  coercive bargain-
ing , in which states use threats and exploit their leverage to pressure 
other states to concede. They make high demands, refuse to budge to 
demonstrate their credibility, and hold issues dear to the other states hos-
tage. Diplomacy is a game of high-stakes poker in which states have no 
incentive to show their cards or believe the cheap talk of others. Realists, 
in contrast, emphasize  pragmatic statecraft . Here the far-sighted diplomat 
focuses on securing the most vital of interests, conceding on issues of less 
importance to avoid creating unnecessary confl ict with others. Good di-
plomacy is chess rather than poker. Finally, liberals highlight the possi-
bility of  reasoned dialogue , in which diplomacy is a process of argumentation 
in which state representatives aim to persuade others of their point of 
view while listening closely to their claims as well. Reason implies 
The Value and Values of Diplomacy
[5]
moderating demands to arrive at an outcome of mutual benefi t but also 
indicates the primary instrument that states use—the giving of reasons. 
This is enlightened, civilized diplomacy of a liberal variety. It is marked 
by good faith and goodwill. 
 The fi rst step in building a theory about diplomacy is to recognize that 
these different styles of diplomacy are a menu from which decision mak-
ers choose and that they very well might choose differently even in the 
same structural circumstances. This choice, of course, implies agency. 
From there, we proceed to link the adoption of these alternative styles to 
particular attributes of decision makers that lead them to prefer one style 
of diplomacy over another. To do so, I draw on the psychological litera-
ture on negotiation. Experiments show that, even in the same structural 
setting, individuals negotiate in different ways. 
 Psychologists point to the role played by two motivational goals: so-
cial motivation and epistemic motivation. These are attributes of indi-
viduals. Negotiators intrinsically have different preferences as to what 
they regard as the ideal distribution of benefi ts. Some are  prosocial , valu-
ing gains for others as well as for themselves. They are value creators 
who seek joint value for the pair. Others are  proself , simply egoistic value 
claimers who think only of themselves. Proselfs make lower offers, re-
veal less information, and hold out longer than prosocials in negotia-
tions. In terms of foreign affairs, proselfs think only of their own states, 
whereas prosocials think also of others. Those with a proself motivation 
are inclined toward coercive bargaining; prosocials are inclined toward 
reasoned dialogue. 
 Some proselfs, however, are more adaptable. Social motivations are 
based on heuristics, cognitive shortcuts with which individuals de-
velop expectations about what interactions with others will generally 
be like. Heuristics impede the objective evaluation of one’s situation at 
any particular time. Those with greater epistemic motivation demon-
strate a greater willingness to transcend these cognitive obstacles and 
develop an accurate understanding of their environment—I call them 
pragmatists. This is the diplomatic style highlighted by realists. It is 
separated from coercive bargaining by a greater level of epistemic mo-
tivation. Pragmatists use both distributive and integrative tactics, 
adapting to the particular strategic circumstances in which they fi nd 
themselves. 
 My argument therefore amounts to a behavioralization of existing in-
ternational relations traditions. The question is not, What is  the nature of 
diplomacy? Instead, it is,  Who acts like a coercive bargainer, a pragmatic 
statesman (or stateswoman), or a reasoned interlocutor? We should think 
of realism, rationalism, and liberalism not as theories that capture the 
singular essence of diplomacy but, rather, as sets of prescriptions that 
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guide the behavior of some (but not all) decision makers. Psychology 
provides a microfoundation for more macro-oriented international rela-
tions theories. 
 One negotiating style alone, however, does not determine the character 
of the interaction among states. Diplomatic styles interact to create a cer-
tain spirit of negotiation. Prosocials’ preference for value creating is driven 
by an expectation of reciprocal concessions and open exchange. It will 
prevail when both sides have the prosocial motivations that drive liberal 
diplomacy—it takes two. In the absence of this reciprocity, prosocials pun-
ish proselfs by adopting the latter’s negotiating style. Coercive bargaining 
by any one side prohibits negotiating pairs from reaching win-win out-
comes that benefi t both by inducing value claiming negotiation among 
all parties. Pragmatists adapt to their environment. They are likely to cre-
ate value with prosocials but to claim value against those proselfs with 
lower epistemic motivation who prefer coercive bargaining. 
 This spirit of negotiation, whether value creating or value claiming, in 
turn affects the outcome. Psychologists and behavioral economists 
studying negotiation have long found arguments relying on structural 
features incomplete. Outcomes in experiments do not vary simply as a 
function of the structural setting, such as the distribution of power and 
interests. Even in games of integrative potential, in which players value 
various items differently, only pairs of negotiators who both practice 
value creating are consistently able to maximize joint value. 
 I hypothesize that those whose diplomatic interactions are marked by 
value claiming are less likely to fi nd a mutually benefi cial agreement. 
This is true even in situations of potential integration, in which each side 
can obtain what it values most provided it concedes on items of less im-
portance. The agreements reached in climates of value claiming will re-
fl ect the distribution of power and leverage in the situation. 
 I fi nd that this combination of diplomatic styles affects outcomes inde-
pendently of the distribution of power and interests by comparing the 
expectations of my argument against a structural baseline. Crude bar-
gaining theories argue that diplomatic style should refl ect the bargaining 
leverage of a state, with the stronger state engaging in coercive bargain-
ing. The outcome of negotiations will refl ect the interests of the more 
powerful parties, defi ned in terms of either material infl uence or satisfac-
tion with the status quo. Value creating is more likely when parties’ inter-
ests are asymmetrical, that is when they value different issues on the 
negotiating agenda differently and can engage in trade-offs and logrolls 
in which each side gains what it values most. 
 I fi nd, instead, that states exercise agency, often  not adopting the diplo-
matic style that refl ects their structural position. Diplomatic style might 
enable states to punch above (or below) their weight. Structure is 
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important but not determinate. Depending on the combination of diplo-
matic styles, easily obtainable outcomes might go unattained while more 
unlikely successes are achieved. Even where the potential for joint gains 
is present, integrative deals are hardly guaranteed. Value creating nego-
tiation is still necessary to reveal the very possibility of such agreements. 
And even when outcomes refl ect the crude distribution of bargaining 
leverage, diplomacy is still a crucial part of the story. It is only when both 
sides embrace a coercive bargaining style that such outcomes emerge. 
 This still leaves an unanswered question: Where do the social and 
epistemic motivations underlying diplomatic style come from? And how 
can we generate expectations about who is likely to engage in which type 
of diplomacy, independent of their negotiating behavior? The difference 
between prosocials and proselfs is based on values. Those engaged in 
diplomacy can decide to reach their interests with or without regard for 
the interests of others. How states pursue value is a function of their val-
ues. Edward H. Carr (1964) famously claimed that politics are not a func-
tion of ethics, but ethics of politics. He was wrong. A theory of the value 
of diplomacy requires a theory of the values in diplomacy. 
 A prosocial motivation in international affairs refl ects a particular set 
of “moral foundations” (Graham et al. 2011). Prosocials care for others, 
and they value fairness and equality in outcomes. They have a greater 
commitment to self-transcendence values than proselfs do (Schwartz 
1992). This is liberal morality, based on Enlightenment thinking, which 
judges ethical behavior on how one treats other individuals regardless of 
what group they are in. A proself motivation in foreign affairs refl ects a 
different set of moral foundations, those of respect for authority and loy-
alty to the in-group. Proselfs are convinced that in-groups must demon-
strate solidarity and preserve order to protect the group from dangers 
both within and without. Conservation values of conformity and tradi-
tion help maintain cohesion and stability within the group. We must be 
careful to avoid a false dichotomy between ethical prosocials and Ma-
chiavellian proselfs. The behavior of the latter is also morally driven, just 
by different sets of considerations. 
 Social motivations and moral foundations are revealed in political ide-
ology. The policy positions of the left and right emerge naturally from the 
particular set of values they embody and represent in politics. The left 
typically emphasizes self-transcendence values based on the moral foun-
dations of providing and caring for others. Leftists believe in the equal 
worth of all individuals. The right, in contrast, values the community 
more highly and sees the need for strong authority structures, whether 
law and order at the state level or traditional values at home, to control 
bad behavior and protect the group from instability, diversity, and 
change. Armed with these insights, political ideology presents a way of 
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measuring social motivation independent of diplomatic behavior. We ex-
pect that those on the left will generally prefer reasoned dialogue, 
whereas those on the far right will use coercive bargaining. 
 Individuals also vary systematically in their degree of epistemic moti-
vation, a cognitive rather than an ethical difference. Those without epis-
temic motivation exhibit a need for closure. They are less open to new 
information and more disinclined to question their beliefs. Although 
those who are ideologically extreme have a propensity toward closed-
mindedness, studies consistently show that the right demonstrates a 
lower degree of epistemic motivation than the left. For this reason, varia-
tion in epistemic motivation is a particularly strong cleavage among con-
servatives. Pragmatic statecraft should fi nd its support primarily in the 
center right, where the proself motivation is present but where epistemic 
motivation is somewhat higher, thereby facilitating pragmatic adapta-
tion to different circumstances based on a more objective perception of 
the environment. 
 The Cases 
 I present two cases. First, I show how my argument explains the pat-
tern of diplomatic relations in 1920s Europe. Bilateral efforts to provide 
France the security it so desperately desired failed twice. In 1922, al-
though there was a deal that both Britain and France preferred to no 
agreement, under which Britain would have issued a security guarantee 
to defend France against German aggression, it fell through due to dis-
tributive bargaining and coercive diplomacy on both sides. This value 
claiming was not a function of the structural circumstances but, rather, 
the product of choices about how to negotiate that were consistent with 
the conservative ideological predispositions of both governments. Brit-
ain, although it valued a security guarantee in its own right, decided to 
try to use its bargaining leverage to extract greater gains on other issues 
from France as a condition for negotiating. And even the much weaker 
France made high demands, refused concessions, played hard to get, and 
denigrated the British offer. This diplomatic style was unsuited to the 
circumstances, given France’s lack of bargaining leverage. 
 Then, after both conservative governments were replaced by those 
with leftist ideological orientations, the liberal diplomatic style of both 
produced value creating negotiation and a tentative agreement on a win-
win outcome called the Geneva Protocol, even though the foreign policy 
goals of the two countries were now actually further apart. Open, infor-
mative, and honest negotiations between two prosocial governments 
yielded a win-win outcome in the form of the Geneva Protocol, in which 
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the Labour government of Britain acquiesced to an extension of the sanc-
tions of the League of Nations that the French government desired in 
exchange for the convocation of a disarmament conference and the insti-
tution of compulsory universal arbitration for all disputes among parties 
to the protocol. The agreement, however, was killed off by the British 
Tories when they returned to power because they had a different set of 
foreign policy goals. 
 It was Germany, despite a complete lack of bargaining leverage, that 
transformed the security situation in Europe. Under the center-right for-
eign minister, Gustav Stresemann, the Germans proposed a treaty of mu-
tual guarantee in which both France and German would renounce the 
use of force along their mutual border, with Britain brought in to guaran-
tee the security of either state in case it became the victim of aggression 
by the other. This was a realist strategy resting on the instrumental con-
sideration of French interests and the pragmatic use of short-term con-
cessions to secure vital interests in the longer term. Stresemann sought to 
gain the trust of France to facilitate an early evacuation of the Rhineland 
and, eventually, border revisions in the east. This effort at conciliation, 
however, cannot be reduced simply to the German structural position of 
weakness. Stresemann’s proposals were opposed by his coalition part-
ners on the far right. These conservatives shared the foreign minister’s 
goals but not his diplomatic style. 
 Whereas the French right denigrated the value of the offer, the leftist 
coalition government in France was willing to engage in an open ex-
change of ideas, given its diplomatic style of reasoned dialogue. Al-
though the left shared the foreign policy goals of the right and still 
feared and distrusted Germany, it nevertheless pursued liberal diplo-
macy. The center-right British foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain, fi t 
Stresemann’s program into his own realist strategy of drawing a reha-
bilitated Germany into a new concert of Europe, returning the country 
to great power status safely. He took the far-sighted view that reconcil-
ing France and Germany was in British interests because Britain would 
inevitably be drawn into any renewed confl ict between the historical 
adversaries. Consequently, he was prepared to pay the short-term price 
of guaranteeing the security pact. Chamberlain prevailed over more 
conservative critics in his cabinet, who, although sharing the goal of 
dampening tensions between France and Germany, favored a different 
diplomatic style. They again wanted to extract a greater price from 
France for the British offer of security. Under the foreign secretary’s 
leadership, Britain set out to broker a deal between the two sides by 
convincing them to practice pragmatic statecraft vis-à-vis one another 
rather than the coercive bargaining that had marked their bilateral rela-
tions in recent years. 
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 Stresemann’s unlikely gambit paid dividends. The Treaty of Locarno 
was drafted at a conference marked by a spirit of value creating negotia-
tion between realists and liberals in which good faith and goodwill pre-
vailed. The security treaty was quickly followed by a package of 
alleviations to the Rhineland occupation that created the impression of a 
simple quid pro quo integrative deal of the kind that rationalists might 
expect based simply on the structure of interests. But Britain and France 
were prepared to offer such concessions only as a reward for the new 
pragmatic diplomacy of Germany. Indeed, had Germany proposed such 
an exchange at the beginning of its peace offensive, as Stresemann’s far-
right colleagues had wanted, it would have undermined the foreign min-
ister’s reassurance strategy by confi rming French and British biases 
about the bottomless German appetite. Only careful pragmatic statecraft 
by Germany had made success possible. 
 The French leftist coalition tried to consolidate this new “spirit of Lo-
carno,” but the value creating that had prevailed previously among the 
three countries was undermined when the conservatives under Ray-
mond Poincaré returned to power in France. Although the occupation 
was of declining importance to the French and there was a win-win out-
come available in which France would offer early evacuation in ex-
change for a renegotiated reparations settlement, the conservatives used 
the occupation coercively to extract greater concessions from Germany. 
The coercive French diplomatic style induced value claiming by others. 
Stresemann, the pragmatist, adapted to the new situation and took a 
similarly confrontational line, demanding an immediate and unilateral 
end to the Rhineland occupation. When the parties convened at a confer-
ence on reparations and the occupation at The Hague, only the British 
threat to unilaterally withdraw their forces from the Rhineland induced 
the French to seriously negotiate an early end to the occupation. After an 
extended period of brinksmanship during which a breakdown of nego-
tiations was a strong possibility, the two sides fi nally settled on an out-
come weighted toward the more powerful French. The last chance of the 
European powers to consolidate the peace before the onslaught of the 
Great Depression and the rise of fascism in Germany was over. 
 In chapters 8 and 9, I extend my analysis to the peace process between 
Palestinians and Israelis, which demonstrates remarkable parallels to 
1920s Europe. Pragmatists on the weaker side, in this case, the Palestin-
ians, made efforts at rapprochement toward the stronger side, the Israe-
lis, by renouncing claims to territory in the hopes of ending a military 
occupation. Pragmatic leaders in an interested third party, the George 
H. W. Bush administration in the United States, tried to play the role of 
honest broker, despite their greater historical ties with the stronger 
party. Nevertheless, true progress was made only when the pragmatic 
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Palestinians teamed up with the prosocial Israeli Labor government. The 
combination of diplomatic styles generated a value creating dynamic 
that fostered the two Oslo accords. Much as the return of coercive bar-
gaining on the stronger French side contributed to undermining the 
spirit of Locarno, the return of the Likud Party to power in Israel changed 
the character of negotiating to value claiming. Benjamin Netanyahu’s 
successor on the left, however, Ehud Barak, also failed to commit fully to 
a liberal diplomacy of dialogue, creating suspicions on the Palestinian 
side that impeded, alongside Yasser Arafat’s intransigence and Palestin-
ian mismanagement, a peace deal at Camp David. 
 Overall, the two cases show that diplomacy adds value to accounts of 
international relations. Diplomacy can both make agreements that 
should be easier to reach more diffi cult and make agreements that should 
be hard to achieve more attainable. The Locarno period is particularly 
well suited for analyzing the effects of diplomacy because it presents a 
hard case for value creating, given the distrust and discord that had char-
acterized prior relations among France, Britain, and Germany. The same 
is true of the Palestinian-Israeli case (chapter 8). I address the diffi cult 
methodological problems faced by those who study diplomacy in the 
next chapter. 
 Defi ning Diplomacy 
 In the remainder of this chapter, I review the academic literature on 
diplomacy. First, however, we need a working defi nition of  diplomacy . 
This is a different question from how diplomacy works. All defi nitions 
of  diplomacy use some combination of two primary components: (1) that 
diplomacy involves communication between states through the collec-
tion, interpretation, and dissemination of information about the inter-
ests of a state and of others (Bull 1977: 158; Watson 1981: 20) and (2) that 
diplomacy involves peaceful confl ict resolution through negotiation 
when interests diverge or do not wholly overlap (Watson 1981: 33; Sharp 
2009: 1). 
 Even though diplomacy involves the peaceful resolution of confl icts, 
this does not require the absence of the implicit or explicit threat of coer-
cion or even force. Hedley Bull writes that the goal of diplomacy is to 
“secure [other states’] cooperation or neutralize their opposition in carry-
ing it out—by reason and persuasion if possible, but sometimes by 
threats of force or other kinds of coercion” (1977: 158). Nor need the ex-
change of information be completely genuine and based on good faith. 
Yet this does not obviate the need for communication in diplomacy. In 
describing Niccolò Machiavelli’s views on diplomacy, Geoffrey Berridge 
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writes of the diplomat: “Much of the information that he obtains will be 
false and misleading, but he owes his own prince his judgment. As a re-
sult, he must compare information from different sources, weigh it, and 
fi nally declare what he himself believes to be the truth” (2001: 89). 
 Going forward it is important to distinguish foreign policy from diplo-
macy. Diplomacy is a part of foreign policy but not identical to it (Nicol-
son 1980: chap. 1). It is important to distinguish foreign policy  interests , 
the specifi c ends that states pursue, from the way they peacefully pursue 
them through communication and negotiation, which is diplomacy. Style 
is not substance, and we want to distinguish the independent effect of 
the former, looking for variation in diplomatic style among those who 
share the same conception of the national interest. Diplomatic style is 
also motivated by something more than hawkish or dovish  beliefs , which 
refl ect different attitudes about the nature of the adversary and the utility 
of military force (Jervis 1976; Tetlock 1983b). While doves might prefer a 
diplomatic style of reasoned dialogue, if diplomacy simply reduces op-
position to the use of organized violence or a benign depiction of one’s 
interlocutors, it does not add much to our understanding of international 
politics. 
 It seems uncontroversial, therefore, to adopt a defi nition of  diplomacy 
as the nonviolent and negotiated pursuit of state interests through the 
communication and exchange of information, even if the threat of coer-
cion, either economic or military, might be present or part of the pro-
cess and if the dialogue might be less than genuine (Steiner 2004: 3; de 
Callières 2000: 6–7). Nevertheless, within this broad notion of diplo-
macy, there is still room for several different types of diplomacy. In a 
review of the limited international relations literature on diplomacy, 
we fi nd three: coercive bargaining, pragmatic statecraft, and reasoned 
dialogue. 
 Three Diplomatic Styles 
 Those who have engaged the subject of diplomacy have attributed our 
ignorance to the role played by power in international relations theory. 
In this vein, James Der Derian writes, “It could well be that diplomacy 
has suffered from theoretical neglect to the extent that power politics has 
profi ted in theory and practice. When diplomacy is construed as a con-
tinuation of war by other means, as is often the realpolitik case, then little 
intellectual energy needs to be wasted on the illumination of power’s 
shadow” (1987: 92). 
 If power is the only currency in international politics, diplomacy per 
se does not matter. The successes and failures of diplomats are reducible 
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to the distribution of material capabilities. Long before the advent of 
structural realism, François de Callières, in one of the classic works on 
diplomatic practice, explained this conception: “When a prince or a state 
is powerful enough to dictate to his neighbours the art of negotiation 
loses its value, for then there is need for nothing but a mere statement of 
the prince’s will” (2000: 83). Diplomacy is epiphenomenal to power and 
serves as a post hoc window dressing, the “silken glove over the iron 
fi st” (Sharp 2009: 58). Adam Watson describes this logic as the “cynical 
claim that the capacity and the will to use force is what ‘really’ infl u-
ences the relations of states, while diplomacy serves as its instrument 
registering and clothing its verdicts” (1981: 55). Diplomats are substitut-
able and mere “transmission belts” for forces larger than themselves 
(Cross 2007: 2). 
 Recent international relations scholarship takes up diplomacy only to 
dismiss it implicitly or even explicitly. Rationalist bargaining theory ar-
gues that diplomatic communication is often uninformative and cheap 
since states have incentives to misrepresent their preferences. James 
Fearon writes that because of incentives to dissemble, “diplomacy may 
not allow rational states to clarify disagreements about relative power or 
to avoid the miscalculation of resolve” necessary to maintain peace (1995: 
391). Signals must be costly to be believed, but this is something out of 
the control of diplomats or any decision makers. If, as some rationalists 
argue, effective diplomacy is equivalent to credible signaling and if, for 
instance, democratic states have an advantage in doing so given their 
transparent political institutions, those who are engaging in diplomacy 
are just as unimportant to the outcome as in neorealism. Anyone who 
can operate a telegraph could send a costly signal in a democracy, yet the 
most skilled diplomat would still be a useless bloviator in an autocracy. 
If domestic institutions do the work, then agency is unimportant. They 
are simply another type of structure. 
 I would also not consider recent rationalist work on “cheap talk” di-
plomacy to capture diplomacy as agency. The attempts by Sartori (2005) 
and Trager (2010) to demonstrate the effect of costless signals also implic-
itly rely on costs. Communication not accompanied by a direct and im-
mediate cost might have an effect on outcomes, but only if it carries with 
it the possibility of a future cost for the sender, such as the interruption of 
other aspects of a mutually benefi cial relationship or the undermining of 
a state’s reputation for honesty. Sartori writes: “A cheap talk signal may 
have eventual negative consequences, but the message itself is costless to 
send” (2005: 10). As Trager points out, Sartori’s model is only based on 
cheap talk in a semantic sense. The game theory literature counts as 
cheap talk any signal that does not incur costs directly and immediately 
upon its transmission. Sartori can claim cheap talk status only through a 
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technicality (Trager 2010: 349). Yet the same could be said of Trager’s 
model, in which threats become credible only because they put at risk 
existing mutually benefi cial relationships. 
 Paul Sharp captures the essence of a crude neorealist position, but it 
could apply just as easily to rationalism, which is also a structural 
approach. 
 Someone has to gather and disseminate information. Someone has to com-
municate threats, promises and bargaining positions. And, less certainly, 
someone has to perform the tasks associated with the more concrete as-
pects of representation such as negotiation. These functions occur auto-
matically, however, and we lump them together as “diplomacy” for 
convenience. That term does not convey any sense that these functions, 
taken together, make an independent contribution to what happens, or ex-
plaining what happens, in international relations at the system level. . . . If 
diplomacy matters in systemic theories, therefore, it does so only occasion-
ally as one of those contingent factors  about which it is neither possible nor 
necessary to theorize. (2009: 54–55; emphasis added) 
 I argue instead that it is both possible and necessary to theorize about 
diplomacy. This is not easy. Diplomacy is shrouded in mystery (Sharp 
2009: 2). It is frequently referred to as an “art,” even a “black art” because 
it can be used for both good and evil purposes (Neumann 2003: 353; Mor-
genthau 1948: 15; Cross 2007: 1). Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu, Vincent 
Pouliot (2008; 2010) conceives of diplomacy as the most important “prac-
tice” of international relations. In his view, however, practices are intui-
tive feels for the situation that cannot be explained by those engaged in 
them, a common sense that cannot be articulated. He writes that “sea-
soned diplomats are at pains to explain their craft in abstract, social sci-
entifi c terms” (Pouliot 2008: 258). 
 Diplomacy is undoubtedly an art in the sense that it a creative process 
of agency in which its practitioners make something new that did not 
previously exist. Even so, we might still say something systematic about 
it. Even as we struggle to explain how particular artists arrive at their 
specifi c results, we can at the very least identify certain common schools 
of painting and music. Next, I explore three such styles. 
 Diplomacy as Coercive Bargaining 
 Even though most contemporary rationalist literature on coercive bar-
gaining minimizes the role of agency, insights of great use can be recov-
ered from the fi rst generation of thinking in this vein. Thomas Schelling 
offers a particular conception of diplomacy, one marked by exploiting 
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leverage. “The power to hurt is bargaining power. To exploit it is 
 diplomacy—vicious diplomacy, but diplomacy,” writes Schelling (1966: 2). 
 This might include holding issues hostage that are of importance to oth-
ers as bargaining chips so as to obtain benefi ts for oneself, even if conced-
ing those issues would be of little cost. Harold Nicolson describes 
coercive bargaining thus: “Fundamental to such a conception of diplo-
macy is the belief that the purpose of negotiation is victory, and that the 
denial of complete victory means defeat. . . . The strategy of negotiation 
thus becomes an endeavor to outfl ank your opponents, to occupy strate-
gical positions which are at once consolidated before any further ad-
vance is made” (1980: 53). 
 The coercive bargaining approach is premised on a particular framing 
of the international environment, that of the deterrence model. As Robert 
Jervis (1976) and Philip Tetlock (1983b) have long pointed out, in this 
particular characterization of state interaction, the adversary is seen as 
implacably hostile. The environment is zero-sum and fi xed-pie in nature. 
Therefore, any efforts to reassure or cooperate will be taken as a sign of 
weakness and exploited. This differs from the spiral model, in which 
confl ict is seen as a product of the strategic situation rather than the inher-
ent disposition of the other side. In the former, international relations is a 
game of chicken; in the latter, it is a prisoner’s dilemma. Coercive bar-
gaining theorists are not concerned about spirals of hostility as unin-
tended consequences of state behavior because the malign intentions of 
the other are taken for granted (Jervis 1989: 192). 
 This framing leads to a particular set of prescriptions. States should 
start from the premise that others are misrepresenting their preferences 
and not reveal their own. A state should understate how interested it is 
in an agreement, infl ate its reservation price, and engage in brinksman-
ship to obtain the best possible outcome. Refusing concessions and hold-
ing out demonstrate resolve. It is best if others make concessions fi rst to 
avoid commitment problems with later compliance and to be able to 
pocket concessions made by others and to ask for more without spend-
ing any capital. 
 The challenge posed by diplomacy in coercive bargaining is making 
the other believe in one’s resolve: “The hardest part is communicating 
our own intentions. . . . Nations have been known to bluff; they have also 
been known to make threats sincerely and change their minds when the 
chips were down. . . . A persuasive threat of war may deter an aggressor; 
the problem is to make it persuasive, to keep it from sounding like a 
bluff” (Schelling 1966: 35). Schelling’s early hypothesis was that, by esca-
lating crises and risking or even fi ghting wars over issues of little impor-
tance, states would indicate that they were highly resolute in future 
confl icts of more signifi cance. 
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 Coercive bargaining is not as simple as a crude neorealist argument in 
which the powerful state generally wins. In terms of card games, diplo-
macy is poker, not war. Schelling stresses the “difference between the 
unilateral, ‘undiplomatic’ recourse to strength” that we could say charac-
terizes neorealism and “coercive diplomacy based on the power to hurt.” 
“International relations often have the character of a competition in risk 
taking, characterized not so much by tests of force as by tests of nerve,” 
he writes. “Particularly in the relations between major adversaries . . . 
issues are decided not by who can bring the most force to bear in a local-
ity, or on a particular issue, but by who is eventually willing to bring 
more force to bear or able to make it appear that more is forthcoming” 
(Schelling 1966: 94). 
 Any observer of international relations is familiar with the types 
 of behaviors that Schelling describes—saber-rattling and threatening 
 messages—and the use of leverage to achieve more favorable outcomes. 
But I argue that coercive bargaining is just this—one style that does not 
describe all diplomacy or even the behavior of all diplomats in the posi-
tion of being able to exploit their leverage. In other words, I seek to be-
havioralize Schelling’s insights, specifying more precisely who will 
engage in this type of behavior. As Erik Gartzke notes, “Winning at poker 
has as much to do with judging human personalities as it does with 
weighing the cards” (1999: 570). Schelling’s intention, after all, was not to 
describe how diplomacy actually worked but to admonish state repre-
sentatives to practice better diplomacy (Jervis 1989: 188). 
 Diplomacy as Pragmatic Statecraft 
 As previously noted, numerous students of diplomacy have attributed 
the dearth of knowledge about diplomacy to the dominance of realist 
thinking in the discipline (de Callières 2000: 83; Sharp 2009: 58; Watson 
1981: 55). Classical realists, however, place signifi cant importance on 
diplomacy, even as they articulate a particular notion of what good 
diplomacy entails (Berridge 2001). Hans Morgenthau offers the most 
compelling realist conception of good diplomacy as prudent statecraft, 
going so far as to offer several “rules of diplomacy” (1948: esp. chap. 31). 1 
Above all, realist diplomacy is pragmatic in nature, which has a number 
of elements. 
 First, the practitioner of pragmatic statecraft focuses on securing vital 
interests while conceding others. Having identifi ed the truly important 
state goals, Morgenthau cautions states to “promote the national interest 
 1. This is the same conception of diplomacy reviewed in Craig and George (1983: 11–16). 
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with moderation and leave the door open for compromise in the form of 
a negotiated settlement” (1948: 534). The distinctiveness of the pragmatic 
approach to diplomacy is most evident when it is compared with 
Schelling’s coercive style. In pronounced contrast to Morgenthau, 
Schelling stresses the “interdependence of commitments” (1966) and ad-
vises states to take a hard and uncompromising line on matters of less 
importance so as to gain a reputation for resolve in matters of greater 
signifi cance down the line. Being pragmatic, in contrast, involves setting 
priorities. Good statecraft is good chess-playing; one sometimes sacri-
fi ces pawns to protect the king. 
 Second, pragmatic statecraft is oriented toward the long term. The 
skilled chess player is able to see several moves ahead. Morgenthau de-
scribes “the mind of the diplomat” as “complicated and subtle. It sees the 
issue in hand as a moment in history, and beyond the victory of tomor-
row it anticipates the incalculable possibilities of the future” (1948: 547). 
The realist should keep his or her eye on the prize, pragmatically making 
short-term sacrifi ces for long-term gains. 
 Third, pragmatic statecraft emphasizes the importance of cold and ob-
jective decision making. Diplomacy is “sang-froid,” sober and emotional 
detachment that facilitates long-term thinking and the careful ranking of 
priorities (de Callières 2000: 12). The primary impediment to good diplo-
macy is what Morgenthau calls the “crusading spirit”—missionary zeal 
that distracts from the real national interest and needlessly infl ates fear 
of the adversary (1948: 544). Moralizing distracts from the national inter-
est. Morgenthau asks those engaged in diplomacy to “give up the shadow 
of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage” (1948: 545; see 
also de Callières 2000: 25, 94). The realist is not afraid to admit hard 
truths, even if they are emotionally costly. 
 Objectivity is also paramount in evaluating the intentions and power 
of others, a primary function of diplomacy. States want to avoid both 
understating and overstating the actual dangers in the international envi-
ronment. Objectively evaluating the interests of other states requires see-
ing the world through their eyes. One of Morgenthau’s rules is that 
“diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of 
other nations” (1948: 553). Classical realist statecraft involves instrumen-
tal empathy. Truly understanding where others are coming from allows 
for more prudent decision making. This includes understanding that oth-
ers might regard oneself as threatening. Ken Booth and Nicolas Wheeler 
(2008) call this “security dilemma sensibility.” Without it, one risks un-
necessary provocation not in the interests of the state (Jervis 1989: 193). 
 Fourth, pragmatic statecraft is situational, adapting to the particular 
environment and using the appropriate tools for the time. Morgenthau 
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describes diplomacy as “quick adaptation to new situations, clever use 
of a psychological opening, retreat and advance as the situation may re-
quire, persuasion, the quid pro quo of bargaining and the like” (1948: 
530). Coercion and force are not necessarily the most cost-effective way 
of reaching one’s goals. Morgenthau recommends “not to advance by 
destroying the obstacles in one’s way, but to retreat before them, to cir-
cumvent them, to maneuver around them, to soften and dissolve them 
slowly by means of persuasion, negotiation and pressure” (1948: 546; see 
also de Callières 2000: 12). There is certainly a place for force and coercive 
bargaining, but there is no one-size-fi t-all strategy. 
 As is clear by the prescriptive nature of so many of the passages quoted 
here, classical realists understand diplomacy as an agent-driven process in 
a way that rationalists often do not. For Morgenthau, good diplomacy is not 
something that occurs automatically or unproblematically. Statecraft is a 
craft (de Callières 2000: 69; Morgenthau 1948: 549; Sharp 2009: 55). Ap-
plied appropriately, diplomacy serves as a source of additional power for 
the state to reach its goals, independent of the threat of force. If used cor-
rectly, diplomacy is a “multiplier” that helps states punch above their 
weight (Morgenthau 1948: 591; de Callières 2000: 11; Sharp 2009: 64). On 
the other hand, when wielded ineffectively, states might squander their 
power by overstating national goals or creating encircling alliances 
(Jönnson and Hall 2005: 15). Power does not speak for itself. But classical 
realism, although it takes diplomacy seriously, does not yet offer any-
thing like a theory of diplomacy that identifi es who is likely to behave in 
this pragmatic fashion. It has not been behavioralized. 
 Diplomacy as Reasoned Dialogue 
 Both coercive bargaining and pragmatic statecraft stand in contrast to 
what I call  liberal diplomacy , by which I mean a conception of diplomacy 
that one can tease out of a diverse set of literatures, including the Grotian 
tradition of the English School and certain recent strands of constructiv-
ism. Liberal diplomacy is the pursuit of joint gains through the exchange 
of information and arguments. It is reasoned dialogue. Liberalism as a 
system of thought is predicated on the noncoercive pursuit of one’s inter-
ests that respects the other’s autonomy and interests. Individuals are re-
garded as fundamentally equal, with none superior to the other (Dworkin 
1977). Reasoned dialogue is not like a card game but rather like solving a 
puzzle, trying to fi nd an outcome that leaves both sides as satisfi ed as 
possible. 
 Liberal diplomacy proceeds in good faith and with goodwill. In terms 
of the former, those in the Grotian tradition prefer the term  dialogue rather 
than  bargaining (Watson 1981). The latter term implies, of course, a more 
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coercive process than do other terms, such as  negotiation . As opposed to 
the Middle Eastern bazaar with buyer and seller far apart, shouting and 
disinclined to budge, the English School sees diplomacy as a “civilized” 
process of patient discussion. In diplomacy, states “transform crude bar-
gaining about objects of interest and desire into discussions about the 
moral and rational bases for particular claims and policies” and “make 
those whose claims and policies are said to be inconsistent with any no-
tion of restraint into shared problems” (Sharp 2009: 42). 
 Liberal diplomacy overlaps considerably with Jürgen Habermas’s 
conception of communicative action, which has been used by some con-
structivist international relations scholars to capture how the process of 
argumentation might lead to a reasoned consensus (Müller 2004; Lynch 
2002; Risse 2000; Mitzen 2005). Diplomacy in this conception is a process 
of talk and persuasion rather than threats. Reason entails remaining open 
to and objectively evaluating new arguments, as well as offering one’s 
own in an effort to persuade the other side. It means giving reasons for 
one’s positions. If reason is to be relevant to international relations, dip-
lomats, like any other actors, must be prepared to change their views in 
the face of a good argument. Habermas conceives of communicative ac-
tion as an ideal type rather than an actual description of politics, much 
less international politics. Nevertheless, we can easily conceive of em-
pirical instances in which this type of diplomacy is more prevalent than 
others. 
 Liberal diplomacy also rests on goodwill. It is motivated by the desire 
to fi nd value for both sides. In the liberal mindset, one does not regard 
the other purely instrumentally, as a means to an end (Doyle 1997: 217). 
Hedley Bull writes, “The extent to which diplomacy can play any role or 
serve any function in the international system is therefore bound up with 
the extent to which states visualize foreign policy as the rational pursuit 
of interests of the state which at least in principle at some points overlap 
with the interests of other states. Diplomacy can play no role where for-
eign policy is conceived as . . . the pursuit of self-regarding interests that 
take no account of the interests of others” (1977: 164). Diplomacy is more 
than “simply the determined assertion of the national will” (Neumann 
2003: 353). 
 Liberal diplomacy is based on a sense of both equality and empathy. 
One must recognize that others have interests as well. The essence of 
being reasonable is to take the interests of others into consideration. Alan 
Gewirth writes, “A reasonable person is one who takes due account of 
the interests of other persons, respecting their rights as well as one’s own 
and maintaining a certain equitableness or mutuality of consideration 
between oneself and others” (1983: 225). Similarly, communicative action 
requires the ability to see things through the eyes of others (Risse 2001). 
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Marc Lynch writes, “strategic action is defi ned by the orientation to-
wards achieving predefi ned egoistic ends, treating the other as an object 
to be manipulated, while communicative action is characterized by the 
orientation towards achieving understanding, treating the other as an 
equal participant” (2002: 192). In this ideal speech situation, in which 
reasoned dialogue can prevail, Nicole Dietelhoff and Harald Müller ex-
plain, “Discourses need to guarantee that asymmetric power resources 
of participants do not infl uence the discursive interplay: only converging 
perceptions and viewpoints of the participants lead to a rational consen-
sus. Everyone affected must be able to take part and should have an 
equal opportunity to speak and to listen to others. These criteria under-
line the necessity that actors empathise with each other; they are required 
to . . . emancipate themselves from the egocentricity of their preferences 
so they are able to refl ect about them as one among alternative sets of 
preferences” (2005: 169). 
 This is not, however, pure altruism or the suppression of one’s own 
interests. Liberal diplomacy involves the pursuit of fair compromises 
and win-win outcomes through creative problem solving. John Owen 
writes, “Liberals have transformed, rather than transcended, selfi sh-
ness” (1997: 35). Francis Watson writes, “It is a function of the diplomatic 
dialogue to mitigate and civilize the differences between states and if 
possible to reconcile them, without suppressing or ignoring them” (1981: 
20). Sharp writes of “dampening passions and moderating egos by re-
ducing ignorance and elevating reason” and “the resolution of confl icts 
by procedures that encourage fair compromise” (2009: 39). Liberals are 
not teleological utopians who believe in the natural harmony of interests 
(Doyle 1997: 211; Zacher and Matthew 1995: 110; Keohane 1989: 11); how-
ever, unlike in realism, others are not regarded as pure means to egoistic 
ends. Nicolson writes of this style, “There is probably some middle point 
between the two negotiators which, if discovered, should reconcile their 
confl ict interests. And to fi nd this middle point all that is required is a 
frank discussion, the placing of cards upon the table, and the usual pro-
cesses of human reason, confi dence and fair-dealing” (1980: 54). 
 Coercive bargaining stands in clear contrast to liberal dialogue in that 
the former is a process of information gathering rather than information 
sharing through argumentation or deliberation. There is neither good 
faith nor goodwill. Indeed, the foundation of the rationalist bargaining 
approach is that information cannot be shared credibly unless it is backed 
by a costly signal. In coercive bargaining, actors start from the assump-
tion that others are not negotiating in good faith. “Actors know each 
other as  strategists , and they must thus fear that apparently innocent and 
useful information is untrue” (Müller 2004: 398). And the goal is to seize 
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as much of the pie as possible by infl ating one’s demands and using pres-
sure to secure an individually benefi cial outcome. 
 Liberal diplomacy potentially allows state representatives to reach 
mutually benefi cial outcomes through communication. “Relative power 
may play a role in determining whether or not state leaders decide to try 
to cooperate, but persuasion is, to a signifi cant extent, out of the grasp of 
power. The ability to persuade is in the hands of the diplomats,” writes 
Mai’a Cross (2007: 4). Yet liberal scholars have not articulated a theory of 
diplomacy. Grotians are more taken with broader historical trends in the 
practice of diplomacy. For their part, Habermasian constructivists have 
been content so far simply to conceptualize a kind of diplomacy distinc-
tive from coercive bargaining without specifying when and by whom it 
is likely to be adopted (Reus-Smit 1999: 28). Again, the solution offered in 
this book is to behavioralize the insights of liberal international relations 
scholars, identifying those diplomats who are more inclined to engage in 
the kind of reasoned dialogue they highlight. Liberal diplomacy should 
be facilitated by egalitarian-mindedness and genuine empathy, a proso-
cial stance toward international relations. In the next chapter, I begin this 
task of converting the insights of international relations theory into a 




 Creating Value 
 A Psychological Theory of Diplomacy 
 Although diplomacy is arguably the most prevalent activity in inter-
state relations, rigorous theoretical and careful empirical work on diplo-
macy in international relations is extremely sparse (Der Derian 1987: 91; 
Sharp 2009: 1–2). Those few scholars who have explicitly engaged the 
subject complain that “IR [international relations] theory . . . has yet to 
give a theoretical account of what diplomacy is” (Jönnson and Hall 2005: 
24). James Der Derian notes that “diplomacy has been particularly resis-
tant to theory”; he cannot fi nd “a substantial theoretical work on the sub-
ject in the contemporary literature of international relations” (1987: 91). 1 
There is considerable research in recent years on diplomacy as a practice 
(Adler-Nissen 2014; Pouliot 2010; Neumann 2012; Sending 2011; Reus-
Smit 1999). Yet the aim of this work is not to specify a theory of when 
diplomacy matters independently of other factors and how to establish 
that empirically. 2 
 In this chapter, I build a theory of diplomacy, looking for guidance in 
three psychological literatures—on negotiation, political ideology, and 
moral values. The sections in this chapter link together disparate fi nd-
ings in these fi elds to develop a theory of diplomacy as agency. Like 
1. Perhaps the most prolifi c student of the process, Paul Sharp admits that “what diplomacy 
is remains a mystery. . . . What we know about diplomacy has typically come from former 
diplomats themselves or from historians who document but do not explain its precise 
mechanisms” (2009: 1–2).
 2 . Those working in this vein generally understand diplomacy as a macro-level institution of 
international society, rather than a micro-level process in which individuals seek interests for 
their state. The two are not incompatible but operate at different levels of analysis with a 
different degree of historical sweep. 
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diplomats themselves sometimes do, I hope to create value through the 
combination of these different strands of research. 
 I fi rst review the literature on negotiation, laying out the difference 
between value claiming and value creating. Formal rationalist work at-
tributes negotiation behavior and outcomes to features of the structural 
situation, such as the distribution of power and interests. This vein of 
research, however, has diffi cult explaining how negotiators resolve the 
dilemma when they have incentives to engage in both value claiming 
and value creating, and it problematically assumes that all negotiators 
interpret the same environment identically. Studies inspired by social 
and cognitive psychology show that attributes of the negotiators matter 
in addition to structure. Particular combinations of epistemic motivation 
and social motivation lead to different negotiating styles that demon-
strate a remarkable parallel to the conceptions of diplomacy uncovered 
in chapter 1. These affect how political actors interpret their task and 
predispose negotiators toward value claiming or value creating indepen-
dent of their situation. 
 I then develop a series of hypotheses about which kind of negotiating 
will prevail when different diplomatic styles interact. Because interna-
tional relations theory does not yet offer a theory of diplomacy, the pri-
mary rival to a psychologically driven account is a purely structural 
account derived from microeconomic bargaining theory in which diplo-
macy is endogenous and epiphenomenal to situational factors. Struc-
tural theories provide a baseline from which to judge the effect of agency. 
Nevertheless, as we will see, rationalism and psychology are not mutu-
ally exclusive. Structure matters, but it is hardly the whole story. 
 Establishing the effect of diplomacy poses some thorny methodologi-
cal issues of measurement and causal inference. Diplomatic outcomes 
might be epiphenomenal to the distribution of power and interests. Dip-
lomatic style might be endogenous to those same factors. And the selec-
tion of cases might be biased in favor of fi nding an effect for diplomacy. 
In the last section, on research design, I explain how I chose the appropri-
ate cases to solve these problems as well as how I rigorously measure 
psychological motivations and diplomatic styles in a nontautological 
way. In short, social and epistemic motivations are embedded in the po-
litical ideology of actors, allowing us to measure them independently of 
behavior. We then look for variations in diplomatic style among political 
parties in the same country that share the same foreign policy interests 
and beliefs, thereby showing that diplomatic style is not endogenous. 
Particular combinations of diplomatic styles are capable of yielding suc-
cessful outcomes when others are not, even though the distribution of 
power interests is more or less constant; this shows that diplomacy is not 
epiphenomenal. And the core of the book revolves around a case in which 
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the preconditions for diplomatic success and value creating were com-
pletely absent at the beginning, mitigating the danger of selection bias. 
 Negotiating Styles: Creating or Claiming Value 
 Both the formal and the psychological literatures generally distinguish 
between types of negotiation.  Value claiming , sometimes called distributive 
or contending negotiation, is marked by noncooperative behavior—one 
side making signifi cant demands of the other side and refusing to make or 
only grudgingly making concessions. Value claiming is marked by the 
heavy use of “positional commitments,” in which parties insist on specifi c 
settlements tilted highly in their favor and threaten to walk away unless 
their demands are met. The aim is to pressure the other side into making 
concessions, coercing others into deals closer to one’s ideal point. Conces-
sions from others are derided as inadequate yet quickly pocketed without 
reciprocation. Holdouts and delays can be used to extract as much as pos-
sible from the other side. One never reveals private information about his 
or her “reservation point,” the lowest possible outcome he or she would 
be ready to accept. Indeed, value claiming revolves around trying to make 
the other side believe that point is as high as possible. All sources of lever-
age are used. One might hold an issue of value to the other (but not neces-
sarily to oneself) hostage, refusing to concede on it so as to extract 
concessions on more important issues (Odell 2000; De Dreu and Boles 
1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Pruitt 
and Lewis 1975; De Dreu and Carnevale 2003; McKibben 2014; Weingart 
et al. 2007). 
 Value creating, on the other hand, aims at a win-win outcome in which 
both sides secure their most important goals. Also called cooperative, 
integrative, or problem-solving negotiation, value creating proceeds 
through reciprocity rather than coercion. In contrast to withholding in-
formation, value creating is possible only if states honestly and openly 
reveal their preference structure. Information exchange is crucial because 
only then is the potential for a win-win deal revealed. If states do not 
have asymmetrical preferences, those engaged in value creating will act 
creatively, trying to draw in other issues through side payments that 
make a mutually benefi cial package deal. One concedes on issues of 
lesser importance, rather than holding them hostage, in exchange for 
concessions by the other side on those issues that one values more. Inte-
grative negotiation avoids the use of threats and the brinksmanship of 
value claiming negotiation. 
 Note that the integrative style does  not imply that one is “failing to 
work diligently to gain value for one’s own side” (Odell 2000: 32). Value 
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creating is no less self-interested than is value claiming (Odell 2000; De 
Dreu and Boles 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Olekalns, Smith, and 
Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; De Dreu and Carnevale 2003; McKib-
ben 2014; Weingart et al. 2007). Indeed value claiming negotiating, if it 
fails, can often result in a lower individual outcome than integrative ne-
gotiating, leaving potential gains on the table. Value creating is designed 
to “expand rather than split the pie” (Odell 2000: 21). It rests on reciproc-
ity, in which concessions and information are exchanged so that both 
sides might benefi t. 
 Perhaps the most common experimental scenario used in negotiation 
research involves two negotiators trying to reach a solution on three or 
more interconnected issues on which the pair has contrasting but also 
asymmetrical interests. In other words, each side would prefer to prevail 
on all the questions at hand, but the matter of most importance to each is 
different. For instance, participants in an experiment try to strike a deal 
on the sale of an appliance. They must agree on the price but also on the 
fi nancing and the speed of delivery. The buyer would prefer the cheapest 
price, the least interest on fi nancing, and the fastest delivery. The seller 
has the opposite preferences. There might nevertheless be potential out-
comes that benefi t both of them more than others; the key is to fi nd them. 
For instance, the seller might care much more about price and the buyer 
about fi nancing. In this way, integrative negotiation does not so much 
create value as it discovers it (Odell 2000; De Dreu and Boles 1998; Beer-
sma and De Dreu 1999; Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 
1975; De Dreu and Carnevale 2003; McKibben 2014; Weingart et al. 2007). 
 Whereas the central problem in value claiming is demonstrating re-
solve, the main challenge in value creating is conveying cooperative in-
tentions. Particularly in interactions among parties whose previous 
relations are marked by prior antipathy and confl ict, value creating is 
likely to involve a process of reassurance (Glaser 2010; Kydd 2005; Ram-
say 2011). One’s interlocutors must be convinced that one is negotiating 
in good faith. 
 Value claiming negotiation should be familiar to students of interna-
tional relations because it is the basis for the models of coercive bargain-
ing discussed in chapter 1, which were pioneered by Thomas Schelling 
and have been elaborated more recently in bargaining theories of war 
(Schelling 1966; see also Fearon 1994, 1995; Schultz 2001). Value creating, 
with its emphasis on good faith and goodwill, parallels the liberal con-
ception of diplomacy as reasoned dialogue. While reasoned dialogue 
also offers the potential for a fundamental reappraisal of one’s interests 
arising from participation in the diplomatic process over the long term, I 
focus on the more simple process of discovering the potential for joint 
gains while holding interests constant. 
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 The Structural Baseline: Microeconomic Bargaining Theory 
 Microeconomic bargaining theory, generally rationalist and formal in 
character, makes two primary claims regarding negotiation. First, the 
choice of negotiating strategy should be a function of one’s bargaining 
leverage. This source of infl uence might be defi ned in various ways, such 
as satisfaction with the status quo, a restricted win set due to domestic 
political opposition, or material power. Those in a position of leverage 
should adopt a coercive bargaining strategy, something fi rst observed 
by John Nash (1953) and subsequently applied to international rela-
tions (Moravcsik 1998; Morrow 1999; Muthoo 1999; Voeten 2001). Those 
lacking such leverage should pursue a conciliatory strategy of conces-
sions or side payments, known as “obliging.” Applied to diplomacy, a 
crude structural model would predict that diplomacy is endogenous to 
structure. 
 Second, rationalists expect that outcomes will refl ect the distribution 
of bargaining leverage (Krasner 1991; Fearon 1998; Moravcsik 1998). In 
other words, the strong do as they will and the weak as they must. Ap-
plied to diplomacy, a crude structural model would expect diplomacy to 
be epiphenomenal. Outcomes are weighted toward status quo states or 
those with the power to coerce. 
 A more sophisticated set of structural arguments maintains that the 
underlying preference structure affects negotiating strategies as well as 
the outcome. Value creating strategies are more likely to be used when 
parties value different issues on the negotiating agenda differently, facili-
tating a package deal. When parties have symmetrical preferences—that 
is, the same preference function—negotiation takes on a zero-sum char-
acter and value claiming prevails (Axelrod and Keohane 1985; McGinnis 
1986; Martin 1992, 1994; Lohmann 1997; Tollison and Willett 1979; Sebe-
nius 1983; Martin 1994; Davis 2004; Morgan 1990). In such fi xed-pie situ-
ations, states will resort to distributive bargaining. Where the pie can be 
expanded, they are able to create value. In any case, diplomatic style is 
still endogenous to the structure of interests, and the effect of diplomacy 
continues to be epiphenomenal. 
 Microeconomic bargaining theory has much to tell us about how states 
negotiate and forms the foundation of the argument that I advance. It 
reminds us that for successful diplomacy to take place there must be an 
overlap in the bargaining space between states and that states engage in 
a communicative process of conveying their interests to each other. If 
there is no outcome that both parties do not prefer to the status quo, no 
amount of diplomacy can overcome this short of a truly transformative 
process of persuasion. Nevertheless, bargaining theory is incomplete in a 
number of ways. 
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 Given uncertainty, negotiators always face an incentive to engage in 
value claiming, even in situations with integrative potential. The very 
existence of joint gains is not revealed unless states engage in value creat-
ing negotiation (Pruitt and Lewis 1975; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000; 
Olekalns and Smith 2009: 347–48). The distribution of interests is not 
something that states necessarily know as they consider negotiating with 
one another. Finding an outcome that creates value requires players to 
reveal private information about which issues are most important to 
them and how far they can actually compromise without crossing their 
red lines. As Mara Olekalns and Philip Smith explain, “The decision to 
offer accurate information to the other party is a critical one. Without 
information about underlying interests, negotiators are unable to iden-
tify mutually benefi cial outcomes” (2009: 347–48; see also Tomlinson, 
Dineen, and Lewick 2009; Pruitt and Lewis 1975). Experimental research 
shows that value creating is necessary to facilitate the striking of integra-
tive deals in which both sides obtain what they value most (Schei and 
Rognes 2003; Weingart et al. 2007; De Dreu, Giebels, and Van de Vliert 
1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schultz and 
Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000). A favorable distribution of 
interests is not suffi cient for generating a win-win outcome. 
 Yet parties to a negotiation, even in the presence of potential joint 
gains, still have an incentive to maintain a value claiming negotiating 
strategy and conceal their underlying preferences (De Dreu, Koole, and 
Steinel 2000; O’Connor and Carnevale 1997). They can infl ate the value 
of low-priority issues for use as bargaining chips (Olekalns and Smith 
2009: 347–48; Risse 2000: 21). Even if they decide against this course, 
they will nevertheless fear that others will exploit their forthrightness 
(Jervis 1970; Fearon 1995; Schultz 2001; Glaser 2010). Or, just as problem-
atically, they might not be believed when attempting such honest com-
munication. At the heart of the rationalist approach to strategic 
interaction is an assumption of distrust among political actors (Kydd 
2005; Rathbun 2012). States cannot believe others’ representations of 
their interests. 
 In other words, value creating negotiation can be impeded by a kind 
of prisoner’s dilemma logic. Olekalns and Smith write, “Despite these 
benefi ts, there is a strong temptation to withhold or misrepresent infor-
mation as a way of increasing bargaining power and individual out-
comes. Moreover, the decision to offer accurate information is high risk 
because it makes negotiators vulnerable to exploitation by the other 
party” (2009: 347–48). This dynamic might impede states from recogniz-
ing the existence of an underlying distribution of preferences that allows 
for value creating in the fi rst place. This is the same conundrum high-
lighted by rationalists in distributive zero-sum games. By withholding 
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private information, even in fi xed-pie situations, both parties risk not 
reaching an agreement that might have left both better off (Fearon 1995). 
Thomas Risse summarizes, “The successful joint search for better over-
all solutions requires creativity, effective communication, and mutual 
trust, whereas success in the distributive battle depends on strategic, 
and even opportunistic, communication and withholding of available 
 information—and a good deal of distrust against potential misinforma-
tion” (2000: 21). 
 This lack of trust can make even coming to the table diffi cult (Ramsay 
2011). If decision makers believe that others have malign intentions, they 
will refuse even to negotiate because any private information shared 
might be used against them in the event that talks break down (Schultz 
2005; Larson 1997). Decision makers are also more likely to believe that 
there is no outcome that will leave both sides satisfi ed; that the greedy 
other will make unacceptable demands that can never be conceded; that 
the offer to negotiate refl ects an ulterior motive; or that any agreement 
will be violated in the future, what rationalists call a commitment prob-
lem (Fearon 1995). 
 Value creating therefore requires both the structural fact of a potential 
package deal and also the agency that uncovers it. Rationalists argue that 
states might engage in a costly signaling process to reassure others about 
their cooperative intentions, which might  create the trust necessary to fa-
cilitate value creating negotiation (Kydd 2005; Glaser 2010). Because the 
recipients of signals of assurance are uncertain of others’ intentions and 
fear exploitation (most classically to be the “sucker” of a prisoner’s di-
lemma), states seeking better relations must make unilateral and costly 
gestures of conciliation that leave themselves vulnerable so that their 
peaceful and cooperative intentions will be believed (Glaser 1994; 2010; 
Kupchan 2010; Jervis 1976). Implicitly in this vein, Kristopher Ramsay 
(2011) argues that states might honestly indicate their willingness to 
compromise, thereby revealing private information that demonstrates a 
serious intent to negotiate. Ramsay calls this cheap talk, but in revealing 
something about their reservation price, this is surely a costly action. 
Nonrationalists make similar arguments, stressing that these signals 
should not be made contingent on immediate reciprocal concessions 
(Larson 1997; Etzioni 1962; Osgood 1962; Nincic 2011). 
 These are important insights, and signals of this sort are undoubtedly 
crucial for generating value creating negotiation. Nevertheless, rational-
ist theories are incomplete in a number of ways. First, taking such steps 
toward reassurance presumes what Ken Booth and Nicolas Wheeler 
(2008) call “security dilemma sensibility,” the understanding that the 
other side is wary of one’s actions, something that should not be taken 
for granted. In fact, in the cases that are diffi cult for diplomacy, those 
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examined in this book, such a sensibility is distinctly lacking. Security 
dilemma sensibility requires states to objectively view the situation both 
from their own standpoint and from that of others. 
 Second, even when such costly signals are made, there is no guarantee 
they will be perceived as reassuring. Rationalists generally assume that 
all individuals will have the same prior beliefs and information and will 
interpret their environment similarly (Rathbun 2007; Yarhi-Milo 2014; 
Schultz 2005; Fearon 1995: 392). Clearly, such an assumption is not likely 
to hold up to empirical scrutiny. It is well known in the psychological 
literature on international relations that decision makers often operate 
on the basis of assumptions and heuristics that lead them to pay more 
attention to some pieces of information than others (Tetlock 1998). They 
often engage in belief assimilation and belief perseverance, drawing in-
ferences from information that allows them to maintain a certain image 
of the other (Jervis 1976; Tetlock 1998; Yarhi-Milo 2014; Mercer 1996). 
This creates the possibility that seemingly objective costly signals will be 
judged by some as cheap talk whereas objective cheap talk will be re-
garded as credible signals. This subjectivity “opens the door for negotia-
tors’ attributions and perceptions to shape how negotiations unfold” 
(Neale and Fragale 2006: 27). Who will read the signals in which way is 
an open question. 
 Behavioral Negotiation Theory: Agency and 
Individual Attributes 
 The poor record of microeconomic bargaining theory in explaining ne-
gotiation behavior has spawned an interest in social cognition ap-
proaches to negotiation built on previous work in behavioral economics. 
As Margaret Neale and Alison Fragale write, “Traditional economic the-
ories, as well as conventional wisdom, suggest that negotiations should 
be rational transactions guided by the principle of utility maximi-
za tion. . . .  Unfortunately, in reality, negotiations are rarely this straight-
forward, and negotiations often fail to play out according to the 
predictions of rational choice models” (2006: 27). This psychological-
inspired literature on negotiation provides solutions to the problems we 
have identifi ed. It explains how individuals’ characteristics lead them to 
engage in very different negotiating behaviors in the same strategic situ-
ation based on how they interpret the environment. When this literature 
is applied to international relations, it indicates how diplomacy might be 
neither endogenous nor epiphenomenal to structure. I begin with the 
literature explaining individual behavior and then proceed to how dif-
ferent individual behaviors combine to produce different outcomes. 
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 The literature to date highlights two individual motivations: social 
and epistemic. The former is the “desire to attain certain distributions of 
outcomes between oneself and the other party”; the latter is “the need to 
develop a rich and accurate understanding of the world” (De Dreu and 
Carnevale 2003). These directly parallel the two main themes of the be-
havioral economics literature: that individuals are not exclusively egois-
tic and that they are often less than rational (Kahneman 2003). As Neale 
and Fragale explain, “Unlike traditional economic models of negotiator 
behavior, the social cognition approach to negotiation recognizes that 
two negotiators, facing the same objective circumstances, may have dif-
ferent goals, express different behaviors, and obtain different benefi ts, 
simply because these two negotiators perceive their circumstances dif-
ferently” (2006: 27). There is a very large psychological literature on the 
importance of individual-level differences in negotiation that has not yet 
been tapped by international relations scholars. 
 The Value Difference: Social Motivation 
 Social motivation is the most powerful predictor of individual-level 
differences in negotiation analysis to date (Deutsch 1960; McClintock 
1972; Messick and McClintock 1968). Prosocial motivation is marked by 
a concern for not only one’s own outcome but that of others as well. Pro-
socials want to maximize joint benefi ts. They are also concerned with 
guaranteeing an equal distribution of gains (De Cremer and Van Lange 
2001). In contrast, proselfs have only egoistic interests. Social motivation 
is either primed in experiments through a treatment, so as to reduce 
omitted-variable bias, or captured as an intrinsic quality through mea-
sures of social value orientation. It has consistently been found that indi-
viduals have dispositional tendencies to prefer different distributions of 
benefi ts for themselves and others that substantially infl uence behavior 
in experimental settings. Research has indicated that priming social mo-
tivation and capturing intrinsic individual differences through prenego-
tiation surveys yield the same pattern of results in experimental behavior 
(De Dreu and Carnevale 2003). 
 These motivations help decision makers resolve the dilemma they face 
between value creating and value claiming behaviors. Prosocials generally 
prefer value creating negotiation; proselfs prefer value claiming negoti-
ation (Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Fry 1985; 
Beersma and De Dreu 1999). Proselfs offer less and demand more. In 
experiments, proselfs make less conciliatory fi rst offers and lower over-
all concessions than prosocials (De Dreu and Boles 1998; De Dreu and 
Van Lange 1995; Carnevale and Lawler 1986; Van Lange 1999; Van Lange 
and Kuhlman 1994; De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Liebrand et al. 
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1986) and make higher demands of others (De Dreu and van Lange 1995; 
Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004). Proselfs 
engage in more positional commitments, in which they draw a line they 
claim they will not cross (Carnevale and Lawler 1986). Proselfs also 
make more threats and give more warnings (De Dreu, Giebels, and Van 
de Vliert 1998; see also Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Tomlinson, Dineen, 
and Lewicki 2009; Weingart et al. 2007; Sorenson, Morse, and Savage 
1999). 
 Committed to equal outcomes, prosocials often forgo gains so that oth-
ers might also share in the spoils (Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976; Kuhl-
man and Marshello 1975; McClintock and Liebrand 1988). In “take-some 
and give-some” games, in which experimental participants move after 
an initial offer has been made, there is a dominant egoistic strategy of 
retaining all chips for oneself. Nevertheless, prosocials give signifi cantly 
more than proselfs (Van Lange 1999; De Cremer and Van Lange 2001). In 
situations in which the decision about allocation must be made simulta-
neously, before knowing what the other does, prosocials give as much as 
they expect others to give, whereas proselfs donate less. Because the ex-
periment is a one-shot game, there is no strategic reason to be generous 
(Van Lange 1999). Prosocials express a greater interest in the welfare of 
others in post-experiment surveys and less interest in maximizing their 
own utility (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; De Dreu and Van Lange 
1995). Concern for one’s own outcomes and lack of concern for the oth-
er’s outcomes are both associated statistically with lower levels of con-
cessions and higher level of demands in negotiation settings (De Dreu 
and Van Lange 1995; Sorenson, Morse, and Savage 1999). 
 Rationalist bargaining theories expect those with the bargaining lever-
age that comes with an exit option, such as being more satisfi ed with the 
status quo, to exploit it. But experimental research indicates that proso-
cials do not take generally take advantage of such opportunities; only 
proselfs do. In a game with integrative potential, having a one-sided exit 
option in the form of a payoff leads proselfs to engage in more coercive 
bargaining with more threats, leading to higher individual outcomes. 
Giving prosocials such power does not lead to a change in behavior 
(Giebels, De Dreu, and Van de Vliert 2000). Proselfs are more opportunis-
tic and exploitative negotiators (Van Lange 1999). They meet weakness 
with higher demands (De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004). And they have been 
found to exploit asymmetric information about other’s type, whereas 
prosocials have not (Schei and Rognes 2003). 
 Proselfs and prosocials differ in terms of their values. That the term 
 value indicates both the price that individuals place on something and 
the moral principles that guide individuals in life is an indication that we 
cannot separate negotiation from ethical considerations. Even selfi sh 
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behavior can have a moral motivation or justifi cation. Individuals have a 
general tendency to regard themselves as fairer, more moral, and more 
honest than the average other and consequently believe that they de-
serve more in negotiations (Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton 1993; 
Messick et al. 1985; Rothbart and Hallmark 1988; Thompson and Loew-
enstein 1992; Paese and Yonker 2001). Individuals often exhibit ego de-
fensiveness, seeing themselves as more entitled than others. They also 
might engage in reactive devaluation, in which others’ offers are seen as 
insuffi cient and insulting (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003). Both behaviors 
are particularly common among proselfs. Self-righteousness is still a 
kind of righteousness. 
 The Cognitive Difference: Epistemic Motivation 
 Those with different social motivations adopt different negotiating 
styles because they have unique framings of the same situation. Negoti-
ating strategies are accompanied by particular mindsets that operate as 
simplifying heuristics (Carnevale and Pruitt 1992; De Dreu and Boles 
1998). Proselfs are more likely than prosocials to adopt a fi xed-pie fram-
ing, viewing negotiations in distributive and zero-sum terms even when 
there is the potential for outcomes of mutual benefi t (De Dreu and Boles 
1998; De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 2000; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 
2000). They are guided by notions such as “winner take all” and “your 
loss is my gain” (De Dreu and Boles 1998). Prosocials, in contrast, see 
more possibility for joint gains because they are more likely to frame 
negotiations in mixed-motive terms, in which interests are only partially 
incompatible (Olekalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Golec and Federico 
2004). They view negotiations more as a problem to be solved than as a 
game to be won. 
 Heuristics provide cognitive shortcuts that tell individuals how the 
world generally works and what their interactions with others will gen-
erally be like. Individuals generally expect others to share their social 
motivation, which is known in the literature as the egocentric bias 
(Iedema and Poppe 1994; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976). Not surpris-
ingly, given their different framings of the same situation, prosocials 
expect negotiations to be more friendly than do proselfs (De Dreu and 
Boles 1998). 
 Nevertheless, as shortcuts, heuristics can distort reality and interfere 
with the accurate interpretation of information. Behavioral economists 
and psychologists use heuristics to explain how individuals are less than 
rational (Kahneman 2003). These simplifying devices lead individuals to 
engage in confi rmatory information searches, searching out and inter-
preting incoming stimuli to be in line with preexisting beliefs (De Dreu 
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and Van Kleef 2004). For instance, prosocials are more open to signals of 
cooperative intent than proselfs because these signals confi rm their pre-
existing beliefs in the joint benefi ts of cooperation. In contrast, proselfs 
demonstrate considerable reactive devaluation, denigrating even the 
generous offers of others (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003: 248). 
 In addition, psychological researchers point to the important role 
played by epistemic motivation, “the need to develop a rich and accurate 
understanding of the world” (De Dreu and Carnevale 2003: 235), in mod-
erating the use of heuristics during negotiation (De Dreu et al. 2006; De 
Dreu, Koole, and Oldermsa 1999). Epistemic motivation encourages 
openness to, and the complex processing of, new information. Those 
who are lower in epistemic motivation demonstrate more of a need for 
closure. Their information processing is marked by “seizing” and “freez-
ing.” They feel an urgency to make a decision quickly and are disinclined 
to revisit it because they are uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambi-
guity (Kruglanski and Webster 1996; Webster and Kruglanski 1994). 
Those who lack epistemic motivation are less committed to developing a 
completely objective view of the situation they are in. De Dreu and Peter 
Carnevale summarize: “Individuals at the high need for closure end of 
the continuum are characterized by considerable cognitive impatience, 
leaping to judgment on the basis of inconclusive evidence and rigidity of 
thought. At the other end of the continuum, individuals with low need 
for closure may prefer to suspend judgment, engaging in extensive infor-
mation search and generating multiple interpretations for known facts” 
(2003: 262). 
 Those with epistemic motivation are more likely to revisit and revise 
their beliefs in light of disconfi rming evidence than are those with the 
same prior beliefs and social motivation because they are more open to 
information (Tetlock 2005; Baron 1994; Mitzen and Schweller 2011; Sta-
novich and West 1998, 2000). In the case of negotiations with those 
viewed from past experience as hostile, uncooperative, and intransigent, 
they will be more receptive to signals of reassurance to the contrary than 
will proselfs who have a higher level of cognitive closure. The latter are 
more likely to engage in belief perseverance and belief assimilation. 
Those with epistemic motivation are also more able and more motivated 
to look at a situation from the point of view of others. When they interact 
with those with whom they have had past confl icts, this allows for the 
security dilemma sensibility often necessary to initiate negotiations. Fi-
nally, those with greater epistemic motivation are better able to admit the 
hard truth of their relative weakness when they are in unfavorable bar-
gaining positions, a weakness that can make coercive bargaining fruit-
less. All these behaviors require cognitive effort, the hallmark of those 
with epistemic motivation. 
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 Theoretical Expectations 
 We now have the tools to behavioralize the diplomatic styles we un-
covered in chapter 1. The combination of epistemic and social motivation 
produces the four different diplomatic styles seen in  fi gure 1 , three of 
which we have already explored. Prosocials with high epistemic motiva-
tion are liberals who prefer reasoned dialogue. As reviewed in chapter 1, 
reason involves both a commitment to fi nding the truth through an ex-
change of information and arguments and a desire to fi nd value for the 
other side as well as oneself. The former tendency is indicative of epis-
temic motivation, the latter of prosocial motivation. 
 Proselfs with low epistemic motivation are inclined to be coercive bar-
gainers. Proselfs with high epistemic motivation are predisposed toward 
being realist advocates of pragmatic statecraft. Whereas the former are 
prisoners of their heuristics, the latter should be better able to adjust to 
their situation. They will be highly attuned to structure and adopt behav-
iors typically associated with both coercive bargaining and reasoned dia-
logue styles. I refer to integrative and distributive tactics used by prag-
matists.  Tactics are different from styles in that they are temporary. The 
term captures how pragmatists move back and forth between distribu-
tive and integrative negotiation, neither of which captures their general 
style. The pragmatist style is to have no fi xed tactics. The realist uses all 
the tools in his or her toolkit. 

















 The common thread of the pragmatist style is a global understanding 
of the situation, which requires more cognitive effort. More than others, 
pragmatists should (1) stress the priority of vital interests over periph-
eral considerations and the need to make painful tradeoffs; (2) self- 
 consciously adopt an objective and unemotional appraisal of the 
environment, including the interests of other states; and (3) emphasize 
the necessity of thinking in steps toward a long-term goal. 3 Pragmatists 
evaluate not just the present but also the future, not just one of their in-
terests but all of their interests, and not just their own interests but those 
of others. These are all driven by an explicitly egoistic instrumentalism. 
Pragmatists should fi nd themselves better able to overcome the fi xed-pie 
bias in situations in which there is integrative potential. Less committed 
to their heuristics, pragmatists will be open to signals of both coopera-
tiveness and hostility. Epistemic motivation should encourage perspec-
tive taking, in which one puts oneself in another’s position, the 
instrumental empathy that realist theorists prescribe. 4 To the extent that 
pragmatists pursue more integrative, conciliatory, and cooperative poli-
cies, they are nevertheless driven by instrumental proself motivations 
rather than by any normative commitment to reciprocity and joint gain, 
as prosocials are. 
 Prosocials with low epistemic motivation are the rosy-eyed idealistic 
utopians who Edward H. Carr (1964) warns about, those who are na-
ively oblivious to wolves in sheep’s clothing. They engage in “oblig-
ing.” For reasons that I explain later, however, prosocials with a low 
epistemic motivation are likely to be relatively rare in politics, particu-
larly international politics, and therefore we can focus primarily on the 
other three styles of diplomacy. Therefore, when I refer to prosocials in 
the empirical cases I present, I mean prosocials with high epistemic 
motivation. 
 Whether value creating or value claiming comes to prevail among ne-
gotiators is a function of the combination and interaction of diplomatic 
styles. The choice made by one country of how to negotiate is not always 
monadic in nature but often depends on the choices made by other states. 
This combination is what affects the character of the interaction among 
 3 . This is not the same as having a longer time horizon, a greater discounting of present 
benefi ts, or a higher evaluation of future benefi ts. It is not that pragmatists are better able to 
deny themselves the immediate gratifi cation of smaller gains and wait for larger gains down 
the line. They are more likely to point to the value of short-term benefi ts and even costs as 
steps in a gradual process rather than to denigrate them as insuffi cient and reject them. On 
the difference, see Rapport (2012 ) . 
 4 . This is different from genuine empathy in that it is instrumental in character. 
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the parties. Although value claiming and value creating are terms that 
also might be used to capture the negotiating styles of particular units, I 
reserve the use of these expressions to capture the spirit of negotiations. 
When referring to the individual use of value claiming, I refer to coercive 
bargaining, coercive diplomacy, or distributive negotiating. When refer-
ring to the individual use of value creating, I refer to reasoned dialogue, 
integrative negotiating, or liberal diplomacy. 
 In what particular combination of diplomatic styles is value claiming 
or value creating more likely to prevail? The most consistent fi nding in 
the social motivation literature on negotiation is that prosocial dyads are 
better able than proselfs to reach joint outcomes that benefi t both part-
ners (Schei and Rognes 2003; Weingart et al. 2007; De Dreu, Giebels, and 
Van de Vliert 1998; Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; 
Schulz and Pruitt 1978; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000; De Dreu et al. 
2006; De Dreu and Boles 1998; De Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 2000; Ole-
kalns, Smith, and Kibby 1996; Carnevale and Lawler 1986). Considering 
the literature review above, this is not particularly surprising since each 
party has a preference for the same style of negotiation. 
 Research shows that proself dyads consistently leave gains on the 
table compared to prosocials because they do not share information or 
reciprocate concessions. These dyads are less able to reach integrative 
outcomes in which both sides obtain what they value most, even when 
such a possibility exists given preference structures (Schei and Rognes 
2003; Weingart et al. 2007; De Dreu, Giebels, and Van de Vliert 1998; 
Beersma and De Dreu 1999; Pruitt and Lewis 1975; Schulz and Pruitt 
1978; De Dreu, Koole, and Steinel 2000). This leads to my fi rst two 
hypotheses. 
 •  Hypothesis 1: Value creating negotiation will prevail among proso-
cials practicing liberal diplomacy, making mutually benefi cial 
agreements easier to reach. 
 •  Hypothesis 2: Value claiming negotiation will prevail among pro-
selfs practicing coercive bargaining, making mutually benefi cial 
agreements more diffi cult to reach. 
 In the former case, negotiations will proceed more quickly and outcomes 
are less likely to simply refl ect the distribution of bargaining power. In the 
latter case, successful agreements are harder to reach and stalemates are 
more likely. Negotiations will be slower and more arduous, with both par-
ties engaging in brinksmanship bargaining. Agreements that are reached 
will probably refl ect the crude distribution of bargaining power if the 
weaker side fi nally capitulates. This does not indicate that diplomacy is 
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epiphenomenal. Such outcomes emerge when a particular type of nego-
tiation prevails. Diplomacy is still necessary to explain when pure struc-
ture prevails. 
 Pragmatists, given their higher epistemic motivation, should fi nd it 
easier to recognize when it makes more sense to engage in value creating 
than in value claiming. Pragmatists are particularly likely to shift to inte-
grative negotiating when they face prosocials and when they have less 
power (or expect to have less power in the future), that is, when coercive 
diplomacy is ineffi cient and inappropriate for the particular situational 
circumstances. Research shows that prosocials do not behave differently 
toward prosocials and proselfs pursuing a tit-for-tat strategy (McClintock 
and Liebrand 1988). These fi ndings open up the possibility of collabora-
tion between pragmatists and prosocials in a Baptist-bootlegger coalition 
to reach the joint gains of an integrative deal, particularly if the pragma-
tist is not in a position to exploit the other side’s weakness in a proself 
manner (Schei and Rognes 2003). 
 •  Hypothesis 3: Proselfs higher in epistemic motivation (pragmatists) 
will adapt their diplomatic style to the structure of the situation 
more easily than proselfs lower in epistemic motivation (coercive 
bargainers) when there is the possibility of joint gains, thereby mak-
ing value creating with a pragmatic or prosocial partner easier. 
 Value claiming negotiation, however, is likely to prevail in any dyad 
that contains a coercive bargainer. Distributive negotiation induces a 
lowest-common-denominator effect on interactions with those with 
other diplomatic styles. Research shows that prosocials’ commitment to 
value creating negotiation is contingent on reciprocity. Prosocials’ com-
mitment to equality and fairness places limits on their other-regarding 
behavior (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001). Reaching equal outcomes 
requires that others contribute to the group as well. In mixed-motive co-
operation games, prosocials do not consistently choose the outcome that 
maximizes joint gains if the other is not cooperating (Kuhlman and 
Marshello 1975; Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976). Consistent with their 
emphasis on joint gains, prosocials demonstrate a greater degree of 
“compensatory” trust, being willing to put up with a few defections to 
elicit cooperation (Kramer et al. 2004). Nevertheless, in a phenomenon 
known as  behavioral assimilation , they defect against defection, indicating 
again that their interest in joint gains hinges on a commitment to reci-
procity and equality (Stouten, De Cremer, and van Dijk 2006; Kanagaret-
nam et al. 2009; Kelley and Stahelski 1970; Kuhlman and Marshello 1975; 
Kuhlman and Wimberley 1976; McClintock and Liebrand 1988; Rotter 
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1980). Prosocials begin with a  general preference for value creating, but 
this might change their behavior vis-à-vis  specifi c partners. Dialogue 
takes two; it is not a monologue. 
 This alerts us again to the important point that concern for other’s 
outcomes does not imply a lack of consideration for one’s own gains. It 
is the combination of a concern for one’s own outcome  and the outcome 
of others that tends to drive instances of win-win value creating (De 
Dreu, Weingart, and Kwon 2000; Kimmel et al. 1980; Pruitt and Lewis 
1975; Sorenson, Morse, and Savage 1999; De Dreu et al. 2006). Prosocials 
want to expand the pie, not simply let others eat all of it. 
 Prosocials have been found to shift from an integrative to a distribu-
tive negotiating style when the number of proselfs in a group increases 
(Weingart et al. 2007; Beersma and De Dreu 1999). Indeed, research 
shows that the joint outcomes of prosocials and proselfs in experiments 
tend to be as low as those between proselfs (Fry 1985; Beersma and De 
Dreu 1999). Prosocials signifi cantly award generosity and punish stingi-
ness (De Cremer and Van Lange 2001; Van Lange 1999; see also Liebrand 
et al. 1986; Kanagaretnam et al. 2009; Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994). 
They are less honest with proselfs than with other prosocials (Steinel and 
De Dreu 2004). 
 Reciprocity is a morally laden principle of behavior for prosocials, not 
an instrumental one of the kind generally seen in the international rela-
tions literature, which is based on long-term egoistic considerations 
(Keohane 1984). Prosocials attribute behavior by others to moral charac-
teristics, holding prosocials to be more moral than defectors. Prosocials 
believe that honesty will have a greater effect on the level of cooperation 
of others than proselfs do (Kanagaretnam et al. 2009; Liebrand et al. 1986; 
Van Lange and Kuhlman 1994). Similar fi ndings are found in negotiation 
studies. Prosocials believe distributive strategies to be morally inappro-
priate (De Dreu and Boles 1998). 
 Pragmatists, too, are unlikely to engage in value creating vis-à-vis a 
coercive bargainer because it leaves them vulnerable to exploitation. 
There is no instrumental gain from cooperative negotiation. Therefore, 
 •  Hypothesis 4: Coercive bargaining by proselfs with low epistemic 
motivation will induce value claiming on the part of others, lead-
ing to negotiations with a value claiming character. 
 By crossing the three types of negotiators, we generate different types of 
potential dyads and expectations for the spirit of diplomatic interactions 
(see  fi gure 2 ). Because obligers are relatively rare empirically, I do not 
include them in the  fi gure 2 . 
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 Methodology: Demonstrating the Added Value of Diplomacy 
 My hypotheses do not give us a fi rm and specifi c prediction about the 
success of diplomacy in any particular case. The nature of any agree-
ment, that is the ultimate outcome, depends on other factors that must be 
treated exogenously on a case-by-case basis, the most important of which 
is the structural environment. We must know the distribution of interests 
and whether it creates the possibility for a mutually benefi cial outcome. 
We must know the distribution of power and which side is favored. Only 
then can we know whether diplomacy has added value. Evaluating the 
infl uence of the character of diplomatic interaction, the added value of 
diplomacy, therefore requires careful reconstruction of the diplomatic 
environment to generate the structural baseline. This forms the null hy-
pothesis that might emerge from a simple rationalist bargaining model 
in which the powerful or satisfi ed prevail. 
 The study of diplomacy poses particularly diffi cult methodological 
problems, particularly regarding causal inference, case selection, and 
measurement. First, it might be the case that the effect of the character of 
the interactions, value creating or value claiming, is epiphenomenal. For 



























instance, parties whose reservation points are close together might fi nd 
agreement easy to reach, but this has little do with diplomacy. This prob-
lem is exacerbated by the danger of selection effects. States have a num-
ber of reasons not to begin negotiations unless they believe somewhat 
strongly that they are likely to bear fruit (Ramsay 2011). Therefore, the set 
of cases marked by the convocation of formal negotiations is likely to be 
unrepresentative and biased in favor of successful agreement. This has 
nothing to do with diplomacy per se but, rather, refl ects a large zone of 
possible agreement. 
 I use a number of strategies to overcome these obstacles. The solution 
to the epiphenomenality problem lies in rigorous research design. We are 
looking for cases in which diplomatic style varies but other structural 
factors, such as the distribution of power and interests, do not. A longitu-
dinal research design in which some combination of states with the same 
attributes is negotiating the same issues over some restricted period of 
time is appropriate to this task. This is akin to a fi xed-effect model in 
statistics. The 1920s are well suited for this task in that the same three 
countries negotiated over the same issues over the course of a decade 
with little or no change in underlying preferences. Yet the governments 
of these countries frequently changed hands, altering the diplomatic 
style and therefore the character of the interactions. There are instances 
of all the types of combinations specifi ed in  fi gure 2 . 
 Second, to cope with the problem of selection bias, the important case 
is one in which the likelihood of success was low but in which the parties 
nevertheless pursued diplomacy and found success. This describes the 
Locarno process of 1925, the core of the book, in which relations among 
the parties were initially marked by profound mistrust. Because value 
creating depends on the open and honest sharing of information, rela-
tions among former adversaries are particularly disadvantageous to suc-
cessful diplomacy. The hostility of Germany to the Versailles regime is 
well known. The peace settlement left it bitter but also diplomatically 
weak, a tough nut for diplomacy to crack. French politicians of all politi-
cal stripes were terrifi ed of a German  revanche . Franco-German relations 
deteriorated further when France under Raymond Poincaré invaded the 
Ruhr in 1923 to force Germany to pay reparations. And the geopolitical 
environment was made all the more diffi cult by the tremendous domes-
tic instability in France and Germany, each of which saw constant col-
lapses in governing coalitions. Politicians faced powerful incentives to 
exacerbate tensions to prove their patriotic credentials. My second case, 
the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict, is also marked by suspicion and hostility. 
 These cases also allow us to observe the behavior of actors with differ-
ent diplomatic styles from the same starting point in regards to their be-
liefs about their interlocutors. For instance, it might be that prosocials 
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fi nd value creating easier because they have more trust in the other side 
than do proselfs, which in other work I have found generally to be the 
case (Rathbun 2012). This would be a simple case of prosocial “doves” 
versus proself “hawks” (Schultz 2005). In these cases, however, distrust 
of the other is pronounced and invariant among all political actors in the 
same country. In the terms of Rathbun (2012), whereas prosocials have 
more “generalized trust,” this does not apply to their historical adversar-
ies; they do not have “particularized trust.” Although trust might cer-
tainly facilitate value creating (Wheeler 2013), in these cases the parties 
began the process in its absence. As we will see, this makes epistemic 
motivation particularly important because it allows cognitively open in-
dividuals to revisit and revise their beliefs (Larson 1997). 
 Overall, the cases demonstrate instances in which agreement was ex-
tremely likely, given overlapping win sets or the potential for integrative 
negotiation, but nevertheless failed as well as cases in which diplomatic 
style overcame a structural environment rocky for diplomatic success, 
making us more confi dent in asserting that diplomacy added value to 
the outcome. So as not to be accused of cherry picking particular suc-
cesses and failures, however, I engage all the efforts by Britain, France, 
and Germany to resolve issues of security during the 1920s. 
 But even if we demonstrate an independent effect of diplomatic style, 
we must be careful to consider the possibility that diplomatic style was 
induced by structure at some point earlier in the causal chain. Microeco-
nomic bargaining theory expects that diplomatic style is strongly infl u-
enced by one’s interests and power. This is the endogeneity problem. My 
solution to this issue is discussed more extensively in the next section. I 
establish that there was signifi cant variation  within a country in the pref-
erence for diplomatic style on the part of those with the same interests 
and information. If so, diplomatic style was not endogenous. This varia-
tion was evident both cross-sectionally at any point in time and longitu-
dinally as one government took over from another. 
 Measurement 
 An argument relying on psychological motivations raises some diffi -
cult measurement issues. When the subject is the decision making of po-
litical elites, particularly when the cases are historical, these two 
motivations are diffi cult, if not impossible, to measure directly through 
the traditional psychological survey instruments. Indeed, those mea-
sures might not even be applicable. A prosocial in his personal life may 
not necessarily be a prosocial in diplomacy, and vice versa. We are look-
ing for some way of predicting either prosocial or proself behavior on 
behalf of one’s group in the arena of international politics as diplomats 
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take on the function of representing their nation-state in interactions 
with others. The psychological research on negotiation centers on how 
individuals interact with other individuals. These might very well be re-
lated, but we should not assume so. 
 The most direct way of measuring social motivation is to seek out evi-
dence of how decision makers think about joint gains. It is not the case, 
as reviewed above, that prosocials are self-abnegating. The difference 
between proselfs and prosocials is in their degree of concern for the out-
come of others. In the context of international relations, a proself position 
is an exclusively nationally oriented one. A prosocial position is a more 
internationalist, egalitarian, and universalist one. Social motivation is 
also evident in the heuristics that individuals exhibit, proselfs being 
marked by their fi xed-pie and prosocials being marked by their 
 expanding- pie characterizations of the situation. The most direct way of 
measuring epistemic motivation is looking for evidence about how 
 decision-makers describe their thinking process. Reference to costs and 
benefi ts, feasibility, and anticipation of the reactions of others are all 
markers of a more epistemically motivated political actor. 
 These direct measures of our psychological attributes, however, are 
not easy to obtain and come with particular pitfalls. For social motiva-
tion, the danger is tautology. We risk measuring social motivation by ref-
erence to the negotiating and bargaining behavior of our actors such as 
their bargaining offers. For epistemic motivation, the danger is a lack of 
data. It is likely that those who lack epistemic motivation will be less in-
clined to describe their decision making since it will be less salient in 
their minds. Deliberate and effortful thought is a valence issue; no one 
wants to admit that they do not do it. Most of our data about key deci-
sion makers comprise what they do, and they generally act without ex-
plicit reference to their psychological motivations. 
 These issues lead me to supplement my direct measure with an indi-
rect measure of these motivations. Making use of the latest advances in 
political psychology, I propose the innovation of capturing these con-
structs through political ideology. John Jost and colleagues make the case 
for political ideology as a motivated social cognition (2003). They argue 
that political ideology is driven by a number of underlying psychological 
motivations, which include those that other researchers have identifi ed 
as crucial for understanding the psychology of negotiation. 
 As I have previously argued, the motivational difference between pro-
socials and proselfs is based on values, and value differences are at the 
heart of the distinction between left and right (Schwartz, Caprara, and 
Vecchione 2010; Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Piuko, Schwartz, and Davi-
dov 2011; Caprara et al. 2006; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Cohrs et al. 
2005). Values are “trans-situational goals that vary in importance and 
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serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or a group” (Schwartz 
2007: 712). In Shalom Schwartz’s scheme of universal values, those who 
identify with the left score more highly on “self-transcendence” values, 
marked by “benevolence,” that is concern for the welfare of close others 
in everyday interaction, but more importantly “universalism,” “under-
standing, appreciation, tolerance, and protection of  all people and na-
ture” (Schwartz 1992: 12, emphasis added). Schwartz himself refers to 
these as “prosocial” attitudes. 
 Left and right are distinguished in large part by their commitment to 
equality and the welfare of others, both of which Paul Van Lange has 
found to predict social motivation in interpersonal settings (Van Lange 
1999; Jost et al. 2003). A preference for social hierarchy is one of the defi n-
ing principles of conservatism, whereas a preference for egalitarianism is 
an attribute of the left. The left has an “approach” orientation. It wants to 
provide for others, which explains its support for state programs to help 
the most disadvantaged (Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci 2007). 5 
Helping those in the most need, of course, also serves to make society 
more equal, which is historically at the heart of distinguishing left from 
the right, even as the particular disadvantaged groups the left has sought 
to empower have evolved over time. More than fi fty years ago, Seymour 
Martin Lipset wrote, “By ‘left’ we shall mean advocating social change in 
the direction of greater equality—political, economic, or social. By ‘right,’ 
we shall mean supporting a traditional, more or less hierarchical social 
order, and opposing change towards greater equality” (1954: 1135). This 
defi nition has maintained a broad consensus over time (Gerring 1998; 
Putnam 1973). 
 The left also identifi es more strongly with the moral foundations of 
protecting others from harm and caring for their well-being as well as 
ensuring fairness and equality (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). Al-
though there is great cultural and individual variation in moral values, 
social scientists have isolated a fi nite number of distinct moral systems, 
that is, discrete sets of different ethical values (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 
2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Haidt and Joseph 2004). Fair-
ness/reciprocity and harm/care are grouped by Haidt and his colleagues 
under a broader rubric of the “ethics of autonomy” (Schweder et al. 
1997). These “individualizing foundations” form the backbone of liberal 
 5 . Although some might object that the left is less libertarian than conservatives, liberal and 
conservative support for state action has a different basis. Whereas conservative enthusiasm 
for government is almost exclusively premised on preventing negative outcomes through 
institutional restraints, liberal support for government action aims at positively providing for 
society, harnessing the power of the state to redistribute wealth or reach collectively more 
optimal resource allocation (Dworkin 1985; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, and Baldacci 2007). 
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philosophical thinking, dating to the Enlightenment, in which morality 
is about how well or poorly individuals treated other individuals (Turiel 
1983). David De Cremer and Paul Van Lange (2001), seeking a better un-
derstanding of what drives prosocial behavior, evoke the twin morally 
defi ned motives of social responsibility and justice, which parallel the 
constituent elements of the ethics of autonomy. 
 Whereas the left demonstrates a more universal prosocial motivation, 
the right is marked by its concern for the security, safety, and stability of 
the in-group, which Jost et al. (2007) calls the “existential motive.” Hier-
archy serves this motivation because it preserves social stability (Jost 
et al. 2003). The right sees adherence to traditional moral values and def-
erence to authorities that coerce and punish violators of social norms as 
necessary checks on individual freedoms to protect society from those 
who would do others harm (Altemeyer 1998). Right-wing authoritarians 
resolve the trade-off between personal autonomy and social order in 
favor of the latter (Feldman 2003). They place a great stress on confor-
mity and tradition because diversity and change are seen as threats to 
social cohesion and stability (Feldman and Stenner 1997). The left, in 
contrast, comes down in favor of greater political liberty, both in the 
United States and in other advanced democracies (Inglehart 1977; Ingle-
hart and Flanagan 1987; Kitschelt 1988a, 1988b, 1994; Kitschelt and Mc-
Gann 1995). The left see less threat to society from free expression. It is 
more comfortable and supportive of diversity (Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and 
Fisher 2003; Feldman and Stenner 1997; Janoff-Bulman 2009b; Jugert and 
Duckitt 2009; Stenner 2009; Van Leeuwen and Park 2009). The right also 
makes more intense distinctions between in-groups and out-groups and 
emphasizes loyalty to the former (Duckitt 2006; Duckitt et al. 2001; Jugert 
and Duckitt 2009; Van Leeuwen and Park 2009). 
 The right embraces the moral foundations of in-group/loyalty and au-
thority/respect and Schwartz’s conservation values. Authority/respect 
concerns the maintenance of social hierarchies to maintain social order. 
This moral foundation highlights the values of obedience, respect, and 
role fulfi llment. In-group/loyalty stresses individuals’ obligations to 
their group to preserve its cohesion, particularly against out-groups 
(Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; 
Haidt and Joseph 2004). These moral systems serve the same function as 
others—constraining self-interested action to benefi t society as a whole. 
They simply do so by subordinating individual needs to the needs of the 
larger community. They are “binding foundations” based on the “ethics 
of community” (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and 
Joseph 2009; Haidt and Joseph 2004). 
 The right identifi es more strongly with conservation values, a set of 
principles that closely match the ethics of community, including 
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conformity, tradition, and security (Schwartz, Caprara, and Vecchione 
2010; Barnea and Schwartz 1998; Piuko, Schwartz, and Davidov 2011; 
Caprara et al. 2006; Duriez and Van Hiel 2002; Cohrs et al. 2005). Confor-
mity restrains the individual expression that would violate social expec-
tations and norms. Tradition involves respect for the customs of one’s 
society. Security indicates a high valuation of the safety of one’s society. 
All these values promote social order, stability, and predictability by 
suppressing the individual, binding him or her to the in-group. They 
inhibit individualism by restricting change across time and variety 
across space (Stenner 2009). Jesse Graham and colleagues (2011) report a 
strong association between this cluster of values and the binding 
moral foundations of in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/
sanctity. 
 Left and right also differ in terms of epistemic motivation. Those who 
are more ideologically extreme are less likely to be epistemically moti-
vated because it is more painful for them to change their beliefs or depart 
from their core values. There is evidence for this in the literature on po-
litical psychology (Rathbun 2004; McClosky and Chong 1985; Tetlock 
1988). Extremists have what psychologists call a directional motivation 
or motivated bias, a desire to reach a specifi c conclusion (Jost et al. 2003). 
Their beliefs determine their level of epistemic motivation. Therefore, we 
expect the relationship between political ideology and the political spec-
trum to be curvilinear. 
 In addition, there is reason to think that the right will demonstrate 
something more of a need for closure than the left (Tetlock 1983a, 1984; 
Van Hiel and Mervielde 2003). Individuals also have nondirectional mo-
tives, those that refl ect the desire to arrive at a belief independent of its 
content (Jost et al. 2003). Those who demonstrate a need for closure are 
uncomfortable with ambiguity and uncertainty and therefore have been 
found to gravitate toward particular beliefs that provide predictability. 
The right might therefore be expected to exhibit lower levels of epis-
temic motivation because conservative values promise more stability. 
Their lower level of epistemic motivation contributes to the adoption of 
their specifi c beliefs. Consistent with this theory, the need for closure is 
associated with support for a socially conservative program of tradi-
tional morality, social conformity, and strong law-and-order policies 
(Altemeyer 1998; Duckitt 2001; Duckitt and Sibley 2009; Kossowska and 
Van Hiel 2003). 
 Jost et al. argue that people on the right also have an “epistemic mo-
tive,” a motivation to avoid uncertainty because they fi nd it threatening 
(2007: 990). As a consequence, even though epistemic motivation is cur-
vilinear in relation to the political spectrum, we can expect it to decline 
somewhat more precipitously on the right than on the left. Therefore 
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variation in epistemic motivation will induce a particularly salient cleav-
age within the right, which is otherwise unifi ed in terms of social motiva-
tion, in terms of diplomatic style. 
 On the basis of this review, we can use political ideology as another 
measure of social and epistemic motivations (see  fi gure 3 ). Placement on 
the center left captures prosocial and high epistemic motivation, which 
should lead to a preference for liberal diplomacy and reasoned dialogue. 
Center-right placement indicates a combination of proself and high epis-
temic motivation that should induce pragmatic statecraft. Far-right 
placement serves as a proxy for the combination of proself and low epis-
temic motivation, which should lead to coercive bargaining. The far left, 
prosocial combined with low epistemic motivation, will be idealists who 
engage in obliging diplomacy. Recall, however, that because of the 
weaker relationship between leftist ideology and epistemic motivation 
described before, this group should be relatively rare; this was confi rmed 
in the case studies that follow. In addition, the competitive pressures of 
international politics select out the pursuit of purely idealistic policies, 
and the far left of the spectrum during this period is occupied by com-
munist parties with Marxist ideologies that fi t uncomfortably within the 
framework offered here, something I take up in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
 Of course, political ideology alone is not suffi cient to measure social 
and epistemic motivations because ideology might also be capturing 
other factors that also affect foreign policy behavior, such as different 












conceptions of the national interest and different beliefs about other 
states, like how threatening they are. In the case studies that follow, I take 
these into account. 
 Rather than relying solely on the ideological placement of individual 
decision makers, I devote much attention to the political orientation of 
their domestic political support base, particularly the positions of their 
political parties. Political parties are aggregations of like-minded indi-
viduals. In past work (Rathbun 2004, 2012), I have shown that we can 
think of them as vehicles for bringing ideology into the foreign policy 
process. The behavior of foreign policy elites such as the prime ministers 
and foreign ministers must be our main focus of analysis given the cen-
tralized, high-stakes, and often secretive nature of diplomacy. But the 
social and epistemic motivations of leaders should be consistent with the 
diplomatic style preferred by their party or coalition base. Where it is 
not, we should expect (and indeed fi nd) cabinet and parliamentary dis-
sension that constrains and alters behavior. Although individuals are un-
doubtedly important in the cases that follow, it is possible to exaggerate 
their infl uence. Devoting attention to broader party orientations also 
leads to a more generalizable theory and more methodologically sound 
empirical conclusions because it enables us to more easily measure moti-
vations independently of behavior. 
 A focus on parties also helps solve the endogeneity issue. If we see 
predictable variation in diplomatic style across the political system 
within the same country, whether judged through cross-sectional varia-
tion at time between the government and opposition or longitudinally as 
governments turn over from one side to the other, we can be more confi -
dent that diplomacy is not endogenous to structure and also that style 
has its origins in social and epistemic motivations. Thinking of parties as 
carriers of psychological motivations allows us to hold structure and the 
issues under negotiation constant with variation only in diplomatic 
style. We must, however, also be cognizant of the need to control for 
shifts in foreign policy goals that also accompany a change in a govern-
ment party coalition. In each country under study, there is an easily 
identifi able left-right spectrum, described in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
 Nevertheless, the personal ideological position of those key decision 
makers is likely to be particularly causally important when parties are 
larger and encompass greater ideological variation or in coalition gov-
ernments in which parties distribute key ministries. I expect that larger 
catch-all parties will demonstrate more ideological variation than 
smaller, more ideologically coherent parties. For instance, the British 
Tories were (still are) the main party of the British right, whereas the 
German People’s Party (DVP) and German National People’s Party 
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(DNVP) competed with each other on the conservative side of the politi-
cal spectrum. In the former case, we expect internal divisions that corre-
spond roughly to the ideological extremity of party members. When 
there is predictable variation within a government, the inclinations of the 
foreign minister and the head of government, who are responsible for 
diplomacy, will be particularly important. 
 Political actors other than politicians certainly matter as well. In the 
cases that follow, elected decision makers were often constrained by their 
militaries. I treat the latter’s preference as largely exogenous and incor-
porate them into the story on an as-needed basis. The cases also gener-
ally neglect the positions and actions of professional diplomats. This is 
made possible by the high profi le of the issues under discussion, which 
meant that decisions were made at the highest levels of government by 
political leaders rather than by bureaucrats. By virtue of their impor-
tance, security discussions were highly political and required a strong 
domestic basis of support from the parliament of each state. Neverthe-
less, a study of the issues of more day-to-day diplomatic interaction 
would probably need to explore the diplomatic style of regular diplo-
mats, as others have done (Neumann 2012). 
 Political parties also have other, more self-serving interests. They 
seek reelection and need to deliver material benefi ts to their members, 
something that might be affected by foreign affairs (Downs 1957; Ford-
ham 1988a, 1998b; Narizny 2007; Gaubatz 1991). It could be that the 
different diplomatic styles adopted by political parties are a conse-
quence of these other functions of political parties. I consider this pos-
sibility on a case-by-case basis in the empirical chapters that follow. 
Security issues might have distributional implications for domestic po-
litical groups that could also explain party cleavages over diplomacy; 
however, there is more unity on national security goals because of their 
life-and-death nature, particularly in the aftermath of a major war, less-
ening this concern. National security issues also provide instances in 
which parties are more united on foreign policy goals, thereby allowing 
us to more easily distinguish between differences over substance and 
over diplomatic style. Nevertheless, I do not just assume, but empiri-
cally establish, this unity. 
 To measure diplomatic style (coercive bargaining, pragmatic statecraft, 
and reasoned dialogue) and the spirit of negotiations (value claiming vs. 
value creating), I draw from the inventory of behaviors identifi ed in psy-
chological work associated with different types of negotiation. We are 
judging style, which is monadic, and the spirit of negotiations, which is 
dyadic, simultaneously by the same actions. Where necessary, I distin-
guish the preferred diplomatic style of a state from the type of negotiating 
it engages in in light of others’ behavior. This is tricky but unavoidable. 
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 Coercive bargaining by any particular party (or value claiming by 
multiple parties) has the following elements: 
 •  Lack of information exchange : Negotiators will not reveal their own 
private evaluation of different offers or their reservation point. 
Nor will they believe the representations of others who are also 
presumed to be engaged in coercive bargaining. 
 •  Pessimism : Practitioners of coercive diplomacy can convey aloof-
ness by expressing their skepticism that a deal can be reached. Op-
timism suggests weakness and a lack of resolve. The more this is 
feigned, the more this is coercive bargaining. Distributive negotia-
tors will overstate, rather than understate, the differences between 
the sides to drive a harder bargain. 
 •  Ego defensiveness and reactive devaluation : Value claimers will deni-
grate the suffi ciency and generosity of others’ offers. Instrumen-
tally, this puts pressure on others to concede more. More genuinely, 
it refl ects the feeling that their side deserves more than the other 
side. Ego defensiveness will inhibit empathetic understanding of 
the needs and constraints faced by the other side. 
 •  Offer infl ation : Negotiators open with high demands, which con-
veys the impression that they will settle only for a deal with major 
concessions, anchors the negotiation at points favorable to their 
reservation price, and allows some room for concessions while 
still commanding a larger share of the pie. The further opening 
bids are from their reservation price, the more coercive the 
bargaining. 
 •  Coercive linkage: Value claiming parties will attempt to hold issues 
dear to the other side hostage to force the others to offer better 
terms on issues they care about. If an issue is of some worth to oth-
ers, but not to them, they still have an incentive to hold onto it as 
a bargaining chip and demand compensation. 
 •  Staging : Value claimers will insist that others make concessions be-
fore they do. This prevents commitment problems in which they 
have to trust that others will come through on their promises. It 
also allows them to pocket others’ concessions and to ask for more 
without having spent any of their negotiating capital. This might 
include demanding prior concessions as a condition of even com-
ing to the table. 
 •  Indifference and brinksmanship : Negotiators should not be quick to 
concede but, rather, should hold out for eventual concessions. By 
not appearing eager, they convey resolve. In the event that a dead-




 •  Positional commitments : Negotiators will use as a favorite technique 
staking out absolute take-home points and pledging not to agree 
on anything short of their obtainment. If done publicly, this creates 
a costly signal of resolve by making it harder to back down. 
 •  Cheap talk : Negotiators will regard efforts by other side to per-
suade as cheap talk in value claiming, not as efforts to explain the 
others’ position or arrive at an accommodation. 
 Liberal diplomacy by any one party (or value creating by multiple par-
ties) has the following elements: 
 •  Honest information exchange : Value creating parties will share ac-
curate private information about their true preferences, feeling 
less concerned about exploitation, and be more inclined to believe 
the representations of others. 
 •  Optimism and earnestness : Value creating parties will indicate their 
optimism that a deal can be reached to encourage the other side to 
negotiate in good faith. They will understate their differences with 
the other side rather than overstate them. 
 •  Recognition of generosity : Value creating parties, in an indication of 
empathy, will recognize when others have made signifi cant con-
cessions and attempt to place themselves in others’ shoes. They 
will not denigrate others’ offers. When done publicly, this sends a 
signal of conciliation. 
 •  Fairer offers : Value creating parties will present offers that more 
closely shadow their reservation point, if they have one, and in-
clude value for the other side as well as an indication of a commit-
ment to equality and mutual benefi t. 
 •  Integrative linkage : Parties use integrative negotiation, which in-
volves connecting issues, not to coerce a better deal but, rather, to 
fi nd outcomes in which each side gains what it values most. Side 
payments can be used as positive concessions. 
 •  Staging : Parties negotiate issues simultaneously, rather than hold-
ing them up to force concessions on other issues, even if an even-
tual integrative deal requires progress on both. Decision makers 
might consider unilateral concessions without immediate com-
pensation to demonstrate cooperative intentions. 
 •  Argumentation : Parties attempt to persuade others to concede to their 
point of view rather than to coerce them. The use of argumentation 
will be seen as an indication that the other side is open to dialogue. 
 •  Retaining fl exibility: Negotiators rarely draw lines because they im-




 Methodologically, I chose to engage in careful qualitative analysis, 
relying predominantly on primary documents. This kind of work is 
well suited for establishing the causal impact of diplomacy by establish-
ing the structural baseline that also contributes to the outcome, which 
must be treated as an exogenous factor on a case-by-case basis. Because 
the distribution of interests, in particular, is private information, it can-
not be measured through behavioral observation, making it diffi cult to 
put together a large data set. Historical case work is also necessary for 
establishing diplomatic style because observing behavior is not enough. 
For instance, if a state leader draws a red line that he or she promises 
not to cross, this might appear to be a coercive bluff aimed at extorting 
a better deal. On the other hand, it might also be a genuine representa-
tion of the reservation price of his or her country and therefore honest, 
integrative negotiating behavior. The action does not speak for itself; 
only by knowing the private information held by the leader can we 
judge. 
 The primary sources of the period are quite comprehensive in most 
cases. Both Germany and Britain have assembled enormous bound col-
lections containing almost all the documents relevant to the cases exam-
ined in this book in their original languages. There is also a complete 
collection of cabinet minutes for both the British and German govern-
ments in their original languages. Where these collections proved to be 
insuffi cient, I conducted my own archival research. The documentation 
of French diplomacy is by far the worst. 6 My fi ndings on France must 
therefore be treated more tentatively. Still, I have attempted to triangu-
late using German and British sources as much as possible. Indeed, most 
students of French foreign affairs rely as heavily on these sources as they 
do on the French archives. 
 The Historical Context and the Plan of the Book 
 A bit of background is necessary to set the scene. Under the terms of 
the Versailles peace treaty, Germany was permanently forbidden to con-
struct fortifi cations or maintain troops on the left bank of the Rhine and 
 6 . For instance, Keeton complains that Briand, by far the most important French politician for 
the purposes of this book, “read little and wrote less” (1987: 107). He “never answered letters 
and never gave written promises” (29). This, he contends, was true of the French as a whole. 
They “committed little to paper, and often discarded what they did” (208). 
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50 kilometers to the east of the river. The left bank was divided into three 
zones, occupied and administered by French, Belgium, and British troops 
and to be evacuated in 1935 provided that Germany met its treaty obliga-
tions. The Cologne zone was set to be freed in 1925, the Koblenz area in 
1930, and Mainz in 1935. The German army was reduced to 100,000, its 
navy was reduced to a token number of ships, and its air force was abol-
ished, all monitored by an Inter-Allied Commission of Control of foreign 
offi cials whose expenses were paid by Germany. The Alsace-Lorraine 
was returned to France, Eupen-Malmedy was given to Belgium, colonies 
were turned over to the allies, upper Silesia was given to Czechoslova-
kia, and unifi cation with Austria was forbidden. West Prussia became 
part of Poland, creating the Polish corridor to the sea and dividing Ger-
many into two noncontiguous parts. Germany lost 10 percent of its pop-
ulation and land. The League of Nations took over the Saar for fi fteen 
years, with control of its valuable coalmines given to the French. Yet the 
French were still obsessed with security and sought a bilateral guarantee 
of its borders from Britain. 
 Figure 4 presents an overview of expectations about the particular 
types of interactions, based on the ideological orientations of the govern-
ments in the three countries. In chapter 3, I compare a coercive bargain-
ing dyad with a liberal dyad (the upper left and lower right boxes in 
 fi gure 4 ) as France and Britain twice engaged between 1922 and 1924 in 
an effort to negotiate an increase in French security, fi rst under rightist 
governments in both countries and then under leftist governments. Un-
able to come to an agreement, they tabled the issue. In chapter 4, I pick 
up the story in 1925 as Germany entered the mix, creating a pragmatic-
integrative Franco-German dyad, a pragmatic-pragmatic Anglo-German 
dyad, and a pragmatic-integrative Anglo-Franco dyad that made value 
creating possible. Here I set the table, making the case that the particular 
combination of diplomatic styles in the three countries laid a fertile foun-
dation for Germany to propose a multilateral security arrangement 
among the three countries, and I consider what might have been had 
other political forces been in power. In chapter 5, the most diplomatic of 
the chapters, I delve deeply into the minutiae of exchanging notes and 
formulating responses that allowed the three countries to get to the table, 
convening formal negotiations. When all sides laid their cards on the 
table, it resulted in the Treaty of Locarno and a dramatic improvement in 
relations that raised the prospect of a complete settlement of remaining 
issues between France and Germany; this is detailed in chapter 6. In 
chapter 7, I show the deterioration of relations following the 1926 shift in 
the French government to the right that turned the tables. As the Franco-
German and the Anglo-Franco dyad shifted to value claiming, the three 
powers found it diffi cult to capitalize on the momentum of Locarno. In 
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chapter 8, I supplement the European cases with one from the Middle 
East. I note how many of the processes discussed in the earlier chapters 
repeat themselves in negotiations between Palestinians and Israelis, indi-
cating the added value of the argument. In the fi nal chapter, I draw les-
sons from the 1920s experience for the Middle East. 
 Appendix: The Political Party Spectrum in Interwar France, 
Germany, and Britain 
 Party positions in interwar France, Germany, and Britain are under-
standable through the political psychological concepts explored in this 
chapter, allowing us partly to infer psychological motivations from ideo-
logical placement, providing this is supplemented with other measures 









































 In Britain, the parties were, from left to right, Labour, Liberal, and 
Conservative. Labour had supplanted the Liberals as the main alterna-
tive to the Conservatives (Tories) by the 1920s. The Liberals had split 
during World War I and played only the most marginal of roles in inter-
war politics. 
 Even the Conservatives in this oldest and most established of democ-
racies represented the ethics of community rather than the ethics of au-
tonomy. The Tories believed that there was a natural and benefi cial 
hierarchy of classes in English society that preserved stability and al-
lowed the community to function effectively as a whole. The interests of 
the nation were more important than that of any individual. Whereas 
radical liberals (and, later, Labour) spoke of rights, conservatives empha-
sized duties and loyalty to the church, king, country and the empire. 
Tories embraced only gradual change because anything else was disrup-
tive to societal stability. They revered the British past and traditions, 
which held society together. Strong authority and law of order were nec-
essary. The Tories were also the strongest advocates of adherence to tra-
ditional moral values (Baker 1993: xiv, 15, 127, 141, 198, 247; Smith 1997: 
79; Hearnshaw 1967: 22–38; Barnes 1994: 315–22). The moral foundations 
and values of the Conservatives, in particular their lack of universalism 
and their intense loyalty to the nation-state, made them the natural party 
of empire (Barnes 1994: 336–38; Smith 1997: 79). 
 Labour represented universalist, self-transcendence values, which 
Jonathan Haidt and collaborators call the ethics of autonomy (Graham, 
Haidt, and Nosek 2009; Haidt, Graham, and Joseph 2009; Haidt and Jo-
seph 2004). The aim of the nationalization of industry, for instance, was 
the creation of a new utopian society marked by solidarity. The Labour 
election manifesto,  Labour and the Nation , identifi ed the egalitarian foun-
dations of its domestic policies: “The Labour Party . . . is a Socialist party. 
Its aim is the organization of industry and the administration of the 
wealth which industry produces in the interest, not of the small minority 
(less than 10 percent of the population) who own the greater part of the 
land, the plant and the equipment without access to which their fellow-
countrymen can neither work nor live, but of all who bring their contri-
bution of useful service to the common stock. . . . It is the practical 
recognition of the familiar commonplace that ‘morality is in the nature of 
things’ and that men are all, in very truth, members one of another” (La-
bour Party 1928). 
 In Germany, the main parties were, from left to right, the Social Dem-
ocratic Party (SPD), German Democratic Party (DDP), Center Party, 
German People’s Party (DVP), and German National People’s Party 
(DNVP). There were also some minor regional parties. The Nazis (Na-
tional Socialist German Workers' Party) also had a small representation 
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in parliament, although not of any discernible infl uence during the pe-
riod under study. 
 The left-right divisions in Germany during the interwar years were 
the starkest of the three countries under study. The core issues were 
social reform, with the looming possibility of a communist revolution, 
and the stability of the recent transition to democracy, with the recur-
ring prospect of a reactionary return to an aristocratic and autocratic 
government. The SPD, DDP, Center Party, and DVP were all committed 
to the preservation of a liberal form of government, that is, to the ethics 
of autonomy. They often came together in great coalitions. The DNVP, 
on the other hand, was largely hostile to the Weimar regime, and this 
intensifi ed greatly in 1929 (Wright 2002; Mommsen 1996; Hiden 1996; 
Craig 1978). 
 However, the DVP, Center Party, and DDP frequently aligned with the 
DNVP on social issues, generally opposing any steps in the direction of 
social democracy, in what were known as bourgeois coalitions. Although 
the SPD was formally a Marxist party, it was not a truly revolutionary 
party, preferring to work within the confi nes of the political system to 
bring about gradual social change while maintaining democracy in a 
way not true of the communists (Eley 2002; Berman 2006; Berger 1994). 
The SPD was the strongest supporter of the Weimar Republic (Berger 
1994: 177). Suzanne Miller identifi es its core principles as the rights of 
democratic freedom, the demands for social justice, and the idea of soli-
darity. In other words, the SPD believed in self-transcendence values 
(Miller 1976: 16–31). It was the most prosocial of the parties. 
 In France, party labels were far more unstable. The French Third Re-
public was highly factionalized. Parties constantly dissolved and re-
formed. Politicians frequently quit their parties to remain in positions of 
power when their colleagues left the government. Fourteen of nineteen 
new interwar parties were formed as breakaways from existing parties; 
the other fi ve were formed from scratch. Names meant little (Kreuzer 
2001: 6). The Left Radicals, for instance, were a conservative and center-
right party. The Radical Socialists were more centrist than the Socialists. 
The term  radical indicates a link with the liberal values of the French 
Revolution. 
 We can, nevertheless, generally distinguish between a left and right 
bloc. The former was composed primarily of the Socialist Party, the pri-
mary vehicle of the French left, and the Radical (sometimes called the 
Radical Socialist) Party, the primary vehicle of the French center-left, or 
liberals. The latter was the equivalent of the British Liberal Party, the de-
fenders of the democratic gains of the French Revolution against its con-
servative and authoritarian opponents. The Radicals shared values with 
the Socialists, although the latter were more extreme (Keiger 1997: 63, 65). 
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They were all in favor of “solidarism,” social reform and welfare to help 
those in need. Their program was “universal suffrage, freedom of the 
press, . . . the separation of Church and State, secular free and compul-
sory schools, income tax, a state-controlled economy, social insurance, 
and far-reaching social reforms” (Kayser 1960: 325). This dual commit-
ment to individual liberty and providing for the less well-off in society is 
an indication of a belief in the prosocial ethics of autonomy. 
 The French right unifi ed under what was called the Bloc National, 
later renamed the Union Nationale. Its constituent parties frequently 
changed their names and used different monikers in and outside of the 
parliament. It represented conservation values, seeking to prevent any 
radical overhaul of French society, particularly in regards to the Church, 
and generally opposing social reform that redistributed wealth and 
power to the masses. Class politics was thought to undermine the soli-
darity of the French people (Keiger 1997: 39, 40, 64). As a consequence of 
its values, the right was more nationalistic and proself in social motiva-
tion. The large number of former military members who served in the 
early postwar right-wing coalitions gave the Bloc National the nickname 
of the “Blue Horizon,” after the color of their uniforms (Keiger 1997 267). 
 For a number of reasons, I have excluded formally communist parties 
from the analysis. First, in no country did the communist parties have 
any effect on outcomes. Second, communists in the three countries were 
universally opposed to any effort at western reconciliation among Brit-
ain, France, and Germany. Such a reconciliation was seen as a precursor 
to a capitalist alliance against the Soviet Union; their position was driven 
not by diplomatic style but by revolutionary foreign policy goals. Third, 
communists fi t uneasily on the left-right spectrum that forms the basis of 
how I capture social and epistemic motivations. It is not the case, for in-
stance, that Marxists are simply more extreme than Social Democrats on 
issues of social welfare—Marxists and Social Democrats are qualitatively 
different (Eley 2002; Berman 2006). The ideology of the former is not 
based on the fundamental value of all human beings. Marxists do not 
have the individualizing moral foundations that are the basis of proso-
cial motivation. They would not score high on self-transcendence. As 
Howard and Donnelly (1986) argue, communist ideology is not based on 
a notion of rights. This is evident in the communist preference for au-
thoritarian government, which would make Marxists more favorable to 
coercive bargaining than liberal diplomacy. Unlike social democracy, 
communist ideology is fundamentally divisive, drawing a strict division 
between the classes. It is not universalist in content, only in application 
(Berman 2006). 
 I stress that I am describing relative differences across the political 
spectrum. It is certainly the case that the ideological fulcrum of left-right 
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varied systematically across countries. The German far right, for in-
stance, was signifi cantly more conservative than the British far right 
during this period. Nevertheless, in all three countries, the points of ide-
ological contestation between left and right were very similar, even in 
Britain—social reform and the extent of democratic participation and 
individual freedom (McCrillis 1998). Social and political egalitarianism 
went hand in hand. “In the Left’s tradition,” writes Geoff Eley, “some 
notion of social justice was practically inseparable from the pursuit of 
democracy” (2002: 18). Even the differences in leftist ideology between, 
for instance, the more radical German SPD and the more evolutionary 
and gradualist British Labour Party are often overstated and belie a set of 
core fundamental values (Berger 1994: chap. 5). 
 Readers might object to the application of the political psychological 
studies on which I rely to a very different period. Studies have consis-
tently shown, however, that, although the issues of political contestation 
have changed over time as democracies have matured and changed, the 
new elements of confl ict are simply grafted onto old political cleavages 
(Kitschelt and Hellemans 1989; Inglehart and Flanagan 1987). For in-
stance, it is not surprising that the left, which historically backed demo-
cratic inclusion and political equality against the right, is now the 





 Tabling the Issue 
 Two Franco-British Negotiations 
 European foreign relations in the wake of World War I were preoccupied 
with the question of French security. This was to great degree the product 
of structural circumstances. Germany was France’s immediate neighbor, 
and France could not take the same wait-and-see approach as Britain. In 
addition, France had suffered losses in the Great War that were dispropor-
tionately larger than those of Germany or Britain. Demographically it was 
estimated that the German population would in a few decades outnumber 
that of France by 20–30 million, giving Germany a decisive advantage, par-
ticularly in the number of men of fi ghting age. Nevertheless, French insecu-
rity was also undoubtedly psychological, a consequence of their wartime 
experience. Arnold Wolfers, whose  Britain and France between Two Wars is 
still, more than seventy years later, the most trenchant analysis of the for-
eign policy of the two countries, writes, “France was obsessed by the fear of 
a new war with Germany,” even though it was “not normal for the policy 
of a great power, especially a victorious power, to be based so openly on the 
fear of future attack by its vanquished opponent” (1940: 11). The French 
saw the Germans as naturally aggressive and bent on revenge. 
 This fear was invariant across the political spectrum. Although politi-
cians were deeply divided on matters of domestic politics during the 
1920s, there was great unity as regards the threat posed by Germany 
(Wolfers 1940: 29). The French left and right had identical foreign policy 
goals and beliefs. 
 France wanted most a fi rm commitment by Britain to protect it in case 
of renewed confl ict with Germany (Wolfers 1940: 76). 1 France simply 
 1. Wolfers writes, “If there was one conviction which all Frenchmen shared, it was the belief 
that outside of their own military preparedness an  entente with Britain must become the 
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could not do it alone. It had made signifi cant concessions on security to 
the allies in the postwar settlement, forgoing the annexation of the Rhine-
land to gain a formal security guarantee from the United States and Brit-
ain. When the Versailles Treaty was not ratifi ed by the United States in 
1919, however, this guarantee fell by the wayside. 
 Members of the British government, composed of a conservative coali-
tion under David Lloyd George, privately expressed a willingness to 
provide a security guarantee even without the Americans. The British 
felt a commitment to the sanctity of the French western borders to be in 
their interest given the changing nature of military technology that made 
the Rhine, rather than the Channel, the new strategic border of Britain. In 
December 1921, they agreed to negotiations with the French, putting the 
issue formally on the table. This should have been an easy case for diplo-
macy given the overlap in interests. 
 Yet a deal was never consummated. How can we explain this unlikely 
failure? The inability to conclude an agreement had major consequences. 
It left Britain without a potential means of restraining France in the lat-
ter’s coercion of Germany to make good on its reparations payments. In 
1923, against British wishes and without British participation, the French 
military invaded and occupied the German Ruhr, seizing industrial as-
sets as compensation for the failure of Germany to pay. 
 In 1924, the issue was put on the table again under much less favorable 
conditions. Anglo-Franco relations were still tense given French behav-
ior vis-à-vis Germany, and the new left-wing Labour government in Brit-
ain had very different foreign policy goals than its predecessor. The 
Labour government under Ramsay MacDonald was generally opposed 
to exclusive alliances, favoring instead more universalist efforts at disar-
mament and arbitration through the League of Nations. The new gov-
ernment of France, a coalition of the left, still badly wanted an alliance, 
but Britain refused to renew negotiations along the lines considered a 
few years earlier because of the change in British interests. 
 Nevertheless, the two sides negotiated a new protocol to the League of 
Nations that was mutually benefi cial to both sides. By making peaceful 
confl ict resolution through means of third-party mediation a require-
ment, the Geneva Protocol institutionalized the peaceful confl ict resolu-
tion that the British left so desired. By providing for League sanctions in 
the case of noncompliance, it met to some degree the French need for 
security. The French also committed to the convocation of a general 
cornerstone of France’s system of security. . . . Her entire post-war foreign policy might 
therefore be characterized not only as an effort to keep Germany in her place but also as a 
continuous struggle to get Britain to pledge her support against Germany” (1940: 76). 
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disarmament conference that the British valued so highly, the successful 
conclusion of which was a condition for the protocol to come into force. 
 The Geneva Protocol episode ultimately ended in failure due to do-
mestic differences over foreign policy. The British Conservatives, who 
returned to power in December 1924, had little interest in a universalist 
scheme that increased British obligations under the League of Nations. 
The security issue was tabled for the time being. But diplomacy had 
brought the two countries to the precipice of agreement before the change 
in government. How was it that the two countries had been better able to 
negotiate a deal when their interests were further apart than when they 
were more closely aligned? 
 Both the successes and failures of bilateral negotiation between the 
two powers can be explained through a focus on diplomatic style. In 
1922, both governments pursued coercive bargaining that we expect 
from conservative parties lower in social and epistemic motivation. Al-
though a simple guarantee was in Britain’s interest, Lord Curzon, the very 
conservative foreign minister, sought to exploit the greater French inter-
est in a pact. He insisted that France make concessions on a host of out-
standing bilateral issues between the two countries before Britain would 
even begin negotiations on the content of a security pact. By rationalist 
logic, the behavior of Britain might not be surprising given its greater 
leverage. But France, even in its much weaker bargaining position, em-
braced a similar style of diplomacy when rationalists would, instead, ex-
pect signifi cant concessions. Governed by a conservative coalition, the 
French also bid high, asking the British for a full-scale alliance in which 
they would coordinate their positions on all major issues and make com-
mitments of specifi c forces to be placed at the service of the French in 
case of aggression. Diplomatic style was not endogenous to structure. 
The conservative premier, Raymond Poincaré, denigrated the British 
offer of a mere security guarantee and pretended not to be interested in 
the conclusion of the pact. The combination led to value claiming nego-
tiation, which left a potentially more benefi cial outcome for both sides on 
the table. 
 When in 1924 the French government again reached out to its wartime 
ally, both France and Britain were governed by parties with a prosocial 
motivation. Just as in psychological experiments in which prosocial 
dyads are better able than proself pairs to reach joint gains through value 
creating negotiation, the French and British left did what their rightist 
counterparts could not do. French and British representatives both made 
signifi cant concessions, indicated their interests honestly and without 
overstatement, and commented on the atmosphere of goodwill and good 
faith. Diplomacy was not epiphenomenal. Despite the now greater dis-
parity in foreign policy preferences, the prosocial character of both 
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governments and their liberal diplomacy facilitated integrative negotia-
tion. Diplomatic style prevailed over foreign policy substance. 
 The Failure: Conservative Governments and 
 the Bilateral Treaty Negotiations of 1922 
 Negotiating with a Big Club: The  Coup de Cannes 
 Given the different structural circumstances of France and Britain, it is 
not surprising from the point of view of formal and rationalist bargain-
ing theory that France fi rst placed the idea of a security treaty on the 
table. The French alternative to no agreement was the exposed position 
France currently occupied vis-à-vis Germany. Even if France overstated 
the threat posed by Germany, Britain was more isolated and therefore 
less concerned about a German  revanche . Premier Aristide Briand, who 
was also serving as foreign minister, explained the French position. 
France had “suffered so much from the proximity of Germany.” It “can-
not contemplate without horror the possibility that such havoc may be 
experienced again. France cannot forget that the German population ex-
ceeds her own by 20 millions; that democracy is still for the great major-
ity of Germans no more than an empty phrase, and this people, highly 
disciplined, industrious, gifted with a fertile genius for organization, but 
dominated by an active political and intellectual propaganda . . . which 
encourages a spirit of aggression and infl ates the desire for revenge, may 
someday render vain the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles.” For this reason, “the best guarantee against any such eventuality 
would be the certainty on the part of Germany that France would not be 
found isolated in the face of a German attack” (Cmd. 2169, No. 35). Bri-
and instructed his ambassador to Britain in early December 1921 to bring 
up the topic of a bilateral alliance informally with the British foreign sec-
retary, Lord Curzon, in a “purely private, unoffi cial and confi dential ca-
pacity” (Cmd. 2169, No. 23). The foreign secretary consented to an 
exchange of views that quickly led to formal negotiations in Cannes in 
January 1922. 
 France’s greater need for security should have made it adopt a concil-
iatory and concessionary diplomacy. Yet, even though France was in the 
role of  demandeur , its initial offer was almost outrageously high. Rather 
than the simple guarantee that had fallen through in 1919, in which Brit-
ain unilaterally pledged to guarantee France against unprovoked aggres-
sion, the ambassador proposed at Briand’s instruction “something much 
more defi nite and precise, nothing less than a defensive alliance” (Cmd. 
2169, No. 23). In a private meeting, Briand suggested a “very broad alli-
ance in which the Two Powers would guarantee each other’s interests in 
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all parts of the world, act closely together in all things and go to each 
other’s assistance whenever these things were threatened” (Cmd. 2169, 
No. 33). And Britain was asked to do this without U.S. help. 
 The French government was pursuing a coercive bargaining style. Bri-
and was historically a center-left politician, a former socialist who had 
left the party when he accepted a ministerial post before the war, some-
thing that was anathema to the socialists at the time (Unger 2005: 78, 98; 
101–2, 181–84; Oudin 2004: 98–99, 120–26, 144–46). After departing from 
his political base he was beholden to a coalition of rightist parties called 
the Bloc National. The moderating force of the French center-left Radi-
cals had left the cabinet in November 1919, leaving Briand as the only 
non-conservative politician in the cabinet. He established an “uneasy al-
liance with a coterie of conservative ministers” (Hall 1978: 1126). 
 The somewhat audacious nature of the French demands became more 
evident in a draft treaty presented in Cannes. France asked Britain to in-
tervene with all its military forces not only in the case of a direct invasion 
of French soil but also in the event of any German violation of its treaty 
obligations to remain disarmed and to keep the Rhineland demilitarized. 
Great Britain and France were also to collectively agree on the strength of 
their respective military, naval, and air forces. France wanted a military 
convention, a specifi c commitment of particular British assets to its de-
fense in advance. France also called for a constant collaboration between 
the general staffs of the two countries. Even the language betrayed the 
bold opening offer of the French. Briand wrote that there was “no more 
effective guarantee of a durable peace than a  vast international arrange-
ment of this nature based on the close union of France and Great Britain” 
(Cmd. 2169, No. 35, emphasis added). France was particularly interested 
in a British guarantee of the security of French allies in Eastern Europe. 
Its proposals made allusions to an agreement of “two stages,” one for 
direct attack on France and the other for indirect attack on French allies. 
The French mentioned Poland specifi cally (Cmd. 2169, No. 23). 
 Briand did moderate his coercive diplomacy with aspects of liberal 
diplomacy. He tried to persuade the British of the advantages of a global 
alliance for Britain. It would allow for France to reduce its land arma-
ments, which was a major British goal (Cmd. 2169, No. 33). It would 
deter the Germans, which was in the interests of Britain as well as France 
(Cmd. 2169, Nos. 23, 33). Briand expressed a willingness to consider side 
payments to the British, calling them an “indispensable part” of an agree-
ment. Briand understood there was “no passion in the hearts of the Brit-
ish” for an alliance, an expression of empathy that took the edge off 
France’s coercive diplomacy (Cmd. 2169, No. 23). 
 For their part, the British were genuinely desirous of a security pact of 
the kind they had been prepared to make in 1919, a unilateral guarantee 
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of French security. It “did not throw heavy obligations upon us” but 
“would be of great value to France,” the cabinet concluded privately (CC 
1 (22)). It would also be in the interests of Britain, as Lloyd George recog-
nized. This kind of guarantee would serve to deter Germany in a way 
that it had not been when Britain had remained noncommittal in the run 
up to the Great War (Cmd. 2169, No. 34). The British cabinet even con-
cluded that it had a “moral obligation” to defend French soil because the 
1919 guarantee had fallen through (CC 1 (22)). The pact was more attrac-
tive if Germany were to subsequently be brought into the arrangement 
through a nonaggression pact with the other Western European powers, 
as Briand thought possible (Cmd. 2169, No. 33). The cabinet believed this 
“would make for a general easement in Europe” (CC 1 (22)). 
 Lord Curzon told Briand that there was “general concurrence” in the 
cabinet that Britain might give France a “complete guarantee against in-
vasion” on its western frontier (Cmd. 2169, No. 33). Nevertheless, as 
Curzon stated, “opinion in Great Britain was hardly prepared for so 
broad an understanding as that” envisioned by France. The British cabi-
net rejected any kind of close military cooperation such as institutional-
ized staff talks or a military convention. It concluded in January that an 
“Anglo-French alliance of a bi-lateral character was open to serious ob-
jections as it would leave us no longer free. France would endeavor to 
induce us to increase our Army so that we should be able to send large 
military forces to the Continent or wherever they were required by 
France” (CC 1 (22)). The British also refused any type of indirect guaran-
tee through a commitment to use force in the event of German violations 
of its Versailles Treaty obligations. The British draft treaty simply stated, 
“In the event of a direct and unprovoked aggression against the soil of 
France by Germany, Great Britain will immediately place herself at the 
side of France with her naval, military and air forces.” Otherwise, it of-
fered only to “concert together” if any treaty provisions were breached 
or consult if there was confusion as to its interpretation (Cmd. 2169, 
No. 38). The cabinet also limited the geographic scope of the treaty, 
concluding it was “beyond our resources to deal with certain military 
problems such as the defence of Poland” (CC 1 (22)). Curzon stated that 
Britain was “not very much interested in what happened on the eastern 
frontier” and even less interested in being drawn into military opera-
tions “in any eventuality” in other parts of the world (Cmd. 2169, No. 33; 
see also No. 34). He spoke of “enormous undefi ned responsibilities” in 
the French scheme (Cmd. 2169, No. 23). 
 Yet, indicative of a coercive bargaining style, the British also decided to 
use the pact to extract other benefi ts. Even though they valued a bilateral 
(or trilateral if, which was possible, Belgium was to be associated) secu-
rity guarantee in its own right, they held it hostage. From the beginning, 
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they linked the successful conclusion of a security agreement with France 
to the resolution of a number of outstanding issues between the two 
countries in the favor of Britain, such as differences over the nationalist 
uprising in Turkey (Hall 1978). At the exploratory meeting with the 
French ambassador, Curzon made this linkage diplomatically but 
unmistakably: 
 I said in conclusion, there was one further question upon which he had not 
touched. Did he contemplate, in his outlook, that the consideration of a 
treaty of alliance between France and ourselves should or should not be 
accompanied by a general clearing up of all the questions upon which we 
disagreed, and which were a source of a good deal of unpleasant bickering 
and quarrel in so many parts of the world? What was the good of an 
 alliance—and indeed, could an alliance be entered into which allowed 
such questions as Morocco and Egypt, to mention two subjects only where 
the French view appeared to be sharply opposed to our own, to remain 
unsettled? If the French Government therefore wished us to examine the 
question of an alliance, they ought to tell us very plainly whether the dis-
cussion ancillary thereto should not embrace the whole fi eld of agreement 
or disagreement between the two Powers. (Cmd. 2169, No. 23) 
 In his formal memorandum to Briand outlining the position to be 
taken by his government at Cannes, the Prime Minister Lloyd George 
stated that the British opposed “any piecemeal treatment of the ques-
tions by which the conference is faced. On the contrary, they consider it 
absolutely necessary that the problem should be treated as a whole.” 
Lloyd George stressed the necessity for Britain, given its heavy reliance 
on trade, of global economic recovery following the destruction of the 
war. He made a security pact contingent on the convocation of a confer-
ence to deal with this question. “Great Britain fully recognizes France’s 
ground for anxiety, and desires to do all in her power to allay it, but she 
cannot agree to postponing the question of the reconstruction of Europe, 
while meeting France’s desires in regard to her reparations and her secu-
rity.” But this was not all. The prime minister called for a “complete en-
tente” that also included a French limitation on submarine construction 
and concessions in the direction of Britain on the Near East problem of 
Turkey (Cmd. 2169, No. 34). 
 As Sally Marks writes, “Clearly, Britain intended to extract a stiff price 
for the limited guarantee of French soil she offered” (1982: 538). Britain 
was governed by Conservatives and a rump Liberal Party that had been 
devastated by splits over policy toward the war. It was effectively a con-
servative coalition, with the Tories supplying the vast majority of the 
ministers. The few Liberals in cabinet came from the right wing of their 
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party that had not decamped to the opposition. Still, given the strength 
of the British bargaining position, the British adoption of a coercive dip-
lomatic style is less surprising than similar behavior by the French. 
 Coercive Bargaining before the Ruhr Crisis: Poincaré’s Diplomacy 
 Briand was punished by the French right for his diplomatic style at 
Cannes. When aspects of the British proposals became public, showing 
that the British were driving a hard bargain, pressure on Briand not to 
concede grew rather than softened. He narrowly escaped a parliamen-
tary recall, but the right-wing French cabinet summoned the premier 
back to Paris. In what was known as the “coup de Cannes,” Briand was 
sacked and replaced by the much more conservative Raymond Poincaré, 
who cabinet members thought would more stubbornly defend French 
interests through coercive bargaining. The phrase played on the triple 
meaning of  Cannes —as a place but also as the French word for a “caning” 
and a “golf club.” Briand had been photographed receiving a golf lesson 
from Lloyd George, which was taken as a metaphor for French subservi-
ence and weakness, drawing nationalist ire. His punishment by the con-
servative cabinet was likened to his being beaten by a wooden stick (Hall 
1978: 4; Keiger 1997: 276). The rightist French government, despite its 
lack of negotiating strength, was not going to simply concede. Because 
no pact had been concluded, Briand was fi red for his diplomatic style 
rather than his foreign policy substance. 
 Poincaré expected a value claiming process in which both sides held 
fi rm, conceding only gradually and out of necessity. He predicted that it 
would not be easy to fi nd common ground (DD, No. 32). He would wait 
for a formal response from Britain “so that we can ourselves measure the 
limit of our concessions” (DD, No. 32). John Keiger writes that Poincaré 
exhibited a “lack of ability to concede points in a spirit of negotiation 
[that] was worsened by a complete lack of tact in expressing his own 
point of view” (1997: 287). He demonstrated a “withering stubbornness” 
(Keiger 1997: 294). The British had anticipated such a shift in diplomacy, 
earlier recognizing that they had an interest in maintaining Briand in 
power. According to Jules Laroche, French bureaucrat, at the now infa-
mous golf outing Briand had gotten in the way of a drive by a member of 
the British delegation. Lloyd George had pulled him quickly back and 
gesticulated at his forehead, saying in broken French: “Watch out, if the 
ball hits here, Briand zap! And then . . . Poincaré!” (in Keiger 1997: 276). 
 The conservative premier had a thoroughly proself motivation in di-
plomacy, writing, “The best way to love mankind is fi rst of all to love that 
portion of humanity which is near to us, which surrounds us and which 
we know best. Instead of scattering our affections and wasting our 
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energies let us concentrate and use them productively in that corner of 
soil where nature rooted us.” This was a moral commitment based on the 
foundation of loyalty. “ La patrie is therefore the material heritage which 
our ancestors have bequeathed to us and which we must, in turn, pass on 
to our descendants. It is not simply our land, it is also our national soul . . . 
 evoked in us by the name of France” (in Keiger 1997: 70). 
 Although it is tempting to reduce his negotiating behavior simply to 
his personality, the new premier’s diplomatic style went part and parcel 
with the psychological motivations embedded in conservative ideology, 
common to the French right. “Poincaré’s  not very original bargaining tech-
nique was to begin by asking for more on the basis of carefully prepared 
evidence in the expectation of settling for less,” writes Keiger (1997: 257, 
emphasis added). This was what his colleagues were expecting from his 
appointment. 
 With Briand gone, there was no longer any check on the conservatives’ 
instincts to engage in coercive bargaining. Poincaré met with Lloyd 
George as the British delegation passed through Paris on its way back to 
London following the aborted Cannes conference. Still a few days away 
from formally taking offi ce, he denigrated the British offer of a guaran-
tee, saying it had “very little effective value in France without a military 
convention,” according to the British minutes of the meeting. “He said 
that he would rather have a military convention without a treaty than a 
treaty without a military convention.” Poincaré described a treaty with-
out a convention as “useless” because the guarantee was “illusory.” 
Rather than a simple promise to come to the aid of France, he wanted 
specifi c commitments from the British as to the military forces they 
would devote to French defense (CP 3612 (22)). 
 When Poincaré offi cially became premier, his government submitted 
to the British another draft treaty that differed little from its fi rst (Cmd. 
2169, No. 39). Britain would still be obliged to intervene militarily in 
cases of violations of the Versailles Treaty. Anything else was “altogether 
insuffi cient security” (Cmd. 2169, No. 40); it “would restrict to a danger-
ous extent . . . the circumstances in which the assistance of Great Britain 
is contemplated,” requiring Germany to actually breach French borders 
(CP 3961 (22); see also Cmd. 2169, No. 41). The French even objected to 
the use of the word  soil by Britain because an attack could come by air or 
sea as well (CP 3961 (22); see also Cmd. 2169, No. 41). 
 The French backed away from a demand for a full military convention 
but called for a formal “entente” between the general staffs in the treaty 
itself, in which the two countries would constantly coordinate military 
plans (Cmd. 2169, Nos. 39–41). The French also spoke of a “general en-
tente,” a pledge to confer together and fi nd a common policy on every 
issue that might endanger the peace (CP 3961 (22); see also Cmd. 2169, 
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Nos. 40–41). This was an effort to extract more British help in the event of 
a German attack to its east (Cmd. 2169, No. 40). Poincaré’s only conces-
sion was to express a willingness to remove the general entente and the 
staff talks from the treaty. They would still, however, be formalized 
through an exchange of letters accompanying the treaty, to be signed and 
published by the two governments (DD, No. 25). 
 Poincaré took all these actions in a security environment that should 
have made him more conciliatory rather than less. This indicates that 
diplomatic style was not endogenous to structure. As discussions with 
the British were taking place, Germany signed the Treaty of Rapallo with 
the Soviet Union, raising the specter of Russian-German cooperation 
against the West. This convinced the French premier that Germany was 
“destined” to disrupt the peace. Yet he believed that it reinforced his ar-
gument about the necessity of a stronger guarantee from Britain in East-
ern Europe and in the Rhineland. He dug in his heels further (DD, No. 
32). Poincaré even referred in private correspondence to the “price” that 
Britain would have to pay for consolidating and tightening the relation-
ship between the countries (DD, No. 37). 
 We might conclude that Poincaré did not in fact, despite the obvious 
French security interest, value a guarantee from Britain or that he radi-
cally misconstrued the bargaining environment. Yet privately the leader 
said that “he would make any sacrifi ce” to gain a pact with Britain 
(Marks 1982: 541). He also understood the weakness of the French bar-
gaining position. Marks writes that the conservative leader “wanted the 
treaty badly but was determined not to appear eager” (1982: 540–41). 
 The lack of fi t between the conservative French  government’s style of 
diplomacy and the French structural position is exposed further by the 
efforts made by Charles de Saint-Aulaire, the French ambassador to Brit-
ain, to soften Poincaré’s position. He cautioned the premier about how 
diffi cult it would be to pass an agreement of the type that he envisioned 
in the British Parliament. He advised that the French should conclude a 
pact as soon as possible, lest the political winds shift unfavorably. Shift-
ing away from coercive diplomacy, St. Aulaire noted to Lord Curzon the 
“high moral value” of a treaty along the lines that Britain envisioned, 
“even if it does not have the precision we would like” (DD, No. 31). He 
tried to reassure the British that Poincaré was in fact eager to conclude a 
treaty and that it was only a matter of extending it for longer than the 
British envisioned (DD, No. 49) He objected to the accusation that the 
French scheme was a “refusal disguised as an offer” (DD, No. 36). Saint-
Aulaire expressed to the British his confi dence that the two sides could 
fi nd a formula that both agreed on (Cmd. 2169, No. 42). His efforts, indi-
cating a more pragmatic and realist style of diplomacy perhaps more 
typical of professional diplomat, were for naught. Poincaré resented the 
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ambassador’s efforts to “make me a part of a conversation that you had 
on the pact” (DD, No. 32). 
 Value Claiming Subtracts Value: The Collapse of Negotiations 
 In the face of French intransigence, the British elected to stall so as to 
coerce the French to make concessions. After he returned home, Lloyd 
George told his cabinet that, given the latter’s weaker bargaining posi-
tion, the British would wait for the French to come to them: “In their 
present hostile attitude towards me it did not seem to be desirable that 
we should take the initiative. After some weeks have elapsed and the 
French began to feel themselves isolated in Europe and began to realize 
that we did not regard the pact as of supreme importance to ourselves, 
it was likely that they would approach us in a more reasonable frame of 
mind” (CC 2 (22)). Lord Curzon reported of the “extreme importance 
which the French Government attach to the conclusion of the Pact, 
upon which the existence of Monsieur Poincaré’s Ministry may be said 
in fact to depend, and left me with the impression that while we hold it 
in suspense . . . we may fi nd in it a powerful level for securing a favour-
able settlement of the other issues” (CP 3664 (22)). He concluded, “It 
would be unwise on our part to abandon the very powerful form of 
pressure which its non-conclusion enables us to exercise” (CP 3760 
(22)). This was a “policy of aloofness” typical of coercive bargaining 
(Cohrs 2004: 39). 
 In another act of coercive diplomacy, the British exploited the parallel 
but separate negotiations with the Belgians to coerce the French in their 
direction. They reasoned that if they could induce the Belgians to accept 
a treaty without a military convention, it would confer “certain tactical 
advantages” in negotiations with the French (CC 2 (22)). And although 
initially the British were inclined to sign a separate guarantee pact with 
the Belgians, who proved more docile in negotiations, they rethought 
their position to put further pressure on the French. British ministers 
realized that securing the Belgian frontier went a long way toward pro-
viding French security and would therefore undermine the value of a 
guarantee by Britain of France. A senior civil servant wrote to Curzon 
that “it might be wise to delay the signature of the Anglo-Belgian pact 
until agreement on the Anglo-French pact was further advanced, as oth-
erwise we might fi nd Poincaré more diffi cult to deal with in view of the 
fact that, as regards her Belgian frontier, France would be automatically 
secure. It seems to me that there is some force in this point.” Curzon re-
plied, “Your point about the Anglo-Belgian treaty is a new one and 




 Curzon also tightened the linkage (CP 3760 (22); Cmd. 2169, No. 44). 
He continued to make any deal with the French hinge on the resolution 
of other outstanding issues between the countries. Curzon, however, did 
not imagine a package deal in which the British gained what they valued 
most while simultaneously conceding what the French most valued. 
Rather, he took an even more coercive line, demanding that France make 
concessions on those items even before renewed discussions of a security 
treaty. Curzon instructed the ambassador: “His Excellency, I said, would 
remember that when the subject was fi rst discussed with M. Briand at 
Cannes the British Prime Minister had clearly laid down that the ground 
must be cleared of certain matters still in dispute between the two Gov-
ernments before the Pact could be concluded. . . . When the whole of 
these matters had been concluded then would be the time to resume the 
discussion . . . of the Pact” (Cmd. 2169, No. 45). 
 Here Lord Curzon seems to have been acting on his own authority and 
in line with his own more conservative ideology. His biographer, Harold 
Nicolson, who also worked with him in the Foreign Offi ce, observes that 
Curzon embraced the moral foundations of loyalty, authority, and the 
ethics of community that drive a proself motivation in diplomacy (Nicol-
son 1937: 13). Curzon believed that “God had personally selected the 
British upper classes as an instrument of the Divine Will. It was inter-
preted in terms of unsparing self-sacrifi ce, of a religious ideal of duty” 
(1937: 16). He was a “nationalist and an imperialist to the depths of his 
soul” with little sympathy for prosocial sentiments that took others’ in-
terests into account (1937: 42–44). The foreign secretary was not prag-
matic, Nicolson claims: “Curzon . . . was not by nature and adaptable 
man. . . . He never learnt the . . . lesson of contemporary politics, namely 
that elasticity is the supreme advantage” (1937: 13, 32). He once said, 
“There are two constituents of successful diplomacy. . . . One is knowing 
one’s own mind, the other is letting other people know it” (in Nicolson 
1937: 43). 
 Yet, even though British behavior was consistent with rationalist bar-
gaining theory, it was ineffective against the French conservatives, given 
their simultaneous adoption of coercive diplomatic style. Even though 
he lacked the bargaining strength, Poincaré acted as indifferently as the 
British. So as not to appear too eager for the conclusion of a pact, thereby 
reducing French leverage, he cautioned his ambassador to remain pa-
tient and to not make any offers until there was a formal British response 
to the French proposal. It was “not for us to remind them” of the French 
interest in the pact (DD, No. 28; see also Marks 1982). When Poincaré met 
Lloyd George in Boulogne, the prime minister raised the security issue at 
the beginning of the meeting, according to minutes. But the French pre-
mier deferred the question and never brought it up again, except to 
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express feigned regret that they might have discussed it “had there been 
time” (Cmd. 2169, No. 45). As the pressure grew on the French govern-
ment, the premier did ask his ambassador to seek a formal reply from the 
British to his draft treaty (DD, Nos. 30, 32) and instructed him to reveal 
to the British how much the French would value an alliance (DD, No. 33). 
He asked the British to restart conversations (DD, Nos. 35, 46) but never 
made any further concessions to sweeten the deal. 
 Coercive diplomacy by both sides meant that negotiations were 
marked by a spirit of value claiming, making agreement more diffi cult. 
The Poincaré government rejected any linkage between completion of 
the treaty and the side payments that the British were connecting to the 
security arrangement (DD, Nos. 24, 31; CP 3961 (22); see also Cmd. 2169, 
No. 41). The French ambassador to Britain cautioned against the appear-
ance of  marchandage —that is, haggling or wrangling. This association of 
independent issues could create an impression of “an exchange of 
money.” This was, of course, exactly the British intention. The side pay-
ments were not extremely costly to France. The exasperated French am-
bassador asked how the British could allow a problem such as Tangiers 
to be the cause of delay given that there was no comparison in terms of 
its importance. The treaty should not be subordinated to a “second rate 
question,” he argued (DD, No. 31). Yet it was precisely the triviality of 
those other issues that should have made conceding easy for France had 
French decision makers been using a different diplomatic style. 
 The interactions were colored by emotion, not pragmatism. The French 
warned that the British coercive linkage could lead them to reject a treaty 
simply out of principle (DD, No. 31). Indeed, the French conservatives 
felt that Britain owed France, given the sacrifi ces France had made at 
Versailles in return for a security guarantee that had never materialized 
in 1919 (DD, No. 31). 2 At one point Poincaré said, “It would be the worst 
blunder to seem to be begging for friendship and to forget who we are, 
what we value, and that which we can do” (in Wolfers 1940: 92). Poincaré 
also engaged in a petty quarrel with British representatives. He felt 
 insulted that they had not formally replied, and he would not revisit his 
offer until they did (DD, Nos. 28, 32; Cmd. 2169, No. 37). 
 For their part, the British conservatives reacted sharply to Poincaré’s 
accusation that a British pledge to come to the aid of France was not 
 suffi ciently valuable. “It would be much better to trust to the honour of 
England,” Lloyd George advised the French premier. “The important 
thing was Britain’s pledge.” France should “take the word of the British 
 2 . France had wanted to occupy more German territory, even annex part of the Rhineland 
either for France or to place it in the hands of an international authority. It had relented only 
in exchange for an Anglo-U.S. security guarantee. 
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Empire, the value of which, and the strength behind it, she knew. . . . If 
the word of the British people was not suffi cient for France, he feared 
that the Draft Treaty must be withdrawn.” Lloyd George threatened that 
“if France was not satisfi ed with the promise of England to put all her 
forces at France’s side, there was really no possible basis for a genuine 
accord between the two countries. . . . It only remained for M. Poincaré to 
communicate those views [offi cially]” (CP 3612 (22)). This emotionalism 
undermined the pragmatic diplomacy that might have facilitated a mu-
tually benefi cial agreement. 
 The British concluded that the French were uninterested in an agree-
ment. Lloyd George told his cabinet colleagues, based on his experience 
at Boulogne, that Poincaré did not “put much stress on the conclusion of 
the Pact. . . . He could easily have discussed the matter at Boulogne had 
he so chosen” (CC 29 (22)). Marks writes that the French premier had 
“overplayed his air of indifference and convinced British leaders that he 
did not want a pact” (1982: 540). With Poincaré remaining steadfast, Cur-
zon informed the French in June that there would be no pact because it 
hinged on the prior resolution of other issues. “The prospect of an early 
settlement of these questions is, I regret to say, far from hopeful, largely 
owing to the attitude of the French Government; and in these circum-
stances no useful purpose would be served by pursuing further, at pres-
ent, the conversations on the subject of the treaty of alliance,” he wrote. 
“I should be glad if your Excellency would take an early opportunity of 
impressing on M. Poincaré the unaltered determination of His Majesty’s 
Government to clear up the outstanding questions at issue between our 
two countries before entering upon a renewed discussion of the treaty” 
(Cmd. 2169, No. 47). 
 Although the door had been left just slightly open by the British, Poin-
caré slammed it shut. Referring to the “declared indifference of the French 
Government,” the conservative leader maintained his course and dealt the 
fi nal blow to any prospect of a security treaty (DD, No. 42). He expressed 
the same view that he had earlier, that “in the form presented to him . . . he 
attached no importance whatever” to a pact. “France was absolutely indif-
ferent as to whether there was a Pact or not” (Cmd. 2169, No. 48). He deni-
grated the value of any British commitment, stating that everyone “well 
knew that Great Britain would be found at her side if she . . . were again 
attacked by Germany, since in the future, even more than in 1914, any at-
tack against the French frontier would directly imperil the equilibrium of 
the world and the safety of Great Britain herself. Above all, the Pact would 
have a moral effect on Germany. That result, though admittedly impor-
tant, would not be of a nature to justify France in making any sacrifi ce of 
her essential interests” (Cmd. 2169, No. 49 (appendix)). The British and 
French did not take up the issue again until Poincaré had left power. 
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 They had missed an opportunity. British and French decision makers 
both subsequently expressed the opinion that had it not been for the “up-
heaval in France,” by which they meant the ideological shift in the French 
government, they would have successfully negotiated a treaty. Briand 
later referred to the “folly of the decision taken in Paris at that moment to 
render null the negotiations at Cannes” (CP 105 (25), minutes of the De-
cember 16, 1924, Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) meeting). Of 
course, the British were also partially responsible. Had they proposed to 
resolve the issues they linked to the security pact simultaneously at a 
conference such as the one in Cannes, reaching an agreement might have 
been easier. Value claiming made a win-win integrative deal impossible. 
Diplomacy had an effect on value, although in this case by subtraction, 
impeding what should have been a somewhat easy case for success. 
 The Near Success: Leftist Governments and the Geneva 
Protocol of 1924 
 The period immediately following the collapse of negotiations was 
perhaps the nadir of interwar French relations, culminating in the Bloc 
National government’s occupation of the Ruhr, over British objections, as 
a means of pressing Germany to pay its reparations. But by the time the 
pact issue was reopened, there had been signifi cant changes in the gov-
ernments of both countries, a shift from the right to the left in 1924. The 
Conservative government in Britain was defeated by the Labour Party, 
which formed a weak minority government relying on the parliamen-
tary support of what was left of the Liberals. In France, a new electoral 
alliance composed of the center-left Radicals and the Socialists took over 
from the Bloc National. The two countries tried again to fi nd common 
ground, this time with a very different diplomatic style. 
 The liberal diplomatic style of Labour was consistent with the overt 
prosocial motivation of the party in domestic and foreign affairs. Schol-
ars of the Labour movement agree that the party advocated internation-
alism and nonviolence in foreign policy, the natural expression of its 
self-transcendence values and the moral foundations of avoiding harm 
and caring for others (Naylor 1969: chap. 1; Gordon 1969: chap. 1). La-
bour consciously sought to reform (indeed, create) international society 
in the same way and on the same principled basis as it was doing at 
home—through cooperation and justice (Gordon 1969: 6). Naylor writes 
of the party’s “belief in human brotherhood” (1969: 9). 
 In its wartime blueprint for a postwar order,  Labour and the Peace Treaty , 
the party lamented the prevailing view of international relations before 
the war, in which the security and prosperity of one was thought to mean 
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the poverty and insecurity of the other (Labour Party 1919). The “Labour 
Party . . . took it for granted that national interests and international ob-
ligations coincided,” writes Michael Gordon (1969: 17). Party members 
had a prosocial motivation that sought to maximize joint benefi ts. They 
rejected a zero-sum framing of international relations, adopting instead 
a win-win heuristic conductive to integrative negotiating. Gordon writes, 
“[I]t is necessary to try to get at Labour’s understanding of discord and 
confl ict in political life. . . . To put it simply, the party regarded confl ict as 
unreal, illusory, mistaken.” The party believed in a “profound truth 
about life: namely, when two or more individuals (or nations for that 
matter) fell out with one another, the resulting discord was unnecessary. 
It was a mistake—the disputants didn’t really understand or appreciate 
each other’s objectives” (Gordon 1969: 17). 
 Gordon directly fi ngers the liberal origins of the diplomatic style: The 
“heart of Labour’s understanding—is that harmony (cooperation, ac-
cord) was alone natural. . . . The disputants had only to discover the com-
mon good which was at the same time their own highest good. . . . There 
was nothing new about this notion. Far from Labour inventing it, a doc-
trine postulating an ultimate harmony of interests was part and parcel of 
the whole Liberal metaphysic that sprang out of the . . . Enlightenment. . . . 
It is hardly surprising that Labour absorbed this doctrine, given its intel-
lectual indebtedness to classical liberalism in so many areas of its 
thought” (1969: 40–41). 
 Labour also came into the government with very different foreign pol-
icy goals than the Conservatives. The party had long advocated the abo-
lition of war as a means of resolving confl icts between states. Labour 
believed that the disarmament of Germany should be accompanied by 
universal disarmament (Labour Party 1919; Naylor 1969, chap. 1; Gor-
don 1969: 39–42; Winkler 1994: chap. 2). It called for the elimination of 
conscription and the private manufacture of arms. After the war, Labour 
also placed great stress on the League of Nations. Gordon writes, “La-
bour spokesmen continually referred to the League as the focus of an 
already existing ‘community of nations.’ Peace was indivisible, interna-
tional cooperation was inevitable, world opinion was real and could be 
counted on” (1969: 16). 3 
 3. Although the Labour Party had been cool to the League of Nations in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, seeing it as the continuation of the wartime alliance dedicated to 
preserving the status quo for the victors (Winkler 1994: 38; Naylor 1969: 7–8), it gradually 
warmed to the idea of making the League an “organ of international justice, inclusive of 




 Just a few months after Labour came to power, the conservatives in 
France were also replaced, by a leftist coalition called the Cartel des 
Gauches. 4 The Cartel was originally led by Edouard Herriot, who took 
on the posts of both premier and foreign minister. The Radicals supplied 
all the ministers, and the Socialist Party merely provided the votes neces-
sary for a majority in the French parliament (Keeton 1987: 11; BDFA, Part 
II, Series F, Vol. 17, No. 91: 381). Liberal republican values and socialist 
ideology were quite compatible, with differences mostly centering on 
whether change was best accomplished through participation within the 
normal political process (Unger 2005: 78, 98; 101–2, 181–84; Oudin 2004: 
98–99, 120–26, 144–46). 
 France was more structurally constrained by material factors—the po-
tential power of Germany and its proximity—than Britain. The left was 
just as terrifi ed of a German  revanche as the right was and therefore just 
as fi xated on guaranteeing French security. All parties on the left but a 
small Socialist minority had supported the Ruhr invasion. Herriot told 
Ramsay MacDonald, who also held both the positions of prime minister 
and foreign minister, “My country has a dagger pointed at its breast, 
within an inch of its heart. . . . I think that I should not have done my duty 
towards my country if I did not place Germany in a condition to do no 
harm. . . . If there was a new war, France would be wiped off the map of 
the world. . . . One takes precautions against common criminals” (PRO 
30/69/123, C 11976/70/18). Herriot continued at another meeting with 
the British: 
 What Germany lacked at the actual moment was leaders. . . . If a new Bis-
marck appeared, there would be a good reason to fear that a war-like pol-
icy would instantly make its reappearance. . . . In ten years’ time Germany 
would be faced with a terrible temptation. France would then be in a bad 
situation; fi rstly because the classes of military age would have few 
 effectives—they would be the generation born during the war. . . . The dan-
ger was accordingly not one of the morrow. It was for ten years hence. That 
was what it was the duty of a French Government to think of. That was the 
peril against which it had to forearm itself. (DBFP I, Vol. 26, No. 508). 
 Briand said the same (Keeton 1987: 90); fear of Germany was hardly con-
fi ned to the French right. British representatives reported back to London 
 4. It was composed of the Group du Parti radical et radical-socialiste (the Radical Socialists, 
sometimes simply known as the Radicals), the Groupe du Parti socialiste-unifi é (the 
Socialists), and the much smaller Groupe du Parti républicaine-socialiste (the Radical 
Republicans) (BDFA, Part II, Series F, Vol. 17, No. 91: 381). 
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that “the security question would be as vital for the next French Govern-
ment as for that of M. Poincaré.  Even the Socialists made it a corner-stone 
of French foreign policy” (BDFA, Part II, Series F, Vol. 17, No. 91: 307, 
emphasis added). 
 The Cartel des Gauches had preferences identical to the Bloc National 
coalition. It insisted on strict German compliance with Versailles, in-
cluding complete disarmament to the letter. There would be no early 
evacuation of the Rhineland. The French government hoped to secure 
the right to permanently monitor German compliance with its treaty 
obligations, particularly the demilitarization of the Rhineland, through 
League auspices after the withdrawal of the Interallied Military Control 
Commission (BDFA, Part II, Series F, Vol. 17, No. 91: 309). And, like the 
Bloc National, the Cartel des Gauches placed most value on an alliance 
with Britain. Herriot proclaimed after taking offi ce, “It is necessary to 
choose between the reestablishment of the interallied entente and the 
maintenance of unilateral action” (in Wolfers 1940: 59). Briand said that 
a pact with Britain “ought to take precedence over all the other prob-
lems, because it is like the  sine qua non of everything else” (in Keeton 
1987: 108). 
 Herriot sought to obtain what Poincaré had not. Early on, he resusci-
tated the idea of a bilateral treaty, telling Prime Minister MacDonald that 
he aimed to “remain faithful to the ideas which the pact prepared at 
Cannes had endeavoured to crystallise” (DBFP I, Vol. 26, No. 508; see 
also PRO 30/69/123, C 11976/70/18; Stambrook 1968: 235). Given, how-
ever, the change in foreign policy goals that resulted from the ideological 
shift from right to left in Britain, the British were no longer interested in 
such an arrangement. British and French preferences were further apart 
than when the Tories and Bloc National governed. MacDonald would 
not countenance a traditional bilateral alliance or pact because it was in-
consistent with the Labour program. The party had argued against an 
alliance with France since the end of the war as part of a general rejection 
of “partial” military arrangements that would perpetuate the pursuit of 
national armaments and the creation of hostile blocs. Labour had come 
out specifi cally against the Cannes proposals in 1922 (Winkler 1994: 86–87). 
MacDonald told Herriot that an alliance would provide only a “false se-
curity” (PRO 30/69/123, C 11976/70/18). 
 MacDonald instead suggested a more inclusive solution: “We wish to 
draw to our side the greatest possible number of friends,” he explained. 
“When all that has been done, we shall be able to defy all the fomenters 
of trouble. This is, perhaps, a very vast conception of broad policy and 
continuous collaboration. . . . I am convinced that it is only in this way 
that we shall obtain the defi nite peace which we all desire” (PRO 
30/69/123, C 11976/70/18). “Security for Great Britain did not mean 
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hastening to the side of France if she was attacked,” MacDonald be-
lieved. “The problem was vaster” (DBFP I, Vol. 26, No. 508). 
 MacDonald proposed as an alternative an arrangement constructed 
within the League of Nations. Noting that the two countries had failed to 
agree at Cannes, he concluded, “It was therefore useless to continue 
along a way which led nowhere. . . . Other means must be found. In that 
connection there was perhaps an issue; it was the League of Nations 
which supplied it. . . . Through the channel of the League of Nations on 
the one hand, through that of disarmament on the other, the solution of 
the problem would be attained, but if [the French] confi ned themselves 
within the actual limits and went on talking about a Franco-British Pact 
of Guarantee, they would only meet with a check” (DBFP I, Vol. 26, No. 
508). MacDonald’s notion was vague at the time, but he proposed that he 
and Herriot, while attending the upcoming League Council meeting in 
September, announce their desire “to create a system which would not be 
limited to two countries but which would include the other nations; for 
in contributing to the solution of the general problem each country 
would contribute to solve the problem for its own benefi t” (DBFP I, Vol. 
26, No. 508). 
 Therefore, it was on the basis of a strengthening of the League of Na-
tions that there was a possible agreement between a leftist British gov-
ernment and a leftist French government (DBFP I, Vol. 26, No. 508). 
Nevertheless, their interests were still far apart. The French, even the 
right, saw the League differently than the British did, as the nucleus of 
what they sometimes called a “general alliance” that could bring in more 
help in the event of German aggression, thereby preserving the favorable 
status quo. (Wolfers 1940: 25, 31, 153, 162; Gordon 1969: 52, 58; Keeton 
1987: 103). In keeping with this conception, the French sought to increase 
the coercive powers of the League, that is, the automaticity and the force 
of its sanctions provisions (Wolfers 1940: 153–58; BDFA, Part II, Series F, 
Vol. 17, No. 91: 308). In addition, the French still envisioned a bilateral 
alliance that would serve as a stopgap during “an intermediary period to 
be traversed, during which France would be unprotected . . . before ar-
riving at this ideal state of affairs” (DBFP I, Vol. 26, No. 508). If there was 
to be an agreement, it would depend on interaction of the diplomatic 
styles of the two governments and the spirit of negotiations that emerged. 
Whereas their interests diverged, their liberal diplomatic styles were 
now aligned. 
 Bridging the Gap: Integrative Negotiation at the League of Nations 
 At the beginning of the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations, Mac-
Donald gave a rousing speech calling for a revision of the Covenant to 
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require compulsory arbitration. As it then stood, members of the League 
were supposed to submit disputes that might lead to the outbreak of an 
armed confl ict to some form of confl ict resolution—judicial if they were 
matters of international law, arbitration through experts or the League 
Council consideration if they were solely political matters. Were the 
Council members 5 to fi nd themselves unable to form a unanimous judg-
ment about how the confl ict should be resolved, however, war was legal 
under the terms of the Covenant. And even after a determination had 
been made through one of these mechanisms, war was still allowed fol-
lowing a three-month “cooling off” period. League members simply 
agreed not to materially help the state that did not comply with the 
decision. 
 MacDonald proposed to plug what was called the “gap” in the Cove-
nant by requiring states to arbitrate all of their disputes, even if the 
Council could not agree. The prime minister was essentially attempting 
to outlaw war by institutionalizing liberal diplomacy—the impartial, de-
liberative, and reasoned resolution of political confl icts. He spoke of dis-
pute settlement “not of a military kind but of a  rational and judicial kind” 
(Marquand 1977: 353). MacDonald highlighted how such an approach 
would be based on the open and reasoned exposition of competing argu-
ments between two sides. “The test is, Are you willing to arbitrate? The 
test is, Are you willing to explain? The test is, Will you come before us 
and tell us what your propose to do?” (in Marquand 1977: 353). The 
prime minister argued that by removing grievances in this way, nations 
would feel the security that made global disarmament, the other major 
Labour goal, possible (Walters 1952: 269). 
 The French found MacDonald’s vision lacking. Herriot’s speech placed 
emphasis on the sanctions that would follow any violation of the terms 
of the Covenant. Consistent with the French focus on security, Herriot 
proclaimed that arbitration was not enough and that France would “re-
gard these three terms—arbitration, security and disarmament—as in-
separable.” If the League did not back its obligations with force, 
arbitration could become a “snare for peaceful nations” (in Marquand 
1977: 353). The leftist coalition government was fi ne with compulsory 
dispute settlement, provided that League members also increased the 
sanctions in the Covenant for noncompliance (Walters 1952: 269). 
 Despite these very different positions, the two nations drafted a joint 
resolution embodying the points of both governments and calling for 
immediate negotiations to revise the Covenant in this direction. Two 
League committees, one dealing with sanctions and the other with 
 5. Under the Covenant, only those who were not party to the dispute were allowed to 
deliberate. The parties involved were forced to abstain. 
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arbitration, set to work at once to devise a new mechanism that would 
blend French and British interests. Indeed, these countries often took the 
lead in private meetings, and their common position was presented to 
the others. Britain was represented by Arthur Henderson and (Charles 
Cripps) Lord Parmoor, prominent Labour politicians; France was repre-
sented by Briand, the former premier, and Joseph Paul-Boncour, Socialist 
member of parliament. The delegates agreed to negotiate a voluntary 
supplement to the Covenant that could be signed, ratifi ed, and applied 
by members of the League that consented. But they also would make a 
later effort to incorporate its provisions into the Covenant so that all 
members would eventually fall under its rules. The instrument became 
known as the Geneva Protocol. 
 The almost impromptu nature of the negotiations meant that the 
British and French representatives did not have approved negotiating 
platforms. The British delegation, for instance, was given almost com-
plete discretion; it merely reported the minutes of the committee meet-
ings. The Foreign Offi ce and the prime minister’s secretary limited 
their responses mostly to continual reminders that any draft agreement 
was subject to government review and eventually the approval of 
Parliament. 6 
 The French and British delegations believed that negotiations in Ge-
neva were marked by a value creating spirit based on joint liberal diplo-
macy. Paul-Boncour stated at the fi rst meeting, “He desired to put before 
the committee the ideas of the French delegation, and he was not going 
to withhold any part of them. It was not part of the policy of the French 
delegation, as used to be the fashion in the old form of negotiations, to 
withhold something in order to have something to bargain with. The 
French delegation wanted to put all their cards on the table; their desire 
was to collaborate whole-heartedly in any modifi cations that the com-
mittee might wish to put forward and to see to arrive at some agreed text 
which would reconcile all views” (FO 371/10570, W8159/134/98). This 
 6. It was “premature to subject this draft to close criticism,” wrote Foreign Offi ce bureaucrats 
on September 24 (FO 371/10570/W8146). The Foreign Offi ce “acted on the assumption that 
they were not required to offer any observations on the proceedings of the British delegation, 
and they have therefore taken no initiative.” There was “nothing to be done until something 
complete and defi nite has emerged.” “In the meantime, it has been made clear by the British 
delegates that anything they agree to is subject to the covering approval of His Majesty’s 
Government” (FO 371/10570, W8281/134/98). Only when the navy objected to a pledge to 
submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court on International Justice on 
questions of international law arising out of actions taken under League Covenant 
obligations did London intervene in the negotiations. The British delegation noted a 




might, of course, have been cheap talk, but it was seconded in private by 
Henderson, who paid tribute to the “spirit . . . amongst the members of 
this subcommittee” (FO 371/10570, W8146/134/98). Francis Walters, the 
foremost historian on the League and personal witness to many acrimo-
nious sessions in Geneva, writes that “they worked with extraordinary 
concentration, with frankness, good temper, and a sincere desire to reach 
agreement. . . . They threw off the artifi cial courtesies of diplomatic 
usage: they were frequently to be seen in shirt-sleeves, and to be heard 
addressing one another by their surnames alone” (1952: 272). In short, 
reasoned dialogue prevailed. 
 One might argue that it was the alignment of the bargaining positions 
of the two sides that made negotiation easier, that diplomacy was epi-
phenomenal. But that had certainly not been enough two years before, 
and the French and British ideal points were now considerably further 
apart. MacDonald later recounted, “This was not a mere evolution of 
good will like the pentecostal peace that we read about in the Acts of the 
Apostles. Not at all. The greeting was cold and critical, but that changed” 
( Hansard , Series 5, Vol. 182: col. 345). He situated that description in a 
general understanding of relations with France that indicated a win-win 
heuristic characteristic of liberal diplomacy: “French interests are not al-
ways the same as ours. I have said so in public several times and in pri-
vate very often. But France has got no interest so diverse from ours that 
France and ourselves, approaching the problem in a friendly spirit, can-
not fi nd agreement upon it. I am profoundly convinced of that. It may 
take us six months to fi nd agreement. That does not matter. I am certain 
that agreement is there if the situation be properly handled on both 
sides” ( Hansard , Series 5, Vol. 182: col. 345). 
 The two sides somewhat easily settled on a mechanism by which 
states were obligated to submit all disputes to some form of nonviolent 
resolution. Any issue not taken up by the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice or through arbitration by independent experts was to be 
brought before the League Council. If the Council unanimously agreed 
on the measures to be taken, its decision was to be binding and no re-
course to war would be allowed. And if the Council was divided, par-
ties could not proceed to settle the question militarily, as was currently 
the case. Rather, they would be obligated to forward the question for 
arbitration. This ensured that all confl icts would be resolved rather than 
left open. And it provided a simple mechanism for establishing the ag-
gressor in any situation, a problem that had vexed previous negotia-
tions—it was the power that refused peaceful confl ict resolution (Walters 
1952: 268–75). 
 Differences between the two countries centered on the sanction for non-
submission or noncompliance. For the French, a mere legal commitment 
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was “not enough by itself.” Rather, they wanted to “make it certain that 
those who refused arbitration would have to face the full consequences of 
their act. . . . Those nations must become convinced that they would fi nd 
all the other nations of the world prepared to compel them to accept the 
arbitration which they had refused” (FO 371/10570/W8159). The French 
wanted both nonsubmission and noncompliance to automatically lead to 
a total severing of economic and fi nancial ties with the aggressor of the 
kind identifi ed by Article 16 of the Covenant. This was to be the case even 
if the state not living up to its commitments had not yet used force. The 
French also wanted to more precisely specify the exact obligations for 
League members to add to the organization’s deterrent effect. There was, 
the French explained, “danger in employing terms of a general nature. An 
aggressor State would be tempted to think that, if two great nations like 
France and Great Britain could not agree exactly on what action they were 
going to take against a breach of the peace, it was worth taking the risk of 
common action by the members of the League being prevented by dis-
agreement on the actual mode of procedure. What the French Govern-
ment wanted to do was to prevent the possibility of aggression” (FO 
371/10570, W7877/134/98). 
 This was a common French position. The French left and right had 
very similar foreign policy goals. The Foreign Offi ce noted that French 
views did not “differ in any important respect from those of previous 
French Governments which have been in power since the armistice” (FO 
371/10571, W9571/134/98). British civil servant Alexander Cadogan 
wrote, “If anything emerged from the debate, it was only the rather fa-
miliar fact that the French require a measure of security satisfactory to 
themselves before they will consent to disarmament” (FO 371/10570, 
W7877/134/98). 
 The British, however, made signifi cant concessions to the French on 
security in a way that the previous government under the Conservatives 
had not. Henderson admitted that “adequate sanctions should be pro-
vided for seeing that award or decision should be carried out.” Indeed, 
he argued, “It was advisable, where possible that sanctions should come 
into operation  ipso facto without the necessity of further confi rmation” 
(FO 371/10570, W8159/134/98). In other words, the Council would not 
have to meet and unanimously agree to institute economic sanctions. 
Henderson was actually the fi rst to point out a contradiction in the text 
that unintentionally implied an authorization session would be neces-
sary, for which the French were grateful (FO 371/10570, W7877/134/98). 
Henderson supported the French desire to make it clear that Article 16 
entailed automatic obligations. The British delegate did maintain that 
states in noncompliance with their obligations, either to consent to dis-
pute resolution or comply with its outcome, would have to fi rst use force 
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before being branded an aggressor subject to sanctions (FO 371/10570, 
W8897/134/98). Nevertheless, the protocol was still a remarkable exten-
sion of British obligations for ensuring European and even global secu-
rity in that it multiplied the potential number of infractions that would 
call Article 16 into play for Britain. 
 The extent of British concessions on sanctions might have just as much 
to do with Henderson’s personal views and foreign policy goals as it did 
with the liberal diplomacy my theory expects of a leftist government of-
fi cial. He was known, in contrast to MacDonald, to believe that obliga-
tions undertaken under the Covenant must be backed by force to be 
effective (Winkler 1994: 4–5, 16, 90). In contrast, the prime minister, more 
of an antimilitarist, thought that the very practice of arbitration, if given 
a chance, would become a “new habit of mind” (Gordon 1969: 2). But 
archival research reveals that even the prime minister had telegraphed 
acceptance of the compromise formula on sanctions reached with the 
French during the negotiations, subject to the understanding that it 
would depend on parliamentary ratifi cation and therefore “stand or fall 
with the rest of the draft” (FO 371/10570, W7877/134/93). 
 Henderson was also accommodating on the issue of the status of alli-
ances in relation to the new protocol. Always eager for certainty, the 
French wanted explicit permission in the Geneva Protocol for states to 
devote specifi c forces to be placed at the discretion of the League Council 
in case the League decided to use military sanctions. Only then, they ar-
gued, would they feel the security necessary for them to disarm. They 
also offered an amendment allowing states that were victims of aggres-
sion to put into place prearranged military plans among smaller groups 
of countries (FO 371/10570, W7992/134/98). Essentially the French 
wanted to add a loophole in the protocol allowing military alliances. 
 Henderson initially objected, consistent with the long-standing oppo-
sition of his party to military alliances. He expressed his “regret that the 
members of the committee have not seen their way clear to make this 
instrument an instrument where the League will act as a whole, instead 
of dividing up into regional alliances. . . . I think we should have rather 
taken the line at which I hinted yesterday afternoon and this morning, of 
trying to get rid, once and for all, and as soon as possible, of all sectional 
alliances. The League ought to stand solidly as a whole. . . . I regret that 
we cannot see our way to the League acting as a whole and to putting 
our faces like fl int against anything like the old balance of power” (FO 
371/10570, W7992/134/98). Henderson suggested an amendment stat-
ing that, because members could devote forces to the League, “no agree-
ment shall in the future be concluded between States members of the 
League providing for military action to be taken by them.” This would 
have effectively made military alliances illegal for parties to the protocol 
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(FO 371/10570, W8067/134/98). He quickly relented, however, and ac-
quiesced to the French position. “I accept it in order to show that I am 
anxious to conciliate in this committee,” he stated (FO 371/10570, 
W7992/134/98). A spirit of value creating was prevailing. 
 The French, in turn, conceded on an issue important to the British. 
Henderson was not eager for his country to assume new obligations to 
enforce the Geneva Protocol without the guarantee that others would 
agree to disarm, the primary British security goal. Lord Parmoor stressed 
the linkage among the three items of “arbitration, sanctions and disarma-
ment.” The fi rst two were “a step towards what is the real subject we are 
upon—namely disarmament. . . . We must have disarmament as an in-
separable link with arbitration and sanctions before anything becomes 
operative for the work we are now doing. If disarmament is not carried 
out, all our work comes to nothing.” The British would not agree to take 
on a greater role in providing security if there were no concessions in this 
regard. Parmoor explained, “The States who agreed to the proposal were 
giving up part of their sovereignty by accepting arbitration, and were 
incurring very heavy obligations in regard to sanctions. . . . It was very 
diffi cult to give sanctions such as those envisaged in an armed Europe” 
(FO 371/10570, W8063/134/98). The British took the line that the Ge-
neva Protocol should come into force only provided that members of the 
League successfully concluded the general disarmament agreement fore-
seen in the Covenant itself but that had not come to fruition. The British 
were suggesting a package deal that created value. 
 The French, not surprisingly, wanted the additional security provided 
by the new treaty (and, more specifi cally, Britain) as soon as possible and 
did not want it made conditional on disarmament negotiations that were 
likely to be thorny, diffi cult, and protracted. Without disarmament, how-
ever, there would be no win-win, value creating aspect of the Geneva 
Protocol. Henderson suggested a compromise. Preparations for a disar-
mament conference would begin immediately, the parties would assem-
ble in only a few months, and Britain would ratify the protocol in the 
interim, giving France greater assurance of British intentions. But Britain 
would only deposit the treaty, thereby making it operational, in the event 
of a successful disarmament agreement. This limited, to some degree, 
French concerns about the British commitment. 
 This was not an extractive linkage but, rather, an integrative one. The 
British were not withholding something from the French that was not of 
value to them. And had the Labour representatives used coercive bar-
gaining, they would have refused to discuss enhanced sanctions until 
disarmament was complete. But, rather than hold the security issue hos-
tage to coerce France in particular to disarm, Britain revealed its private 
position on security, allowed negotiations on sanctions to proceed, and 
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even made signifi cant concessions before any disarmament program 
was in place. The French were appreciative and did not hold out for 
more. They accepted the British offer gracefully and even “rendered 
homage to the great effort of conciliation made by the British delega-
tion.” In response, the British representative, Lord Parmoor, expressed 
his gratitude for the conciliatory way in which Paul-Boncour “had re-
ceived the suggestion” (FO 371/10570, W8063/134/98). 
 The results of these concessions by both sides was, in David Mar-
quand’s words, an “adroit, indeed a brilliant compromise between Her-
riot and MacDonald—between the French fear that they might be left 
alone with resurgent Germany, and the old U.D.C. [Union for Demo-
cratic Control] 7 doctrine that military pacts led to war” (1977: 355). Wal-
ters calls it “highly ingenious” (1952: 272). “At a stroke, it hoped, in 
accord with socialist prescriptions, to satisfy the French yearning for se-
curity . . . and to boost internationalism by amending the Covenant and 
enhancing the League’s authority,” writes Gordon (1969: 49). In the terms 
of this book, the two sides created value through an integrative deal that 
had not been possible between the conservative Poincaré and Lloyd 
George governments. The two sides made signifi cant concessions, trad-
ing issues of less importance for what they desired most. They had 
solved a puzzle through reasoned dialogue. 
 Special Agreements for Special Needs: The Tory Rejection 
of the Geneva Protocol 
 The fate of the Geneva Protocol was still very uncertain. Eager for 
greater security, the French signed the fi nal draft of the protocol imme-
diately. But given the unconventional way in which it had been negoti-
ated, the British government had not subjected its provisions to a 
thorough dissection. Foreign Offi ce bureaucrats indicated in their notes 
to one another in London during the conference that much of their un-
derstanding of its contents came from press reports (FO 371/10570, 
W8281/134/98). On the completion of the negotiations, the Foreign Of-
fi ce began to prepare for the review of the protocol, fi rst by the Commit-
tee of Imperial Defence (CID) and then by Parliament (FO 371/10570, 
W8487/134/98). 8 
 7. The Union for Democratic Control was an extraparliamentary pressure group advocating 
“liberal” positions on foreign policy, most notably democratic oversight of foreign policy. The 
organization was closely aligned with Labour after the war. 
 8. There were major objections on the part of the armed services, which feared greater 
international commitments to enforce the peace. Foreign Offi ce bureaucrats opposed the 
radical departure of the protocol from traditional diplomacy. Nevertheless, MacDonald’s 
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 As Henderson and Parmoor negotiated in Geneva, however, early 
elections were called in Britain. When the latter sent a memorandum to 
MacDonald rebutting the objections of the navy to the proposed protocol 
in late October, the Foreign Offi ce prepared a curt response: “Reply say-
ing that next week we may be defeated” (Marquand 1977: 356). The For-
eign Offi ce understood the consequence of that outcome for the fate of 
the protocol. “We must wait and see what government will be in offi ce 
after the election,” they wrote in internal correspondence (FO 371/10571, 
W9571/134/98). The election returned a majority Conservative govern-
ment under the leadership of Stanley Baldwin, which then had to com-
plete the government review. 
 For the Conservatives, a detailed examination was hardly necessary. 
The Tories rejected the Geneva Protocol because of their substantial for-
eign policy differences with Labour rather than variation in diplomatic 
style. The Conservative government had no interest in any universal ar-
rangement such as the protocol. This was the position taken in private 
and in public. Lord Curzon complained that it “cuts a slashing gash into 
the root of national sovereignty, that it involves a very serious loss of 
national independence, and that it does convert the League into the very 
thing we have always been trying to avoid, namely, into a sort of super-
State” (CP 105 (25), minutes of December 4, 1924, CID meeting). The 
Conservatives preferred traditional alliances. Foreign Secretary Austen 
Chamberlain said that “the way to promote the peace . . . is by proceed-
ing from the particular to the general. . . . The reason why the Covenant 
fails is because we undertake equal obligations in respect of matters in 
which we have a vital concern and matters in which we have no concern 
whatsoever, except as one society of nations” (CP 105 (25), minutes of 
February 13, 1925, CID meeting). He complained specifi cally that the 
protocol obligated Britain to help Eastern Europe “when those who sup-
port it say that it is impossible that we should undertake a similar guar-
antee for the Eastern frontiers of the countries bordering on the Channel” 
(CP 105 (25),  minutes of December 16, 1924, CID meeting; see also DBFP 
I, Vol. 27, Nos. 180, 300). 
biographer concludes that he would have probably accepted it, provided it was altered to meet 
the objections of the armed services and the dominions (Marquand 1977: 356). Indeed, 
following the Tory dismissal, MacDonald planned a major campaign in support of the 
protocol (ADAP A12, No. 162). The National Executive of the party and the General Council 
of the closely related Trades Union Congress proclaimed that they “should do everything in 
its power to obtain the acceptance of the principles of the Protocol” and “strongly oppose any 




 The Geneva Protocol, however, created a profound diplomatic problem 
for the Conservative government, which agreed that it needed an alterna-
tive lest it be blamed for shattering the world’s hopes for security and 
peace. The meetings of the Committee of Imperial Defence were preoc-
cupied not with the merits of the protocol, which it soundly rejected, but 
with the question of whether Chamberlain’s formal refusal at the March 
1925 meeting of the League Council should be accompanied by some sort 
of compromise alternative (CP 105 (25), minutes of December 4, 1924, and 
February 19, 1925, CID meetings). 
 Here Austen Chamberlain, the center-right and pragmatic foreign 
secretary, left his fi rst mark on British diplomacy. He said that “to turn 
down the Protocol . . . is quite the easiest of the decisions that we have 
to take, and that act by itself, unaccompanied by anything else, would, 
in my opinion, be an absolute disaster” (CP 105 (25), minutes of De-
cember 16, 1924, CID meeting; see also DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 180). The 
cabinet agreed, concluding “that the Geneva Protocol is open to grave 
and objection and cannot be accepted” but also that “a reply to the 
League in the form of a simple rejection of the Protocol, without any 
attempt to pave the way to some alternative plan in regard to the vital 
question of national security, is to be deprecated as calculated to pro-
long the present state of insecurity and tension in Europe which it is 
the aim of His Majesty’s Government to allay” (CC 12 (25)). The British 
needed a “constructive policy,” wrote Chamberlain (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 180). 
 The Conservative government settled on a general formula, an-
nounced by Chamberlain at the League, to supplement the Covenant 
with “special arrangements in order to meet special needs” (CP 136 (25); 
see also DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 349;  Hansard , Series 5, Vol. 185: cols. 1560–
62). Countries should not be asked to undertake universal obligations. 
Instead, he proposed “knitting together the nations most immediately 
concerned” (CP 136 (25)). More specifi cally, although the British “could 
not accept an extension to every frontier of obligations of the most seri-
ous kind, they could properly undertake such obligations in that sphere 
with which British interests are more closely bound up, namely, the 
frontier between Germany and her western neighbors” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 349). 
 Even though both of these cases ended in failure, they demonstrate 
how value creating differs from value claiming and how variations in 
social motivation lead to distinct diplomatic styles between the left and 
right in the same country. These were pronounced enough even to over-
come the effects of the distribution of interests. The two cases also lay the 
groundwork for the next chapter, providing the historical context for the 
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extremely domestically and diplomatically diffi cult position that the 
British found themselves in following the rejection of the protocol. 
The Conservative government needed an alternative to the Geneva Pro-
tocol consistent with its conception of British foreign policy interests. 




 Setting the Table 
 German Reassurance, British Brokering, and  
 French Understanding 
 France in 1924 was still preoccupied with security and terrifi ed of Ger-
many. In the winter, at French insistence, the allies announced that they 
would not evacuate the fi rst zone of the Rhineland occupation area, cen-
tered around Cologne, as scheduled in 1925. The Treaty of Versailles 
gave them the right to maintain their forces in German territory if Ger-
many did not disarm completely. The allied decision demonstrated the 
depth of the problem posed by French insecurity. The German infrac-
tions were for the most part trivial. Given French fears and the allies’ 
position of strength, German leaders fretted that foreign troops might 
remain on German soil indefi nitely. In addition, the post of foreign sec-
retary in Britain had been taken up by Austen Chamberlain, in the past 
a strong and consistent voice for a bilateral entente with France. The 
possibility of a Franco-British alliance threatened a further deterioration 
of the already prostrate German position (Jacobson 1972: 10–12; Grat-
wohl 1980: 62–63; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 97–113; Vermächtnis II: 73–80; 
Wright 2002: 303). 
 The German foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, sought through di-
plomacy to reverse the declining fortunes of Germany and its persistent 
role as the “object’ of international negotiations. He wanted Germany to 
be a subject, demonstrating its own agency (Jacobson 1972: 10–12; Grat-
wohl 1980: 62–63; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 97–113; Vermächtnis II: 73–80; 
Wright 2002: 303). Stresemann wrote of “fundamentally changing the 
situation” (Vol. 2: 88–95) and avoiding “passive purposelessness” (Vol. 2: 
225). “German foreign policy need not be inactive,” he wrote (Vermächt-
nis II: 171). To reassure France, and to block a Franco-British alliance, 
Stresemann proposed a multilateral security pact in which France and 
Germany would both legally renounce the use of force to change their 
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mutual border, backed by a British guarantee of both sides against ag-
gression from the other. 
 The chances of success were slim. The French would have to enter an 
agreement with their most hated and feared adversary and face the 
prospect of armed military action against them by a German-British 
combination. The British would have to make a commitment on the con-
tinent they had so far been reluctant to give. And Franco-German rela-
tions were at a nadir. The failure by Germany to pay its reparations on 
time had led the conservative Poincaré government in 1923 to move 
French occupation forces deeper into Germany territory, seizing the in-
dustrial Ruhr area as compensation. German passive resistance, marked 
by the refusal of German workers to report to their jobs in factories held 
by the French, was bankrolled by printing money. This hyperinfl ation 
ruined the German middle class and further poisoned relations with the 
French. This type of animosity and mistrust made value creating very 
diffi cult. 
 Making things even more diffi cult, Germany had little to offer. To con-
vey its vulnerability, the German foreign minister referred to his pro-
posal as  das Kind (“the child” or “the baby”) (Stambrook 1968). How 
would Stresemann be able to keep his progeny alive long enough to de-
velop and thrive? Strese mann was armed only with diplomacy. 
 Stresemann’s proself motivation and high level of epistemic motiva-
tion, consistent with the ideology of his party, led him naturally toward 
a realist diplomatic approach. Stresemann was a center-right politician 
and leader of the DVP (German People’s Party). Given the very weak 
German position, realism dictated that returning Germany to its former 
position as a great power required conciliation rather than confrontation. 
Stresemann’s pragmatism allowed him to put himself in the French posi-
tion and realize that French insecurity was the source of German prob-
lems. Only when France felt secure could it be led to withdraw its troops 
from the Rhineland and take a softer line on the longer-term ambitions 
of Germany, particularly to revise the territorial settlement in Eastern 
Europe and regain its former lands with large numbers of German 
inhabitants. 
 His proposal was an expression of pragmatic statecraft in which Ger-
many would surrender something of value now for greater gains down 
the line. It was a costly signal of reassurance. The pact amounted to the 
de facto recognition of the loss of Alsace-Lorraine to France. And the Ger-
man foreign minister also offered to conclude arbitration treaties with the 
eastern neighbors of Germany so that its efforts would not be seen as a 
ruse to tie France up legally while Germany turned its sights in the other 
direction. The foreign minister believed that, by making concessions, 
Setting the Table
[89]
Germany would create the rapprochement and trust that would allow 
France to ease and end the Rhineland occupation early. He was setting 
the table for future gains. 
 Rationalists might argue that Germany, given its weakened state, sim-
ply had no other options. Its conciliatory diplomacy of concessions was 
structurally determined. This is belied, however, by the opposition that 
Stresemann faced in cabinet from his coalition partners, the DNVP (Ger-
man National People’s Party). This far-right party, with a low epistemic 
and a proself motivation, embraced coercive diplomacy even though 
Germany had little leverage. Although Stresemann shared all the goals of 
the DNVP—unifi cation with Austria, the rectifi cation of eastern German 
borders, and the early end of the occupation—the nationalists wanted a 
resolution of all these issues quickly and without any signifi cant German 
concessions, much less unilateral ones. Consequently, Stresemann found 
support from the centrist parties in his coalition and the socialist opposi-
tion in the legislature. 1 Diplomacy was not endogenous to structure. 
 The German gambit came at precisely the right moment for the British, 
who were struggling to articulate an alternative to the Geneva Protocol. 
Austen Chamberlain, center-right politician and British foreign secretary, 
was an ideological fellow traveler. He had a two-stage strategy of, fi rst, 
reassuring France and, then, bringing Germany into a new Concert of 
Europe in which the three powers would institutionalize the quiet, pri-
vate, and pragmatic diplomacy of the post-Napoleonic period. With the 
long-term perspective facilitated by a high level of epistemic motivation, 
Chamberlain believed the return of Germany to great power status was 
inevitable, so pragmatism dictated that its main concerns be addressed 
lest it turn violent. Britain would pay the present price of guaranteeing 
the European status quo for the future gain of European peace, which 
was in the British interest. 
 The right-wing members of the conservative British cabinet opposed a 
guarantee of French security at the current time. They shared Chamber-
lain’s foreign policy goal of improving relations between France and 
Germany but did not share his diplomatic style. The more conservative 
Tories wanted to withhold British willingness to make such a commit-
ment until later in the negotiation process to extract as much as possible 
from the French. Only the foreign secretary’s threat of resignation led 
Britain to reveal its preferences and make such a commitment before for-
mal negotiations began. By making such a pledge, British brokering 
 1. The Communists opposed any rapprochement with the West, seeing it through their 
Marxist lenses as the precursor to a capitalist alignment against the Soviet Union. 
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contributed to constructing a zone of possible agreement between the 
French and the Germans. The realist diplomacy of Britain was a neces-
sary condition for successful agreement. 
 Value creating, however, requires reciprocation by others. Therefore, it 
was crucial that the French government still be led by the left-leaning 
and more prosocial Cartel des Gauches. Although distrustful of Ger-
many, the coalition still engaged in liberal diplomacy, which led the Car-
tel to explore the German proposal rather than dismissing it outright. As 
coercive bargainers, the French right derided the signifi cance of the Ger-
man offer; it did not see the German offer as a costly signal. Had it been 
in government, the diplomatic style of French conservatives would have 
strangled Stresemann’s baby in its cradle. 
 German Reassurance 
 Stresemann’s Realism in Theory: Recognizing German Weakness 
 The origins of the German initiative cannot be understood without ref-
erence to the pragmatic statecraft of the German foreign minister, Gustav 
Stresemann. The man himself constantly described his approach as 
“sober realpolitik” (in Wright 2002: 285). Stresemann’s realism is evident 
in his insistence on putting vital interests fi rst, a careful “ordering of pri-
orities” as Robert Gratwohl (1980: 120) puts it. In an indictment of coer-
cive bargaining, the foreign minister cautioned that “a nation must not 
adopt the attitude of a child that writes a list of its wants on Christmas 
Eve, which contains everything that the child will need for the next 
fi fteen years” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 221; Wright 2002: 345). Good diplo-
macy “depends . . . on the actual restriction of these aims, and the conse-
quent abandonment of a policy that attempts to advance in every 
direction at once” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 159; Jacobson 1972: 116). 
 Separating vital interests from more peripheral ones was particularly 
important given the disarmed state of Germany (Vermächtnis II: 172). 
Realism required an objective view of German options that was “con-
scious of the limitations on our power” (Wright 2002: 298). “Power poli-
tics works to our disadvantage presently,” Stresemann wrote. “It is 
necessary to draw the consequences from that in order to be able to 
move forward, as diffi cult as it is to admit” (Vol. 2: 88–95). Lacking mili-
tary might, Germany needed to develop friendlier relations with other 
nations: “Progress within the sphere of these foreign-political aims is 
not dependent on warlike resources, which German lacks. But it does 
depend on co-operation and understanding with the Powers whose de-
cision on these questions is essential for its attainment” (Stresemann, 
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Vol. 2: 159). Cooperation would bring greater gains than saber-rattling. 
He wrote that “abroad, we have at present neither political power nor 
infl uence. You can conduct successful policy only if you have one or the 
other or the fi rst through the second. The only policy which can succeed 
is that which aims to become a worthwhile ally for other nations” (in 
Wright 2002: 285). 
 Stresemann was therefore carefully attuned to situational constraints. 
He was inspired by the example of Otto von Bismarck, as a “master of 
the art of the possible” (Wright 2002: 267). He admired the former chan-
cellor’s ability to adapt to circumstances and conditions, quoting him in 
public that “consistency in a politician must mean that he had only one 
idea” (in Wright 2002: 329). Stresemann himself was constantly adjust-
ing: “I frankly declare that it is to-day not possible to lay out a programme 
of policy, because in certain circumstances events dash onward like a 
torrent, and in others, barely trickle forward at all” (Vol. 2: 225). 
 This was, of course, not a principled commitment to cooperation but, 
rather, an instrumental one: “The preservation of peace and the attempts 
to secure it are not weakness, are not timidity, they are the realistic recog-
nition of our own national interest,” Stresemann said (in Wright 2002: 
472). In his famous letter to the crown prince, Stresemann wrote that his 
fi rst priority was the “assurance of peace, which is an essential promise 
for the recovery of our strength” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 503). Stresemann’s 
diplomacy was thoroughly proself in its social motivation. Nations “are 
always egoists,” he claimed, and cooperative relations with other states 
depended on “parallel interest” (in Wright 2002: 344). Under his leader-
ship, Germany sought “understanding and peace because we need both” 
(in Wright 2002: 298). More specifi cally, but in a similar vein, he said: “If 
I am told that I pursue a policy friendly to England, I do not do so from 
any love of England, but because in this question German interests coin-
cide with those of England, and because we must fi nd someone who 
helps us” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 225). 
 Although Stresemann was deeply discontented with the current cir-
cumstances of Germany, he recognized that changing them would be a 
long-term process (ADAP B1/2: 665–69; Wright 2002: 285). Expressing 
frustration with that long “Christmas list,” Stresemann said, “In foreign 
politics I often have the feeling that I am being confronted with such a 
list, and that it is forgotten that history advances merely step by step, and 
by Nature not by leaps and bounds” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 20). 
 The foreign minister recognized that not everyone in his country was 
similarly pragmatic and unemotional. It was “a diffi cult inner burden,” 
as he put it, for many Germans to admit their current circumstances and 
to remain patient as Germany overcame its obstacles and achieved its 
objectives one by one. Stresemann cautioned that they had to objectively 
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evaluate their situation, “which will not change any time soon” (Ver-
mächtnis II: 73–80). Emotion was the enemy of pragmatism. “We are let-
ting ourselves be led too much by our feelings,” he wrote. “If our policy 
is driven by our feelings, then we have to reject diplomatic relations with 
the world. . . . That will not get us anywhere” (Vermächtnis II: 173–74). 
“One cannot make foreign policy or domestic policy with sentimental-
ity,” he advised his compatriots. “It is a question of adopting realpolitik” 
(in Wright 2002: 298). Stresemann preached sober and calm diplomacy. 
“It would be wrong to indulge in too much indignation,” he wrote in his 
diary. “We should rather try to dispose of the matter on a common-sense 
basis, by negotiation” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 21). In true pragmatic fashion, 
Stresemann thought the ends would justify the means, only in this case 
the means were cooperative. The foreign minister told German audi-
ences: “Do not always worry about the [cooperative] methods so long as 
one is moving forward. For in the end success decides which methods 
are right” (ADAP B1/2: 665–69). 
 Statecraft required attentiveness to the interests of others. Strese-
mann lamented previous German failures to do so, even when Ger-
many was a great power. “We are not yet so great that we can ignore all 
this, and I believe that, in earlier days when we were great, we should 
have often held a different position in the world if we had paid more 
attention to this world atmosphere and other such considerations” 
(Stresemann, Vol. 2: 196–204). 
 The foreign minister was the architect of German foreign policy but 
throughout had the wholehearted backing of his parliamentary caucus, 
something that had not been true on domestic political issues at other 
points during Weimar Republic. Stresemann was the founder of the 
DVP, which occupied a center-right position in the party system and 
therefore combined a proself motivation in international affairs with a 
high degree of epistemic motivation that made it supportive of Strese-
mann’s realist diplomacy. As he saw it, the DVP, along with the centrist 
parties, would mediate between the far right and the left to allow “that 
great diagonal without which no  statesmanlike policy can be conducted” 
(Wright 2002: 276, emphasis added). Before the December 1924 elec-
tions, at the DVP conference, Stresemann opposed a right bloc or left 
bloc, instead backing a coalition of bourgeois parties united behind a 
foreign policy of “national realpolitik” (Wright 2002: 298). 
 Stresemann also had the consistent support of Hans Luther, the chan-
cellor at the time. The head of the German government was also politi-
cally of the center-right but refused party affi liation throughout his 
career, making him an ideal selection for coalitions ostensibly composed 
of experts rather than party offi cials. Consistent with his political ideol-
ogy, he was a pragmatist. Luther disliked doctrinaire thinking, seeing it 
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as an impediment to solving practical problems (Clingan 2010: 2, 4–5, 9, 
19, 23, 32, 55). C. Edmund Clingan writes, “Luther lived a variety of lives, 
but there were consistent traits. The fi rst trait was fl exibility” (2010: 7). 
 Stresemann’s Realism in Practice: Acknowledging French Fear 
 The most vital interest for Germany was regaining “the sovereignty of 
Germany on German soil” (Jacobson 1972: 8; ADAP B1/2: 665–69), the 
easing and eventual termination of the French occupation of the Rhine-
land, and the assurance that there would no future incursions into Ger-
man territory such as the Ruhr invasion. Stresemann put it more 
colorfully before nationalist audiences. He called the Rhineland the 
“burning wound on the German body” (Vermächtnis II: 88–95). Strese-
mann wrote to the crown prince: “The most important thing . . . is the 
liberation of German territory from any occupying force. We must fi rst 
get the stranglehold from our neck” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 503–6; see also 
Jacobson 1972: 42). Only then could Germany turn toward longer-term 
German goals, particularly the revision of the eastern borders of Ger-
many with Poland and the return of ethnically German majority areas to 
the Reich, aims that Stresemann shared with the nationalist right (Strese-
mann, Vol. 2: 503–6; Wright 2002: 268). 
 France was the primary obstacle to restoring Germany to its former 
great power status (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 158). Given the present weakened 
state of Germany, however, only a policy of reconciliation was possible. 
Stresemann advocated “reaching an understanding with France as the 
most stubborn opponent of international German renewal, thereby lay-
ing the foundation for German viability” (Vermächtnis II: 171). 
 Stresemann’s high degree of epistemic motivation, which he shared 
with the German center-right and left, allowed him to see that, even in its 
current preeminent state, France required reassurance given its fear of an 
eventual German  revanche . In his diary, Stresemann revealed that he per-
sonally thought that the French fears were irrational: “How far the mad-
ness has gone in France may be seen from the statement of a deputy in the 
French Chamber that Germany is to-day better equipped for a war than 
she was in 1914,” he wrote. “We ourselves know that we have no weap-
ons . . . so that the way stands open for a Polish march on Berlin. . . . 
Anyone who ventured on even a defensive war would be sending his 
men to certain death” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 15). More irreverently, he wrote 
in a private letter: “The fact that in France the idea of security should still 
beset people’s minds is comprehensible, though absurd” (Stresemann, 
Vol. 3: 421). He complained that the France maintained its troops in Co-
logne “because twenty thousand rifl e-barrel castings have been found 
somewhere” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 15). 
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 Yet pragmatically Stresemann recognized that the Germans “shall do 
no good by ignoring this attitude. The other Allies will have to take it 
into account” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 15). He set about trying to fi nd some 
way of resolving French fears. “We must . . . ask ourselves whether the 
question of French security, this nightmare of a future German attack, all 
these modifi cations regarding the control of the Rhineland . . . whether 
all these obsessions could be abolished,” he wrote (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 
64; Jacobson 1972: 9). He had “security dilemma sensibility” (Booth and 
Wheeler 2008). 
 A more secure France would be less intransigent regarding the remain-
ing disarmament questions that were postponing the evacuation of Co-
logne. Through diplomacy, Germany could avoid the strict interpretation 
of the Versailles Treaty and forestall the implementation of the perma-
nent disarmament-monitoring regime that the French desired (Ver-
mächtnis II: 88–95). It might also eventually allow for the alleviation of 
the stringent conditions under which the Rhine population lived, per-
haps even an early end to the occupation in the other zones (Cohrs 2006: 
228). In a memo to the German ambassador to France, Stresemann ex-
plained that the issues of the Rhineland and disarmament had to be un-
derstood as part of a general problem of security. The French would not 
leave the occupied areas unless “beforehand something in the general 
security question occurs” (ADAP A12, No. 22). Without security, the 
French would forever fi nd reasons to drag their feet in leaving the Rhine-
land, perhaps, Stresemann and others feared, even staying beyond the 
date that was foreseen in the treaty (ADAP A12, No. 67). The French 
could always fi nd some legal pretext for extending their stay (ADAP 
A12, No. 67). 
 A fearful France would also block any efforts by Germany to redraw 
its eastern borders. The settlement of the western situation was neces-
sary for the resolution of the eastern (Cohrs 2006: 251; Wright 2002: 306). 
A peaceful transformation through diplomacy would be possible only “if 
[Germany] had previously effected a political understanding with all the 
world Powers who would have to decide the matter.” France was the 
most important (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 215; see also Wright 2002: 342; Strese-
mann, Vol. 2: 73–80). Were he to successfully steward Germany toward 
better relations with Britain and France, it would have the “best and 
friendliest relations with those world powers” when it raised border 
questions down the line (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 73–80). France had estab-
lished a system of alliances and agreements with the eastern neighbors of 
Germany, the Little Entente, as a second-rate replacement when the 
United States and the United Kingdom failed to provide the guarantee 
promised in 1919. Pragmatically, Stresemann explicitly thought in terms 
of a gradual progression of steps (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 503–6; Cohrs 2006; 
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Wright 2002: 327). He asked rhetorically, “But what stands in the way of 
a strengthening of Germany? What stands in the way of a recovery of 
German soil . . .? What stands in our way is the eternal anxiety that if this 
60-million nation becomes a 70-million nation. . . . The moment the inces-
sant threat of war on our western frontier ceases to exist, this argument 
is no longer valid” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 221). 
 The Price of Realism: The Costly Signals in German Memoranda 
 In the deteriorating context sketched in the introduction, Stresemann 
proposed to bring about a rapprochement in Franco-German relations 
and open up opportunities for Germany to secure other longer-term in-
terests by offering France a security pact. The two nations would pledge 
not to use force to alter their common border. France and Germany 
would also negotiate arbitration treaties establishing procedures to settle 
their bilateral disputes peacefully. Other interested parties, the most im-
portant being Great Britain, could be drawn in to guarantee, with force if 
necessary, the integrity of the present territorial status quo against any 
aggressor, whether it be France  or Germany (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 189; 
ADAP A12, No. 64). 
 Recognizing that Great Britain was crucial to the success of such a proj-
ect, the Germans ran the idea by Chamberlain fi rst. Stresemann’s fi rst 
memorandum framed the issue as providing security for France. He 
began, “The present acute questions of disarmament and evacuation are 
frequently considered in France from the standpoint of security against 
possible aggressive intentions on the part of Germany. For that reason it 
would probably be easier to fi nd a solution for them if they were com-
bined with an agreement of a general nature, the object of which would 
be to secure peace between Germany and France.” In an indication of his 
instrumental empathy, Stresemann wrote that “Germany is perfectly 
ready to take this [French] point of view into consideration. She is anx-
ious to see the problems arising between her and France dealt with by 
no other method than that of friendly understanding” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 189). 
 After sounding out the British, the Germans sent a similar memo to the 
French. When transmitting the document, Stresemann instructed his am-
bassador in Paris to describe it as a “sign of our goodwill,” in spite of the 
very diffi cult and fraught relationship that prevailed currently between 
the two countries. Herriot had just recently given a sharp speech critical 
of Germany before the French parliament (ADAP A12, No. 67). In his 
conversation with the French premier, the German ambassador explicitly 
acknowledged French security concerns and pledged the willingness of 
Germany to begin open, fundamental, and discreet conversations to 
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improve bilateral relations, perhaps even somehow making use of the 
preferred French vehicle, the Geneva Protocol (ADAP A14, No. 80; see 
also ADAP A12, No. 64). In his memo to the British, Stresemann wrote 
that, given the desire for peace of all involved, “a secure treaty founda-
tion . . . cannot be diffi cult to fi nd” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 189). Rather than 
stressing, as one would using a coercive bargaining strategy, the great 
distance between the positions of each side, the Germans minimized the 
differences between the parties. 
 The German note contained two concessions meant as costly signals. 
First, the acceptance of the current territorial status quo between Ger-
many and France amounted to a German “renunciation” of Alsace-
 Lorraine, the former German territory that many Germans still coveted 
and considered ethnically German (Gratwohl 1980: 78). The very offer by 
Germany of a security pact amounted to a concession of a long-standing 
German goal before any formal negotiations even began, one that would 
be particularly diffi cult for the nationalist right in the German governing 
coalition to accept. Rather than retaining all items as bargaining chips in 
a coercive diplomatic style, Stresemann let go of one without simultane-
ous reciprocity to demonstrate his cooperative intentions. The foreign 
minister used the German term for “renunciation,”  Verzicht , in his guide-
lines to his ambassador, although not in the written note presented to the 
British and Germans (ADAP A12, No. 67). 
 In a second costly signal in his memos, to alleviate French concerns 
that Germany was simply trying to neutralize the French militarily by 
treaty so that Germany could move with force against the east, Strese-
mann offered to negotiate arbitration treaties with any other states that 
desired them, a clear reference to the eastern neighbors of Germany 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 189; ADAP A12, Nos. 64, 67). Although these would 
not lock in the current territorial status quo, as the western agreement 
would (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 73–80, 88–95), this was nevertheless a conces-
sion, particularly given the special importance that nationalist Germans 
placed on the recovery of these territories, through force if necessary. It 
was meant again as a “sign of good faith” (ADAP A12, No. 99). German 
representatives were told to continually stress pacifi c German intentions 
in this regard (ADAP A12, Nos. 67, 99). 
 Honor and Dignity: German Nationalist Diplomacy 
and the Battle of the Proselfs 
 Might this simply have been the only way to respond to the particular 
structural circumstances of Germany? In other words, would a foreign 
minister or government of any ideological stripe have been forced to 
pursue such a policy? After all, what other options did such a weak 
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country have? Rationalists and realists would emphasize these structural 
constraints in an explanation of German behavior, in which case diplo-
macy was simply endogenous to the distribution of power. 
 Had there been no room for agency, however, we would observe cross-
party consensus on the course Germany should take, particularly among 
those who bore the responsibilities of governing. Yet a clear contrast in 
diplomatic style can be seen between Stresemann, his DVP, and his cen-
trist allies, on the one hand, and their coalition partner, the highly conser-
vative DNVP, on the other. The nationalists were the largest non-Socialist 
party in the German parliament and the most signifi cant right-wing 
party in the country, dwarfi ng the only nascent Nazi movement. 
 As a rightist party, the DNVP shared the proself motivation of Strese-
mann and the DVP and their foreign policy goals—the restoration of 
Germany as a great power. They had identical foreign policy ends in 
mind—the most important being the return or incorporation of German-
speaking populations in Eastern Europe and Austria, the revision of bor-
ders with Poland, and the pursuit of colonies. Yet the DNVP consistently 
opposed Stresemann’s realist diplomacy. The nationalists preferred a co-
ercive diplomatic style of direct confrontation with Britain and France 
and opposed Stresemann’s pragmatic statecraft. Gratwohl writes, “It 
was the old story of catching bees: the Nationalists wanted to use vine-
gar; Stresemann preferred to use honey” (1980: 120). The nationalists 
wanted to “refi ght the war through the diplomacy of confrontation in 
order to assert Germany’s rightful place in the sun” (Gratwohl 1980: 119). 
 The difference was epistemic motivation. Stresemann criticized the na-
tionalists for their lack of pragmatism. They lacked objectivity, setting 
their immediate sights too high and not coming to terms with the weak-
ened state of Germany. “That Germany is completely disarmed and can-
not contend with other great powers at its current strength is only 
contested by a few fools hoping for a miracle,” he wrote in an anony-
mous article (Vermächtnis II: 170–75). At a party conference, Stresemann 
spoke of a nationalist prayer, “Give us each day our daily illusion” (in 
Wright 2002: 380). He said, “Those who hope for a miracle can reject all 
constraints and dream of growing wings that will fl y him again to the 
dawn. Those who think that we must have both feet on the ground will 
frame the question: ‘What serves my ultimate goal and brings me for-
ward’” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 172). 
 With a high degree of cognitive closure, the nationalists were also 
overly short-sighted and emotional, thereby undermining their very 
own objectives. The nationalists believed Germany was unjustly perse-
cuted. Even when the DNVP was in government and at its most re-
strained, Graf von Westarp, a powerful leader in the party, complained 
that Germany “stands under the pressure of force and injustice.” 
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Germany had “right without power” and the allies “power without 
right.” The nonevacuation of Cologne was one of the “most disgraceful 
days in world history.” The DNVP had no empathy, instrumental or oth-
erwise, for the position of France; French policies were driven not by fear 
but by the “1000 year old” desire to dominate (VDR 62: 1894–1903). And 
this was the DNVP at its most moderate, before the decisive turn further 
toward the right led by Alfred Hugenberg in 1929. 
 For Stresemann, pragmatic statecraft was the surest path back to 
power. “The honor and dignity of the German nation, about which so 
much is spoken, will be protected soonest, if the success of this step 
serves to secure the development of Germany’s vital needs in a peaceful 
way” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 175). He was following the example of Bis-
marck, unlike those “political philistines who put principle above every-
thing” (in Wright 2002: 275). He contrasted their emotional diplomacy 
with his own pragmatic diplomacy of “rational understanding” (Wright 
2002: 380). 
 Stresemann criticized the DNVP for not prioritizing their goals and 
 setting out a long-term program of diplomacy. He noted, “there were of 
course people in Germany who attach importance to raising question of 
Polish frontier at once, but this was the view of irresponsible individuals” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 264). Stresemann shared their goals, but any effort 
to raise all the concerns of Germany at once would backfi re, raising the 
hackles of the French right in particular. “I am of the opinion that every-
thing must now be done fi rst to achieve the evacuation of the Rhine-
land. . . . When we have achieved that, then we must consider whether 
the eastern question is more important than the colonial question, and 
that further to be considered is whether and when it would be desirable 
and successful to tackle the Austrian question.” 
 The foreign minister justifi ed this plan by referring to how it would be 
perceived in France, demonstrating greater epistemic motivation. “For if 
in my speeches and statements and my appearances in Geneva I let it be 
known that I wanted all that, then [the French nationalists] would say to 
[French Foreign Minister] Briand: ‘There we have it! If we evacuate the 
Rhine, then they attack Poland, then they want Austria and then they 
want to have colonies!’ and then Poincaré would declare: ‘That is Ger-
man imperialism against which you poor French must defend your-
selves.’ Therefore I have concentrated on one thing and I believe that we 
must do things one after the other” (in Wright 2002: 405). The center-
right had a longer-term horizon and an ability to see things through 
other eyes that the far right lacked. The DNVP “still operated with delu-
sions of pre-1914 grandeur,” writes Gratwohl (1980: 119). 
 We might argue that the far right in Germany simply had different pref-
erences. In rationalist terms, perhaps they simply preferred continued 
Setting the Table
[99]
deadlock to reconciliation with France, regardless of the terms. Perhaps 
they were preparing for the day when Germany could take back former 
German territories by force. But such an argument neglects the impatience 
of the nationalists. Stresemann was the patient one. Gordon Craig writes 
that Stresemann’s goals “were objectives that most people in the rightist 
parties regarded as desirable. The trouble was that they wanted them to 
be proclaimed publicly and to be accomplished forthwith. . . . They would 
not understand that the realities of the European situation made patience, 
ambiguity and opportunism requirements of German foreign policy” 
(1978: 512). The difference was in the level of epistemic motivation. “Un-
conditional men with a proneness to over-simplifi cation, they had no 
sympathy with a minister who was always as acutely aware as Bismarck 
had been of the limitations of foreign policy” (Craig 1978: 512). Indeed, 
had the far right been more pragmatic, it might have supported Strese-
mann’s efforts as a way of lowering the French guard for a later German 
strike. Stresemann is often accused, unjustly, of pursuing just such a strat-
egy (see chapter 9). 
 At the time that Stresemann made his proposal to the allies, Germany 
was somewhat fortuitously in the midst of a political crisis. The previous 
coalition had fallen, and the cabinet did not have the backing of parlia-
ment. Constitutionally, however, German ministers were still allowed in 
the interim to pursue policies in their areas of responsibility, provided 
that they stayed within the guidelines set by the chancellor, who sup-
ported Stresemann’s bid. An untraditional government was eventually 
formed in late January 1925. Rather than having the formal support of a 
set of parties in the Reichstag that constituted a majority of legislators, 
ministers were “personalities” without the explicit backing of their par-
ties in a vote of confi dence. Nevertheless, they served as the conduits 
between their caucuses and the government and functioned essentially 
as a multiparty coalition cabinet (ADAP A12, No. 28; Wright 2002: 317; 
Stresemann, Vol. 2: 127–28). 
 Even after the German government was formed and the DNVP took 
its place at the cabinet table with the greatest number of cabinet positions 
(although not a majority), Stresemann did not brief the government 
about his plans, preferring instead to work out the overall framework 
with the French and British in private without domestic complications in 
either Germany  or France. Stresemann knew the pact idea would be ex-
tremely controversial in France and Germany and wanted to give the 
notion room to germinate before it was smothered by nationalist outrage 
on both sides (ADAP A12, No. 67; also No. 81). Stresemann conceived of 
the process as fi rst winning over the French government, then convinc-
ing the German cabinet, and then bracing for the “right-wing circle’s 
storm” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 90). The foreign minister was wise. Had he 
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not acted when he did, he would have had to seek prior cabinet (i.e., 
DNVP) approval and his initiative might very well never have gotten off 
the ground (Wright 2002: 317; Gratwohl 1980: 67–69; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 
62–71). But when word of the proposal leaked in the international press, 
Stresemann and the German chancellor were eventually forced to dis-
cuss and justify the proposal in meetings with Martin Schiele, the DNVP 
minister of the Interior and spokesperson for the party in the cabinet, as 
well as a number of rank-and-fi le DNVP parliamentarians. 
 When details about the proposed pact became known, the DNVP 
promised the Pan-German League and Fatherland societies, conserva-
tive and nationalist pressure groups that were key electoral constituen-
cies for the party, that it would protect the “honor and dignity of our 
nation” and oppose the renunciation of German populations (Gratwohl 
1980: 77). The DNVP addressed a formal letter to the Chancellor insisting 
that further negotiations be undertaken in closest consultation with the 
DNVP and asserting the right of the party to refuse any deal if foreign 
policy continued in “the present spirit.” This provoked a mini-crisis that 
almost ended in the exit of the DNVP from the cabinet. 2 
 Despite this, save the German communists, who considered any se-
curity pact a de facto Western alliance against the Soviets (Cohrs 2006: 
215; DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 234), the other German parties largely sup-
ported Stresemann. The SPD (German Social Democratic Party), accord-
ing to Leon Blum, prominent French leftist, showed the “same 
abnegation that the French Socialists had shown when they urged M. 
Poincaré to enter into negotiations with Germany on . . . the Ruhr” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 252). It had suggested a similar policy, along with 
the centrist DDP (German Democratic Party), the previous year (Grat-
wohl 1980: 59). The SPD leader, Rudolf Breitscheid, spoke warmly of the 
German initiative. In keeping with the prosocial motivation and prefer-
ence for reasoned dialogue of the left, he hoped for a “system of Euro-
pean states . . . without thoughts of the past, only with thoughts of the 
future, to live equally” in contrast to the vision of the nationalist right 
(VDR 62: 1886–94). 
 2. Luther accused the party of indicting the entire trajectory of Stresemann’s foreign policy. 
The chancellor agreed to a formal response in which he pledged to consult with the DNVP 
going forward, but only if the DNVP reframed its previous letter as objecting to the secretive 
style rather than the substance of the German proposals. This was, of course, not the case, but 
Schiele agreed to it to prevent a cabinet crisis (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 55; see also Wright 
2002: 306–7; Gratwohl 1980: 71–73; DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 263; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 78). That buried 
the issue for the time being. The secretive beginnings of the German initiative allowed the 
DNVP to deny any prior knowledge of the policy and therefore preserve its credibility while 
simultaneously justifying its continued participation in the cabinet to shape future 
developments (Gratwohl 1980: 78, 83). 
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 The centrist parties were not as enthusiastic, waiting to see the details. 
But they took a more realistic line than the DNVP, in keeping with their 
moderate position on the ideological spectrum. Ludwig Kaas spoke for 
the Center Party, noting the possibility for steady, if not revolutionary, 
progress in German relations with the western powers and the impor-
tance of reassuring the French as a step in that process (VDR 62: 1903–11). 
Johann Heinrich Graf von Bernstorff of the DDP was less charitable but 
embraced Stresemann’s practical approach given the German depen-
dence on others. As “laughable” as it was to think that France, “armed to 
the teeth,” was afraid of Germany, Germany would be unable to free the 
occupied areas until France had security. There was no use in “putting 
their head in the sand” (VDR 62: 1930–34). Germany should see things 
objectively. 
 British Brokering 
 Chamberlain as Castlereagh: British Realism and the 
New Concert of Europe 
 Stresemann, however, was only one piece of the puzzle. Whether the 
foreign minister’s opening to the allies would produce anything tangible 
depended on how they received his signals of peaceful reassurance. The 
German gambit could not have come at a better time for the British. The 
new Tory government was set to reject the Geneva Protocol, but, as seen 
in chapter 3, it needed an alternative to avoid the opprobrium of the in-
ternational community and prevent a deepening of the sense of crisis 
prevailing on the continent (Jacobson 1972: 15). Here the Conservatives 
disagreed due to differences on how to conduct diplomacy, opening up 
a divide between advocates of coercive bargaining and of pragmatic 
statecraft. 
 Chamberlain, the new foreign secretary, took it upon himself to fi nd an 
alternative to the Geneva Protocol. As a moderate in his rightist party, he 
was inclined, as expected, toward realist diplomacy in a way not true of 
his more conservative predecessor at the Foreign Offi ce. In an indication 
of his centrist ideological position, a few years earlier Chamberlain, as 
leader of the party, had sought a merger into a new “centre party” of the 
Tories and the Lloyd George Liberals, with whom the Conservatives had 
governed during and after the war. This would have amounted to a shift 
to the left, and Chamberlain’s initiative led to an intraparty split along 
ideological lines. Chamberlain talked of a union of those with “progres-
sive” views, whereas his opponents appealed to those “who still 
believe in their principles” (Lindsay and Harrington 1974: 35–36, 39). 
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Chamberlain ultimately failed, and the coalition parties split apart, lead-
ing the Conservatives to fi ght the election of 1922 as a separate party 
(Smith 1997: 77–78). 
 Chamberlain’s proself and high epistemic motivations are seen clearly 
in a memorandum early in his tenure outlining his vision for British di-
plomacy. “A successful British foreign policy depends, fi rst, on a clear 
appreciation of the facts of the situation with which we have to deal, and 
secondly, on an equally clear conception of British interests and of their 
relation to the facts,” he wrote. Consistent with this realism was a preoc-
cupation with the vital interests of Britain: “The only sound line of Brit-
ish policy is the path of British interests. The road is too dark for any 
altruism or digression; it is our own security which must remain the sole 
consideration” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 205). 
 Chamberlain identifi ed as vital those interests that no Conservative 
(or Labour or Liberal Party member, for that matter) would have 
objected to, such as the safety of sea communications with the British 
dominions (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 205). More relevant to the European situ-
ation, Chamberlain highlighted, again uncontroversially, the need to 
prevent any single power from occupying the channel and North Sea 
ports (CP 122 (25)). In light of changes in military technology such as the 
advent of air warfare, this required that Britain also prevent any aggres-
sion against France and the Low Countries: “The frontiers of France and 
the Low Countries now bear the same relation to the heart of the Empire 
as the Channel ports did 100 or 200 years ago.” Chamberlain had Ger-
many in mind: “A Germany established in the Low Countries and domi-
nating France would hold the heart of the British Empire at its mercy” 
(CP 122 (25)). 
 Even though the foreign secretary admitted he was the most pro-
French member of the cabinet and that he loved France “as a man loves 
a woman” (Grayson 1997: 32; Jacobson 1972: 16), his epistemic motiva-
tion is evident in his ability to objectively evaluate the situation in Eu-
rope and see the perspectives of both sides. Chamberlain diagnosed the 
problem on the continent as one of French fear and German hatred that 
created a cycle of acrimony and confl ict, which could trigger war and 
draw Britain in. He wrote, 
 The main psychological factors in every case are almost the same. All our 
late enemies continue full of resentment at what they have lost; all our late 
Allies are fearful of losing what they have won. One-half is dangerously 
angry; the other half of Europe is dangerously afraid. The friction between 
these infl amed emotions is incessant, and acts as some septic irritant, poi-
soning the wounds which are yet unhealed. Fear begets provocation, ar-
maments, secret alliances, ill-treatment of minorities; these in their turn 
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beget a greater hatred and simulate a desire for revenge, whereby fear is 
intensifi ed, and its consequences are enhanced. The vicious circle is thus 
established. (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 205; see also No. 180; CP 105 (25), Decem-
ber 16 CID meeting) 
 Chamberlain believed that both the German and French positions were 
emotionally driven, rather than based on sober realism. Chamberlain’s 
perceptions of the French were similar to Stresemann’s: “As the genuine-
ness of the feeling, I have no doubt. . . . If you ask me whether the facts 
are such as to justify fear as to the immediate future, in my opinion they 
are not” (CP 105 (25), February 13, 1925, CID meeting). 
 The foreign secretary identifi ed a worst-case scenario, in which Brit-
ain would be “dragged along, unwilling, impotent, protesting, in the 
wake of France towards the new Armageddon. For we cannot afford to 
see France crushed, to have Germany . . . supreme on the Continent, or to 
allow any great military power to dominate the Low Countries” (DBFP I, 
Vol. 27, No. 180). It was up to Britain, therefore, to provide security and 
interrupt the cycle, thus encouraging more pragmatic behavior on the 
part of others. “As long as Security is absent, Germany is tempted to 
prepare for the Revanche,” he wrote. “‘The Day’ will still be the national 
toast and with far more reason, whilst French fears, goading France to 
every kind of irritating folly, will keep alive German hatred and lead us 
inevitably, sooner or later, to a new catastrophe” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 
180). He sought to prevent France from “committing suicide under the 
infl uence of her fears.” 
 This aim was not altruistically or prosocially driven. Chamberlain 
wrote in a memorandum, “So far I have spoken of the uneasiness of Eu-
rope and of the feelings of Frenchmen. But the case for an agreement 
with France does not rest only or mainly upon these considerations. Brit-
ish interests are affected at every turn by the insecurity of the European 
situation. We live too close to its shores to escape being affected by the 
unrest of the Continent” (CP 122 (25)). Even for the Francophile Cham-
berlain, Britain was interested in the security of France because its inter-
ests were interdependent with those of his own country. He wrote to a 
like-minded friend: “Do not let you and me because of our strong French 
sympathies tie ourselves to the defence of all the vagaries of French pol-
icy or allow our reason to be quenched in her fears” (Grayson 1997: 45). 
His epistemic motivation made him conscious of his biases. 
 Because the problem was psychological and emotional, Chamberlain 
believed that the task was to preserve peace long enough for scars to 
heal. His diplomacy was far-sighted and oriented toward the long term: 
“The only hope for world peace is that the situation should be stabilized 
for long enough to allow new generations growing up who  can accept 
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the  fait accompli and  will accept it rather than face again the horrors of war 
with no certain prospects of success” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 180). In a letter 
to the king, he wrote, “I am working not for today or tomorrow but for 
some date like 1960 or 1970” (Grayson 1997: 41; see also CP 105 (25), Feb-
ruary 13, 1925, CID meeting). 
 More specifi cally, Chamberlain’s realist plan had two main compo-
nents. In a memorandum, he wrote: “I believe that Great Britain has it in 
her power at this moment to bring peace to Europe. To achieve this two 
things are indispensable: 1) that we should remove or allay French fears. 
2) That we should bring Germany back into the concert of Europe. Both 
are equally vital. Neither by itself will suffi ce & the fi rst is needed to 
allow the second” (Grayson 1997: 45; see also Cohrs 2006: 212). The for-
eign secretary proposed that Britain should fi rst offer France and Bel-
gium a security guarantee that would allow them to adopt a more 
pragmatic, conciliatory policy toward Germany. Had such an entente 
been in place before 1914, Chamberlain believed, the Great War would 
have never broken out. The foreign secretary imagined that Germany 
would be admitted into the security arrangement later, after French fears 
had softened due to the British commitment to their security (DBFP I, 
Vol. 27, No. 205). 
 The second, longer-term aspect of Chamberlain’s plan was to bring 
Germany back into the community of nations as a great power. He did 
not want to “hold Germany down in a position of abject inferiority and 
subjection.” The foreign secretary proposed to “close the war chapter 
and start Europe afresh as a society in which Germany would take her 
place as an equal with the great nations” (Jacobson 1972: 24). This was 
not, as Jon Jacobson correctly notes, the expression of an “international-
ist” frame of mind like that of Labour, in which Chamberlain sym -
 pathized with the German plight (1972: 215) but, rather, based on a 
far-sighted and pragmatic conception of British interests. The return of 
Germany to great power status would occur “sooner or later,” however 
objectionable. Chamberlain believed that “no power on earth can keep 
Germany disarmed indefi nitely” (Wright 2002: 383). And when Germany 
became a military factor again, it would inevitably set out to fi x the “two 
most objectionable provisions” of the Versailles order: the Polish corridor 
and the partition of Silesia (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 205). Chamberlain wanted 
to lock in a favorable status quo before the structural environment and 
the distribution of power shifted in favor of Germany. If Germany were 
not accommodated beforehand, it would challenge the status quo by 
force (Cohrs 2006: 214). 
 Chamberlain shared this thought with Herriot, the French premier. 
The allies “could not hold Germany down forever, and our object ought 
to be to bring about such a change in the situation that by the time that 
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Germany might really have become dangerous again she should enjoy 
suffi cient well-being and have travelled too far away from the bitter 
thoughts of today to care to risk what she then possessed on the chance 
that she might recover what she had lost in 1914” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 
225). He wanted to make “the position of German tolerable, so that she 
may lose something of her bitterness and forget something of her humili-
ation” (CP 105 (25), February 19 CID meeting). 
 Chamberlain conceived of a re-creation of the Concert of Europe, in 
which Germany would take its rightful place. Points of friction would be 
resolved through pragmatic, unemotional, and far-sighted diplomacy. “If 
the concert of Europe can thus gradually be recreated, saner councils will 
prevail,” he believed. He drew a direct analogy with the situation after 
the Napoleonic Wars, where the position of France was that now occu-
pied by Germany. He was the new Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh: 
“That policy was in principle the same as I was pursuing today: fi rst to 
secure the Allies against a possible attempt by France to reverse the settle-
ment of 1815, and, having secured their own safety, to bring France into 
the comity of nations” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 326; see also Jacobson 1972: 
217). Chamberlain envisioned the League of Nations Council as provid-
ing the forum (Grayson 1997). Although he made this idea his own, it was 
a common British conception of the League of Nations, even at the incep-
tion of the organization (Rathbun 2012; also CP 105 (25), February 19, 
1925). Chamberlain’s concert strategy contrasted sharply, of course, with 
the Labour view of the League of Nations (seen in chapter 3). Whereas the 
Labour Party, based on its diplomatic style, wanted to institutionalize 
reasoned dialogue through a legalistic process of compulsory arbitration 
under League auspices, Tory pragmatists such as Chamberlain sought to 
institutionalize realist diplomacy. 
 When it became clear that he would not obtain his fi rst option of pro-
ceeding step by step, fi rst through a bilateral agreement with France, 
Chamberlain backed Stresemann in earnest. He sought to make the Ger-
man initiative a vehicle for his Castlereaghian strategy, proposing “to 
found upon the German proposals a restoration of the concert of the 
Great Powers in Europe and a lasting peace for our countries” (DBFP I, 
Vol. 27, No. 259). Chamberlain recognized the importance of the German 
memorandum, calling it the “most hopeful sign yet” from Germany 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 200; Cohrs 2006: 210). 
 Chamberlain was impressed by the German concessions. It “appeared 
to me an incident of the utmost importance, which might be of vital con-
sequence to the Allies and have a determining infl uence upon the whole 
question of our future security. As I understood the German proposal, it 
was in the fi rst place a voluntary acceptance of the present western 
 frontiers of Germany. These frontiers Germany had accepted under 
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compulsion at the time of the signature of the Treaty of Versailles. Now 
they not only for the fi rst time accepted them voluntarily, but they of-
fered their guarantee” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 212; see also No. 269). 
 He also noted the German pledge to resolve eastern border changes 
peacefully: “I took their reference to the eastern boundaries as a fact of 
great importance and as an earnest of their good faith and their pacifi c 
intentions” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 283). The memo was particularly impor-
tant given the high cost that the government would pay in domestic poli-
tics. This was indicative, to Chamberlain and others, of “courage and 
statesmanship” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 395). The British ambassador to 
Germany, Edgar Vincent, Viscount D’Abernon, expected that “when text 
of this communication becomes public there will be general surprise at 
boldness of policy indicated—a surprise which in many circles [in Ger-
many] will be accompanied by resentment” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 218). 
 As Stresemann had hoped, Chamberlain also appreciated what Ger-
many did  not ask for. He attached “immense importance to this new 
move on the part of the Luther Government” precisely because it was not 
made conditional on a shortening of occupation (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 
200). He spoke of Germany’s “reasonable representations” (DBFP I, Vol. 
27, No. 212). The foreign secretary also noticed the German consideration 
of French needs. Chamberlain wrote that he “welcomed the evidence af-
forded by this communication that the German Government appreciated 
the reality of French fears and were spontaneously considering what 
Germany could do to allay them” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 195). 
 Chamberlain’s reaction indicates a high level of epistemic motivation, 
particularly because Chamberlain and his colleagues frequently ex-
pressed negative and essentialist views about the Germans as a whole, 
even during this process. Yet they did not let this blind them, which fa-
cilitated productive discussions (cf. DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 409, 493; Gray-
son 1997; DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 53). 
 Conservative Coercion: The Distributive Style of the British Right 
 As with Stresemann and Germany, it might be argued by rationalists 
that any foreign minister would have taken Chamberlain’s position. Was 
his strategy simply the “rational response of an overcommitted world 
power seeking peace” (Jacobson 2004: 14)? In other words, was the for-
eign secretary’s realist diplomacy endogenous to Britain’s structural po-
sition? Again, the fact that that there were very different approaches 
within the government suggests otherwise. A signifi cant number of 
“conservative imperialists” within the cabinet opposed Chamberlain’s 
proposal to immediately offer France a security guarantee as a fi rst stage 
toward European pacifi cation. Leo Amery, Lord Curzon, and Frederick 
Setting the Table
[107]
Smith (Lord Birkenhead) all spoke out against it (Jacobson 1972: 19; Jacob-
son 2004: 23). Curzon, the former foreign secretary, was the fi ercest op-
ponent (Jacobson 2004: 23), but Winston Churchill, the chancellor of the 
Exchequer, was the most articulate spokesman of the group. His precise 
ideology is hard to identify, but his followers in the British cabinet were 
primarily drawn from the right of the party (Cohrs 2006: 208; Jacobson 
1972: 18) and Churchill’s views on foreign affairs have been identifi ed by 
others as lacking in epistemic motivation (Tetlock and Tyler 1996). As 
expected, ideological divides corresponded with differences between the 
coercive bargainers and pragmatic realists. 
 Churchill and his counterparts had a similar diagnosis of the continen-
tal situation and British interests, especially that Franco-German rivalry 
and friction threatened to draw Britain into a confl ict that it would prefer 
to avoid. In his memorandum for the cabinet meeting at which Cham-
berlain’s alliance idea was also presented, Churchill echoed Chamber-
lain: “What is the cause which brings this dreaded possibility and choice 
before our minds? It is the quarrel between France and Germany. This 
antagonism, which has lasted through centuries, is unappeased. All the 
minor feuds of Europe group themselves around it. Everyone fears that 
it may lead to another World confl ict. No one at any rate feels any assur-
ance that it will not. We feel that we are deeply involved in this quarrel. 
Though we do not share its hatreds, though we cannot control its occa-
sions, though all our interests and desires are to avoid it, we may irresist-
ibly be drawn in” (CP 118 (25)). Nor did the groups differ on foreign 
policy goals. Churchill also believed that “Our interest in the ports of the 
Channel and North Sea is vital. . . . This necessity has given to the foreign 
policy of this country in European affairs whatever consistency it has 
possessed. The creation of the British Empire may almost be said to be a 
by-product of its execution” (CP 122 (25)). 
 The British advocates of coercive bargaining were even warm to the 
idea of a trilateral pact. Curzon urged Chamberlain to “seize this favour-
able opportunity” (CP 105 (25), February 13, 1925). Churchill had earlier 
expressed his willingness for Britain to act as a guarantor of a pact be-
tween France and Germany (CP 105 (25), February 13, 1925). Strese-
mann’s note could attract the support of all conservatives such as 
Churchill because it was less universal in character than the Geneva Pro-
tocol (CP 118 (25)). It application was limited to where Britain had vital 
strategic interests—in Western Europe (Jacobson 1972: 23, 37; Grayson 
1997: 36; DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 300, 349; CP 105 (25), February 19, 1925). 
 The difference lay in diplomatic style. Whereas Chamberlain and the 
British realists were willing to make this short-term concession now as a 
long-term investment in British security, the coercive bargainers pro-
posed withholding a British commitment for the time being in hopes of 
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inducing more conciliatory French behavior vis-à-vis Germany. Churchill 
believed that “increasing French anxiety will make them all the more 
desirous of obtaining our assistance. We may be in a position at a later 
date to procure from the French concessions to Germany of a far more 
sweeping character than any they contemplate at the present time” (CP 
105 (25), February 19, 1925). He argued, “It is by standing aloof and not 
by offering ourselves that we shall ascertain the degree of importance 
which France really attaches to our troth” (CP 118 (25)). He suggested a 
message for France: “These are the years in which you have the opportu-
nity of establishing much better relations with Germany, and so render-
ing a renewal of war less likely. We will do everything in our power to 
promote these improved relations. The better friends you are with Ger-
many, the better friends we shall be with you” (CP 118 (25)). Cabinet 
members Amery, Arthur James Balfour, Birkenhead, and Curzon agreed 
(Grayson 1997: 49; Jacobson 1972: 15; Cohrs 2006: 209). They advocated 
postponing discussions on security until France was ready to end the 
military occupation and discuss a change to the eastern borders of Ger-
many. Chamberlain, they thought, was too willing to concede a British 
commitment without appropriate compensation (Jacobson 2004: 25). 
 For these advocates of coercive bargaining, French conciliation was 
not something to be expected as a consequence of reassurance. It was a 
price to be paid in advance for British security. Were Britain to make such 
a commitment prior to French concessions, it would lose its leverage and 
encourage French provocation. Churchill told his colleagues that “there 
is a tremendous risk in our being involved in that way in a policy which 
will simply keep alive this antagonism between Germany and France. 
France, with us, would feel strong enough to keep that antagonism alive” 
(CP 105 (25), February 13, 1925). 
 This group lacked the instrumental empathy for France that accompa-
nied pragmatic statecraft. Curzon asked rhetorically, “Is there any 
ground for that feeling [of insecurity] existing in an aggravated form 
now? . . . There is no defenceless condition there. France is the most pow-
erful military country in Europe.” He suspected that the French were 
overstating their fear to exploit British sympathy: “For the moment, 
surely, there is no danger at all and when we hear about the French gov-
ernment and the French nation being obsessed with their own helpless-
ness and insecurity, is not that done to a large extent to put pressure on 
us?” (CP 105 (25), February 13, 1925, CID meeting). Balfour remarked, 
exasperated, on how the French “are so dreadfully afraid of being swal-
lowed up by the tiger, but they spend all their time poking it.” Curzon 
replied pithily: “And the tiger is not a tiger for the moment” (CP 105 
(25), February 13, 1925, CID meeting). Balfour complained of being 
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asked to do things “which we should never do if [the French] were not 
rather insane” (CP 105 (25), February 13, 1925, CID meeting). Birken-
head agreed. 
 With other cabinet members backing Chamberlain’s realist diplomacy 
and diagnosis of the situation (CP 116 (25)), the government was sharply 
split. “I am frankly at a loss,” lamented Chamberlain in early January 1925 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 180). The British cabinet, in meetings in early March, 
fi rst endorsed the position that Britain “do[es] not feel able to enter into a 
dual pact with France” but that a “quadrilateral 3 agreement . . . for mutual 
security and for guaranteeing each other’s frontiers in the West of Europe, 
stands on a different footing and might become a great assurance to the 
peace of Europe” (CC 12 (25)). Chamberlain, who was soon to travel to 
meet the French foreign minister in Paris on his way back from rejecting 
the Geneva Protocol at the League offi ces, was authorized to tell Herriot 
that the government “attached the highest importance to Germany’s 
overture” as the “best chance for giving security to France and peace to 
the world.” The British hoped that “the proposals would be most care-
fully considered” and pledged that they “would also do their utmost to 
contribute to the successful development of this most hopeful episode” 
(CC 12 (25)). 
 Then, due to pressure from conservative imperialists, the cabinet 
walked back from a decision to give a defi nitive pledge to participate, 
hoping to extract more concessions from France fi rst. “So extensive a com-
mitment,” it was represented in the cabinet conclusions, “went consider-
ably beyond what public opinion whether at home or in the Dominions 
would be willing to accept,  at any rate at this stage of the negotiations , and the 
Cabinet were not prepared to sanction any step in that direction which it 
might afterwards be diffi cult to retrace” (CC 14 (25), emphasis added). In 
other words, the Tory right wanted to take a hard line and concede only 
gradually. It was only through threat of resignation that Chamberlain 
was able to force the cabinet to make a fi rm statement of British willing-
ness to participate in a pact. In his meeting with Herriot, the foreign sec-
retary blamed the conservative imperialists for the British indecisiveness 
(Jacobson 1972: 20; DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 224–25). 
 French Understanding 
 It cannot be contested that the structural position of France, particu-
larly its geography, made it more vulnerable to a German  revanche . This 
 3. Including, perhaps, Belgium. 
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made it diffi cult for any French government, regardless of its ideology, to 
ponder rapprochement with its former adversary. As discussed in chap-
ter 3, the leaders of the Cartel des Gauches demonstrated as much dis-
trust of Germany as those of the Bloc National. Herriot confessed his 
fears privately to British offi cials. Citing the recovering German econ-
omy, which contrasted positively with lagging French fortunes, the for-
eign minister said, “From my heart . . . I tell you I look forward with 
terror to her making war upon us again in ten years” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 224). He called the Rhine the “last condition of our security” (Jacob-
son 1972: 19). Chamberlain remarked that, when he spoke with Herriot, 
the French premier said that the only word that properly described the 
French attitude toward security was “obsession” (CP 105 (25), February 
13, 1925, CID meeting). “We cannot have too many securities,” the French 
premier stated (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 186). 
 Herriot’s public position was hardly suggestive of, or conductive to, a 
security arrangement that included Germany. His speech before the 
French parliament in late January 1925, before he received the German 
note, was truculent. The foreign minister defended the continued occupa-
tion of the Cologne area, citing a litany of failures by Germany to comply 
with its disarmament obligations. He even suggested an indefi nite occu-
pation of Germany beyond the term specifi ed in the Versailles Treaty 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 193; Grayson 1997: 51). The British ambassador re-
ported that the “speech was acclaimed by the entire Chamber, most of the 
deputies rising to their feet. [Herriot] was throughout listened to in al-
most religious silence, save for occasional outbursts and spontaneous and 
unanimous applause in which the right took a prominent part.” Indeed, 
wrote the ambassador, many passages might “have been made by M. 
Poincaré himself” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 193). Foreign policy under the left 
was not weak or neglectful of French interests, despite the prosocial mo-
tivation of the Socialists and Radicals. There was unanimity on foreign 
policy goals and beliefs in a way that was not true in Britain at the time. 
 The British move was therefore decisive. As seen in chapter 3, the 
French valued a British security guarantee of some form more than any-
thing else. Briand, who became foreign minister in April 1925 after Her-
riot’s cabinet collapsed, declared that “the best security for France is to 
remain always in close contact with her allies and to do nothing save in 
agreement with them” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 294). The British offer had 
the effect of transforming a distributive game vis-à-vis Germany into a 
potentially positive-sum one. Without British assistance, French security 
from Germany depended mostly on the occupation and demilitariza-
tion of the Rhineland (Jacobson 1972: 19), but ridding the area of French 
troops was Stresemann’s top priority. A British guarantee allowed the 
possibility of providing France enough security to allow it to restore 
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German sovereignty. British realist diplomacy had real value in solving 
the European crisis of the 1920s. Herriot stated that without Britain a pact 
was a nonstarter, given “sentimental distrust of any German promise” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 216). Chamberlain was not modest, taking the credit 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 283). 
 Reserving the Right: The Exploration of Stresemann’s 
Proposals by the French Left 
 British diplomacy was not suffi cient, however. Britain had, after all, 
been willing to make such a pledge in 1922 as well, but the conservative 
Bloc National government under Poincaré had refused a bilateral secu-
rity guarantee on British terms. The French left was somewhat suspi-
cious when fi rst hearing about the plan from the British. They were 
concerned initially that the German proposal would be coupled with a 
demand for a reduction in the length of the occupation and might also be 
intended to split the allies (DBFP I, No. 27, No. 224; Jacobson 1972: 13; 
Cohrs 2006: 210; Wright 2002: 304). Herriot confessed that, the more the 
Germans stressed their desire for peace in the west, the more he feared 
war in the east (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 225). 
 Yet Herriot was very receptive to the German proposal when it was 
actually delivered by the German ambassador. The French premier ex-
pressed the “greatest interest” in the German memorandum (ADAP A12, 
No. 99) and promised to bring it to the attention of the French President 
Gaston Doumergue that very evening (ADAP A12, No. 81). Herriot sub-
sequently sought him out at the opera house (ADAP A12, No. 107). The 
German ambassador reported to Stresemann that his impression of his 
meetings with Herriot were “favorable beyond expectations” (ADAP 
A12, No. 99), even the fi rst time he broached the subject (ADAP A12, No. 
81). The British also reported that Herriot “received the memorandum 
rather favourably” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 197) and that he had no objection 
to the inclusion of Germany in a security pact (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 198; 
Jacobson 1927: 27). 
 What explains the favorable reaction of the French? The prosocial mo-
tivation of the coalition and its preference for reasoned dialogue made 
the French government more likely to engage the German government in 
a way that a conservative government could and would not have done. 
Had the left not been in government, the German plan would have been 
stillborn. Chamberlain’s realism was a necessary but not suffi cient condi-
tion for the pact idea to survive its infancy. 
 The French were seeking a mutually benefi cial solution consistent 
with their prosocial motivation. The French left indicated empathy and 
consideration for the German position. Herriot told the German ambas-
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sador that he understood that Germany also wanted and needed secu-
rity, that any bilateral alliance would jeopardize the prospects for the 
German proposal, and that this was not his intention (ADAP A12, No. 
99). Similarly, he told the British that “He recognized completely that, if 
France is guaranteed against German aggression, Germany has an equal 
right to be similarly guaranteed against any attack by France. He said 
this . . . with no sort of  arrière pensée [“ulterior motive”]” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 198). Briand expressed understanding when the German ambassa-
dor stressed that little could be accomplished on the diplomatic front 
unless Cologne were evacuated (ADAP A12, No. 263). Herriot even told 
the British in private that “it must be admitted that there was much in the 
present arrangement of the map in the east which lent itself to serious 
criticism” and that it should be possible to work out deal between Po-
land and Germany peacefully (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 232). Briand recog-
nized that French behavior was also part of the solution: “We must take 
all precautions, but we must also take precautions in order that we do 
not uselessly disturb people’s minds” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 294). 
 Herriot was replaced shortly afterward by Briand, who continued the 
same path. The British attributed the diplomacy of France to its foreign 
minister’s liberalism, implicitly evoking his epistemic and prosocial mo-
tivations. Chamberlain described Briand as “a man of supple & inge-
nious mind, capable of admitting disagreeable truths & forming broad & 
liberal views” (Grayson 1997: 57). He remarked on the liberal diplomacy 
of France and Briand’s belief that the creation of the right character of 
diplomatic interactions could transform European relations. “What 
struck me most about Briand was . . . the conviction which he holds, and 
which appeared again and again in the course of the conversation, that if 
we can bring these negotiations to a successful conclusion, our success 
will change the whole situation, and many problems which are now of 
great diffi culty will solve themselves” (DBFP I Vol. 27, No. 364). The for-
eign minister was actively trying to create a new spirit that could make 
agreement easier. 
 The French left, therefore, appreciated the concessions embedded in 
the German memorandum rather than denigrating their importance. Bri-
and admired Germany for how it had “acted courageously” in sending 
its memorandum (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516). Herriot called Stresemann 
“well intentioned and honorable” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 198). He publicly 
empathized with Stresemann’s domestic situation, noting that the Ger-
man foreign minister had to reckon with his own public opinion and 
pointed out that the conciliatory attitude of the German government per-
sisted even in the wake of the recent election of the nationalist Paul von 
Hindenburg as president, which had so unsettled France. Referring to 
Stresemann’s recent speeches, he said, “One must think of the intention 
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of his words. I was not able to fi nd in what he said the brutal  non possu-
mus 4 that might have been expected after a certain election.” Stresemann 
picked up on the signifi cance of this statement (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 346; 
Stresemann, Vol. 2: 84). Rather than engaging in reactive devaluation and 
ego defensiveness, Briand noted the “many Germans who were genu-
inely anxious to reach a pacifi c solution” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 353). The 
approach of his government became known as the policy of “under-
standing,” conveying both the epistemic and social motivation that 
drove it. 
 The Reservations of the Right: Conservative Opposition to 
Stresemann’s Proposals 
 Rationalists might argue that a French government of any ideological 
make-up, given the vulnerable position of France, would have been re-
ceptive to a German proposal that offered the prospect of a British guar-
antee, particularly given the recent and painful failures to commit the 
British to French defense. France had failed in its efforts to handle Ger-
many unilaterally, evident most clearly in the Ruhr crisis. From this per-
spective the French had overplayed their previous hand and returned to 
a conciliatory diplomacy that more closely refl ected their structural bar-
gaining position. 
 But this potential argument is belied by the fact that the French right 
did not greet the pact idea with enthusiasm. When news of the pact 
began to leak, Herriot felt pressured to put the record straight in a pri-
vate session before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French parlia-
ment. Poincaré, a member of the committee, dismissed the German idea 
as a mere retread of proposals made a few years before by the Wilhelm 
Cuno government in Germany that he had rejected when premier. Even 
before the security pact had developed a specifi c form, Poincaré was 
opposed and saw little need to negotiate. In keeping with his prefer-
ence for reasoned dialogue, Herriot responded that the French should 
keep an open mind to see how discussions developed (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 134). 
 After the German memo became public knowledge, the conservative 
former prime minister made public statements against it. In an indica-
tion of his coercive style of diplomacy, he dismissed both the value of the 
concessions made by the Germans and the worth of a pact from Britain. 
Costly signals did not speak for themselves. He pleaded of Marianne: 
“Let her not be asked to exchange those means of protection for the 
 4 . Latin for “We cannot,” shorthand for an intransigent and uncompromising attitude. 
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semblance of guarantees or the mirage of security. In the diplomatic ne-
gotiations now going on France must not sacrifi ce the substance for the 
shadow” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 277). He engaged in reactive devaluation: 
“In exchange for a few concessions, we are obtaining a commitment from 
the Reich worth only what the reigning mood in Germany is worth” 
(Keiger 2004: 103). 
 Poincaré’s views were shared by prominent fi gures on the French right 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 266). French conservatives accused Herriot, by en-
gaging in an exploration of conciliation, of “naïve idealism” and believed 
that his government’s “policy of understanding” would lead to a “fi -
asco” according to German reports (ADAP A12, No. 48). The leftist coali-
tion had diffi culties with the French military as well, which was 
conservative and nationalistic. Particularly problematic was the French 
war hero, Marshal Ferdinand Foch. A British diplomat described him as 
low in epistemic motivation. He was “impervious to arguments of any 
kind. . . . He certainly represents one of those solid breakwaters of obsti-
nacy on which the waves of M. Herriot’s eloquence and good intentions 
must dash themselves in vain” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 238). The French 
right might have given up on the use of force to realize French objectives; 
however, the experience of the Ruhr did not convince conservatives to 
change their style of diplomacy. The Cartel des Gauches did manage to 
elicit the support from some center-right politicians, but given the lack of 
cohesiveness of French political parties in general, this meant less than it 
did in Germany (Keeton 1987). This pragmatist group was not well 
organized. 
 The hostility of the right presented a signifi cant challenge for the Car-
tel des Gauches, which did not have a secure majority and was recog-
nized as fragile both at home and abroad (Stresemann, Vol. 1: 75; Wright 
2002: 287). This necessitated a diffi cult balancing act between domestic 
and international politics. Herriot explained to the British that if too cool 
a reception were given to the German proposals, the DNVP would be 
strengthened and encouraged. And if the proposals were greeted too 
warmly, it would stimulate opposition in France and perhaps put the 
rightist Bloc National in power (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 266). After taking 
over as foreign minister, Briand told Stresemann, “You are not to imag-
ine, however, that you have a monopoly of [nationalist opponents]. . . . 
They are to be found everywhere. . . . There are people in my country 
who gaze into the past and remember that we once held the Palatinate, 
that Mainz was once French, and that the Rhine policy was once the his-
toric policy of France; and I must fi ght against these people in France just 
as you have to contend against such moods in Germany” (Stresemann, 
Vol. 1 224–25). The French asked for patience from the Germans, time to 
make palatable the idea of a security pact “step by step” (ADAP A12, 
Setting the Table
[115]
No. 134). Briand reminded the Germans that they did “not have a mo-
nopoly of insanity” (Unger 2005: 494; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 180–81). He 
explained his need to reassure public opinion as they embarked on a 
“new way of reaching mutual agreements between former war adversar-
ies” (ADAP A13, No. 219). 
 Both the British and Germans believed the French, recognizing that 
the French left would be more receptive to Stresemann’s ideas than the 
right, given variations in diplomatic style. Of the French, a British diplo-
mat wrote, “What a relief it is to have Briand to talk to after the sinister 
Poincaré” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 354). The British understood the value of 
diplomacy. A memorandum cautioned that “if the spirit of France be-
comes again the spirit of Poincaré, the negotiations will break down” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 255). British offi cials in Paris urged their home gov-
ernment to be more forthcoming to make the job of the French govern-
ment easier: “Unless [Herriot] can allay feeling on the [security] subject, 
he may be swept away and replaced by an administration of more Na-
tionalist temper” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 198). Referring to the Poincaré 
government, Chamberlain noted that the German memorandum, though 
brave, “met with a far more friendly reception from the French Govern-
ment that would have been possible a little time ago” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 395). The Germans recognized Briand’s “goodwill” (ADAP A12, 
No. 263). 
 The British and Germans understood the French government to be 
well intentioned but forced by domestic circumstances to behave some-
what differently, precisely because of their political stripes. Stresemann 
wrote pessimistically, “[Herriot] is a Democrat and a Pacifi st, and for that 
very reason he cannot give way to any weakness on the question. Against 
the attacks of the Right we must prove that he is guarding the rights of 
France and not sacrifi cing the security of France. . . . In any event there 
can be no doubt that Herriot’s standpoint being what it is, we have noth-
ing to expect from him. He will, in this connection, roar with the lion, 
and we have to reckon on determined opposition from France to the 
evacuation, for these reasons, which may be regarded as originating in 
home politics” (Stresemann, Vol. 1: 17–18; see also ADAP A12, No. 22). 
Stresemann expected the French to engage in coercive bargaining. The 
German foreign minister compared this dilemma to his own position at 
home (Grayson 1997: 58) and attributed the failure to evacuate Cologne 
to these pressures rather than to a lack of good faith on the part of the 
Cartel des Gauches (Stresemann, Vol. 1: 30). The German ambassador 
gave his impressions of early meetings with Herriot: “I became con-
vinced of the unconditional honest and personal intentions of the minis-
ter, who is under great pressure due to the security the problem and is 
honestly striving to fi nd an exit” (ADAP A12, No. 99). Similarly, a British 
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memorandum described how Herriot was often overcome by military 
resistance to his plans: “M. Herriot may enter the marshal’s [Foch’s] 
presence an  homme de gauche [“man of the left”]. . . . He must always 
leave it so transformed as to be indistinguishable . . . from M. Poincaré” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 238). 
 The situation in early 1925, therefore, presented a potentially favorable 
window of opportunity for consolidation of peace in Western Europe 
due to the conjunction of domestic political developments and diplo-
matic styles in these three countries. The British, in particular, recognized 
the importance of the ideological character of the governments and the 
change in diplomatic styles that accompanied them. Chamberlain told 
his colleagues, “You have a Government in Germany which can settle 
some of these questions, and certainly I do not think you are likely to 
have a more pacifi c Government or one more anxious to fi nd a reason-
able solution than exists at present in Paris” (CP 105 (25), February 19, 
1925). Others agreed. Curzon noted, “It gives us a chance which we have 
never had before. You have got a friendly minister in France; you have 
for the fi rst time a reasonable minister in Germany. It is an extraordinary 
combination” (CP 105 (25), February 13, 1925). British pragmatists saw 
the possibility of value creating negotiation in the Baptist-bootlegger 
combination of the French left and the German center-right. The various 
parties had set the table for the tough diplomatic work that would fol-




 Getting to the Table 
 The Diplomatic Perils of the Exchange of Notes 
 An agreement on a deal that created value for both France and Ger-
many, even with the British lending a hand, was hardly foreordained. 
Simply getting to the table posed its own problems. The French and Ger-
man governments, both dealing with domestic constraints, exchanged a 
number of formal notes whose contents could have broken off negotia-
tions. Under pressure from the French right to engage in coercive bar-
gaining, the Cartel des Gauches government reimagined the German 
proposal somewhat dramatically in a way that suited French interests. It 
wanted infractions of the Versailles Treaty to call in the British security 
guarantee and for France to be able to protect the eastern neighbors of 
Germany against any German violation of their arbitration treaties with 
Germany. 
 Yet diplomacy was again of great value. Even though the French left 
put forward the same demands that the French right had earlier in terms 
of the scope of a British guarantee, the former did not hold out in hopes 
of greater gains, instead expressing understanding and appreciation of 
the British point of view. And even as they fi lled in Stresemann’s skeletal 
sketch of a pact in a way that tilted it heavily in France’s favor, the French 
refused to draw any lines in the sand that would make agreement diffi -
cult to fi nd. They expressed their optimism about the possibility of suc-
cess as opposed to the instrumental skepticism that would have marked 
a purely coercive bargaining style. And the French expressed an appre-
ciation for the concessions that the Germans had made. These behaviors 
are all indicative of the liberal diplomacy expected from a government 
with prosocial motivations. 
 Had the French responded differently, it would probably have trig-
gered enough conservative opposition in the German cabinet to sink the 
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negotiations. As it was, the nationalists regarded the French proposal, 
incorrectly, as set in stone and indicative of a wide gulf between the two 
parties. The DNVP wanted Stresemann to break off negotiations. Only 
with great diffi culty did Stresemann and his realist allies manage to keep 
the possibility of a deal open in the face of the premature conclusions 
drawn by those with lower epistemic motivation. 
 As a pragmatist, Stresemann took a tough line on matters of vital inter-
est to Germany, such as the French guarantee of the eastern treaties, but 
made concessions on other, less important issues. He also had long-term 
gains in mind. The German foreign minister believed that, by not linking 
the conclusion of a security pact to the occupation of the Rhineland, Ger-
many could better signal its cooperative intentions, thereby making the 
securing of such goals easier in the future. More instrumentally empa-
thetic, he thought such demands would imperil a deal with the French. 
 Stresemann’s far right adversaries in the German cabinet, however, 
insisted that the German response to the French notes formally refuse its 
war guilt and forced Stresemann to explicitly link any approval of the 
security pact to alleviations in the Rhineland occupation and the evacua-
tion of the Cologne zone. This could have easily derailed the negotia-
tions. Briand, however, disregarded the German notes as harmless 
blustering in a way that his rightist counterparts would not have, given 
their different diplomatic styles. In something of a role reversal, he re-
sponded with more equanimity than even the pragmatic British, indicat-
ing the importance, again, of the liberal diplomatic style. French diplomacy 
was an iron glove over a silken fi st. 
 The role of Britain in the run-up to the negotiations was to urge the 
two sides to avoid coercive bargaining statements and to keep their ex-
changes short on the demands that would prevent them from sitting 
down to resolve their difference privately and calmly in the pragmatic 
fashion favored by the realist foreign secretary, Austen Chamberlain. As 
an honest broker, the British defended the Germans to the French and the 
Germans to the French, regardless of how they actually felt about their 
respective positions. They continually stressed that the two countries 
should consider the practical benefi ts of an agreement and eventually 
succeeded in getting all the parties to the table. 
 Leaning Liberal: The French Response to 
the German Memorandum 
 As seen in chapter 4, the Cartel des Gauches government was open to 
German overtures, given its diplomatic style of reasoned dialogue. 
Nevertheless, even though Stresemann’s memorandum marked a 
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signifi cant and promising departure for German foreign policy, a turn-
over in the French government did not lead simply to a rapprochement 
between the two countries and an integrative deal on a security pact. 
There was signifi cant distrust of Germany, even on the French left. And 
the position of the coalition in French domestic politics was precarious, 
making it impossible to ignore the objections of French nationalists on 
the right. Briand explained, through his ambassador, the square he was 
trying to circle domestically: “He must not rouse French Nationalist 
opinion by appearing to yield too much or too readily, nor, on the other 
hand, must he antagonize Socialist opinion by an unsympathetic or 
harsh reply” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 322). In other words, Briand had to 
balance a reasonable and liberal diplomatic approach with a coercive 
and distributive one. 
 In their formal response to the fi rst German note, whose drafting was 
supervised by Aristide Briand, the new foreign minister, the French took 
a position considerably different from that of Germany (and Britain). 
Their diplomacy, although liberal, was not one of capitulation. Like the 
Germans, the French envisioned a legal commitment by the parties to the 
pact to refrain from the use of force against one another to revise borders 
and also, in the event of the violation of that pledge, an obligation by 
Britain to come to the aid of the party attacked. Beyond this, however, the 
French added elements seen before in their bilateral negotiations with 
the British, when the French conservatives were in power. The British 
guarantee was also to apply to violations of the Versailles Treaty. The 
French also wanted a far-reaching compulsory arbitration agreement be-
tween the French and the Germans on matters both juridical and political 
in nature (DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 318, 349). A simple refusal to submit to 
arbitration, even if the party that declined to do so did not subsequently 
use force, would require coercive action by the guarantors of the pact (CP 
268 (25)). The French, however, excluded any interpretation of the Ver-
sailles Treaty from the arbitration process (CP 256 (25). In essence, the 
meaning of the treaty would be judged solely by the French and British, 
allowing France to intervene forcefully against the Germans without 
submitting to a confl ict-resolution process in ambiguous cases. The 
French also stressed that the new agreement would not be accompanied 
by any easing of German obligations under the Versailles Treaty (DBFP I, 
Vol. 27, Nos. 318, 349). 
 Most controversially, the French took up Stresemann’s willingness to 
conclude treaties of arbitration with the eastern neighbors of Germany 
but recrafted his proposal so that these agreements would have a form 
similar to those concluded with France and Belgium. Although these 
eastern treaties would not require a recognition of the territorial status 
quo, they would obligate their parties to negotiate all types of disputes 
Chapter 5
[120]
peacefully. Any power associated with the western pact would also have 
the legal right to protect the victims of an attack in the east (DBFP I, Vol. 
27, Nos. 318, 349; CP 268 (25)). France was essentially trying to bring its 
alliances with the Little Entente under the same umbrella as the pro-
posed security pact and to commit the Germans to peaceful revision. The 
French feared that, otherwise, the Germans might use the western pact 
as a legal shield to prevent French intervention in Eastern Europe (CP 
268 (25); DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 389). Without this, if Germany did not move 
against France and the east simultaneously, France would be faced with 
the unpalatable choice of standing by or risking the intervention of Brit-
ain against it if France moved into Germany. 
 Therefore, the effect of the liberal diplomacy of the French government 
was not to make immediate concessions but, rather, to facilitate an open 
exchange of views that might reveal a basis for an agreement in the interest 
of both sides. The difference with the conservatives was stylistic, not sub-
stantive. For instance, the French did not draw any red lines in their memo-
randum. The French response was presented as a kind of brainstorming 
document that fi lled in the sketch provided by Stresemann. Briand ex-
plained that it “was not his intention to make exactly formal conditions. . . . 
He had no intention of dictating the sense of the Germany reply. He wished 
to give them full freedom as to the character of their answer, and not in any 
way to appear to force upon them a Yes or a No” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 322). 
He told the British the same as they coordinated their policy: “M. Briand 
particularly emphasized the importance of avoiding any appearance of 
confronting the Germans with a cut and dried scheme which they would 
have to accept or reject as it stood.” Rather, the French note would be a 
“basis for free discussion” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 443). 
 Under the leadership of the Cartel des Gauches, the French also did 
not denigrate the offer made by Germany. Their reply stated that the 
“French Government do not fail to appreciate the value to the cause of 
peace . . . of a solemn repudiation of all idea of war.” The French recog-
nized “with satisfaction” Germany’s willingness to negotiate arbitration 
treaties with its eastern neighbors. It hoped for a response that would 
allow the countries to enter into negotiations of a treaty (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 349; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 14). As Briand described it, “His object 
had been to show that he accepted the German overtures as made in 
good faith” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 322). These, of course, might be re-
garded as purely cheap talk, but it should be recognized that even this 
costless type of signal had not been offered by the rightist coalition under 
Poincaré. Briand’s foreign ministry wanted to encourage Germany to en-
gage in reasoned dialogue. 
 The note was also quickly followed by the announcement that France 
would, earlier than scheduled, withdraw its troops from the Ruhr, which 
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had been occupied by France in 1923 to coerce Germany to pay its repara-
tions. The Germans recognized this more costly unilateral concession as a 
sign of “goodwill” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 145). The British noted that it eased 
the domestic political pressure on Stresemann considerably (DBFP I, 
Vol. 27, No. 417). 
 Briand’s government transmitted its note to Germany on June 16, 
1925, and was very pleased with the domestic reception of the memo. 
The reaction of the press and politicians in all circles was positive. A lead-
ing British diplomat reported that the general opinion in France was that 
“French essential interests have been adequately and successfully safe-
guarded by M. Briand” but also that the memo was a “work of goodwill 
and good faith, a sincere effort at conciliation and realization of the de-
sire to safeguard treaty rights” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 389). Briand used the 
same argument on Germany that its representatives had used on him. 
He noted to the German ambassador that circles that had been skeptical 
of reconciliation were supportive of his conception of the pact and that 
Germany should grasp this opportunity at peace (ADAP, A13, No. 88). 
Briand had squared his domestic circle. 
 Bringing Something to the Table: Bilateral Franco-British 
Negotiations on the Guarantee 
 The diffi cult question for the British cabinet was determining the ex-
tent of the security guarantee it was willing to offer (CC 26 (25)). The 
foreign secretary suspected correctly that France would seek greater Brit-
ish involvement, “involving us in obligations that we have hitherto re-
fused to assume” (CC 26 (25)). British offi cials wanted to limit the 
commitment to the continent to situations that directly threatened the 
interests of Britain. The cabinet authorized Chamberlain to endorse in 
the House of Commons only a pledge to safeguard the frontiers of the 
Rhineland countries (CC 17 (25). 
 At the same time as the French were drafting their response to Ger-
many, they were working on a draft security treaty with Britain. Chamber-
lain insisted that the guarantee would be called into effect only if armed 
force were used and the actual peace broken (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 343). The 
French position that parties would commit to an automatic use of coercive 
force in case of an infringement of the Versailles Treaty, without recourse 
to arbitration and even if a party did not actually resort to armed hostili-
ties, threatened to draw Britain into smaller confl icts that did not threaten 
its interests (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 424). The British therefore amended 
French plans to give the League a larger role (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 349). In 
their exchanges over a draft security pact, the British drafts envisioned the 
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League Council, and not just the allies, determining whether a violation of 
the Versailles Treaty had actually occurred and recommending the appro-
priate response. The British wanted to “make it clear that the Council of 
the League has a  locus standi to intervene” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 424). The 
League Council would also take up issues of nonsubmission of disputes to 
arbitration and noncompliance in which force was not used (CP 312 (25); 
CP 318 (25); DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 316, 317, 384, 405). This conception lim-
ited British commitments while simultaneously promoting the League 
venue as a new Concert of Europe. 
 Britain, of course, had the most bargaining leverage in this situation. 
We might argue that it is therefore unsurprising that its view on the scope 
of the security guarantee prevailed. But, as we have seen, the French 
under the conservatives had refused better offers, holding out for greater 
gains. Chamberlain warned against doing so again. He wrote the French, 
“I was apprehensive lest the French, in seeking to fi ll every gap and to 
provide against unimportant contingencies such as some slight infrac-
tion of the demilitarization clause, should so confuse and alarm public 
opinion that the real guarantee of security which was within their grasp 
might escape from their hands” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 424). Even as they 
had similar goals, however, the French left and right had different diplo-
matic styles, allowing the Cartel des Gauches to achieve what the Bloc 
National had not. The British were impressed with Briand’s liberal dip-
lomatic style, particularly his regard for British interests. He had “showed 
himself fully alive to the need of distinguishing between fl agrant viola-
tions and purely technical infractions” and “admitted frankly that Great 
Britain could not be expected to give a guarantee which might involve 
her in a war as a result of a trivial incident” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 443). The 
two sides agreed that only gross breaches of the treaty, such as an assem-
bly of troops in the demilitarized zone, would call into play the security 
guarantee (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 412). 
 The liberal-led French coalition government and the realist-led British 
government were in total agreement that Germany must join the League 
as a part of the conclusion of the pact. Chamberlain identifi ed German 
membership in the League as “the basis of our whole conception of the 
pact” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 340; see also No. 231). German entry was the 
“essential condition of the new settlement (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 426). The 
French also wanted Germany to join the League of Nations on the basis 
of the conditions affi rmed in a note by the League of Nations from March 
of that year, in which it was implied that the disarmed condition of Ger-
many did not give it a waiver from participating in economic or military 
sanctions organized by the League against an aggressor (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
Nos. 261, 322; CP 256 (25)). The Germans had not proposed joining the 
institution at all in their earlier memoranda (Locarno-Konferenz No. 14). 
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 Pressure on Pragmatism: The German National People’s 
Party and the German Reply to the Reply 
 In his proposal, Stresemann did not link the pact to other concessions 
that Germany desired, in an attempt to extract greater gains (ADAP A12, 
No. 40). Rather than making the German renunciation of the Alsace-
 Lorraine contingent on French reciprocity in the areas of disarmament, 
the evacuation of Cologne or the alleviation of the occupation, Strese-
mann explicitly advised German representatives to separate these ques-
tions to indicate that Germany was not using the security pact to try to 
wiggle out of any remaining disarmament obligations (ADAP A12, Nos. 
67, 81). He suggested language to his ambassador in Paris: “We believe 
that it would contribute to the relaxation of the situation and would be 
completely in the interests of a reasonable development of general policy 
if security policy were simply discussed openly and intimately with the 
participation of Germany separate from the disarmament question” 
(ADAP A12, No. 67). He stressed to the British that his proposal “must 
not be confounded or confused with the controversies respecting disar-
mament and the evacuation of the Cologne area. From these they are 
distinguished by being of a different order of magnitude” (DBFP I, 
Vol. 27, No. 189). 
 The questions were, of course, connected in Stresemann’s mind. The 
foreign minister did hope that the Cologne situation and the remaining 
disarmament squabbles could be folded into a security pact deal, but he 
intentionally did not link them explicitly at the beginning (Cohrs 2006: 
228), as the British duly noted (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 263). Stresemann be-
lieved that the importance of the German step would be deprecated if it 
were connected to the shortening of occupation since this would suggest 
an ulterior motive (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 73–80). The foreign minister, in-
stead, counted on the fact that his offer would create trust that would 
allow the later solution of the remaining diffi culties (ADAP A12, Nos. 40, 
67). If the proposal were to be successful, a new “atmosphere” would be 
created (ADAP A12, No. 81). Stresemann talked and thought in terms 
not of bargaining quid pro quos but of natural and logical “ramifi ca-
tions” or “consequences” that would follow an ease in tensions. In Ger-
man, the term is  Rückwirkungen , and in later chapters I show the 
importance the foreign minister attached to them. He wrote privately, “It 
goes without saying that the conclusion of such a treaty, in which the 
chief powers of Europe proclaim that the security of Europe has thereby 
been established, involves the corollary that an absolute security no lon-
ger needs to be strengthened by a ten years’ occupation of the Rhineland. 
The period of occupation would thus be shortened” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 
67). The Rhineland issue would arise naturally over time as the “logical 
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conclusion of a security pact” (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 62; see also 
Gratwohl 1980: 73–75; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 79). 
 Seeing things from the French point of view, a part of pragmatic state-
craft, helped in this regard. He did not make any demands about early 
evacuation, for instance, “because I said to myself that we ourselves 
should not do anything of the sort if we were in the position of the other 
side, and because I always tell myself that policy is the art of what is pos-
sible” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 222). For the time being, “there must be no 
attempt to make a condition of these matters beforehand. It is of course 
merely Utopian to try to put forward claims that, for those in responsible 
positions, do not come into question” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 135–36). 
 Stresemann’s DNVP coalition partners preferred a more confronta-
tional diplomacy of coercive bargaining, consistent with the proself and 
low epistemic motivations typical of the far right. With a distributive 
mind-set, they denigrated the French proposal as not offering enough for 
Germany. Schiele believed that the Germans had made too many conces-
sions in their note and “found missing guarantees for us” (Kabinette Lu-
ther, Vol. 1, No. 50). D’Abernon, the British ambassador to Germany, 
explained to London that the DNVP did not understand why its govern-
ment was giving something away for nothing (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 266). 
Schiele, the liaison between the DNVP parliamentary party caucus and 
the cabinet, argued that, by surrendering a concession without a counter-
concession, Germany had “thrown a net over its own head” and pro-
posed rescinding the offer of fi xing the mutual borders of the countries 
(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 123). 
 The DNVP demanded concessions prior to any negotiations. In the full 
cabinet, Berndt asked what the Germans would receive as a reward for 
their very willingness to negotiate (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 62; see 
also Stresemann, Vol. 2: 79). In the fi rst party statement concerning the 
pact idea in the parliament, Kuno Graf von Westarp noted that France 
wanted Germany to fi rst completely disarm, enter the League, and nego-
tiate a security pact; only after that would France leave Cologne. For the 
DNVP, he argued, the order should be the reverse (VDR 62: 1894–1903). 
This was a staging concern typical of coercive diplomacy. The national-
ists opposed giving away Alsace-Lorraine without signifi cant compensa-
tion. DNVP members outside the cabinet called on their government to 
make the infl ated goal of a complete evacuation of the Rhineland the 
basis for negotiations (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 62; see also Strese-
mann, Vol. 2: 79). 
 Given the great divide between France and Germany on a number of 
issues and the presence of the DNVP in the German government, it is not 
surprising that Stresemann and the German cabinet received the French 
note unfavorably. The foreign minister complained that it “twisted the 
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original German offer out of all recognition” and linked it to issues that 
for Germany were separate, most notably German entry into the League 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 401; see also ADAP A13, No. 136). The Germans 
had warned the allies against this earlier (ADAP A13, No. 263). Strese-
mann emphasized that he had proposed treaties with the eastern neigh-
bors of Germany precisely because he had not contemplated entering 
the League, which was a very contentious issue for his country, given its 
symbolic connection to the Treaty of Versailles (ADAP A13, No. 136; 
Stresemann, Vol. 2: 97–113; DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 211). The League had its 
own provisions for political reconciliation that would make arbitration 
treaties superfl uous. The scope of arbitration was also too broad. The 
Germans had in mind a process in which only decisions on juridical 
questions would be binding, whereas political arbitration would only be 
advisory, even with France (ADAP A13, No. 136; DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 
401). Stresemann also found the French hypocritical. They stressed the 
importance of the League and yet shielded any alleged violation of the 
Versailles Treaty on their part from the consideration of the League 
Council (ADAP A13, No. 136; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 89–91, 97–113; DBFP I, 
Vol. 27, No. 401). The Germans pointed out that any French invasion of 
Germany short of self-defense would violate the terms of an agreement 
reached in London the year before (ADAP A13, No. 136; DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 401). 
 The two main points for Stresemann, however, were the effort by 
France to force Germany into signing nonaggression pacts with its east-
ern neighbors that France would itself guarantee and the conditions 
under which Germany would enter the League. These were the issues of 
most vital interest to Germany (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 97–113; ADAP A13, 
No. 136). Even as the Germans expressed their desire to resolve confl icts 
with their eastern neighbors peacefully, they had honestly admitted from 
the beginning that they were not willing to make formal commitments 
offi cially foreclosing the use of military force to rectify German borders. 
This would have been impossible domestically (ADAP A12, Nos. 201–2; 
DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 254). The German offer of arbitration treaties was 
“an indication of our desire to settle any matters in dispute by peaceful 
methods” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 67). These would de facto exclude force, 
the Germans explained privately (ADAP A12, No. 201). Germany would 
declare formally in a private letter only that the “German Government 
renounce any idea of bringing about by warlike measures an alteration 
in the present German-Polish frontier” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 392; see also 
DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 274; ADAP A12, No. 213). This “solemn engage-
ment” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, Nos. 216, 220), however, could not be published 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 212). Publicly, Stresemann would declare in the 
Reichstag only that “to bring about a forcible alteration to the eastern 
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frontiers Germany has neither the strength nor the will” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 392; see also Stresemann, Vol. 2: 84). 
 Also at issue was whether Germany in its disarmed state could be ob-
ligated as a League of Nations member under Article 16 to participate in 
a mandatory economic boycott of states deemed aggressors by the 
League Council. There had been ongoing negotiations previously be-
tween the League of Nations and Germany over the terms of its potential 
membership, and the international body had insisted that Germany take 
on all the same obligations as other members. Germany was particularly 
worried about the devastating possibility of being drawn into a war with 
the Soviet Union. In addition to its inability to defend itself against a 
Soviet invasion, any such confl ict would probably incite a civil war in 
Germany between communist and nationalist militias. “No obligations 
can be laid upon us which may involve Germany in the risk of a declara-
tion of war upon her by another Power,” said Stresemann (Vol. 2: 97–113). 
The pragmatic diplomat was, however, willing to accept an informal, de 
facto release from its treaty obligations rather than a formal exception 
(Stresemann, Vol. 2: 135). 1 
 When the German cabinet met to discuss the French note and the Ger-
man reply, Stresemann identifi ed these two items as the major sticking 
points (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 110). Nevertheless, the foreign min-
ister, given his realist diplomatic style, believed that the German re-
sponse should be general and conciliatory. He wanted to make sure that 
the note “should not be packed with demands”; he cautioned not to 
“burden the [discussions] with conditions, or with questions that will be 
dealt with as a matter of course during the negotiations” (Stresemann, 
Vol. 2: 135). Germany should let negotiations proceed to see if something 
of value might be gained, even though in light of the French response it 
might seem doubtful. The best way to proceed was by raising the ques-
tions together in a diplomatic conference rather than laying out fi rm 
negotiating red lines in an exchange of diplomatic notes (Kabinette 
 1. At no time did Stresemann attempt to extract more from the allies by dangling the prospect 
of developing closer relations with the Soviet Union, a coercive diplomatic move that many 
nationalists advocated. He refused to play the “Rapallo bluff.” As a realist, Stresemann saw 
the need to cultivate good relations with both sides given the currently weakened state of 
Germany. Stresemann emphasized that Germany was not under the “tutelage of any power 
or group of powers.” He balanced his negotiations with the West by opening discussions with 
the Russians on commercial matters and eventually concluding the Treaty of Berlin in 1926, a 
limited neutrality agreement with the Soviet Union to be superseded by German obligations 
under the League of Nations Covenant (Wright 2002: 310–12, 322–24, 354–59; Jacobson 1972: 
81–82, 367–71). “In his effort to win agreement and support in the West, the Russian connection 
was of no real disadvantage or advantage to Stresemann,” writes Jacobson (1972: 369). 
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Luther, Vol. 1, No. 62; see also Gratwohl 1980: 73–75; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 
79). This pragmatism refl ected his greater epistemic motivation, which 
contrasted with the right-wing need for closure. The British noted how 
this was a departure from the coercive diplomatic style that Germany 
had employed historically (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 409). 
 Domestic politics, however, particularly the position of the DNVP, 
made a simple reply of that kind impossible. Whereas Stresemann’s 
early diplomatic initiatives had taken place without cabinet scrutiny, the 
formal German response to France required cabinet agreement. The ses-
sions were acrimonious (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 96). Despite French efforts, 
DNVP ministers treated the French demands as a fi xed and unalterable 
ultimatum rather than an opening offer in a negotiation process. It indi-
cated their perception of the negotiations as zero-sum in nature, in 
which Germany faced an intractable and unyielding French adversary. 
Lacking epistemic motivation, they were unreceptive to the signals of 
the French openness to discussion. Instead, the nationalists saw the 
French note as an accurate refl ection of an unacceptable French position 
that made talks pointless (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 110; Wright 2002: 
316–17; Gratwohl 1980: 86–88; Jacobson 1972: 53). To proceed would 
amount to a formal recognition of the points of the French note. Their 
position was highly emotional. Any discussion based on the French note 
was for the nationalists a “diffi cult sacrifi ce” and a “humiliation” of Ger-
many (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 123). Privately Graf von Westarp 
estimated “with 99% probability that the minimum demands for the 
protection of honor and interests would not be met by the allies” (Grat-
wohl 1980: 106). 
 DNVP cabinet members demanded that the government call off nego-
tiations. If they were to consent to allow them to move forward, it was 
only with the explicit hope that they would fail. Albert Neuhaus said it 
would be a “gift from God” if nothing ever came of the German memo-
randum as he saw no advantage (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 110; 
Wright 2002: 316–17; Gratwohl 1980: 86–88; Jacobson 1972: 53). Had it 
been up to the nationalists, Stresemann’s ideas would have been aban-
doned. Schiele advocated abandoning the terms of the original German 
memorandum and walking back from any pledge on the western bor-
ders (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 123). 
 In contrast, the center-right pragmatists proved more open to recog-
nizing the liberal elements of French diplomatic style. Before the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, Stresemann stated, “We are convinced that we are 
not here confronted with an ultimatum” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 110). Strese-
mann and Luther were supported by the centrist parties, which all fa-
vored the continuation of negotiations without prejudging the results 
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(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 110; Wright 2002: 316–17; Gratwohl 1980: 
86–88; Jacobson 1972: 53). 2 
 Stresemann tried to make the pragmatic case to the DNVP. The foreign 
minister denigrated the cost of German concessions, arguing that the rec-
ognition of the status quo of Franco-German borders was of no conse-
quence given that Germany, currently weak, was in no position to change 
them (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 67–69, 88–95). There was “no question of a 
moral renunciation [of the Alsace-Lorraine] but merely a recognition of 
the fact, which every sensible person would admit, that it would to-day 
be madness to play with the idea of a war with France” (Stresemann, Vol. 
2: 215–25). It was only of a “theoretic character, as there is no possibility 
of a war against France” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 503–6). In short, Germany 
was gaining more and giving up less than the DNVP claimed. “It was not 
we who were the givers,” he said to them (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 100). 
 The conservatives were not convinced by this pragmatic logic. Outside 
the government, the DNVP launched a vigorous attack against Strese-
mann to force him to resign. Fifty-one of 111 nationalist delegates to the 
Reichstag signed a protest demanding that he step down (Stresemann, 
Vol. 2: 91; Gratwohl 1980: 90; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 116). Although 
they failed, Stresemann described the episode as among “the severest 
fi ghts of his career” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 399). And the party pressure 
clearly affected the German response to the French note. Stresemann’s 
challenge was to craft a formal reply that alienated neither the allies nor 
his nationalist coalition partners. In his instructions to the German am-
bassador in France upon transmitting the fi nal draft, he told him of his 
dilemma in answering generally while not giving the impression of con-
ceding specifi c French points and drawing right-wing ire (ADAP A13, 
No. 182). 
 The infl uence of the DNVP can be seen in Stresemann’s linkage of the 
security pact to the occupation. Germany, for the fi rst time, made refer-
ence to the alleviation of the occupation’s conditions in the other two 
zones as a “ramifi cation” of the conclusion of an agreement. The “secu-
rity pact would be such an important improvement that it could not be 
without consequences for the arrangements in the occupied zones and 
the whole question of the occupation,” read the German reply (Locarno-
Konferenz, No. 16; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 143; Jacobson 1972: 55–56). This 
question of  Rückwirkungen had been part of Stresemann’s thinking all 
along, of course, but he had wanted to wait and raise it afterward. The 
 2. See contributions by Heinrich Brauns, Otto Gessler, and Rudolf Krohne. The only exception 
to this pattern was Josef Frenken, the Center Party minister. He, however, also served as 
minister for the occupied territories and took a strident position, in keeping with his portfolio 
(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 110). 
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foreign minister told his diplomatic emissaries abroad to stress that this 
was not a formal condition for agreement on a pact (ADAP A13, No. 211). 
Stresemann did, however, explicitly link the belated evacuation of Co-
logne with the conclusion of a security treaty (ADAP A13, No. 211; Kabi-
nette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 116). Heretofore he had refrained from doing so 
formally while promising such a result to the cabinet (Jacobson 1972: 
53–54; Gratwohl 1980: 95; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 113, 134). Now, although 
it was not in the offi cial note, Stresemann was laying down this condi-
tion. Under pressure from the right, Stresemann was departing from his 
preferred pragmatic statecraft for the fi rst time and using extractive 
linkages. 
 The moderate parties had a different type of infl uence. To the extent 
that moderate party members added to the debate, it was to urge Strese-
mann to add “warmth.” The draft was not “kind” enough (Kabinette 
Luther, Vol. 1, No. 123). Stresemann’s DVP was more concerned about 
overstating its objections to the eastern arbitration treaties than it was 
about listing its preconditions for an agreement (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, 
No. 123). Cabinet transcripts show the center of the political spectrum 
shared the goals of the German right but differed in diplomatic style. 
 Like the French, the Germans directly stated their position on the is-
sues that mattered most to them, most notably the French guarantee of 
the eastern arbitration treaties and the right of the League to play a role 
in settling differences over the interpretation of the Versailles Treaty. Ger-
many conceded to joining the League of Nations but stressed that a solu-
tion must be found to the question of Article 16 that took into account 
the special geographic and military position of the country (Locarno- 
 Konferenz, No. 16; see also ADAP A13, No. 211; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 143; 
Cohrs 2006: 251–52; Gratwohl 1980: 99). 
 Rather than remaining aloof and skeptical about the potential for 
agreement, as when coercive diplomacy is used, the note stressed the 
openness of Germany to negotiation, its goodwill in working toward an 
agreement of mutual benefi t, and its optimism about the eventual out-
come. As the French had done, the note began by stating the German 
“satisfaction” that the allies were “ready to consolidate peace together 
with the German government” and “enter into a mutual exchange of 
opinions” (Locarno-Konferenz, No. 16). The note ended in a conciliatory 
way as well, stressing that, despite concerns about specifi c points, Ger-
many observed a “convergence” of the positions of both sides that were 
“fundamentally united in their genuine desire to settle the security ques-
tion through the security pact suggested by Germany as well as the ex-
pansion of the system of arbitration treaties.” The memo advocated 
far-sighted realist diplomacy that did not lose sight of the big picture. 
“Specifi cs” on which there were still “doubts and differences of opinion 
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would be overcome if the governments kept in view their goal.” For its 
part, “the German government” hoped “that further discussions will 
lead to a positive result” (Locarno-Konferenz, No. 16). This had been 
Stresemann’s position vis-à-vis the French since the receipt of the French 
note (ADAP A13, No. 136). 
 When the allies, following a preparatory conference of the judicial ex-
perts of the three countries, formally invited Germany to a conference in 
Locarno to conclude a security pact, the same process was repeated. The 
German nationalists again proved to be a stumbling block, demanding 
that any acceptance be accompanied by a long list of German demands. 
They wanted to make resolution of the Cologne-evacuation issue a 
 precondition for any conference rather than an object of negotiations— 
 Germany should claim all it could before it went to Locarno rather than 
having to pay for this concession in Switzerland. More controversially, 
however, they insisted on an offi cial denial by Germany of its war guilt, 
even though previous German governments had already made several 
such declarations. Although it was not directly relevant to the negotia-
tions, the DNVP claimed that, by agreeing to join the League, Germany 
would be symbolically and tacitly affi rming its guilt were it not other-
wise stated (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, Nos. 158, 159, 160, 161). The DNVP 
insisted on a public and formal statement against the “great injustice” of 
the war-guilt clause (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 158) to be announced 
not only to the allies but to all the members of the League (Kabinette 
Luther, Vol. 1, No. 159). 
 Stresemann, again, opposed a long list of demands and favored a writ-
ten response of only a “few words,” accompanied by an informal, pri-
vate, and oral explanation of the German positions on Cologne and war 
guilt (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 158). He believed that proceeding oth-
erwise, particularly in regards to the morally charged war-guilt question, 
would ignite a confl agration that could lead the allies to break off the 
talks (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 160). As a pragmatist, he believed that 
Germany had to keep its eyes on its main political goals and not be dis-
tracted by largely symbolic issues that did not confer distinct political 
benefi ts (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 161). The moderate centrist mem-
bers of the cabinet agreed (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 158). When the 
nationalists refused, Stresemann suggested the compromise of an oblique 
reference to a previous document that had refused German war guilt 
without direct quotation (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 159). 
 The allies, however, told Germany that they would not accept the re-
ceipt of such a document, threatening to derail the conference before it 
had even begun. In the end, the German reply to the invitation was, in-
stead, accompanied by a written declaration stating that, if Germany 
were to enter the League, it should not be understood that it was taking 
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on any “moral charge” against the German people. The reply also stated 
that any effort toward reconciliation would be prejudiced if there were 
no settlement of the remaining points concerning the disarmament nec-
essary for the evacuation of the Cologne zone (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 168; 
Locarno-Konferenz, No. 22; DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 493; Jacobson 1972: 57). 
The Germans linked these issues to a successful conclusion of a treaty, 
although they refrained from making them a precondition for negotia-
tions to begin. Thus, the DNVP had an impact on the German diplomatic 
style. 
 Pushing Pragmatism: British Brokering and 
French Nonchalance 
 An important part of Chamberlain’s realist diplomacy was facilitating 
an agreement between the French and Germans, acting as an “honest 
broker” in the foreign secretary’s words (Jacobson 1972: 23; Grayson 
1997: 59). Early on, he told both countries it “would be a great mistake for 
the Germans to withdraw [their plan] or for the French not to consider it 
with the serious and even appreciative attention which it demands” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 216). Chamberlain urged both sides to negotiate in 
a pragmatic and far-sighted rather than a short-sighted and coercive 
fashion. The foreign secretary continually cautioned both sides to focus 
on their most vital of interests. He stressed that they “must have patience 
in dealing with immediate diffi culties so that the larger hopes which 
seemed to be within our reach might not be shipwrecked on some smaller 
point before we could bring them into port” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 259). 
He told the French, “Whether we can do something for France depends 
on French behavior. . . . An attitude . . . which showed a sincere desire 
gradually to improve the relations between the two countries and to rec-
oncile Germany to the conditions of the Peace of Versailles would do a 
great deal to remove one of the diffi culties in our path. On the other 
hand, an attitude of unreasonable insistence on small points or a con-
stant succession of irritating incidents would . . . only keep alive the hos-
tility of Germany and accent the danger to French security with which 
France was already oppressed” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 188). At one point, 
Chamberlain said that he was “not unhopeful that in spite of . . . all the 
 unreason , whether in Berlin or in Paris, we have made some progress” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 255 emphasis added). 
 Britain pushed France toward Germany and Germany toward France, 
encouraging them to seize the window of opportunity to remake Franco-
German relations. On remaining issues of disarmament preventing the 
evacuation of Cologne, he wanted to show “consideration for German 
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feeling” and to “honestly try to meet their point of view,” focusing on 
“big questions” rather than “trifl ing matters of no military consequence” 
(Jacobson 1972: 49). He asked the French to “stretch a point here and 
there in favor of Germany, provided she shows a reasonable spirit” 
(Cohrs 2006: 245). At times, he called French policy “frivolous” (Cohrs 
2006: 215). But Chamberlain simultaneously reminded the Germans of 
Briand’s domestic political diffi culties with the French right. 
 During the initial exchange of notes, the British stressed to both the 
French and Germans that their notes should be conciliatory in nature and 
general in substance (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 388). He saw the formal ex-
change of notes laden with preconditions and demands—in other words, 
coercive diplomacy—as inhibiting the negotiation of deals of mutual 
benefi t. Chamberlain characterized the French and German notes as con-
ciliatory whether this was true or not. When the French sent their formal 
reply to Germany, he asked his ambassador to make sure the Germans 
saw it “as a not unfriendly response” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 283). When the 
French formally responded on June 16, he told Luther, “The Briand note 
was as favourable an answer to Germany as could be expected in view . . . 
[of the] necessity of protecting . . . against nationalist attack” (DBFP I, 
 Vol. 27, No. 409). He then urged the Germans to respond in kind: “I most 
sincerely trust that German government are not going to be misled into 
making quibbling diffi culties over French note of June 16 th . It was drafted 
by the French government in markedly conciliatory terms. . . . It is surely 
inconceivable that they will throw away such an opportunity. To my 
mind the proper course for the German government is to express ac-
knowledgement of the spirit of conciliation which so obviously inspired 
the French note, to avoid all petty discussion of detail, and to accept with-
out cavil the broad general principles which it enumerates” (DBFP I, Vol. 
27, No. 388). Chamberlain promised to “to use his whole infl uence with 
the German Government to induce them to send a reply of an equally 
conciliatory character, to refrain from offering meticulous criticisms and 
to get to practical negotiations as early as possible” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 410). 
 By July 1925, Chamberlain wanted both parties for stop their exchange 
of notes and begin private negotiations that would facilitate value creating 
negotiation. “It seems to me impossible to continue indefi nitely a written 
and public exchange of views in which it must be clear that neither side 
will be willing, or indeed able, to commit itself beyond a certain limit. . . . 
It is clear that personal meetings and informal conversations will be neces-
sary before complete harmony of views can be obtained” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
No. 426; see also No. 429). Getting to the table, however, was not easy be-
cause of the diplomatic style of the German nationalists. 
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 Chamberlain’s response to the German note is worth quoting at length 
because it so trenchantly analyzes the distinction between pragmatic and 
coercive diplomacy and shows how poorly British realists received coer-
cive bargaining. The British foreign secretary maintained that Germany 
was in danger of sinking the entire negotiation through its diplomatic 
style. He complained that “Germany having opened to her a prospect 
which would have seemed impossible a few months ago now shows a 
disposition to delay and haggle which would justify every suspicion of 
her good faith and would not only deprive us of all power to help her but 
must make us feel that it is not only useless but dangerous to attempt it” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 400). This stood in contrast to its earlier, more prag-
matic diplomacy. He also wrote, 
 It cannot be too strongly insisted that the problem which faces us is psy-
chological. Security is a state of mind rather than a physical fact. It can only 
exist in stable conditions and when there is confi dence that stability will 
continue. The German offer of the 9 th February was valuable because it 
tended to produce stability and confi dence, and therefore, in the end, secu-
rity. It diagnosed the situation correctly and proposed the proper rem-
edy. . . . The German note of the 20 th July, on the other hand, appears to 
have been based on a different principle and wears a wholly different as-
pect. The German Government no longer appear in the role of a far-seeing 
contributor to the general cause of peace, but rather in that of a somewhat 
unwilling participant, who acquiesces in a scheme, not because of its in-
trinsic merits, but merely in the hope that consent will enable him to drive 
a bargain in other directions. (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 429) 
 Chamberlain emphasized how coercive bargaining could raise suspi-
cions about German intentions and undermine the efforts of Germany to 
reach a mutually benefi cial deal. “In a word, the German note raises 
again those doubts as to Germany’s real intentions, which had in a large 
measure been allayed, and which must be cleared up if a lasting settle-
ment is to be reached” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 429). He excoriated Germany 
for its lack of regard for others’ interests. He complained, “Thinking only 
of the party position in Germany they published an election manifesto 
and addressed it to the French government” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 431). 
Due to this shift in diplomacy, Germany was in danger of missing an 
important window of opportunity offered by the reasoned dialogue of 
France and the pragmatic statecraft of Britain. “Never was France so set 
on peace or her government so liberally inclined. Never since the war 
has the British government so defi nitely marked its desire for better rela-
tions with Germany or spoken with such generous appreciation of the 
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attitude of the German government. What is the result? As we advance, 
Germany recedes” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 400). 
 Specifi cally, Chamberlain chastised the Germans for making an ex-
plicit link between the pact and the easing of the occupation, which of 
course Stresemann had done to pacify nationalist opposition at home. 
Consistent with his diplomatic style, Chamberlain did not begrudge 
the Germans for their “very pertinent criticisms” and goals but, rather, 
their clumsy and unpragmatic diplomacy. “Quite apart from its rela-
tion to their previous assurances, it is permissible to question the wis-
dom of the German Government’s attitude. Even if it be true that the 
condition of a security pact ‘could not but react on the conditions in 
the occupied territories and the question of occupation in general’, the 
 manner and moment chosen by the German Government for its asser-
tion are such as merely to invite rebuff” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 429, em-
phasis added). He objected to the diplomatic style of Germany, not its 
foreign policy. He continued, “It was only to be expected that the Ger-
man Government would advance them at some stage. I had hoped, 
however, that they would have found means of reserving such ques-
tions of detail for later verbal discussion” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 429). 
This, of course, had been Stresemann’s preference, but he was over-
come by the DNVP. 
 When the second German note raised the issue of war guilt, the British 
were again outraged because this indelicate act of diplomacy under-
mined their attempts at honest brokering. As a pragmatist, Chamberlain 
objected not to the German position but to the obstacle it placed in the 
way of beginning negotiations on more important and tangible issues. 
“All that the German government are asked to decide is whether or not 
they will take part in a conference where they will have full opportunity 
of making such declarations as seem good to them. . . . It is unnecessary 
to make specifi c reservations which can only be regarded as conditions 
and will thus introduce precisely that controversial element which it is 
essential to avoid at this stage” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 488). 3 This was par-
ticularly galling because the allies had not made any recognition of war 
guilt a condition of a pact. Germany was very unpragmatically creating 
problems that did not exist. “As far as my memory served me, not one 
word had passed between the German and the British Governments on 
the subject of war guilt since the Pact negotiations opened. Why on earth 
did the German Government raise the question now? What possible useful 
 3. In response, “The German ambassador sheepishly stated that he did not expect Chamberlain 
to confi rm or respond in any way. He simply had to deliver this message.” It was “not his 
intention to make any conditions” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 493). This was not something that 
Stresemann cared about, but it was needed to get the Germans to the table. 
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purpose could be served by their so doing? . . . Nobody asked the Ger-
man Government to repeat [their war guilt]” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 493). 
 Yet, as he had done for the French note, Chamberlain defended the 
Germans to the French. He emphasized that the German note accepted 
membership in the League. The Germans indicated no desire to modify 
existing treaties, in particular provisions regarding the occupation. “A 
careful examination of the German reply shows on the whole a closer 
approximation of views than might have been expected,” he wrote. As 
he had for the French note, he stressed the diffi cult domestic circum-
stances the government was facing (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 426). Privately, 
however, Chamberlain was vexed by the coercive style of the German 
response. He told D’Abernon he was putting “the most favourable con-
struction possible upon the note” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 429). 
 As much as Britain acted as mediator between the two sides, Germany 
and France would have never gotten to the table were it not for what 
Chamberlain called Briand’s “liberality.” Although under more pressure 
at home than the British foreign secretary, the French foreign minister 
was not particularly annoyed by the fi rst German note. Briand said it 
was necessary to read between the lines of the German reply (Unger 
2005: 491). Unlike Chamberlain, who was irritated that Germany had 
raised the question of the occupation, Briand was reassured by the Ger-
man promise not to make this an issue during the formal pact negotia-
tions. On the eastern treaty question, Briand stressed his simple desire to 
prevent the possibility that governments might use arbitration treaties as 
a way to prevent self-defense in situations of obvious aggression. In 
other, more ambiguous situations, another mechanism could be used, 
and he stressed his belief that a solution could be found. In an expression 
of empathy, Briand even went as far as to say that he would have taken 
the same position had he been in the Germans’ shoes. The German am-
bassador to Paris, after meeting Briand, reported that his meeting “went 
as well as one could have hoped. . . . The understanding he has for our 
position even surprises me somewhat” (ADAP A13, No. 219). 
 Whether proceeding to face-to-face negotiations was possible de-
pended on how the French received the second German note. Strese-
mann was not optimistic. He believed that it would lead “French public 
opinion . . . [to] boil over” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 135). The foreign minister 
wrote, “It is so unfavourable to the Briand Note that I should not be sur-
prised if the whole matter dropped. Much diplomacy will be needed to 
get the matter through at all” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 141). Yet the French 
treated even the war-guilt issue with more equanimity than did the Brit-
ish, again showing the importance of liberal diplomacy in facilitating an 
agreement. The French response simply stated matter-of-factly that the 
issue of war guilt had been settled and was not a question for upcoming 
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negotiations (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 499; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 23). Other 
than that, the French were pleased that the Germans would come to Lo-
carno. The French did not rise to the bait of the German nationalists, al-
lowing negotiations to proceed. The reasoned dialogue of the leftist 
coalition allowed discussions to continue, whereas previously they 
might have broken down due to conclusions about German intentions 
drawn from the German coercive bargaining style. 
 During this entire period, members of the French and German right 
who opposed diplomatic rapprochement were working against, rather 
than with, the core economic interests of their constituencies. French and 
German business interests had an acute interest in securing credit from 
U.S. investors, who had been largely scared off from placing their capital 
in Europe given the instability of security relations between the two 
countries (Jacobson 1972: 5; Wright 2002: 342, Cohrs 2004: 250; Keeton 
1987). The agricultural and business interests that supported the DNVP 
were particularly in need of a cash infusion and upset with the line that 
their party was taking (Wright 2002: 279; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 140, 205, 233; 
Gratwohl 1980: 145). Yet it was the French left and German center-right 
that pushed this fi nancial and economic argument. This was not a case of 
political economic determinism, however. Stresemann and Briand were 
the drivers of the policy. Their motivations were primarily political, and 
they mobilized business interests behind them to place pressure on those 
in their countries who were reluctant (Wright 2002: 287, 319; Cohrs 2004: 
250; Gratwohl 1980: 87). Even Edward Keeton (1987), who more than any 
other scholar stresses the role of political economy in 1920s diplomacy, 
claims only that business did not act as an encumbrance on their efforts. 
 Crass electoral party politics also seemed to not have infl uenced the 
process in any meaningful way. Genuine policy-seeking motivations, 
rather than offi ce-seeking motivations, drove Stresemann (Rathbun 
2004). The foreign minister’s considerations about the constellation of 
German party coalitions were based on what he felt gave him the best 
chance of bringing his pragmatic statecraft to fruition. It had been largely 
at Stresemann’s insistence that the DNVP was brought into government. 
The foreign minister, largely on the basis of his experience with the na-
tionalists’ parliamentary intransigence during the reparations negotia-
tions over the Dawes Plan, concluded that his policy of rapprochement 
with the western allies would be easier to accomplish if the DNVP were 
in government rather than criticizing it from outside. Stresemann be-
lieved that the “responsibility” of governing would have the effect of 
inducing a greater recognition of “realist political necessities” on the part 
of the DNVP (ADAP A12, No. 28; see also Wright 2002: 196, 279; Strese-




 Cards on the Table 
 The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee and  
 the “Spirit of Locarno” 
 Having persevered during the diffi cult prenegotiation phase, the three 
powers met in Locarno, Switzerland, in October 1925, where they drafted 
the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee as well as bilateral treaties of arbitration 
between Germany and its eastern neighbors. 1 The fi nal product heavily 
favored Britain and Germany. Unlike Poincaré, Briand readily conceded 
to British demands that restricted the scope of the British guarantee to 
fl agrant violations of the Versailles Treaty amounting to precursors to 
the use of armed force. More surprisingly, Germany avoided a French 
guarantee of its eastern arbitration treaties with Poland and Czechoslo-
vakia and also secured a note indicating that, when it joined the League 
of Nations, consideration would be given to its weakened military and 
economic position if the League implemented sanctions against an 
aggressor. 
 We are tempted to work backward from the results of the treaty and 
to infer that Germany had more negotiating leverage, possibly as a con-
sequence of its more precarious domestic political situation. Or perhaps 
German preferences on both issues were simply more intense, allowing 
it to engage in more credible coercive bargaining. In reality, this is not 
how diplomacy proceeded around the table at Locarno. Accounts of the 
meeting universally indicate an absence of value claiming. Instead 
value creating prevailed. Despite the incentives present in all negotiat-
ing situations to retain private information and not reveal bottom lines, 
the Locarno discussions were remarkable for their good faith. All sides 
laid their cards on the table, revealing their negotiating positions openly 
 1. Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, and Poland also sent representatives. 
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and honestly. Transcripts reveal that the French and Germans did not 
resort to threats, positional commitments, or infl ation of demands. They 
argued their positions and tried to convince others of their point of 
view. Indeed, participants noted how distinct the talks were from prior 
interactions among the parties. Negotiators spoke later of the “spirit of 
Locarno.” 
 This value creating was made possible by the combination of German 
and British pragmatic statecraft, on the one hand, and French reasoned 
dialogue, on the other. Consistent with the psychological argument I 
have made, it was the most liberal of the three governments, the French, 
that seemed to respond most to argumentation. France ceded on most 
issues to Germany, even though its initial position had British support. 
The outcome was not epiphenomenal to the distribution of power and 
interests. 
 Even as the nations agreed on the terms of the Treaty of Mutual Guar-
antee, Germany placed other issues on the table. Stresemann’s realist di-
plomacy originally foresaw that Germany would fi rst reassure the French 
and British by negotiating the treaty and only then bring up the issue of 
the Rhineland in a new climate of trust. His conservative cabinet col-
leagues opposed this strategy, however, demanding, in essence, payment 
on the spot. Over their objections, and despite the weakness of Germany, 
the DNVP pressured Stresemann and Luther to demand certain conces-
sions on the Rhineland as part of the formal negotiation requirements of 
the delegation sent to Locarno. The nationalists were again pushing the 
foreign minister and chancellor away from their preferred pragmatic 
style toward a more coercive and distributive one. 
 Stresemann raised the issue at the conference in its fi nal days but re-
ceived only a promise from France and Britain that they would work 
quickly to create a package of Rhineland alleviations. Nevertheless, in 
mid-November, the allies came through with an extensive list of amelio-
rations of the occupation, resulting in the ratifi cation of the Locarno 
treaty by a sizable margin in the Reichstag. A rationalist account might 
claim that Germany, given the hostile reception of the draft treaty on 
Stresemann’s return to Berlin, was able to force these concessions be-
cause domestic opposition strengthened its leverage and credibility—
what the allies were not initially willing to provide, the Germans were 
able to extract through coercive bargaining. 
 But a review of the documents shows that France and Britain did not 
grant these concessions on the occupation in response to German pres-
sure. The allies intended to make these allowances to Germany as a ges-
ture of reciprocity for Stresemann’s realist policy of reassurance. These 
concessions were the continuation of value creating. All parties spoke of 
the new spirit of Locarno that would make agreement on previously 
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contentious issues much easier. These  Rückwirkungen might have indeed 
been necessary for German ratifi cation, but this is not what motivated 
Britain and France. 
 At the end of this period of negotiations, all had received what they 
valued most. The French received security, the Germans greater sover-
eignty, and the British conciliation on the continent. Franco-German rela-
tions had been completely altered. In less than a year, with help from 
British realists and French liberals, Stresemann had transformed Ger-
many from the object of negotiations to an equal participant, despite his 
complete lack of bargaining leverage. The overall result was not, how-
ever, a foreordained exchange of benefi ts based simply on a favorable 
distribution of interests. The German foreign minister recognized, and 
the French and British confi rmed, that had the Germans fi rst come to 
them with a package deal of the kind eventually agreed on—alleviations 
of the occupation in exchange for a pledge of nonaggression—the pro-
posal would have failed. Structure allowed but did not determine events. 
Diplomacy added value. 
 Around the Table: The Locarno Conference 
 Diplomacy in Locarno proceeded through an exchange of arguments 
rather than demands, threats, and counterdemands. The parties prac-
ticed value creating rather than value claiming negotiation. Indeed, we 
can say that in some ways the representatives of the three countries 
went beyond value creating, engaging in communicative action in which 
all sides remained open to being persuaded to rethink their positions. As 
the representatives of the three countries (as well as Italy, Belgium, 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland) met in Locarno in October 1925, there 
were two major issues of contention, both of which had occupied a 
prominent place in the earlier exchange of notes: the sanctions obliga-
tions of Germany when it became a member of the League of Nations 
and whether France would guarantee the treaties of arbitration that Ger-
many would sign with its eastern neighbors. Briand playfully referred 
to these as the “rheumatism points” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 1; Locarno-
Konferenz, No. 25). 
 On the question of the eastern treaties, France framed its guarantee of 
the German arrangements with its eastern neighbors as different from a 
traditional alliance. Whereas the aborted 1919 treaty had been directed 
against Germany, the treaty that now was imagined in both the east and 
the west was reciprocal in nature. France would be guaranteeing Ger-
many against Polish aggression as well. Briand stated that he did not 
believe in old-fashioned alliances but, rather, looked for pacts along the 
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multilateral lines of the League (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5; Locarno-Konferenz: 
 149–54; ADAP A14, No. 123; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174). The 
French foreign minister also argued that if Germany indeed had peaceful 
intentions and was indeed serious about not resorting to force to change 
the eastern borders, then it should have no problem with a French guar-
antee. There was “no reason why the principles applied to one frontier 
should not be applied to the other” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5; see also 
 Locarno-Konferenz: 149–54). Stresemann had his own counterargument. 
He questioned whether it was possible for a state to objectively guaran-
tee a treaty in which an ally was involved. France could not credibly 
claim it would go to war against Poland if its ally attacked Germany or 
judge Poland, rather than Germany, to be at fault in an ambiguous case. 
 On the issue of Germany’s obligations under Article 16 of the League 
Covenant, Stresemann used two arguments. First, he claimed that it was 
not fair to ask Germany to contribute to military or economic sanctions 
on behalf of the League in its currently disarmed state, one that Germany 
had not asked for but which had been imposed as part of the Versailles 
peace terms. This was not “willful inequality.” In its “exceptional posi-
tion,” Germany “did not ask for privileges, but only for special treatment 
during a transitional period.” Germany would be able to take on the 
same obligations as other countries when, as foreseen in the League Cov-
enant, global disarmament took place (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8; see also 
Stresemann, Vol. 2: 176–78; Locarno-Konferenz: 161–72). Second, he 
noted that Britain and France, and the League in general, had already, 
during negotiations over the failed Treaty of Mutual Assistance, con-
ceded the point that obligations to the League might take into account 
the different geographical positions and military power of the countries 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 522 and app. 8; Locarno-Konferenz: 161–72). The 
Germans were simply asking for an affi rmation of this established 
principle. 2 
 The French responded that the League of Nations was the “pivot” for 
the entire pact and was based on equal obligations that applied to all. For 
Briand, the League was “one and indivisible. It was not compatible with 
choosing what was pleasant and rejecting that which was unpleasant. All 
 2 . The allies suggested that that Germany simply rely on its veto power as a future permanent 
member of the League Council to prevent the organization from implementing any undesirable 
sanctions. Luther and Stresemann protested that doing so would leave Germany in an 
unacceptable position of “moral isolation” in the event it blocked action against a wanton act of 
aggression by another state. They did not want to be under any ethical obligation to participate 
when it might prove practically impossible for Germany to do so (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 
175; DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8 and No. 523; Locarno-Konferenz: 161–72). 
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members must all take on the same obligations or the spirit of association 
would be broken.” The German position was the “point of view of the 
individual and not the whole body” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8; Locarno-
Konferenz: 161–72). 
 The British made different, more pragmatic arguments. The foreign 
secretary urged the Germans to consider the practical effect of a French 
guarantee of the eastern treaties “apart from the objections of sentiment.” 
Chamberlain pointed out that France already had alliances with the East-
ern European neighbors of Germany, so any new guarantee changed lit-
tle for Germany. Indeed, the treaty might limit the operation of this 
alliance if the League was obliged to take up any violations of the arbitra-
tion pact before France took action (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 518). German 
representatives responded that the symbolic recognition of this Little En-
tente was impossible for Germany (ADAP A14, No. 123). Luther de-
scribed the German public’s objections on the issue as “emotional” yet 
very real (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174). 
 On Article 16, Chamberlain’s realism made him sympathetic to the 
points made by Germany about the uniqueness of its position, particu-
larly its vulnerability vis-à-vis the Soviet Union: “If he had been a Ger-
man, Mr. Chamberlain said he would no doubt have the same ideas as the 
German Government and would have sought to do what they were 
doing. All the same, it was certain that it would not be possible to get the 
League of Nations to accept the German view” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8; 
No. 522). To ease German fears, the British urged the Germans to think of 
Article 16 as they did and to take advantage of its ambiguity. The League 
Covenant obligated some action to be taken by all states, particularly in 
regards to economic sanctions, in the case of aggression. It did not, how-
ever, specify any particular measures (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 8). There was 
already a “certain liberty left to the Powers as regards the extent and even 
the times of their co-operation” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 522). He even sug-
gested that the Germans join the League and work to dilute Article 16 
with the British from within. Given its extensive global economic ties, 
Britain would suffer the most from cutting off international commerce. 
And it was more important than any other country, given its navy, in im-
plementing any blockade (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 533). When Luther ex-
pressed his admiration for Chamberlain’s “practical idealism,” the British 
foreign secretary reported, “I believe I blushed” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 528). 
Pragmatism was the greatest compliment such a realist could receive. 
 All parties remarked on the value creating that prevailed at the confer-
ence. The delegates were impressed by the skilled exposition of compet-
ing arguments. Miles Lampson wrote, “I claim to be as phlegmatic and 
unemotional as most of my countrymen: but I admit having been thrilled 
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to the bone once or twice by the eloquence and obvious sincerity of both 
Briand and Stresemann. . . . My pen has somewhat taken charge and you 
may well think that I am overdoing it as regards enthusiasm. Optimism 
is a catching complaint, and perhaps it blinds my vision; but I do not wit-
tingly exaggerate (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). Stresemann wrote in his 
diary, “In the evening Chamberlain said that never in his life had he been 
present at a more interesting debate. [Oswald] Hesnard observed that 
the debate had touched the limit of what was politically possible, but had 
been conducted in such a dignifi ed manner that Briand himself had spo-
ken with great appreciation of the argument, though my observations 
were naturally not much to his liking” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 178). Lamp-
son reported back home, “Yesterday, over the question of Germany’s 
entry into the League, they were both at their best and I have never be-
fore had the good fortune to hear a discussion conducted on so high a 
plane” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). A German memo noted that Briand 
spoke with “excellent rhetoric” and Stresemann with “the most effective 
execution” (ADAP A14, No. 127). 
 Germany ultimately prevailed on both issues despite its lack of bar-
gaining leverage. The parties moved beyond even integrative negotiation 
toward something resembling Habermasian communicative action. Each 
of the “rheumatism points” was discussed separately and resolved on its 
own merits rather than linked to concessions on a different point. The 
nations agreed that they could act against another pact member in de-
fense of countries in Eastern Europe only if the League Council approved 
it. If the League Council could not come to an agreement about the mea-
sures to be taken, the parties could act only against the country that was 
the fi rst to attack (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 12). The French then signed a 
treaty with the Polish, making such a commitment should the Germans 
be the fi rst to strike, but this was not part of the offi cial conference delib-
erations or protocol. By claiming they had reaffi rmed their alliance, the 
French saved some face. As a result of the pact, however, France was in 
less of a legal position to defend its eastern allies than it had been before 
the treaty. On Article 16, the allies formally stated that their understand-
ing of that particular clause of the League of Nations Covenant was that 
members would take action compatible with their geographical and mil-
itary situation (DBFP, Vol. 27, No. 532, app. 10; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 
182). This was effectively an informal exemption for Germany. 
 We may be tempted to simply reduce the German victory on these two 
conference issues, after the fact, to the bargaining leverage conveyed by 
their smaller “win set” domestically, the international strength conferred 
by domestic weakness (Putnam 1988). Stresemann declared that Ger-
many was “absolutely unable to accept” a French guarantee of the east 
(DBFP, Vol. 27, No. 516; see also app. 1). Luther said the issue posed an 
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“almost insuperable diffi culty” (DBFP, Vol. 27, No. 518). A guarantee was 
“impossible of acceptance by any representatives of Germany” (DBFP, 
Vol. 27, No. 518; see also Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174). Did German 
threats coerce the allies into concessions? Was the outcome the refl ection 
of the distribution of interests and power? 
 But this is not at all how the negotiations proceeded. Germany indeed 
stressed its domestic diffi culties; however, the French did also. Briand 
noted that France had its own “nationalist hotheads” to convince. He 
reminded Stresemann and Luther that Germany was not the only coun-
try with a problem of domestic public opinion (Locarno-Konferenz: 149–
54; DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). And each side did so not to coerce but to 
evoke understanding from the other. Lampson wrote, “Briand, Strese-
mann and Luther sit opposite to one another in the Conference Room 
and discuss with the utmost discretion and good humour their various 
diffi culties. Each goes out of his way to show that he realizes those of the 
other; each is obviously genuinely desirous of helping the other out so 
far as he possibly can consistent with his own national interests. In 
short, there is a complete absence of bitterness or back biting. . . . This 
strikes me as really the most signifi cant feature of the whole conference” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). At Locarno, both the French and Germans 
were open and honest about their domestic constraints and believed the 
statements of the other even though each had incentives to bluff and to 
dismiss the claims of the other side. Extensive value claiming did not 
occur. 
 All observers at the conference commented on the spirit of good faith 
and goodwill that prevailed. Even on the very fi rst day, Chamberlain of-
fered the “general comment” that the “most striking atmosphere of help-
ful goodwill prevailed throughout. M. Briand and Dr. Luther went out of 
their way to emphasize their determination not only to bring Pact to a 
successful conclusion but also to eliminate once and for all division of 
Europe into rival camps of victor and vanquished.” He described the 
interactions as “easy, frank and loyal” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516), with a 
“noteworthy absence of any spirit of bargaining” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 
547). The Germans agreed. Luther reported to the German cabinet, “The 
goodwill of the English, French and Belgians to reach a positive outcome 
that is also acceptable to Germany cannot be doubted based on all that 
we see. The type of cooperation and the mutual dealings have been com-
pletely irreproachable” (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 180). The Germans 
praised Briand’s “courage” in making the concessions he did (ADAP 
A14, No. 157). On this good faith, Lampson wrote, “Frankly I am 
amazed—I think everyone must be—by the absence of all chicanery. All 
parties come to the table and explain their particular diffi culties in the 
simplest and most straightforward language” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529). 
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 In other words, the countries were putting their cards on the table. The 
foreign secretary wrote, 
 Something which the Chancellor had said led me to observe that if an in-
habitant of Mars suddenly visited the Conference room, knowing nothing 
of the history of the last few years, he would certainly get no idea that 
those who were sitting round the table were lately bitter enemies: he would 
think, rather, that they were good friends who had indeed differences of 
opinion upon serious matters, but were bent upon settling them in the 
most amicable spirit. . . . Who would have dreamed a few months ago that 
a discussion of that kind, so frank, so open, so conciliatory on both sides, 
would have been possible? (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 528; see also  Hansard Se-
ries 5, Vol. 188: col. 421) 
 The discussion proceeded on the basis of the equality that facilitates 
value creating. Lampson, the veteran British civil servant familiar with 
past efforts at conference diplomacy, claimed there was “all the differ-
ence in the world” between the Locarno negotiations and those of previ-
ous meetings: 
 However much in theory we may have met in London 3 on a footing of 
complete equality, in practice we certainly did not: we, the allies, decided 
what we wanted; we, the allies, persuaded the Germans to accept our pro-
posals after, it is true, thorough and perfectly fair discussion: so that it was 
in fact a division into two groups. What is the position here? Strikingly 
different. No groupings of parties, no division into allies on one side and 
Germans on the other. . . . For the fi rst time since the war the French and the 
Germans meet as man to man, one might almost say as friend to friend. 
There is complete equality; there is no longer a division into groups; all 
that is past and gone. (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 529) 
 Briand claimed that he would not have found himself in Locarno if he 
had wanted the division between the allies and Germany to persist. He 
wanted complete equality. Chamberlain agreed. If this split persisted 
after Locarno, then the countries would not have achieved anything, he 
asserted (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516 and app. 1; Locarno-Konferenz, No. 25). 
 Nor was this atmosphere simply endogenous to prior agreements on 
the issues being discussed or a glow that emerged after a successful com-
promise. “Fundamental divergencies of view of course there are: but in 
no single instance have they been expounded in such a way as to cause 
 3. The reparations conference of 1924. 
Cards on the Table
[145]
the slightest umbrage to the other party,” Lampson wrote (DBFP I, Vol. 
27, No. 529). At another point, the British described a “prolonged inter-
change of views and arguments between Herr Stresemann and Herr Lu-
ther and M. Briand conducted with excellent temper on both sides but 
not disclosing any possible basis for agreement. M. Briand insisted that 
the principle was fundamental but offered to consider any alternative 
form of its application” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 517). 
 In their role as honest broker and facilitator of a pragmatic compro-
mise, the British were intentionally trying to create such an atmosphere. 
Although he had been asked to chair the discussions, Chamberlain pro-
posed, instead, at the fi rst meeting to forgo any formal chairmanship so 
that the negotiations should have the “character of ‘conversations’” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516) that were “as free and as informal as possible” 
with “complete frankness” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 1). The parties should 
proceed on the basis of “perfect equality” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 1). 
 Nevertheless, it was the French who were most responsible for the 
value creating that prevailed at Locarno. The French foreign minister 
came to the conference with an integrative mind-set characteristic of lib-
eral diplomacy. Of their meetings to draw up a draft treaty in August 
before departing to Locarno, Chamberlain wrote, “Briand was the fi rst to 
insist . . . that we must prepare for a real discussion with the Germans so 
as to arrive at a mutual agreement, and not another treaty imposed by 
the Allies upon Germany” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 439). At the conference, 
the Germans described Briand as “conciliatory on even the most diffi cult 
questions” (ADAP A14, No. 163). 
 Sitting with Luther early in the conference, Briand revealed his proso-
cial motivation: “You are a German, and I am a Frenchman. But I can be 
French and a good European. And you can be German and a good Euro-
pean. Two good Europeans should be able to understand one another” 
(in Unger 2005: 495). Stresemann put his fi nger on the essence of French 
liberal diplomacy as well. He praised France’s effort to balance the na-
tional interest with that of the collective. Paying tribute to Briand, the 
foreign minister said, “You started from the idea that everyone of us be-
longs in the fi rst instance to his own country . . . but that everyone also is 
a citizen of Europe, pledged to the great cultural idea that fi nds expres-
sion in the concept of our continent. We have a right to speak of a 
European idea” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 239–40). Chamberlain had also com-
mented on how Briand “has, in truth . . . a European mind” (DBFP I, Vol. 
27, No. 364). 
 Briand was perpetually optimistic rather than instrumentally pessi-
mistic. He told the delegates in his opening statements that “He himself 
had long refl ected on the consequences resulting from that act by Ger-
many. . . . He wished to assure Dr. Luther that he had come to Locarno 
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without arrière-pensée, and with a real desire to settle this question of 
security so that it would not arise again.” He wanted “to arrive at a bal-
ance” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516). Even as he laid out his arguments in 
favor of a French guarantee of the eastern treaties, Briand stressed that 
the solution was largely a question of doing the “same thing in another 
way in order to satisfy German public opinion” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). 
It was a matter of fi nding a “formula” (ADAP A14, No. 123; Kabinette 
Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174). He was “sure that each side would use its inge-
nuity to seek another solution” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). Chamberlain 
wrote that Briand “has almost taken my breath away with his liberality” 
(Grayson 1997: 57). 
 The French foreign minister also disclosed private information. When 
Luther asked him if France envisioned a guarantee of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia in which France would be able to act immediately with-
out waiting for League deliberation, he revealed that this was negotiable 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). He even proclaimed himself “naïve enough to 
admit that he had proposals for a compromise to put before the confer-
ence” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 175). Briand had in mind identifying a set of 
trustees that would act on behalf of the League to guarantee the treaty. 
He had told the British in August that he hoped this would meet the Ger-
man concern about impartiality without diminishing the effectiveness of 
the guarantee, suggesting he recognized the power of their argument 
(CC 42 (25)). His eventual concessions went even beyond this. 
 The French concessions were not driven by British pressure. Given the 
importance of the security guarantee of Britain to France, the British 
could have exercised considerable leverage on the French to make con-
cessions to the Germans. But they did not do so. Even though the British 
were relatively uninterested in the east, they sided with the French on the 
issue of the French guarantee of the eastern treaties. And the British were 
insistent that the Germans be under some obligation to participate in 
League economic sanctions, even if the precise form were decided on a 
case-by-case basis (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). This was true during the en-
tire course of negotiations, even before the conference (DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
Nos. 249, 321, 363, 405); CP 245 (25); CP 312 (25); CP 318 (25)). 
 Chamberlain’s credited the success of the conference to diplomatic 
style, which he attributed to the characteristics of the German and French 
diplomats. On the fi rst day he had observed that “Chancellor [Luther] 
seemed to me to show just the qualities which, joined with M. Briand’s, 
are needed for success” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 516). Later in parliament, 
Chamberlain declared, “I think I am not saying too much when I say that 
the success of the Locarno Conference was essentially due to the charac-
ter of the representatives of Germany and the representatives of France 
at that Conference” ( Hansard Series 5, Vol. 188: col. 421). Agency was 
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necessary to deliver the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. He gave particular 
credit to France. “I was particularly fortunate in the character of the great 
Frenchman who represented his country there. M. Briand is a man of 
singular courage, of great clearness of vision and of a wide and generous 
liberality of thought. When he sets to work to make peace, he does it in 
the largest spirit” ( Hansard Series 5, Vol. 188: col. 421). 
 Clearing the Table: The Ramifi cations of 
 the Spirit of Locarno 
 Primate Diplomacy: New German Demands at Locarno 
 Stresemann’s realist diplomacy was based on the idea that Germany 
would fi rst secure a rapprochement with the allied powers through a 
security pact and then begin to push for the easing of the occupation and, 
eventually, the complete evacuation of foreign troops from German soil 
before the year stipulated in the Versailles Treaty—1935. From the begin-
ning, the foreign minister told his cabinet colleagues that Germany 
would insist on an assurance that at least the Cologne zone would be 
evacuated after the conclusion of a pact. He believed that it would be too 
much to ask for any further alleviations for the Rhineland at the present 
moment (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, Nos. 49, 116, 123, 153; Gratwohl 1980: 
71, 110–11). Full evacuation would not result from a treaty, but it was the 
“logical consequence” of a pact (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 79; Gratwohl 1980: 
73). This was the offi cial position of Stresemann’s DVP as well (Kabinette 
Luther, Vol. 1, No. 116). In a Reichstag address in July, Stresemann merely 
stated that he “expected some alleviations, notably of the burden of oc-
cupation if the pact came into being” but not as a condition for its suc-
cessful conclusion (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 422). Stresemann was restraining 
his demands to better reassure the French and British of Germany’s peace-
ful and cooperative intentions. 
 This was not suffi cient for the DNVP, as mentioned in chapter 5. Kuno 
Graf von Westarp, the leader of the nationalist parliamentary caucus and 
a strong conservative, identifi ed not only the amelioration but also the 
reduction of the length of occupation as part of any acceptable deal 
(Gratwohl 1980: 98). This was the party offi cial position (Gratwohl 1980: 
84). In the cabinet, Schiele of the DNVP had more moderate aims but, at 
least in the short term, they were still markedly more infl ated than Strese-
mann’s. In the cabinet, he called for a revision of the occupation regime 
as part of any deal on the security pact and an evacuation of the Cologne 
zone before the conference took place so that it would not become an 
“object” of the negotiations, a bargaining chip that the allies could use 
to pressure Germany to accept other terms (Gratwohl 1980: 110–11; 
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Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 158). As part of coercive diplomacy, the 
right-wing politician was attempting to remove a source of leverage 
from the allies by claiming as much value as possible now. 
 This nationalist pressure from inside the coalition forced Stresemann 
to shift in the direction of coercive bargaining. The offi cial guidelines for 
the delegation to Locarno required that Germany secure both the settle-
ment of the remaining disarmament questions and the evacuation of Co-
logne, as well as an assurance that the conditions of the occupation 
would be made less burdensome. The representatives to Locarno were 
also to “strive” for a reduction in the length of occupation, although this 
was not a precondition for acceptance (Gratwohl 1980: 113–22; Kabinette 
Luther, Vol. 1, No. 170). Stresemann was obliged to bring home some-
thing tangible in terms of the occupation. 
 Feeling this pressure, the Germans began to broach the topic of ramifi -
cations for the Rhineland with the allies even before the conference (Strese-
mann, Vol. 2: 151–53). The allies noticed the change in the German 
diplomatic style. Chamberlain complained that, although the German 
government obviously wanted to secure a deal on the security pact, he 
had “to confess that they hold at times a language incompatible with 
their earlier statements and assurances and their attitude may present 
unexpected diffi culties” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 509). The Germans then 
attempted to raise the subject of ramifi cations early in Locarno (ADAP 
A14, Nos. 127, 132; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174) but were told to 
hold off until the pact was settled (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 174; 
ADAP A14, No. 137). It was only after the deal on Article 16 and the east-
ern arbitration treaties had taken shape that the British and French were 
willing to engage the subject, and then only on the perimeter of the con-
ference in a private meeting that was to be “absolutely informal” and 
“non-offi cial” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). 
 Stresemann began with a long list of concessions that the German del-
egation “wished to obtain to order to render their position in Germany 
easier.” In addition to holding fi rm on a few issues of disarmament that 
had blocked the evacuation of Cologne, the foreign minister asked for a 
reduction in the number of foreign troops in the Rhineland to the level of 
German troops that had been stationed in the Rhineland before the war. 
He requested the creation of a mixed commission, including German rep-
resentatives, that would reduce the number of ordinances in the occupied 
zones that had created de facto martial law in the Rhineland. Stresemann 
called for an assurance that there would be no permanent inspection of 
German disarmament, an assurance of the right of Germany to develop 
civilian aviation, the immediate withdrawal of all black allied troops, and 
even the shortening of the length of occupation (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11; 
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ADAP A14, No. 138; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 179–80). The Germans did not 
make a positional commitment. They stressed that this was simply a list 
of desires, not demands. But something “concrete,” in Luther’s words, on 
the Rhineland was necessary to avoid the impression that they had re-
turned “empty-handed” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). Stresemann explained 
that “it was necessary to have something beyond mere words to satisfy 
that anxiety” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11; see also ADAP A14, No. 138). Strese-
mann’s right-hand man, Carl von Schubert, later almost apologized in a 
private meeting with Chamberlain for the coercive bargaining. National-
ist pressure, he disclosed, was forcing Germany to engage in “primate 
diplomacy.” Germany could not operate with “diplomatic subtleties” 
but, rather, had to present “our wishes and demands very openly and 
baldly” (ADAP A14, No. 141). 
 A deal was reached on Cologne and disarmament on the basis of a 
British compromise proposal. 4 The fi rst zone was fi nally to be freed. As 
for the other German demands, Stresemann wrote later that “Briand had 
almost fallen off the sofa. . . . He was astonished at my boldness, which 
indeed he thought had gone too far. If my views were to be accepted, the 
Treaty of Versailles might as well cease to exist” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 180–
81, 185–88). Briand joked that all these issues would require their own 
conference. It bordered on “foolhardiness” (ADAP A14, No. 138). 
 Yet, in keeping with his liberal diplomatic style of reasoned dialogue, 
Briand did not reject the German demands outright but, rather, was con-
ciliatory and empathetic. It was “natural” that after the pact was signed 
that they “should consider everything for the realization for which we 
hoped” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). German desires were “completely nor-
mal” (ADAP A14, No. 138). He recognized that the Germany “could not 
be satisfi ed with mere expressions of hope otherwise they would be 
called illusionists” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). Briand even expressed opti-
mism. “In a general way, Dr. Stresemann’s list did not  a priori seem 
 4 . As he had before, Chamberlain took it upon himself to broker a deal on the remaining 
points of disarmament so that Cologne might be evacuated quickly, thereby helping to clear 
the path for German ratifi cation. He devised a solution in which Germany would address a 
note to the Conference of Ambassadors on those issues that remained unsettled and pledge 
that it would make an effort to resolve them as soon as possible with the allies. The allies 
would take the Germans at their word and formally set a date for evacuation. The realist 
foreign secretary saw the remaining points of disagreement as trivial and wanted to remove 
them as an obstacle to a much more important goal—the conclusion of a security pact. 
Chamberlain applied pressure on his military representatives to move quickly and to stop 
quibbling about small points, such as how many German troops were allowed to be stationed 
in barracks or the title given to the German police (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11 and No. 541; ADAP 
A14, No. 149; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 186–88; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 195b, 195a). 
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impossible of realization. Quite the contrary. He would say for himself 
that he could even conceive further points which might be considered” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). Briand even used Stresemann’s terms. The pact 
must have “important repercussions” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 186). This was 
not simply cheap talk. Briand expressed the same sentiments to the Brit-
ish privately before the Germans raised these issues. 5 
 Briand was willing to consider the German proposals because of Strese-
mann’s pragmatic statecraft. At Locarno, the French foreign minister 
stated that, as a consequence of Stresemann’s overtures, France had had its 
“anxieties allayed as regards her own frontiers” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 5). 
He said, “If there was general security we could make certain allowances” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11; also Stresemann, Vol. 2: 180–81). 
 Briand did not grant these concessions immediately at the conference 
for two reasons. First, he did not have any backing yet from his govern-
ment. Stresemann had inserted issues on the agenda on which the French 
government had not formulated an offi cial position. 6 Second, domestic 
opposition to his diplomacy also meant that it “must not appear that 
there had been any sort of bargain about the Pact behind the scenes” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11; see also ADAP A14, No. 138). In essence, any 
additional concessions would raise questions about the genuineness of 
German intentions at home in France (ADAP A14, No. 138). This had 
been the German foreign minister’s own concern. Briand stressed he 
“had no objection to the treaties working out in this sense. Still we could 
not expect all this to happen at once. . . . He, too, had many enemies in 
France.  Unreasonable persons were not a monopoly of Germany. He was 
attacked in Paris for exchanging a sound system of defence for a security 
system. He, too, had been called a traitor” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 180–81, 
emphasis added). The French military was a particularly formidable ob-
stacle (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 195a). 
 Briand was not using the French right as an excuse for inaction, how-
ever. The foreign minister told the Germans that “it would be his fi rst task 
to press this on the French Cabinet on his return to Paris” and even prom-
ised to resign if it did not bear fruit. He promised that the “facts which 
 5 . The British wrote, “For example, he proposed that we should adjourn the question of 
military control after evacuation of the Rhineland, which appears on the agenda of the 
Council, remarking that, if our pact negotiations went through this would be easy to arrange. 
Many matters which would now present great diffi culty would become of little or no 
importance” after conclusion of the pact (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 364). 
 6 . The French foreign minister stated that “this was not the moment. He had not the mandate 
and his position would be untenable.” It was “outside the notes which had been exchanged” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 11). 
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would follow on the Pact would be suffi cient proof” that the original mem-
orandum had led to decisive gains for Germany (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 15; 
see also Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 184, 195b). Briand hoped to reduce 
the number of troops and ordinances. The French minister even promised 
the Germans that they could “enlarge on the effects of the general reaction 
on all sorts of things, with the practical certainty that it would have these 
concrete results” that would “follow very quickly, more quickly indeed 
than the German public could at present anticipate” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 
11; also ADAP A14, No. 138). Rather than dismissing German desires as 
being impossible to realize, as one would do when engaged in coercive 
bargaining, Briand went so far as to ask the German government for an 
offi cial memorandum identifying a wish list on the occupation (ADAP 
A14, No. 140; see also No. 149). He said he would think it dishonest to not 
follow through and bring about a decisive change in the occupation regime 
(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 184). 
 The Germans trusted Briand. Stresemann described a remarkable ex-
change at the conference. “After his speech on Friday evening, Briand 
came to me and stretched out both his hands to me. I took his right hand 
and said that I was grateful to him from my heart for the words that he 
had spoken, to which he replied: ‘No, don’t speak of words. I shall prove 
to you that they are not merely words, but deeds’” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 
188; see also Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 184). The British recognized 
this explicitly as liberal diplomacy. Chamberlain wrote home of the 
“noble reply of M. Briand, breathing the true spirit of Liberal France. 
With his mandate exhausted and no longer able to speak in the name of 
his Government, he yet pledges himself on his return to France to en-
deavor to give the largest possible satisfaction to the unspoken wishes of 
the German delegation. None of us who had witnessed that scene would 
ever forget it” (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 6). 
 Chamberlain responded differently, consistent with his pragmatic dip-
lomatic style. He urged Germany to moderate its demands given the re-
alities of the present circumstances (ADAP A14, No. 141; DBFP I, Vol. 27, 
app. 11). The foreign secretary told its representatives, “She [Germany] 
would always fi nd the other members of the Council sensible of what 
had passed at Locarno. We were just as anxious as they were that the new 
spirit engendered at Locarno should continue and bear fruit” but “there 
were concessions which were not in the [domain] of  practical politics” 
(DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 14, emphasis added). Whereas Briand, as a liberal, 
expressed genuine empathy for the position of Germany, Chamberlain, 
as a more instrumental pragmatist, complained privately about German 
primate diplomacy (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 547). Even though the French 
should have been most opposed to the new German demands given their 
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greater vulnerability and insecurity, the British were actually the ones 
who objected the most. Nevertheless, Chamberlain promised the Ger-
mans that he would travel through Paris on the way home to impress on 
the French prime minister and other key offi cials the British support for 
Briand’s concessions in this area (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 541). 
 The parties agreed to initial the fi nal results in the form of a draft treaty 
to convey an offi cial approval of the treaty proceedings while also allow-
ing the German delegation to bring the instrument home to discuss with 
its cabinet. The success of the treaty hinged on the issue that had driven 
Stresemann to write his memorandum in the fi rst place—steps toward 
returning Germany sovereignty in the western occupation zones. 
 Amputee Diplomacy: Stresemann Returns and the 
German Nationalists Depart 
 Stresemann returned home to an angry German cabinet. The members 
had been briefed during Locarno on the progress of negotiations, and the 
now familiar divide had opened up between the centrist and conserva-
tive elements. The nationalists complained that the Article 16 arrange-
ment was not comprehensive and binding enough. 7 Outside the cabinet, 
in the Reichstag Graf von Westarp denigrated “gentlemen’s agreements” 
on issues such as Article 16 (Gratwohl 1980: 128, 138). Schiele insisted 
that defi nitive concessions be brought home on the Rhineland occupa-
tion now so that they did not become objects of negotiation later (Kabi-
nette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 197). He also wanted a specifi c commitment to 
reduce the length of occupation for the remaining zones (Kabinette Lu-
ther, Vol. 2, No. 201). Hindenburg responded emotionally, complaining 
that the treaty amounted to a “perpetual genufl ection” for the Germans 
(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 214). 8 
 7 . Hindenburg called the note on Article 16 that Stresemann had secured a “noose around the 
neck” (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 183). Han von Seeckt complained that Germany must secure 
a categorical exception from any obligations, rather than merely the right to participate to the 
extent that it sought fi t (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 187). Schiele complained of its non-binding 
nature and demanded a League Council resolution absolving Germany of its responsibilities 
(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 190). He and Otto von Schlieben, DNVP member, also insisted on 
an explicit assertion that Germany had no obligation to participate in economic sanctions either 
(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 183, 190). 
 8 . He insisted on a clarifi cation that Germany had not permanently renounced the Alsace-
Lorraine (only a settlement through force), a “more precise” statement on war guilt, a complete 
exemption from any Article 16 negotiations, more binding commitments beyond simple 
promises to ease the occupation, and absolute fl exibility in exiting the pact. 
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 The DNVP caucus in parliament issued a communique denigrating 
the achievement and betraying their zero-sum heuristic: “The German 
Nationalist Reichstag delegation is not able to see in the results of the 
negotiations in Locarno the fulfi llment of the demands justifi ed by the 
vital necessities of the German people. The delegation also fails to fi nd 
the fulfi llment of the prerequisites to the conclusion of a treaty, as well as 
the compensations by the other participating powers commensurate 
with the sacrifi ces to be assumed by Germany” (Gratwohl 1980: 137; see 
also Stresemann, Vol. 2: 193). 9 
 The German delegation had been informed of nationalist feeling while 
in Locarno. Hermann Pünder, the foreign offi ce representative briefi ng 
the cabinet, had telegraphed the negotiating party to report the very seri-
ous opposition at home (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 183). 10 The nation-
alist opposition was so strong that Heinrich Brauns, as acting chair of the 
cabinet, could not secure cabinet approval for Stresemann and Luther to 
initial the draft treaty. The cabinet sent word forbidding them from doing 
so (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 197). Upon receiving the message, Lu-
ther, who was sitting with his British interlocutors, stated in colloquial 
English, “Tell him to ‘kiss my ass.’ I mean to sign” (in Gratwohl 1980: 130; 
Wright 2002: 338). 
 In his briefi ng to the cabinet on his return and in a meeting with Graf 
von Westarp, Stresemann made the pragmatic case for the treaty. He per-
sistently emphasized that Germany had realized “100%” of its main ne-
gotiating goals (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, 201; see also ADAP A14, No. 
160). This was not just grandstanding; Stresemann wrote the same in his 
diary (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 232–34). In recounting his successes, the for-
eign minister noted that his achievements came despite the structural 
weakness of Germany: “Never had a delegation had such a success. We 
had been a nation of helots, and to-day we were a State of world impor-
tance” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 191–92). 
 The difference between the centrists and the nationalists lay not in 
their goals but in their diplomatic styles. The right was unpragmatically 
 9 . Beyond the issue of ramifi cations, the DNVP found fault with the fundamental premise of 
Stresemann’s original memo, the legal rejection of using force to recover Alsace-Lorraine. The 
DNVP caucus vowed that “it will not approve any treaty . . . that does not exclude any 
renunciation of German land and peoples” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 193). 
 10 . Graf von Westarp wrote Luther demanding that he put the war-guilt question at the center 
of discussions (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 171). Schiele telegraphed Stresemann once to 
complain of his “serious misgivings” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 184) and then again, on behalf of all 
the DNVP cabinet members, to castigate the delegation for the abandonment of Alsace-
Lorraine (ADAP A14, No. 154). 
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making the perfect the enemy of the good. Stresemann complained, “The 
Peace of Versailles has but one pattern in the history of the world; that is 
the peace that Rome imposed on Carthage after the second Punic War. I 
don’t know if there was a single supporter of Hannibal in the Carthagin-
ian Senate who would not gladly have agreed to an armistice of the kind 
indicated by Locarno. I see in Locarno the preservation of the Rhineland, 
and the possibility of the recovery of German territory in the East. I may 
be wrong. But hitherto no one has shown me the slightest sign of any 
other way that might lead to the same goal” (Vol. 2: 231). The nationalists 
were being unrealistic. “Politics is the art of the possible,” he stated again 
(in Jacobson 1972: 65). For instance, it was pointless to insist on an allied 
statement against war guilt because the allies would never grant it (Kabi-
nette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 215; see also No. 223). “Everything that could be 
done” on war guilt “has been done. . . . The idea that the Allies may on 
their side allow the Article to drop, I regard as purely Utopian” (Strese-
mann, Vol. 2: 196–204). 
 Stresemann explained to his colleagues that the pact was the corner-
stone for a longer-term and pragmatic strategy of emancipating Ger-
many and preventing “the plan of Poincaré to remain on the Rhine. That 
was the most important element” (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 233). A 
Foreign Offi ce memorandum emphasized the importance of thinking 
step by step “for a long future” and recognizing the current constraints 
of Germany. This was not a “genufl ection” but, rather, a step forward in 
a long-term process of restoring German “freedom” (Kabinette Luther, 
Vol. 2, No. 215; see also No. 223). Luther spoke of “laying tracks for tire-
less work to hollow out the [Versailles] treaty.” This would take consider-
able time, and there would be setbacks (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 
233). The “main point is the political effect,” Stresemann emphasized 
(Vol. 2: 196–204). The spirit of Locarno would make it easier for Germany 
to overcome Versailles over time (Wright 2002: 343). 
 As pragmatists, Luther and Stresemann were more attuned to the op-
portunities offered by particular structural circumstances but also the 
necessity of exercising agency to seize them. Locarno was “like the hem 
of the garment in the story, to be grasped when opportunity offers,” 
wrote the foreign minister (Stresemann Vol. 2: 304). Both recognized the 
deteriorating German status quo. Luther warned that “politics does not 
stand still” and that “such a passive approach is in the long run com-
pletely impossible.” If Germany did not proceed, the possibility that it 
might fi nd itself the target of a Franco-British alliance was “no fantasy” 
(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 1, No. 110; Wright 2002: 316–17; Gratwohl 1980: 
86–88; Jacobson 1972: 53). 
 The more moderate elements in the German cabinet, those with greater 
epistemic motivation than the nationalists, endorsed Stresemann’s state-
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craft. Heinrich Brauns, Center Party member, and Otto Karl Gessler, 
Democratic Party member, defended the results of the conference. 11 Ex-
pressing a similar realist style of diplomacy, Brauns praised the foreign 
minister for making an important step forward in what must be a long-
term process. Rudolf Krohne of the DVP agreed that Germany had 
achieved much and would achieve more in the future. Not everything 
must be accomplished at once. Gessler likened Hindenburg’s position to 
a “person missing both legs who threatens not to dance.” He advised the 
former general, “We have to learn again to act in the spirit of Bismarck” 
(Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 233). The pragmatic moderates had a better 
understanding of the weak German position. 
 The precarious domestic situation again put pressure on Stresemann 
to engage in coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis the allies on the issue of the 
ramifi cations. Even though he was personally very pleased with the out-
come for Germany at Locarno, he instructed his representatives abroad 
to downplay the extent of the German gains. This would enable Ger-
many to extract more concessions before the treaty came before the 
Reichstag, thereby putting the government in a better position to sign 
and ratify the treaty (ADAP A14, No. 163). 
 Germany had to walk a fi ne line, however. It did not want to give the 
impression that it valued these “specifi c advantages” more than the 
peace pact itself. Yet these were matters of such “vital interest” that they 
had to be secured before ratifi cation (ADAP A14, No. 160). If Germany 
denigrated the agreement to date, it would be accused of ill will, which 
might threaten the treaty ratifi cation abroad. If, however, Germany 
seemed too pleased, the allies would feel under no further “obligation,” 
endangering the treaty’s prospects at home (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 
201). Luther agreed (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 200). 
 Stresemann’s realism softened the coercive diplomacy. The Germans 
never gave the allies an ultimatum with specifi c demands that had to be 
realized for legislative approval. The foreign minister simply wrote, dip-
lomatically, “I take it for granted that friendly assurances given in Lo-
carno will materialize in a practical form without undue delay” (DBFP 
IA, Vol. 1, No. 43). German representatives abroad were instructed to 
stress the diffi culties Germany would face in the coming weeks (ADAP 
A14, No. 163; DBFP IA, Vol. 1, Nos. 28, 36). Stresemann told the allies that 
it was up to them to choose their concessions themselves so that these 
 11. They saw the note on Article 16 as binding and clearly in line with the German 
negotiating guidelines (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, Nos. 183, 187, 190). And the moderates 




would not be regarded as a price paid for German acquiescence (ADAP 
A14, Nos. 160, 195). The Germans framed the issue not in coercive terms, 
as the minimum side payment required for them to ratify the treaty, but, 
rather, as proof of the new spirit of Locarno that had arisen as a conse-
quence of the conference (ADAP A14, No. 187; see also No. 212). 
 Ratifi cation and the  Rückwirkungen : German Ransom or  
 Reward for Reassurance? 
 In mid-November, the allies sent a note to Germany listing their envi-
sioned alleviations of the Rhineland occupation, including the removal 
of most ordinances governing civilian life, the reduction of the size of 
foreign garrisons, the abolition of the hated delegates who served as liai-
sons between the German local government and foreign troops, and the 
full evacuation of Cologne by December 1 (Jacobson 1972: 64; Wright 
2002: 347; Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 223; DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 69; Strese-
mann, Vol. 2: 211). This was a dramatic series of alleviations. Even Strese-
mann, despite his vow to maintain unimpressed, later confessed that 
they were “much more considerable than any of us could have imag-
ined” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 232–34). 
 This outcome might appear on the surface to be the result of subtle 
coercive bargaining by Germany. Rationalists would point out the ad-
vantage conferred on Germany by the hostility to the pact within the 
cabinet. It restricted the win set of Germany and increased its leverage. 
But this was not what moved the allies. Rather, the concessions were the 
joint product of French liberal diplomacy and British realism. Chamber-
lain and Briand had always had every intention of making concessions to 
Germany following the conclusion of the pact. Germany did not need to 
coerce Britain and France. It was pushing on an open door. 
 The concessions to Germany by France and Britain were meant as a 
post-treaty reward for the new cooperative diplomacy practiced by Ger-
many. They were the continued manifestation of the value creating that 
prevailed at Locarno. In transmitting their note to Germany, the allies 
wrote, “In the same spirit of confi dence, good faith and good will, the 
Powers concerned in the occupation of the Rhineland have decided in 
regard to this occupation to introduce all the modifi cations compatible 
with the Treaty of Versailles” (in Stresemann, Vol. 2: 214–15). 
 That the allies had every intention of keeping their promise at Locarno 
was evident in British behavior immediately following the conference, 
well before Germany began to press. Before Chamberlain even returned 
to London, he wrote of the “ détente which should inevitably follow entry 
into force of Pact and reaction which it should have not only upon ques-
tion of evacuation of Cologne but also in direction of a general alleviation 
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of conditions in Rhineland.” He referred to the “inevitable and most de-
sirable effect on conclusion of pact” and promised “that anything in the 
nature of mollifi cation in the Rhineland to which French are ready to 
agree will have my strongest support” (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 2). 
 The foreign secretary immediately instructed the British commissioner 
in charge of British forces in the Rhineland to cancel all ordinances not 
necessary for the safety of allied armies, with a particular focus on those 
that would be the most striking to public opinion in the Rhineland (DBFP 
IA, Vol. 1, No. 47). In keeping with the British role as honest broker, 
Chamberlain pushed the French for an evacuation of Cologne to begin 
on December 1, 1925, the day that that pact was to be signed (DBFP IA, 
Vol. 1, Nos. 50, 59). In British eyes, this was to be a “fi rst gift” to Germany 
(ADAP A14, No. 49), not a quid pro quo brought about by the applica-
tion of German leverage. The British felt that ramifi cations, in Chamber-
lain’s words, “were not a bargain nor the purchase price of German 
assent” but, rather, “were to proceed from our own initiative because we 
felt that they were the natural results of the treaty of Locarno” (DBFP IA, 
Vol. 1, No. 73). 
 Because Britain had every intention of working earnestly on allevia-
tions in the Rhineland, Chamberlain was irritated when Germany began 
to pressure the allies. He chastised the Germans again for shifting from 
pragmatic to coercive diplomacy. He wrote, “Since the return of the Ger-
man delegates, the Nationalists have repudiated the treaty . . . and the 
German Ministers in this diffi cult situation open their mouths wider and 
wider, demanding the impossible, whilst more and more they and the 
supporters of the pact use language incompatible with the spirit of Lo-
carno, create the appearance of a  marchandage and give the impression of 
a condition or even an ultimatum to the doing of things  which were con-
ceived and intended as a free act of appeasement and goodwill ” (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, 
No. 73, emphasis added). Chamberlain reacted particularly strongly to 
Stresemann’s request after Locarno that the British consider a shortening 
the occupation. The Germans “must not make the mistake of asking the 
impossible, such as an assurance that the period of occupation of the re-
maining zones would be shortened, nor the equally grave mistake of 
treating concessions which would have appeared impossible to them a 
month ago, and which they now saw within their grasp, as valueless from 
the moment that they were offered, or of allowing themselves and their 
public to think that nothing was of any value except that which was re-
fused” (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 64). 
 If anything, the shift in German diplomatic style endangered rather 
than improved the prospects for ramifi cations. When the Germans began 
to press, the foreign secretary wrote to his ambassador in Berlin, “There 
is a limit beyond which we cannot go, and there is a risk that the German 
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government, in trying to push us too far, may end by defeating the very 
object they have in view. In short they are in grave danger of falling into 
their usual error of opening their mouths too wide. Time is on their side 
if they play their cards even moderately well. Can you not make them 
realize this?” (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 53). At another point, Chamberlain 
wrote, “I do not for a moment question the good faith of the Chancellor 
or Stresemann but this course is  full of danger . . . . The Germans ask a great 
deal too much. The attitude of their Nationalists  make more diffi cult the 
grant of the concessions  for which we were prepared nor are we in any way 
helped by the attitude of the other parties” (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 73, em-
phasis added). Stresemann had a greater chance of securing concessions 
by maintaining his realist course. 
 Briand also consistently demonstrated a desire to grant Germany con-
cessions unilaterally, independent of any German pressure. The British 
noted that while in Locarno Briand “had practically pledged his govern-
ment to undertake some modifi cations in the occupied territories” (DBFP 
IA, Vol. 1, No. 18), and when the French foreign minister returned to 
Paris, he set about trying to make these a reality. The liberal politician 
encountered great resistance on the part of the military, particularly in 
regards to the reduction in the number of French forces (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, 
Nos. 28, 33; ADAP A14, No. 176). The British thought that the French 
military resistance would ultimately stymie his efforts (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, 
No. 33). Marshal Foch demanded more time even on the issue of the Co-
logne evacuation. Briand and his leftist allies countered that a quick 
reply was necessary so as to maintain the “spirit of the Locarno Confer-
ence” (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 33). In response to anxious inquiries, Briand 
told one of his representatives in Germany, “Tell your friends in Berlin 
that I am thinking of them, always thinking of them, and that I am work-
ing on it” (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 210). The Germans themselves 
reported that Briand demonstrated “far-sightedness without narrow-
mindedness” and always had the “best intentions” (ADAP A14, No. 212; 
see also No. 176). His diplomacy was marked by good faith and 
goodwill. 
 Despite their greater degree of vulnerability to German aggression 
compared to the British, the French were the ones who were willing to 
give more. In reporting on the Franco-British deliberations over the ex-
tent of alleviations, the Germans expressed their astonishment that Bri-
and, even with his reluctant military, was willing to make more 
concessions than even the British War Ministry thought wise (ADAP 
A14, No. 254). For the fi rst time, the German ambassador to France noted, 
Germany had been successful in direct negotiations with the French and 
even created a common front against others. He advised they “should 
not overlook the progress in relations with the French and should be 
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pleased with the great change in Franco-German relations since the days 
of Poincaré” (ADAP A14, No. 25). 
 There is a second reason to believe that the limited coercive German 
diplomacy did not induce the allies to grant Stresemann’s request for 
ramifi cations. The leverage of the German government came from the 
signifi cant opposition of the DNVP in the cabinet. But the DNVP with-
drew from the government several weeks before the allies sent their note 
on concessions. The nationalist cabinet ministers and even many of their 
parliamentary colleagues wanted to remain part of the government to be 
in a better position to shape negotiations. A meeting of provincial dele-
gates and the executive committee of the DNVP, however, rejected the 
draft treaty as it currently stood and demanded the removal of the DNVP 
cabinet members, who subsequently resigned (Wright 2002: 304; Kabi-
nette Luther, Vol. 2, No. 207). Differences over diplomacy broke apart the 
German coalition. 
 This removed much of Stresemann’s bargaining leverage because it 
was, correctly, assumed that other parties were more favorably disposed 
to the treaty. The Germans recognized as much (Kabinette Luther, Vol. 2, 
No. 216; Stresemann, Vol. 2: 195) And, as Chamberlain told the Germans, 
the departure of the DNVP reduced the gains for the allies because a 
treaty approved by the DNVP would have been of greater value than one 
to which the party remained hostile (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 20; Kabinette 
Luther, Vol. 2, No. 216). Chamberlain wanted to court “every moderate 
and reasonable element in Germany” so that the treaty had the “widest 
obtainable support” in the country (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 5). “A Pact en-
dorsed by a Government supported by the Right is worth ten Pacts car-
ried in the Reichstag against the votes of the Right,” calculated the British 
ambassador to Germany (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 263). The Germans them-
selves had made this one of their selling points (ADAP A12, Nos. 28, 40, 
81; Gratwohl 1980: 65). The resignation of the DNVP should therefore 
have, under rationalist bargaining logic, made the allies less likely to 
yield. Yet they persisted on the course of giving signifi cant concessions. 
Briand was particularly unmoved by the change, showing again his 
more reasonable liberal diplomacy. Noting the difference between Brit-
ain and France on this issue, Stresemann correctly diagnosed that this 
was “because [Briand] . . . stands on the Left” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 206). 
 Stresemann made up for the lack of DNVP support by relying on the 
votes of the SPD, which had consistently backed his diplomatic efforts 
and on whose support he had always counted, even though the Socialists 
had a political incentive to withhold support to see the government fall 
(DBFP IA, Vol. 1, Nos. 43, 64; ADAP A14, No. 195). Unlike the national-
ists, the SPD appreciated the signifi cance of the allied concessions. The 
alleviations were to them a “triumph of the spirit of peace” (DBFP IA, 
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Vol. 1, No. 107). With the fi nal statement on ramifi cations in hand, the 
German government was now in a position to take a stand on the treaty. 
The unusual nature of the cabinet, as a collection of personalities repre-
senting the views of their parties but without the formal confi rmation of 
the German parliament, meant that it could continue on in offi ce despite 
the resignation of the DNVP ministers. Stresemann and Luther an-
nounced that they would continue the business of pushing the pact to a 
vote, after which the president would be given the task of forming 
a new government. This allowed the SPD members to vote their con-
science without ruling out the possibility that they might take up the 
reins of government (ADAP A14, No. 187; DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 43, 49). 
The cabinet sent the document with its endorsement to the Reichstag, 
where the treaty passed by a vote of 291 to 174, although without any 
of the DNVP votes that both the allies and Stresemann had hoped for 
(Gratwohl 1980: 155). 
 Even if coercive diplomacy was not necessary to bring the allies to 
make the concessions on the Rhineland occupation that they had prom-
ised at Locarno, the outcome might be regarded as a simple package deal 
refl ecting the distribution of interests. Rationalists expect that, in such 
instances of asymmetric preferences, parties create package deals in 
which each side trades off the issues it cares less about in exchange for 
concessions on those items it values most. Germany received its fi rst pri-
ority, an improvement of conditions in the Rhineland and the return of a 
substantial amount of German sovereignty in the region, in exchange for 
a legal pledge of peaceful relations with the allies. France secured a Brit-
ish security guarantee. Britain obtained peace on the continent. In this 
view, diplomacy per se is not really important. It is epiphenomenal to the 
structure of interests. 
 But such an account neglects that the allies needed prior reassurance 
before they were willing to make such concessions at all. And only a 
specifi c type of pragmatic or liberal statesman (in this case, Stresemann) 
would have done this. Germany was only in the position to ask for rami-
fi cations because of its previous realist diplomacy. Indeed, had Strese-
mann’s initial memorandum proposed such a package deal in January, 
the allies would certainly have turned him down. As seen in chapters 3 
and 4, one of the most reassuring aspect of the initial offer of Germany 
was that it was not made conditional on any changes to the occupation. 
Earlier Chamberlain had written, “The German offer of the 9 th February 
was valuable because it tended to produce stability and confi dence, and 
therefore, in the end, security” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, No. 429). The pragmatic 
statecraft of Germany transformed European relations, according to the 
British foreign secretary: 
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 My general feeling upon the whole question of German disarmament is 
that its importance has been fundamentally modifi ed by the initialing of 
the Locarno treaties. . . . In brief, the policy of the allies was to safeguard 
the peace of Europe by insisting upon Germany’s scrupulous execution of 
her outstanding disarmament obligations. The initialing of the Locarno 
treaties, however, has introduced a wholly new spirit into the relations be-
tween Germany and the Allies, which . . . is refl ected in the view that the 
peace of Europe will be better guaranteed by the exhibition of a concilia-
tory spirit on both sides. (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 50) 
 Now he vowed “to do everything that can be done to mark at once that 
our relations with Germany are now on an entirely new footing and that 
confi dence established between us enables concessions to be made  which 
would have been unthinkable earlier ” (DBFP IA, Vol. 1, No. 2, emphasis 




 Turning the Tables 
 Reparations, Early Evacuation, and  
 the Hague Conference 
 The French and Germans found it diffi cult to capitalize on the new 
spirit of Locarno following the return to power of the French right. Bri-
and’s leftist coalition was replaced in July 1926 by a conservative govern-
ment. Briand remained on as foreign minister, but Poincaré returned as 
premier. The value creating that had prevailed between the two coun-
tries gave way to value claiming, making the pursuit of mutual gains 
much more diffi cult. The dynamics among the three countries from 1926 
to 1929 show that the continuation of good relations marked by new 
achievements was contingent on diplomatic style and that coercive bar-
gaining by any one side can undermine the potential for mutually benefi -
cial agreement. 
 The preference of the French right for coercive bargaining undermined 
efforts by Briand to clear the table of all remaining grievances, which he 
called a “fi nal liquidation of the war.” In late 1926, he met privately with 
Stresemann in Thoiry, Switzerland, where the French foreign minister 
proposed a package deal covering the issues of reparations, the occupa-
tion, the return of the Saar, and the monitoring of German obligations 
under the Versailles Treaty after the removal of allied forces. In an indica-
tion of a liberal diplomatic style, he made concessions before Germany 
even asked for them and bluntly revealed the extent of the fi nancial 
weakness of France, which had driven him to the table. When he re-
turned home to Paris, however, Briand was forced to publicly disclaim 
the idea of an early evacuation from the Rhineland. The French right had 
turned the tables on the foreign minister. 
 There was still a simple package deal to be reached by linking repara-
tions to the Rhineland, a win-win outcome for both sides, particularly 
because the occupation was of less and less value to France. As the 
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deadline for total evacuation in the Treaty of Versailles drew closer, less 
could be extracted from Germany in exchange for early withdrawal. And 
with the construction of the Maginot Line, Poincaré and his colleagues 
thought the occupation was unnecessary for French security. At the same 
time, the Dawes Plan on reparations was provisional in nature. It did not 
even identify a precise fi nal sum that Germany would pay the allies. The 
German payments were also set to balloon, raising questions about its 
capacity to pay, creating an incentive for both France and Germany to 
revisit the issue. And Germany desperately wanted French troops out of 
the Rhineland. 
 Nevertheless, the two countries struggled to link the issues, much less 
to identify a mutually benefi cial outcome, given the coercive diplomatic 
style of France. Even though it was of little value to him, Poincaré in-
sisted on holding the occupation as a pawn to extract the greatest possi-
ble concessions from Germany. He offered to only gradually withdraw 
German troops as Germany steadily made payments. The Rhineland 
was to be held as a deposit to coerce the Germans. 
 The coercive bargaining of the French right induced distributive nego-
tiating by the Germans. As hypothesized, coercive bargaining by one 
side induces coercive bargaining by the other. Stresemann adjusted to 
the new situation brought about by the French shift in diplomatic style 
by abandoning integrative negotiation. In early 1928, Stresemann em-
barked on a public offensive, demanding unilateral French withdrawal 
from the two remaining zones of occupation. The Germans turned the 
tables on the French. Stresemann and his colleagues refused any link be-
tween reparations and the evacuation, knowing that the French could 
use the former to stall the latter and the latter as leverage for a better deal 
on the former. The Germans knew that the two issues were effectively 
linked given France’s greater bargaining strength and that they would 
eventually have to settle. They decided to use distributive tactics in 
which they misrepresented their private position with a high opening 
offer and an infl ated reservation price. As had been the case between 
Britain and France in 1922, value claiming inhibited the trade-offs and 
information sharing that would have benefi tted both sides more. A fa-
vorable distribution of interests was not suffi cient. 
 The countries agreed only to convene technically separate but parallel 
talks on reparations and evacuation, which culminated in a conference in 
The Hague in August 1929. There the French refused to negotiate, hold-
ing the Rhineland issue hostage as leverage in the stalled reparations 
negotiations. In the end, British intervention was necessary to bring 
about an agreement. In the face of French intransigence, the leftist British 
Labour government also shifted to distributive bargaining, announcing 
that it would begin to remove British troops from the Rhineland in just a 
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few weeks, thereby leaving France alone with Belgium. The British 
turned the tables on the French. 
 Rather than bringing the Germans and French together by providing a 
signifi cant concession, as they had in the Locarno negotiations, the Brit-
ish facilitated an agreement through coercion. Only following the British 
ultimatum did the French begin to negotiate the dates and conditions of 
the end of the occupation. Due to distributive bargaining on both sides, 
the negotiations could have easily failed had it not been for British inter-
vention. Even so, in stark contrast to the Locarno negotiations, both the 
French and Germans engaged in brinksmanship negotiation until fi nally 
settling on a termination date for the occupation of June 30, 1930. And 
given the lowest-common-denominator aspect of Franco-German inter-
action, this time the outcome was more skewed toward French prefer-
ences because France held the better cards. Although the agreement 
refl ected the distribution of power, this was true only because both par-
ties engaged in distributive bargaining. Diplomacy is a necessary factor 
to explain this triumph of structure. 
 Tea for Two: Consolidating Franco-German 
 Rapprochement in Thoiry 
 For their efforts at Locarno, all three foreign ministers were awarded 
the Nobel Prize. Briand gave a riveting speech upon the entrance of Ger-
many into the League of Nations, calling on nations to do away with 
their cannons and machine guns and make way for peace. The question 
was whether the three countries could consolidate their gains. At the 
time of the signing of the Locarno treaty, all three foreign ministers had 
made reference to the new spirit that animated their relations and that 
would propel them toward further reconciliation. Stresemann called this 
the “imponderable effect” of the treaty, that sense of good faith and 
goodwill that would contribute to better relations between the countries 
in a way that was hard to measure or pin down (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 88–
95, see also 196–204). Briand stated, “If we had done nothing here but 
negotiate the terms of a treaty, and if we were then to return each to his 
own country, trusting to the hazards of fortune to realize the promises 
which it contains, we should have done nothing but make a futile ges-
ture. If this gesture does not correspond to the new spirit, if it does not 
mark the beginning of an era of confi dence and collaboration, it will not 
produce the great effects which we expect of it” (DBFP I, Vol. 27, app. 15). 
Chamberlain emphasized that “Locarno is a beginning, not a conclusion. 
It is not merely the written treaty, it is the spirit of Locarno that the world 
needs” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 211). The mood in Europe was euphoric. 
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Stresemann and Briand each estimated that he had the support of three-
quarters of his population (ADAP B1/2, Nos. 94, 173). 
 At the signing ceremony, Stresemann credited Chamberlain with mak-
ing the conference “informal,” thereby creating “the atmosphere of per-
sonal confi dence that may be regarded as part of what is meant by the 
spirit of Locarno” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 239–40). “It was not a relationship 
in which the three men consistently duped, tricked, or deluded each 
other,” writes Jacobson (1972: 68–76). Value creating prevailed. And after 
Germany joined the League of Nations, the League Council meetings 
provided, as Chamberlain had envisaged, convenient opportunities for 
Briand, Stresemann, and Chamberlain to confer privately and informally 
to capitalize on the spirit of Locarno. Their face-to-face meetings became 
known as “Geneva tea parties.” 
 It was at one of these Council meetings that Briand and Stresemann ar-
ranged to escape from the prying eyes of the press in Geneva and rendez-
vous in a tiny Swiss town called Thoiry in October 1926. They used 
subterfuge, each switching modes of transportation en route and travel-
ling separately, so that they could arrive unseen and speak completely 
frankly. Briand had initiated the idea of discussing a “general settle-
ment,” a massive package deal that would clear the table of all of the re-
maining security issues between the two countries. He proposed the 
complete evacuation of the Rhineland within a year, the return of the 
Saar to German control, and the termination of the allied inspection of 
German disarmament. All he asked in return was an advance repara-
tions payment by Germany, to be fi nanced through the public sale of 
bonds that Germany had deposited with the Reparations Commission as 
security against default, for which the German railways served as col-
lateral (ADAP B1/2, Nos. 94, 88; Kabinette Marx, Vol. 1, No. 83; Wright 
2002: 374–80; Jacobson 1972: 87–90). As Briand conceived it, those bonds 
would be sold by Germany to private bondholders, mostly in the United 
States, and the proceeds would be given to France. This was, as Wright 
writes, a “bold proposal for a French foreign minister,” and Stresemann 
recognized it as such (2002: 374). He understated when he told Briand 
that a “great gesture like the evacuation of the Rhineland would corre-
spondingly strengthen the spirit of Locarno” (Wright 2002: 374; ADAP 
B1/2, Nos. 88, 94). The Thoiry scheme would, in one step, secure for 
Stresemann all the goals he had envisaged for the fi rst stage of his long-
term program of returning Germany to great power status. 
 Briand’s immediate interest in a fi nancial settlement lay in the deterio-
rating fi nances of France, which had precipitated a crisis in the value of 
the franc in July 1926 (Keeton 1987). Although this had added to the ur-
gency, the French foreign minister had consistently supported such a 
deal long before the fi nancial situation had become acute, indeed since 
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immediately after Locarno (Jacobson 1972: 86; Keeton 1987: 211–15). 1 A 
discussion of Briand’s ideas was postponed due to the fall of the Ger-
man government, which saw Luther replaced as chancellor by Wilhelm 
Marx in a minority government of the centrist parties. The discussion 
was then delayed further until Germany joined the League on account of 
a controversy over the admission of other permanent members to the 
League Council. The acute nature of the economic crisis surely added to 
Stresemann’s leverage. Nevertheless, Briand’s concessions seem to have 
gone beyond what we might have expected given the structural position 
of France. 
 More signifi cant was Briand’s diplomatic style, again liberal rather 
than coercive. At the beginning of the meeting, Briand promised “to 
completely and openly lay the cards on the table” and tell Stresemann 
the true French position (ADAP B1/2, No. 94). In a violation of the coer-
cive bargaining style, Briand confessed that France’s fi nancial needs 
were acute. He wanted to see a “general agreement” on all outstanding 
points between the countries because negotiating issues individually 
would simply make it more diffi cult. It amounted to a series of never-
ending “pin pricks,” he explained (Kabinette Marx, Vol. 1, No. 83). Bri-
and was trying to cultivate goodwill by making concessions and openly 
stating the French position rather than maintaining private information 
to hold out for a better deal. 
 Indeed, Briand offered Stresemann signifi cant concessions before the 
German foreign minister even had a chance to ask for them rather than 
retaining them as bargaining chips. When Stresemann asked about the 
existing plans to hold a referendum to determine the status of the Saar 
before it was returned to Germany, Briand waved him off, saying that he 
“hasn’t the slightest wish” to hold a plebiscite (ADAP B1/2, No. 94); it 
was “completely unnecessary” (Kabinette Marx, Vol. 1, No. 83). Briand 
dismissed the concerns of the French military about the good faith of 
Germany in meeting its disarmament obligations, another potential bar-
gaining chip: “We occupy ourselves a lot with theories and see ghosts 
everywhere” (ADAP B1/2, No. 88). 2 Briand said the whole question of 
monitoring, such as through the League of Nations after the removal of 
the Inter-Allied  Military Commission of Control (IMCC) , was “pure 
 1 . See the mentions in ADAP B/1 Nos. 2, 11, 15, 16, 24, 33 110, 116, 225, 2270, 275, 276. 
 2 . Briand told Stresemann about the thousands of fi les about German disarmament 
infractions that had been delivered to him by the War Ministry when he told the military of 
his intention to remove military control in Germany. Briand proceeded to throw them into the 
corner and asked to hear about on issues of genuine importance (ADAP B1/1, No. 94). He 
believed there were only a “few small questions” to resolve, after which he would have all 
military control lifted (ADAP B1/2, No. 94). 
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theory” and “academic.” He reassured Stresemann that “No one is think-
ing of investigation through the power of the League Council” because 
“no one would dream of an investigation in the case of a League Power.” 
They would fi nd a solution that corresponded to the needs of Germany, 
he promised (ADAP B1/2, No. 94; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 17–27). 3 As will be 
seen later, Briand thought of inspection as a simple face-saving device for 
public opinion, with little actual value. But he told Stresemann this as a 
sign of good-faith diplomacy. Finally, Briand did not propose breaking 
apart the evacuation of the Rhineland into a number of steps to maintain 
leverage, as he might have. 
 The two foreign ministers agreed that they would make a joint state-
ment indicating that they had discussed a general settlement of out-
standing issues and would recommend such a deal to their own cabinets. 
If they found support, the two countries would appoint expert commit-
tees to deal with the technical details of a fi nancial settlement and the 
evacuation (Kabinette Marx, Vol. 1, No. 83). The two statesmen were so 
pleased with their honest and open exchange and so optimistic about the 
prospects for peace that Briand said of the meeting, “Our souls were as 
white as the snow on Mt. Blanc” (Wright 2002: 377). 
 Stresemann returned home somewhat awestruck by the generosity of 
the French offer. The chancellor believed it was “almost too good to be 
true” (Kabinette Marx, Vol. 1, No. 83). But Stresemann had noted to 
Briand that “we both have to overcome glaciers.” Whereas he had to get 
by President Hindenburg, Briand had to circumvent an even more dif-
fi cult obstacle—Poincaré, who had returned as French premier (Wright 
2002: 377). The domestic political environment in France had shifted 
under Briand’s feet. As long as the domestic political constellation in 
the three countries remained consistent, there were great gains to be 
made. French diplomacy under a conservative government would be 
very different. 
 The French Turn: Briand and the 
Conservative Union Nationale 
 The conservative Raymond Poincaré returned in July 1926, becoming 
both premier and fi nance minister, to stop the falling franc, along with a 
number of other rightist ministers such as André Tardieu and Louis 
Marin. Briand was again in the position of being the lone liberal in a 
 3 . He maintained that it was necessary to have the League exercise a “certain control” but 
promised, “I agree in advance with what may be decided on the matter by the jurists, subject 
to your review”(Vermächtnis, Vol. 1: 17–27). 
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conservative coalition. Even though this meant the end of the Cartel des 
Gauches, Briand’s Locarno policy was so domestically popular that he 
was essentially untouchable, and he stayed on in the Union Nationale 
government as foreign minister even though he ceded the premiership 
(Keeton 1987: 175). The German ambassador in Paris estimated that 
75–80 percent of the French embraced Briand’s appeasement policy 
(ADAP B1/2, No. 173). Briand recognized that in cabinet “he sits across 
from the intellectual elites of his political opponents” but believed that 
his high degree of support would nevertheless allow him to carry 
through his Thoiry scheme over Poincaré’s objections (Kabinette Marx, 
Vol. 1, No. 82). Poincaré had never lived “among people,” only “with 
fi les,” and “pursues his ideas with tenacity,” he told Stresemann. “But he 
does not know the feeling of the French people and he knows nothing of 
the spirit that is necessary for a new time” (ADAP B1/2, No. 94). The 
German foreign minister’s only reservation about the deal at Thoiry was 
that stabilizing the franc would in turn strengthen Poincaré and allow 
him to stay on. Briand reassured Stresemann that Poincaré would soon 
fall. Only the foreign minister would be given credit for a diplomatic suc-
cess of this type because “everyone knows that Poincaré does not like 
making concessions” (ADAP B1/2, No. 94; Kabinette Marx, Vol. 1, No. 
83). Briand pledged to return home, touch base with his “party friends” 
and like-minded cabinet colleagues, and prepare the ground (Kabinette 
Marx, Vol. 1, No. 83; ADAP B1/2, No. 94). Stresemann doubted that Bri-
and would succeed with this plan in a conservative cabinet but had little 
to lose by pursuing it (Kabinette Marx, Vol. 1, No. 75). 
 Briand vastly underestimated the conservative resistance. Poincaré 
was an economically orthodox fi nance minister and willing to let his for-
eign minister at least explore a deal that would make it easier to balance 
the budget and stabilize the franc. The German ambassador reported 
that the French fi nancial situation was so deleterious that even the “wild 
right [news]papers” did not reject any potential deal with Germany out-
right (ADAP B1/2, No. 109). But when Briand returned from Thoiry, he 
was hammered in the cabinet for the extent of his proposed concessions. 
His colleagues lambasted his “personal” policy and reprimanded him 
for going beyond his guidelines (ADAP B1/2, No. 106). Marin, perhaps 
the most conservative member of the cabinet, organized a behind-the-
scenes campaign of the right-wing press against Briand’s ideas, saying 
that the plan would leave France defenseless in return for “fi nancial tri-
fl es” (Keeton 1987: 173). The conservatives backed coercive diplomacy to 
secure more gains (ADAP B1/2, Nos. 119, 142, 156, 157, 173). The right 
wanted to drive a harder bargain for Rhineland evacuation, by insisting 
on German recognition of its eastern frontiers, a permanent system of 
inspection of disarmament, and a comprehensive reparations agreement 
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that would guarantee French receipts rather than the simple one-time 
payment foreseen by Briand (Keeton 1987: 220; ADAP B1/2, No. 109). 
The continued occupation of the Rhineland could be used as leverage to 
compel greater concessions. Briand, as Stresemann later noted, “had 
ventured too far” given the ideological character of his government 
(Stresemann, Vol. 3: 73–77). The conservatives had turned the tables on 
their cabinet colleague. 
 Briand was too domestically popular for the French government to 
simply reject the proposed deal. The cabinet, however, issued the most 
tepid of press statements. It simply acknowledged what was discussed at 
Thoiry, claimed that Briand did not “lay down even the barest outline of 
an agreement,” and reiterated again that complete compliance on disar-
mament was necessary for early evacuation (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 27). In 
coercive bargaining style, the statement noted how diffi cult it would be 
for the deal to be arranged. The German ambassador called the commu-
niqué a “product of embarrassment” (ADAP B1/2, No. 106; see also No. 
173). The cabinet agreed to convene committees of experts but, as the 
Germans noted, stacked them with conservative opponents of Briand’s 
liberal diplomacy (ADAP B1/2, No. 106). Briand put up a fi ght, speak-
ing, in the words of one anonymous source, with “staggering conviction” 
(ADAP B1/2, No. 106). But he was forced to retreat. His own liberal style 
of diplomacy could not be maintained against conservative resistance. 
 Under Poincaré’s strict fi nancial stewardship, French fi nances im-
proved quickly, more rapidly than anyone had anticipated. This sug-
gests a simple structural account, that France had offered signifi cant 
concessions only due to its bargaining weakness, concessions that it sub-
sequently retracted when its economy recovered. Certainly the improv-
ing situation of France lessened conservative interest in a deal with 
Germany. But, major conservative opposition to Briand’s liberal diplo-
macy had been evident before this rebound and Briand’s proposals pre-
ceded the onset of the crisis. It seems almost certain that Poincaré’s 
government would have rejected Briand’s proposal regardless of France’s 
fi nancial circumstances. In private, Stresemann himself attributed the 
failure of the Thoiry plans largely to politics. The “idea that only the eco-
nomic necessities of France could induce that nation to adopt such a 
policy is to take rather too exclusively material a view. I fancy that, hav-
ing regard to the mentality not only of the French nation but also of other 
nations, if the old atmosphere of hatred still persists, it cannot be re-
moved by any sort of fi nancial services rendered by Germany” (Strese-
mann, Vol. 3: 41). 4 
 4 . The failure of the Thoiry proposal was overdetermined. The technical aspects of Briand’s 
scheme, as Stresemann had prognosticated in his very fi rst conversation with the foreign 
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 Briand’s position in the rightist Union Nationale government contin-
ued to deteriorate, leaving him ever more isolated. At a “Geneva tea 
party” on the sidelines of the December 1926 League Council meeting, 
Stresemann and Briand arranged for the fi nal removal of the IMCC in 
exchange for the resolution of some contentious issues of disarmament 
(Jacobson 1972: 91–98). Withdrawing allied military inspection without 
some kind of replacement meant that the allies no longer had any on-site 
presence for detecting rearmament or a remilitarization of the Rhine-
land. France would only have the legal right to request the League Coun-
cil for an ad hoc inspection in cases of suspected violation (Jacobson 
1972: 91–98). 
 Conservatives in the cabinet, led by Tardieu, insisted that the cabinet 
telegram Briand in Geneva to warn him not to exceed his powers (Jacob-
son 1972: 102–3). Briand had to threaten to resign to overcome the cabinet 
opposition for the deal he had worked out with the Germans (Wright 
2002: 382; Keeton 1987: 176). He complained to Stresemann that he “had 
gone home . . . with thorns” and Stresemann “with laurels” (Stresemann, 
Vol. 3: 119). 
 On his return, Briand fought back, defending his liberal diplomacy in 
testimony before the parliament (Keeton 1987: 225–26). Both sides had 
been trying to reach an agreement that benefi tted each party through 
open and honest discussion. “It is true that on certain points there were 
differences of opinion between Stresemann and myself. A talk between 
two Ministers in the dining-room of an inn 5 cannot at one blow alter the 
position of France and Germany, and wipe out a blood-stained past. 
The essential point is that there shall be good-will on both sides; and 
that the nations shall be able to say—‘At last they are getting together’” 
minister, also helped sink the proposal (Kabinette Marx, Vol. 1, No. 89). The successful 
commercialization of the German railway bonds was predicated on adequate demand, 
which could be provided only by U.S. investors. Floating German bonds in the United 
States, however, required the authorization of the U.S. government, which was not interested 
in providing such permission unless the French fi rst ratifi ed a war-debt agreement that the 
two nations had recently negotiated (ADAP B1/2 No. 107, 119, Stresemann, Vol. 3: 41; 
Jacobson 1972: 87–90). Poincaré’s rightist cabinet was hostile to the arrangement, which was 
concluded before it took up the reins of government, for emotional reasons. Conservatives, 
in particular, believed that France should not have to pay off loans to the United States 
considering the price paid in blood by its armed forces during the war on behalf of the 
Americans. Even if the U.S. government had been more forthcoming, however, there would 
have not been an agreement, due to Poincaré’s coercive diplomacy. Stresemann later noted 
that the “alteration in the political situation  and in the technical condition of the currency 
induced Herr Briand to ask me to abstain from positive proposals” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 76, 
emphasis added). 
 5 . In Thoiry, Stresemann and Briand had met at a small hotel. 
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(Stresemann, Vol. 3: 71–73). Nor was the occupation a bargaining chip 
that should be held to extract further concessions, as the French right 
felt it should be. “The occupation of the Rhineland is not a penalty. . . . 
The occupation can alter in character, and its duration can even be 
modifi ed, if it has fulfi lled its purpose,” asserted Briand (Stresemann, 
Vol. 3: 72). 6 
 By January 1927, however, Briand was forced in a statement that had 
been unanimously approved by the cabinet to publicly disavow any sup-
port for withdrawing French troops ahead of schedule (Jacobson 1972: 
138). Briand promised to consult the cabinet in the future and even de-
nied having ever supported early evacuation, claiming that the Thoiry 
plans had been suggested by Stresemann (Jacobson 1972: 103; Wright 
2002: 404; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 57–59, 73–77). The foreign minister’s wings 
had been clipped. The German ambassador wrote to Berlin, “Had he 
tried to go further with the Locarno policy, he would have suffered de-
feat” (in Jacobson 1972: 103). The Frenchman set his sights on the spring 
1928 French elections, which he believed would oust the right from 
power and allow him to reinstate his liberal diplomacy (Jacobson 1972: 
138, 146; Wright 2002: 390, 396; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 368). He asked the 
Germans for patience, stressing that he continued to be committed to the 
policy of understanding (ADAP B1/2, Nos. 156, 167, 173). Stresemann 
still trusted Briand, noting in a private memorandum that “however 
much a cynic he might seem to the outer world, [he] did in fact hold 
views that were based on an intention to bring about a Franco-German 
understanding” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 41). He wrote, “I do not think there 
is much change in the man’s own mind. But he knows that French public 
opinion would not tolerate his speaking in the sense of his former utter-
ances” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 41). The spirit of Locarno was put on ice due 
to conservative opposition. 
 The German Turn: Stresemann and 
 the French Conservatives 
 German diplomats in Paris stressed to their home offi ce that Briand 
was isolated and that pushing the French too far would undermine their 
closest ally, someone genuinely driven by a belief in mutual gains (ADAP 
B1/2, Nos. 157, 167, 173). Only the Socialists in France fi rmly supported 
 6 . The foreign minister even expressed admiration for Germany: “It has been accounted to 
me as an infamy that at Geneva I admitted a certain greatness and nobility in our former foe. 
If that is a blunder, then I regard myself as honoured by having committed it” (Stresemann, 
Vol. 3: 72). 
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the foreign minister (ADAP B1/2, No. 173). As the ambassador to France 
argued (and Stresemann accepted), the Germans could not get more 
from any other politician in France (Jacobson 1972: 116). Efforts should 
be made not to publicly embarrass him despite the short-term tempta-
tion because it would undermine long-term efforts (ADAP B1/2, Nos. 
167, 173). This was classic realist diplomacy, pragmatic cooperation 
driven by instrumental self-interest. 
 Fear of undermining Briand at home and the shared hope that the 
French elections would work in his favor led Stresemann to refrain from 
publicly demanding at that time an immediate and unconditional evacu-
ation of the Rhineland (Jacobson 1972: 138–39; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 180–82; 
Wright 2002: 382–82; Keeton 1987: 234). In an internal memorandum, Strese-
mann explained that he was handling the evacuation question publicly 
“only in the most general way, and always in a form that endeavoured to 
avoid creating any acute tension” so that “M. Briand should maintain the 
position of being able to do something soon, at least in the matter of the 
reduction of troops, without laying himself open to the reproach that he 
was giving way to Germany pressure” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 149). 
 In public, Stresemann asked for a greater reduction of troops in the 
occupied zone but never a complete evacuation. 7 In speeches before the 
Reichstag in 1927, Stresemann defended Briand’s sincerity and noted 
that novel ideas such as Briand’s created confl icts between those “ahead 
of their time, and the rest, who are never more violent and ungrateful 
than towards those who utter a truth before the majority of the nation 
has given its  placet ” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 63). 8 Stresemann directed his ill 
will toward the French premier rather than Briand. He asked, “What is 
the goal of Herr Poincaré, the Ruhr policy or the Locarno policy? One or 
the other is possible, but not one with the other” (VDR 326: 1101–9; see 
also Stresemann, Vol. 3: 179; Wright 2002: 406). 
 7 . He used only moral pressure, in both private and public, arguing that the continuation of 
the occupation and the size of the contingents in the remaining zones were “not compatible 
with the spirit of Locarno” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 116–19). It was an “anomaly” given the 
rapprochement transpiring between Germany and the western powers (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 
143–44). “Either Locarno means peace on the western frontier or it does not have this 
meaning” (ADAP B1/2, No. 36). He told Briand privately, it “could not be understood why 
the peace between France and Germany needed to be backed by bayonets” (Stresemann, 
Vol. 3: 116–19). 
 8 . In a speech, he proclaimed the signifi cance of the fact “that the accredited representative of 
the French nation no longer regards the post-War policy hitherto pursued as compatible with 
the spirit of Europe today. This is the object for which Briand is resolved to work. He may meet 
with great diffi culties in this struggle. But the mental wall is surmounted, and there has been 
much less opposition made than on many other occasions” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 61–62). 
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 Stresemann, however, was losing patience. The foreign minister cau-
tioned privately in spring 1927, “Any further dilatoriness in these mat-
ters is impossible in the interest of both our foreign and internal policy. 
The centre-point of my foreign policy is the understanding with France, 
and this will be most seriously imperiled if something does not happen 
soon which can be taken as evidence that the French Government in-
tends to continue it. . . . I cannot go on facing the Reichstag, when it again 
assembles, with vague promises that something will be done sometime” 
(Stresemann, Vol. 3: 149–50). He emphasized the “continuing regard 
which I have shown for Briand’s situation” but that this “cannot go with-
out reciprocation” (in Jacobson 1972: 116; see also Stresemann, Vol. 3: 
143, 151). 
 The British were also growing tired of the coercive bargaining by 
France. Chamberlain sided with the Germans. In regards to troop re-
duction, he told Briand that the French had “behaved badly” and ad-
mitted that the allies were “guilty of a very ugly breach of faith” 
incompatible with the value creating that had prevailed (Jacobson 1972: 
82). “I and all British opinion,” he said to the French, believe that delay-
ing troop reduction is “radically indefensible” (in Jacobson 1972: 82). 
He admitted to Stresemann that the British did not have “clean hands” 
(Jacobson 1972: 133) and had a “very bad conscience” (Stresemann, Vol. 
3: 119–24). The German protests were “perfectly well-founded. The 
number of troops engaged was not justifi able” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 119–
24). At the June League Council meeting, in a “tea party” with Briand 
and Stresemann, he exploded, maintaining that Britain “could not ac-
quiesce in this state of affairs. He wanted this question settled. . . . He 
could in no way counter the arguments put forward by the German 
Foreign Minister. . . . Herr Stresemann has the right to regard us in this 
matter as having given a common pledge to keep our express and sol-
emn promises. It does not interest Herr Stresemann to know how many 
Belgian, English and French troops are still in the Rhineland; what inter-
ests him is the occupation as a whole. We must therefore meet and ar-
rive at an agreed solution of this question” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 
168–69). 
 The British foreign secretary tried to broker a compromise without sig-
nifi cant costs to either side. He urged the Germans to accept some sort of 
token inspection regime of the Rhineland to replace the IMCC as a face-
saving device for the French that would facilitate an earlier evacuation 
(Jacobson 1972: 114). It would be a “very good bargain from the German 
point of view” if Germany permitted “a few gentlemen to kick up their 
heels in the Rhineland,” he wrote to his colleagues (in Wright 2002: 383). 
Chamberlain, as a pragmatist, stressed that it would be more symbolic 
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than substantive; this would be “nothing but a gesture” for Germany 
(Jacobson 1972: 133). He envisioned “giving the French the minimum 
that they need to satisfy their public opinion that evacuation is safe and 
asking nothing of the Germans either in form or substance which they 
could not accept with perfect equanimity and without any serious incon-
venience” (Grayson 1997: 133). 
 But in January 1928 domestic circumstances in Germany compelled Strese-
mann to break the “gentlemen’s agreement” to not raise the issue of the 
early and complete evacuation of the Rhineland until after the spring French 
elections (Jacobson 1972: 146). Axel von Freytagh-Loringhoven of the DNVP 
publicly attacked Stresemann in the Reichstag for his lack of diplomatic re-
sults, claiming it had led to a “cul-de-sac” (Wright 2002: 412; Jacobson 1972: 
143). Although this opposition was hardly new, it had much more domestic 
political signifi cance now because the DNVP had recently returned to the 
German cabinet as part of Chancellor Marx’s second coalition. Stresemann 
had opposed the inclusion of the party, preferring some sort of arrangement 
with the Social Democrats who, even when in opposition, were always the 
most loyal supporters of his policy. As before, his calculations about party 
politics were based on considerations about what most favored the imple-
mentation of his realist diplomacy. But Stresemann was outvoted by others 
in the cabinet. Nevertheless, Stresemann was successful in his insistence 
that the DNVP explicitly pledge support for the Locarno treaty and his dip-
lomatic efforts, as well as indicating their willingness to accept the conces-
sions that might prove necessary to achieve early evacuation (Wright 2002: 
395). The Marx government declaration on foreign policy described its 
“ abandonment of the idea of revenge,” replaced by a policy of “mutual un-
derstanding” (Strese-mann, Vol. 3: 114–15). Therefore, the speech by von 
Freytagh-Loringhoven, one of the most reactionary members of an already 
very conservative party, was a breach of the earlier commitment of his party. 
 In two public replies, Stresemann defended the gains of his policy so 
far and noted that the DNVP had not offered any realistic alternative. 
However, he also demanded for the fi rst time publicly that the allies re-
move all their troops from the Rhineland. The occupation was an “anom-
aly”; the spirit of Locarno was not compatible with its “opposite.” 
Alluding to Briand’s famous speech at the September 1926 League Coun-
cil meeting, he accused the French of exhibiting a “bit of hypocrisy.” 
“Much has been said about discarding machine guns and cannons, but 
machine guns and cannons are still staring [Germany] in the face in the 
Rhineland,” he observed. The maintenance of allied troops was a “psy-
chological obstacle” to rapprochement. Stresemann expressed his will-
ingness to discuss an exchange of premature withdrawal for some kind 
of advanced payment of reparations. But he explicitly stated that he 
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would not agree to any “lasting measures that go beyond the Treaty of 
Versailles,” by which he meant any French proposal of a permanent com-
mission of inspection in the Rhineland beyond 1935, when all foreign 
troops were scheduled to be withdrawn. Stresemann had switched to 
distributive tactics, making extreme demands, drawing red lines, and 
using public pressure as bargaining leverage (VDR 371: 12490, 373: 
12556–60; Jacobson 1972: 143–47; Wright 2002: 412; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 
350). Coercive bargaining by France had induced similar tactics by Ger-
many. Briand wrote Stresemann, “I was horrifi ed at your speeches. . . . 
They stood my hair on end” (in Jacobsen 1972: 148). 
 In what became known as the “winter debate,” the French foreign 
minister responded in kind with a speech before his own legislature, in-
sisting that France needed guarantees of security and reparations before 
it could leave the Rhineland. Any assurance offered by Germany might 
not last past his government, and France needed something more perma-
nent (Jacobson 1972: 150; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 352–54). Stresemann cor-
rectly attributed Briand’s tone to his “disabilities in the Senate, and 
probably in the Chamber as well” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 355). Of Briand’s 
“personal goodwill I have no doubt,” wrote the foreign minister (Strese-
mann, Vol. 3: 150); however, this was no longer enough to justify German 
moderation. The pattern continued. 9 A spirit of value claiming had re-
placed one of value creating. 
 Rather than weakening the conservatives, the spring elections in 
France consolidated the right. The French Socialists, the one party favor-
ing immediate and unconditional evacuation of the Rhineland, lost seats, 
as did the Radical Socialists. In contrast, the rightist parties of Marin 
and André Maginot increased their number of seats and augmented their 
infl uence in the Union Nationale (Jacobson 1972: 226). The Radical So-
cialists acted as a moderating force in the cabinet but dropped out 
of the coalition later in the year (Jacobson 1972: 303–5). Briand stayed 
on as foreign minister. Knowing the domestic popularity of Briand’s 
 9 . At the League Council meeting in September 1928, the German Chancellor Hermann 
Müller, a Social Democrat, accused French policy of wearing a “double face”: “In international 
negotiations the mutual confi dence of States in each other is eloquently proclaimed, and 
mutual understanding between the nations is celebrated as an event; on the other side . . . in 
practice things remain as they were, and that not one of the barriers that have arisen as a result 
of the War has been wholly removed” (in Stresemann, Vol. 3: 395–96; see also Jacobson 1972: 
195). Briand responded with what became known by the Germans as his “angry speech.” 
Thinking that he personally had been called “two-faced,” Briand launched a diatribe 




diplomatic efforts, Poincaré disingenuously endorsed his liberal diplo-
macy during the election campaign, going so far as to falsely claim pater-
nity of the Thoiry scheme (Jacobson 1972: 162; Keeton 1987: 198, 232). 
Once the election was over, however, the declaration of government 
policy omitted what had become a standard reference to the spirit of Lo-
carno and even expressed suspicions of German revisionism (Jacobson 
1972: 171). 
 Security Deposits: Coercively Linking the Rhineland 
Evacuation to Reparations 
 There was a simple package deal to be made between France and Ger-
many. Germany’s annual payments of reparations under the Dawes Plan, 
the provisional reparations deal reached in 1924, were scheduled to bal-
loon shortly, potentially exceeding the capacity of Germany to pay. This 
was in the interests of neither France nor Germany, and the head of the 
international reparations authority, Parker Gilbert, recommended a new 
scheme that would permanently set the amount of reparations Germany 
would owe. In the meantime, France had begun the construction of the 
Maginot Line, the series of fortifi cations on its eastern border that conser-
vatives genuinely (and incorrectly) believed would provide them a de-
gree of permanent protection (Keeton 1987: 229, 306). The occupation of 
the Rhineland was therefore of decreasing value to them in terms of se-
curity, and there was an incentive to cash in on it while it still maintained 
value for Germany. The Rhineland was scheduled to be evacuated in 
1935; every year that passed made an early evacuation less and less 
meaningful for Germany. France could trade premature withdrawal for 
a fi nal settlement on reparations that would cover its war debts to the 
United States and Great Britain. 
 The type of diplomacy pursued by both France and Germany, how-
ever, inhibited such a solution, in stark contrast to the Locarno period. 
The Poincaré government employed a coercive bargaining approach. 
The premier proposed to use the continued occupation of the Rhineland 
as a bargaining chip to ensure reparations payments from Germany after 
the conclusion of any deal. He wrote Britain that “for the Allies, the 
Rhineland occupation remains the only effective insurance of repara-
tions payments” (in Keeton 1987: 307). 
 Even as the occupation was declining in value due to its impending 
expiration and the perceived increase in French security, Poincaré, 
backed by his conservative colleagues in the cabinet, Tardieu and Marin, 
proposed that the evacuation of the Rhineland would begin only after 
Paris began to receive advance payments of reparations. The German 
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debt would have to fi rst be capitalized, commercialized, and gradually 
sold in the bond markets (Wright 2002: 413; Jacobson 1972: 157, 279, 301). 
A simple agreement on terms was not enough to begin the withdrawal; 
typical of a coercive bargainer, Poincaré insisted on, literally, seeing the 
money fi rst. Even after the agreement went into effect, the evacuation 
would not proceed all at once. French troops would be gradually pulled 
out only if Germany continued to make its payments (ADAP B9, Nos. 
139, 263; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 383–92; Jacobson 1972: 173–74, 193). By di-
viding up the withdrawal, France could extract more concessions from 
Germany. 
 Poincaré was transparent about his diplomatic style. He admitted to 
the German ambassador that security considerations no longer made a 
continued occupation necessary. But, under the terms of the Dawes 
agreement that had ended the Ruhr standoff, France no longer had the 
legal right to reoccupy German territory if Germany refused to pay. 
Therefore, France could abandon German territory only piecemeal if it 
were to maintain its leverage (ADAP B9, No. 139; Jacobson 1972: 173). As 
Stresemann described it, the occupation gave the French a “trump” that 
put France in a “power position.” It was a valuable “deposit” (VDR 373: 
12556–60). The German ambassador called it a “pawn” (Jacobson 1972: 
171). 
 When the German ambassador asked for an evacuation of the second 
zone two years ahead of schedule as a demonstration of French inten-
tions in the Locarno spirit, Poincaré refused. “The French would not un-
derstand if France, suddenly out of high heaven, made direct sacrifi ces to 
Germany,” he said. “There must be an occasion.” When the ambassador 
suggested that this might be a reward to the German people for their re-
pudiation of the nationalists in the recent elections and the construction 
of a grand coalition with the SPD, the French premier replied that this 
“was scarcely such an occasion.” “The French people demanded clearer 
reasons,” he stated. They—meaning, of course, Poincaré—opposed “any 
acts of spontaneous accommodation” (ADAP B9, No. 139; Jacobson 1972: 
173). Every concession has a price in coercive bargaining. 
 Stresemann, the realist, was disgusted with Poincaré’s coercive di-
plomacy: “Not one of the responsible politicians in France has any real 
apprehension of Germany. The intention is to use the Rhineland as a 
bargaining point in order extract larger sums from Germany. Monsieur 
Poincaré, who decisively rejects the idea of Security, emphasizes the 
character of the Rhineland as a pledge for the fulfi llment of a fi nancial 
claim.” It was a “very short-sighted pursuance of a hand-to-mouth pol-
icy, without any attempt to look further head” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 42). 
The Germans cautioned Poincaré that he was overplaying his hand 
given that the evacuation was to end just a few years hence. Strese-
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mann asserted genuinely that the incentive of Germany to maintain 
its fi nancial creditworthiness would alone ensure that it paid its debts 
(Stresemann, Vol. 3: 383–92; ADAP B9, No. 263; Jacobson 1972: 193). 
But the French did not budge. In a coercive fashion, Poincaré even 
infl ated his previous demands, asking for a permanent renunciation of 
any effort, even peaceful, by Germany to regain the territory of 
Alsace-Lorraine. 
 The French position was not a simple function of the structural bar-
gaining position of France, however. French diplomacy was not endog-
enous to French power. This is evident in the fact that Briand had a 
different diplomatic style. Rather than proceeding by stages, as Poincaré 
envisioned, Briand advocated a total and comprehensive agreement 
(ADAP B9, No. 262; Stresemann, Vol. 3: 380–83; Wright 2002: 429). The 
French foreign minister attempted an integrative compromise. He sug-
gested that the allies would evacuate troops from Coblenz as soon as a 
committee of fi nancial experts was appointed to draw up a plan for a 
fi nal fi nancial settlement on German reparations, provided that Ger-
many also consented to what he called a Commission of Verifi cation and 
Conciliation. When experts arrived at a reparations settlement formally 
approved by the relevant countries, the third and fi nal zone would be 
freed at once rather than over time (DBFP Series IA, Vol. 5, nos. 146, 152, 
287; Jacobson 1972: 198, 233). The foreign minister disparaged his cabinet 
colleagues to his foreign counterparts. “The nationalists would always 
cry for the moon and it was better to ignore them and to search for some 
compromise,” he said (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 156). He confessed, however, 
that he was “compelled to take up a position in conformity with the man-
date which he had from his Government.” He promised that “so far as he 
was personally concerned, he would like to be able to meet the wishes of 
the German Government and he could assure the German Chancellor 
that he would approach the subject in the most liberal spirit” (DBFP IA, 
Vol. 5, No. 151). 
 This appears at fi rst glance as a kind of coercive diplomatic exercise, 
adding an additional side payment from Germany. But the foreign min-
ister did not believe that the commission had any real value for France, 
calling it a “ridiculous trifl e” (Keeton 1987: 235) and a face-saving de-
vice for public opinion (Keeton 1987: 317) that would allow him to be 
more conciliatory on the other issues. 10 The Germans believed him (Ja-
cobsen 1972: 299). Indeed, Poincaré placed little value on monitoring 
 10 . Briand even said publicly, “You can never stop Germany from having a population of sixty 
million. And you can never stop such a country from being a great power. . . . You can try in vain 
anything you want” (in Keeton 1987: 225–26). This made inspection unrealistic. “A nation of sixty 
millions cannot be controlled permanently and with safety” (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 72). 
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and, therefore, did not want to expend any bargaining leverage to get it 
(Jacobson 1972: 156, 305). Briand went out of his way to make the body 
as inoffensive as possible to Germany. It was an “entirely new depar-
ture” (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 287), different from previous “exaggerated” 
demands by the allies (ADAP B10, No. 208). The name was softened so 
that it did not mention  investigation . It need not be resident in the Rhine-
land. Its representatives would be civilian in character and include a 
German delegate. It needed only to be permanent and to possess the 
power to conduct immediate inspections without German permission 
(DBFP IA, Vol. 5, Nos. 146, 156; ADAP B10, No. 199; Jacobson 1972: 
295–97). 
 The British again sought to broker a pragmatic compromise by pres-
suring both sides. They continued to urge the Germans to accept a token 
verifi cation commission (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 158; ADAP B10, No. 208). 
Three to fi ve representatives would suffi ce, they thought (ADAP B10, 
No. 188). Chamberlain suggested that the Germans should present the 
ideas as having been being suggested by Germany itself so as not to be 
regarded domestically as “an indignity put upon them by us” (DBFP IA, 
Vol. 5, No. 287). In bilateral meetings, however, the British simultane-
ously pushed the French to evacuate the second zone as a gesture, with-
out any compensation from Germany (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 158). Baron 
Cushendun, sitting in for an ailing Chamberlain, explained that “so far 
as the second zone was concerned the period was so nearly mature for its 
evacuation that it was really of very little bargaining value.” Therefore, it 
was best used as an object of goodwill, conceded prior to formal negotia-
tions so as to “create a better atmosphere” (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 152). In 
British eyes, the French were attempting to squeeze too much out of Ger-
many through their coercive diplomacy, making an agreement more 
diffi cult. 
 When Briand suggested his compromise, the Germans held fi rm as 
part of their shift to distributive tactics. Reestablishing territorial integ-
rity had been the very point of Stresemann’s diplomatic initiatives, and 
the pressure on the foreign minister had only increased. The leader of the 
Center Party, a reliable supporter of Stresemann’s diplomacy in the past 
both in the Reichstag and in the cabinet, had publicly criticized the for-
eign minister’s lack of results in the parliament, referring to the “undeni-
able failure of German foreign policy” (in Jacobson 1972: 229, see also 
232; Wright 2002: 435; ADAP B10, Nos. 188, 199). This was the fi rst defec-
tion of Stresemann’s center and center-left support base. In his private 
correspondence, the foreign minister was very black. The occupation 
was “driving everybody back to the German Nationalists. The ground 
here is slipping away under my feet,” he wrote. Locarno was a thing of 
the past, he lamented (in Jacobson 1972: 249–50). 
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 Therefore, the foreign minister argued that it was inconsistent with the 
whole purpose of his policy of understanding, of no value to France, and 
impossible for the German government to accept a verifi cation commis-
sion (ADAP B10, Nos. 188, 199). While in Geneva, Chancellor Hermann 
Müller offi cially inquired of his cabinet about the French proposal. The 
German ministers would consider a commission only under the condi-
tions that it be terminated in 1935 (the year the occupation was set to 
end), restricted to the occupied zones (rather than the entire demilita-
rized zone), and exchanged for the complete removal of troops (Jacobson 
1972: 197–98; DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 161). The Center Party threatened to 
leave the cabinet under any other terms (Jacobson 1972: 297). 
 In the face of French coercive bargaining, Stresemann instead backed 
the strategy laid out in a  Denkschrift (“thought piece”) by his state secre-
tary, Carl von Schubert. The spirit of Locarno gave France a “covering 
cloak,” allowing it to perpetuate the occupation without any public out-
cry by Germany, thereby removing from Germany the leverage it might 
gain by mobilizing sympathetic world opinion. Germany should demand 
a complete evacuation without any concessions in the area of reparations 
(Jacobson 1972: 164–68, 175–83; ADAP B10: 609–14; Wright 2002: 436). The 
government should also try to maintain an independence between the 
two questions because reparations were a much more complicated issue 
that involved other powers, most notably the United States, and would 
likely drag on, allowing the French to hold the Rhineland hostage indefi -
nitely. In the face of these new circumstances brought about by a shift in 
French diplomatic style, Germany adjusted in a pragmatic fashion. 
 The German government recognized that France would never consent 
to this. The issues were de facto connected, but making such a positional 
commitment would put Germany in a stronger bargaining position 
when the two issues did become linked. Under no circumstances, how-
ever, would Germany commit to a fi nal reparation settlement indepen-
dent of a deal on the Rhineland (Jacobson 1972: 164–68, 175–83). The 
Germans also infl ated their demands, insisting on a fi nal settlement on 
the status of the Saar as part of any package (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 580; 
ADAP B12, No. 146; ADAP B10, Nos. 56, 208; Jacobson 1972: 171, 279, 
292; DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 287). These were distributive tactics of a type 
that the German government had generally not engaged in under Strese-
mann because integrative negotiation was thought to be more fruitful. 
The Germans turned the tables on the French. The British noted the shift 
and complained that to separate reparations and evacuation was simply 
“not within the bounds of practical politics” (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 151). 
 At meetings in Geneva in September 1928 and Lugano in December 
1928, the British, French, and Germans discussed the issues of repara-
tions and evacuation. Stresemann turned down a partial deal that would 
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make an evacuation contingent on progress on reparations agreements, 
which could easily break down and leave the French with too much le-
verage (ADAP B10, No. 208). The Germans consistently opposed the 
linking of the two questions and denigrated the value of the occupation 
for France, never yielding (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, Nos. 149, 161). Just as insis-
tently, the French emphasized “it would be useless to approach the prob-
lem from the point of view of demanding the immediate evacuation of 
the occupied territory without offering some substantial  quid pro quo, ” as 
Briand explained it (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 146). The most that the three 
powers could agree on in September 1928 was a set of technically sepa-
rate and parallel negotiations on reparations, early evacuation, and a 
monitoring commission for the Rhineland. The fi rst would be based on 
the report of a committee of experts (Jacobson 1972: 195–200; DBFP IA, 
Vol. 5, No. 161). This solution allowed the Germans to publicly claim that 
the issues were not linked and that evacuation could and should proceed 
without a prior agreement on reparations (Jacobson 1972: 201, 225). The 
French could simultaneously tell their home audience that there was a de 
facto link (Jacobson 1972: 202, 221, 227; Wright 2002: 433). 
 Briand did promise that the evacuation would begin immediately 
upon the convocation of the committee of experts (known as the Young 
Committee) and that negotiations on the fi nal termination date of the oc-
cupation would continue even if fi nancial discussions came to a stand-
still or failed (Jacobson 1972: 233). These commitments, however, were 
overturned by his more conservative colleagues, who favored coercive 
diplomacy. Even after the experts fi nished their deliberations, French 
troops stayed put. Holding the occupation issue hostage, Poincaré in-
sisted that discussions on evacuation would begin only when the Young 
Plan was fi nalized, with withdrawal beginning after the German debt 
was successfully commercialized and sold in the private market (Jacob-
son 1972: 240). It was not until much later, in August 1929, that the pow-
ers convened in The Hague to negotiate a fi nal liquidation of the war. 
 The British Turn: Labour and the French Conservatives 
 In the interim, however, there was a major change in British domestic 
politics; another Labour government took power in May 1929. Although 
Labour still did not gain an absolute majority and governed again only 
as a minority with Liberal support, the election was the best result for the 
left ever and made Labour the largest party in Parliament for the fi rst 
time in its history (Jacobson 1972: 280). It was a short-lived administra-
tion, governing for only twenty-seven months. But this gave it enough 
time to decisively infl uence Franco-German relations. 
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 The Labour government was more ideologically committed to better 
treatment of Germany. Even before the end of the war, the party had 
condemned the harsh peace terms being contemplated and the exclusion 
of Germany from the League. It blamed the autocratic German leaders 
for the war rather than the German people and complained bitterly that 
the latter were paying too high a price for the sins of their offi cials. La-
bour objected to the eastern territorial settlement, which violated the 
German people’s right to self-determination by placing German minori-
ties in other countries, and the exploitative excision of valuable economic 
regions such as Silesia and the Saar (Labour Party 1919; also Winkler 
1994: chap. 2). It was not that the party was “pro-German.” Rather, it 
objected to the immorality of the peace settlement and its one-sided and, 
therefore, inegalitarian nature (Naylor 1969: 5). The Labour Party had a 
“tradition of sympathy for post-Versailles Germany, deriving from a 
characteristic concern for the underdog and from a rejection of the ‘war 
guilt’ thesis,” writes David Carlton (1970: 34). 
 Before the election, Labour had castigated the Conservatives in the 
Commons for their European policy (Jacobson 1972: 209, 211, 214). In its 
manifesto, the party promised the “immediate and unconditional with-
drawal of all foreign troops from the Rhineland, the continued occupa-
tion of which is indefensible in view of the fact that Germany has fulfi lled 
her obligations under the Treaty of Versailles, that she is a member of the 
League of Nations, and that she is a signatory” of the Locarno and 
 Kellogg-Briand treaties outlawing war (Labour Party 1928; also Jacobson 
1972: 210, 242, 281–83). Germany had a “right” to the evacuation due to 
its good behavior (Jacobson 1972: 282). The French were not reciprocat-
ing German concessions. 
 The party had declared itself, even before the war ended, against the 
coercive use of the occupation, derisively calling it “the use of human 
beings as ‘pawns’” (Labour Party 1919). France was, therefore, generally 
regarded by Labour Party members as perpetuating an unjust status 
quo. This led to a change in foreign policy goals. Arthur Henderson, now 
foreign secretary, told his permanent undersecretary that there could be 
“too much continuity in foreign policy” (Carlton 1970: 21). He had the 
party manifesto,  Labour and the Nation , distributed to senior career bu-
reaucrats, along with a note to make foreign policy consistent with it 
(Jacobson 1972: 282–83; Winkler 1994: 322). 
 The cabinet subsequently approved in July a decision that Britain 
would evacuate the Rhineland unilaterally, with a private deadline of 
Christmas that year. Henderson informed the French that “the examina-
tion of the problem of how to bring about the total evacuation of the 
Rhineland at the earliest possible date can no longer be delayed or made 
dependent on the settlement of contentious issues not immediately 
Turning the Tables
[183]
arising out of it” (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 189; see also No. 300). The Ger-
mans were, of course, delighted with this prospect because it would in-
crease pressure on the French to evacuate alongside their allies and 
reduce the French ability to use the occupation as leverage in fi nancial 
negotiations (DBFP IA, Vol. 5, No. 300). The leftist British government 
also stated that the commission on verifi cation “is in no way indispens-
able in view of the machinery already provided for by the League of Na-
tions and by the Treaty of Locarno” and refused to support France if it 
insisted on any kind of inspection regime lasting past 1935 (DBFP IA, 
Vol. 5I, No. 189). The British had turned the tables on the French. 
 Hostages in The Hague: Negotiations on 
Reparations and the Rhineland 
 At the Hague conference, faced with German intransigence and lack-
ing British support, the French conceded on the commission issue, which, 
of course, Briand had never thought important. There would be no per-
manent inspection of the Rhineland. Instead, Briand proposed and the 
Germans accepted that the arbitration procedures set up in the Locarno 
treaty also be given the task of resolving disputes over any alleged in-
fraction of German obligations on disarmament and demilitarization of 
the Rhineland (Jacobson 1972: 332; ADAP B12, Nos. 155, 178, 197; DBFP 
IA, Vol. 6, No. 326). But, although the British helped to put this issue to 
rest, their coercive bargaining on the issue of reparations threatened to 
wreck the conference. Chancellor of the Exchequer Philip Snowden re-
visited the numbers of the Young Plan, which were supposed to serve as 
the basis for the negotiation of the fi nancial settlement. Snowden ob-
jected to the distribution of the total reparations receipts, particular the 
percentage of “unprotected” annuities that Britain would receive com-
pared to France. These were the fi nancial payments that the German 
government could not suspend even in the case of a crisis of the mark 
and capital fl ight out of Germany. 
 The British fi nance minister had received the endorsement of the cabi-
net prior to the conference to try to gain a larger share of the reparations 
pie. If he encountered resistance, however, he was obliged to report back 
to the cabinet. It would then advise him about the “degree of rigidity” to 
be taken, that is how much coercive bargaining to engage in. Snowden 
disobeyed these guidelines (Carlton 1970: 39). He was rebuked by James 
Ramsay MacDonald, the prime minister, in a telegram to the delegation: 
“I am relying . . . on you before break occurs to get into touch with me 
and perhaps we could arrange to meet before any action for adjournment 
is taken or if you prefer that one of you should meet me in London” (in 
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Carlton 1970: 44). But the message was mistakenly sent nonsecretly, and 
the entire conference learned of its content. This forced the prime minis-
ter to transmit a statement unequivocally backing the fi nance minister to 
restore his standing and credibility at the conference, making it subse-
quently impossible to rein him in (Carlton 1970: 45). 
 For his coercive bargaining, Snowden earned the acclaim of the per-
manent foreign offi ce bureaucrats who accompanied him to The Hague. 
Maurice Hankey wrote, “The Chancellor the Exchequer is amazing. 
Never for one moment has he budged from his 100% demand, in public, 
in meetings with his colleagues, in private or (I ask myself) to himself! . . . 
One cannot but admire such fortitude, with all the great politicians in 
Europe. . . . If you were to ask me what the Chancellor would take, 
frankly I could not tell you—but I think it would be diffi cult to refuse 
75% of our demand, if we ever got such an offer” (in Carlton 1970: 48). 
Not surprisingly, however, his Labour colleagues were upset at him for 
departing from their preferred style of reasoned dialogue. Lord Parmoor, 
now Lord President of the Council, threatened to resign. Beatrice Webb, a 
cabinet member, complained that the fi nance minister approached diplo-
macy like a conservative. Snowden was “playing up to the vulgar inter-
national individualism of Chamberlain, the Jingo Press—with the object 
of superseding J.R.M. [James Ramsay MacDonald]” (Carlton 1970: 45). 
 Henderson objected to coercive bargaining because it imperiled a 
value creating deal on the occupation and reparations. As Hugh Dalton, 
his aide, later explained, “a few millions are dust in the balance, com-
pared with the gains of the early and complete evacuation which will 
also certainly follow swiftly on a general acceptance of the Young Plan” 
(Carlton 1970: 40, see also 48). Memoranda from the previous summer 
indicate that Henderson foresaw such a problem far in advance. He cau-
tioned that if the Hague conference failed due to the British position on 
reparations, the British “would fi nd themselves isolated and held up in 
the United States as the Powers who for petty and selfi sh fi nancial mo-
tives had sacrifi ced the interests of Europe and kept alive the discredited 
system whereby Europe is still divided into the two camps of victors and 
vanquished” (DBFP IA, Vol. 6, No. 182). In other words, he thought La-
bour should pursue diplomacy consistent with its prosocial motivation, 
promoting joint gains through consideration of others’ interests as well 
as those of Britain. The “fi nancial reasons for such a rejection must be 
absolutely overwhelming to justify a course fraught with so many dan-
gers to the future success of Great Britain’s foreign policy of reconcilia-
tion and co-operation” (DBFP IA, Vol. 6, No. 182). 
 It is unclear why Snowden took such a line. Scholars have pointed to 
the diffi cult fi nancial circumstances in Britain, in particular the unem-
ployment level and the need for a minority government to attract the 
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votes of other parties. Reparations agreements also have distributive im-
plications at home in a way that security arrangements do not. And, of 
course, Snowden’s bureaucratic interest was in protecting the British 
budget, not British diplomatic standing. All these factors probably mat-
tered. Nevertheless, it does appear that the chancellor was the exception 
to the rule. “No other incident of this sort marred the government’s be-
havior,” writes Michael Gordon (1969: 60). And it speaks for the psycho-
logical argument that the main supporters of the fi nance minister’s 
negotiating style were outside the Labour government—the right-wing 
press and Conservatives (Carlton 1970: 51). 
 Snowden’s coercive diplomatic style led to a prolonged deadlock with 
France. If Britain were to claw back a greater share of reparations re-
ceipts, the difference would have to mostly come out of the share of 
France. As a consequence, Briand stalled negotiations in the political 
committee dealing with the evacuation question. To apply leverage, the 
French foreign minister would not even begin discussions on the poten-
tial terms of a deal, such as a beginning date for the withdrawal of French 
forces (ADAP B12, Nos. 155, 161; Jacobson 1972: 316; DBFP IA, Vol. 6, No. 
313). This stands in sharp contrast to the way that diplomacy at Locarno 
proceeded, in which issues were dealt with sequentially rather than 
being held in abeyance before agreements on others and positions were 
openly and honestly revealed. Had the spirit of Locarno prevailed, Bri-
and would have explored the basis of one element of the package deal, 
even while maintaining that all was contingent on agreements on all the 
issues on the table. This contrast in diplomatic style refl ects the different 
diplomatic style of the cabinets Briand represented at the two confer-
ences. The foreign minister stressed that he was now in charge of the 
conservative coalition that Poincaré had recently left behind when he 
resigned for health reasons. Most of the ministers are “comparable to 
Graf Westarp,” he said, in an allusion to the ultra-conservative German 
politician and supporter of coercive diplomacy (ADAP B12, No. 168). 
 Stresemann objected to the French line, reiterating at the conference 
the German view that the two issues were not, in fact, linked and that 
there was no reason why division over fi nancial questions should impact 
progress on the political ones (ADAP B12, No. 158; DBFP IA, Vol. 6, No. 
313). He declared this publicly to apply pressure (Stresemann, Vol. 3: 
580–82). Stresemann threatened not to recommend any fi nancial deal to 
his cabinet if the parties at the conference had not set a defi nitive end 
date for the occupation (ADAP B12, Nos. 155, 161, 168, 178; DBFP IA, Vol. 
6, No. 316). With no reparation deal in place to induce the French to ne-
gotiate, however, the Germans had little leverage. 
 It was only that this point, in the face of the lack of cooperation by 
France, that Henderson dropped his bombshell. Representing Britain 
Chapter 7
[186]
on the political committee dealing with the occupation question, he 
tried to coerce the French by announcing British plans to withdraw all 
their forces, regardless of the outcome of the reparation negotiations. 
The removal of troops would begin in mid-September, and all soldiers 
would be home before Christmas (ADAP B12, Nos. 157, 158; DBFP IA, 
Vol. 6, No. 316). Although military leaders had stressed to him that it 
would take months to even begin the evacuation, Henderson instructed 
them that the pull out was to commence in just a few weeks (ADAP B12, 
No. 167). 
 It is unclear whether this shift refl ects a change in foreign policy sub-
stance or diplomatic style. As mentioned earlier, Labour did make bet-
ter treatment of Germany a foreign policy goal. Despite this, the Labour 
government announced its policy at the conference only in response to 
French coercive bargaining, suggesting that the persistent French coer-
cive bargaining had induced the same style on the part of the British, as 
expected by my theory. Reasoned dialogue is not based on unrequited 
concessions. Coercive bargaining induces coercive bargaining. In any 
case, given British leverage, the move helped unlink the two issues to 
some extent. The prospect of being left isolated in the Rhineland in-
duced Briand to agree to begin the French withdrawal of the second 
zone alongside the British, irrespective of progress on reparations 
(Winkler 1994: 235). 
 The French still intended to save the fi nal zone until after the ratifi ca-
tion and implementation by all parties of a fi nancial agreement, should it 
ever be concluded. And Briand still refused to name an end date for the 
occupation, leading Stresemann to suspect that the French would use the 
continued occupation as insurance against German nonpayment (ADAP 
B12, Nos. 157, 168, 178). Disingenuously, Briand stressed the logistical 
diffi culties posed by moving troops in the winter (ADAP B12, Nos. 155, 
196). More accurately, he noted that the French military wanted to buy 
time to fi nish the Maginot Line (ADAP B12, No. 161). The German for-
eign minister leaked the divisions between the allies to increase the pub-
lic pressure on the French. This behavior stood in contrast to his previous 
preference for quiet and private diplomacy during the Locarno period 
(Jacobson 1972: 319). 
 France and Germany, now fi nally negotiating, were still engaged in 
value claiming. Two weeks into the conference, the French foreign min-
ister fi nally proposed a date for the completion of the evacuation— 
 October 1930. Stresemann deemed this unacceptable and countered with 
April 1, 1930 (ADAP B12, No. 188). Briand argued that he would be 
sacked if he accepted such an early date because it contradicted the state-
ment he had made before parliament. He warned that he would be re-
placed by a thoroughly nationalistic and conservative government 
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(ADAP B12, No. 196; also Jacobson 1972: 327). Stresemann gave the same 
warning about what would happen in Germany if he conceded—the 
right would take over, undermining any efforts at Franco-German recon-
ciliation (ADAP B12, No. 158). Rejecting the offer, he threatened to resign 
if Briand stayed fi rm (ADAP B12, No. 191). The use of threats and coun-
terthreats was new for the two statesmen, who had never before engaged 
in such face-to-face value claiming. In a game of chicken, the two stub-
bornly held out for days before fi nally accepting June 30, 1930, as the 
termination date for the occupation, fi ve years ahead of schedule. 
 The French and Germans had not reached a compromise through the 
open sharing of their positions and an exchange of benefi ts based on a 
desire for a mutually benefi cial outcome. France and Germany found 
success at The Hague despite their negotiating styles, not because of 
them. At several points, it seemed that the entire set of negotiations 
would collapse. Unlike Locarno, The Hague was a combative confer-
ence. Had it not been for the Labour government’s coercion of France, 
inducing it to move in the direction of Germany on the issue of the 
evacuation, the conference might very well have ended in failure. By 
shrinking the bargaining space of the French and creating at least the 
prospect of success, the British created the potential for a package deal. 
Indeed, without this diplomatic move, the two might otherwise have 
been so far apart that even a successful reparations deal would not have 
been enough incentive to settle the evacuation of the Rhineland. 
 Still the lowest-common-denominator bargaining between France and 
Germany meant that the fi nal terms favored the more powerful French in 
a way that had not been true at Locarno. When value claiming negotia-
tion prevails, deals tend to either fall through or refl ect the distribution of 
power. Germany was forced to make some fi nal fi nancial concessions on 
reparations to bridge the gap between France and Britain. By reworking 
the timing of the payments, the Germans covered the difference between 
the fi nal French and British positions (Carlton 1970: 50). The settlement 
on the occupation was accompanied by a fi nal fi nancial agreement in 
which the British clawed back 83 percent of the amount Snowden had 




 Additional Value 
 The Rise and Fall of the Israeli-Palestinian  
 Peace Process 
 In this chapter, I extend the analysis by telling the story of two groups 
attempting to transcend what was largely perceived as an intractable 
confl ict. The weaker group, having lost considerable territory through 
ill-advised military action and now occupied by the stronger group, 
made gestures toward peace, including the recognition of lost lands and 
a promise to end violent confrontation. Even though, in many ways, the 
weaker side had no other options due to its structural position, the moves 
toward conciliation were initiated by pragmatists in the group against 
the strident opposition of extremists who preferred coercive methods to 
force the stronger group out. A third group, with stakes in the peace and 
stability of the region and historical ties to the stronger group, attempted 
the role of honest broker, trying to lead the two sides toward compromise 
by institutionalizing a process of diplomatic exchange. Although helpful, 
the process yielded success only when a prosocially minded leftist gov-
ernment of the stronger group, instead of exploiting its leverage, 
engaged in a diplomatic process of openly and honestly exchanging in-
formation. A pragmatic-prosocial combination generated a value- 
 creating spirit that yielded a win-win outcome for both sides in which 
the cessation of hostilities was exchanged for the promise of the gradual 
return of territorial sovereignty. The weaker side had parlayed a very 
weak hand into long-sought-after goals. A Nobel Prize was awarded. 
 Yet, even though all sides declared that a new spirit had emerged, the 
two groups found it diffi cult to consolidate their gains through future 
agreements when a rightist party returned to power in the stronger 
group. Even though its conception of the national interest was increas-
ingly similar to that of the left, it used a different diplomatic style, coer-
cive bargaining, that contributed to a value claiming dynamic between 
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the two groups. Mutual recriminations and increasingly violent actions 
by both sides sidetracked the prospect of permanent peace for over a 
decade. 
 Readers might believe that they have already heard this story and in 
some ways they have. But it was largely repeated in a different part of the 
world decades later. There are remarkable parallels between the interwar 
relations of the European powers and the relations of the Israelis and 
Palestinians in recent decades that show the broader applicability of my 
theory. In this chapter, I apply the theory advanced in previous chapters 
to this more contemporary case, the rise and fall of the peace process. As 
was true in 1920s Europe, key events in Israeli-Palestinian relations can-
not be understood solely in terms of the distribution of power and inter-
ests. In a different time and in a different part of the world, diplomacy 
was necessary to achieve the negotiation successes and, perhaps, even 
suffi cient to bring about the failures. 
 In the late 1980s, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the 
national movement for the Palestinian people that had engaged in terror-
ist and other military activities against the Israelis for decades, took ten-
tative steps toward reaching a rapprochement with Israel. Pragmatists in 
the group succeeded in having it endorse a diplomatic settlement with 
Israel to form a Palestinian state located in territories taken by the Israelis 
in the 1967 war: the West Bank of the Jordan River, including East Jerusa-
lem, and the Gaza Strip on the Mediterranean Sea bordering Egypt. Land 
would be traded for peace, as long called for by UN Resolution 242. The 
organization formally renounced the use of violence and gave up its 
claim to the rest of Mandatory Palestine, the territory carved out of the 
Ottoman Empire and administered by the British after World War I. This 
amounted to the acceptance of the existence of Israel on the land for 
which it fought a coalition of Arab states in 1948, a confl ict that Israelis 
refer to as the War of Independence and Palestinians call Al-Nakbar (“the 
catastrophe”), which led to the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Pal-
estinian refugees. 
 Like Stresemann, these pragmatists were willing to let go of their 
claims to former lands and renounce the use of aggression in the hopes 
that such moves would end the occupation. The PLO was bankrupt, mil-
itarily overmatched, and increasingly without international allies, yet 
only the pragmatists had the epistemic motivation that allowed the ad-
mission of these facts. Just as Germany, destitute and occupied after 
World War I, was nevertheless confl icted over the style of diplomacy to 
pursue after its military loss, so too were the Palestinians. Structure was 
not determinant. 
 Sensing an opportunity to create greater stability in the Middle East, 
an area of key strategic concern, the United States tried to bring the 
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Palestinians and Israelis together at the negotiating table. Just as the Brit-
ish had valued peace on the continent and had been willing to push their 
French allies to make concessions, so did the Americans approach the 
Middle East. Despite its greater strategic and affective ties with Israel, 
the George H. W. Bush administration (and later the Bill Clinton admin-
istration) took on the role of honest broker between both sides, urging 
both toward compromise. James Baker, the pragmatic secretary of state 
of the fi rst Bush administration, wanted to institutionalize a process of 
diplomatic interaction between the two sides, just as Chamberlain had 
tried to do between France and Germany. 
 Yet, as was the case in 1920s France, real progress occurred only after 
the election in Israel of a leftist government, led by the Labor Party, which 
replaced the Yitzhak Shamir government, led by the rightist Likud Party, 
in 1992. A diplomatic back channel in Norway with PLO pragmatists led 
to the drafting of the Declaration of Principles, in which the two sides 
agreed to recognize one another, curb violence, and begin a gradual 
transfer of autonomy to the territories taken by Israel in 1967. Pragmatic 
statecraft was necessary on the Palestinian side. Instead of insisting, as 
they historically had, on a commitment to full Israeli evacuation all at 
once, they agreed as Stresemann had to accept a concession—the Israeli 
surrender of Gaza—as the fi rst step in a long-term process toward re-
turning the West Bank to Palestinian control. For their part, the prosocial 
Israelis, as the prosocial French had done for the pragmatic Germans, 
rewarded the Palestinians for their shift in diplomatic style. Rather than 
exploiting the greater leverage of Israel, the Labor government granted 
the Palestinians a foothold in the West Bank at the onset of the process 
and committed to a reasoned dialogue about a number of issues that Is-
rael had previously refused to discuss, such as the right of return and the 
establishment of a Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. 
 A Palestinian-Israeli agreement in the early 1990s was as unlikely as a 
Franco-German rapprochement in the 1920s. This was a hard case for 
diplomacy, one of the most intractable confl icts in recent history (Wanis-
St. John 2011: 1–2). Even one of the greatest Israeli “doves,” Shimon 
Peres, writes that at the time it “had become effectively impossible to 
conceive of borderlines that could be acceptable to a solid majority of 
Israeli opinion, let alone the Palestinians. That underlying confusion 
made the prospects of a negotiated settlement appear increasingly re-
mote” (1995: 278). Ron Pundak, an academic who helped initiate the 
back channel in Oslo, later reminisced that the “baleful history between 
Israelis and Palestinians represents an almost insurmountable obstacle 
for conventional negotiations, taking as a point of departure the existing 
imbalance of power between the occupier and the occupied that im-
peded conventional negotiations” (2001: 32–33). 
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 Despite these obstacles, a new “spirit of Oslo” facilitated over the next 
few years the establishment of a Palestinian Authority with autonomy 
over most of the major population centers in the West Bank, gains that 
persist today. The victory was particularly sweet for the PLO, which, like 
interwar Germany, redirected the political momentum and completely 
revived its sagging fortunes despite its lack of bargaining strength. The 
two sides worked toward these ends even in the face of suicide terrorism 
by Palestinian religious extremists against Israeli civilians and a brutal 
crackdown by Israeli security forces that negatively impacted the lives of 
ordinary Palestinians in a dramatic way. 
 Then, just as the return of Poincaré and the right to power in France 
interrupted the new negotiating dynamic that had emerged with Ger-
many in 1926, the election of a Likud government in 1996 under Benja-
min Netanyahu put the peace process on hold. Even though its conception 
of foreign policy goals demonstrated increasing convergence with those 
of the Israeli left, the Likud government used a diplomatic style of coer-
cive bargaining. The prime minister insisted that the Palestinians take 
the fi rst steps to push the peace process forward. Netanyahu sought to 
increase Israeli leverage over the territorial dimension of a fi nal status 
agreement through the expansion of Israeli settlement activity in the 
West Bank, including in the very sensitive area of Jerusalem. Progress in 
the peace process was contingent on the spirit of negotiations that pre-
vailed among the parties, not just on the foreign policy interests of the 
two sides. The peace process is a process, one that is contingent on 
the behavior of multiple parties, and style matters just as much as 
substance. 
 A last gasp at settling all the remaining issues on the table began under 
the leadership of Ehud Barak, who led a Labor government to Camp 
David in 2000 in the hopes of achieving a fi nal status agreement with the 
Palestinians. Yet, as was the case at the Hague Conference of 1929, 
 the Camp David Summit was marked by a spirit of value claiming, given 
the combination of coercive bargaining by the two sides. Barak’s behav-
ior appears to be something of an anomaly for the analysis presented in 
this book, yet his combination of coercive bargaining, on the one hand, 
and a greater willingness to compromise, on the other, makes sense given 
the political complexion of his government, which also included a num-
ber right-wing parties. In any case, the character of the interactions 
among the parties at the conference made it harder for the two sides to 
identify a zone of possible agreement between the two sides, and talks 
broke down. 
 The fi ndings of this chapter must be regarded as more tentative than 
those of the previous chapters. Unlike for 1920s Europe, there is a dearth 
of primary documents available, leading me to rely more extensively on 
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secondary sources and memoirs of the key participants. This makes it 
diffi cult to defi nitively establish the diplomatic styles used because the 
bottom lines of the various sides are sometimes very cloudy. For instance, 
it still cannot be determined whether there was a deal at Camp David 
that both sides preferred to the status quo. 
 This lack of documentation is particularly true of the Palestinian side, 
so my assessment of Israeli behavior stands on fi rmer evidentiary 
ground. Unlike Israel, the PLO and the Palestinian Authority are not 
transparent democracies. And for most of the period under study, both 
organizations were led by the enigmatic fi gure of Yasser Arafat, who 
maintained control by playing his high-ranking aides against each other. 
He empowered multiple negotiating teams, often with confl icting in-
structions, resulting in a Byzantine labyrinth that makes systematic anal-
ysis very diffi cult. Because the PLO and Palestinian Authority lacked a 
coherent ideological space and party structure akin to mature democra-
cies, it is also impossible to identify those indirect manifestations of epis-
temic and social motivation among the Palestinian elites that would 
make us more confi dent in our measurement, separate from behavior. 1 
For all these reasons, critics might rightly call this analysis Israeli-centric 
in its focus, if not its sympathies. Nevertheless, a strong case can be made 
that diplomatic styles are a necessary component of any explanation of 
the initiation, the successes and failures, and the collapse of the peace 
process. 
 Palestinian Pragmatists: Accepting Land for Peace 
 Without a fundamental change in the goals of the PLO, there was no 
possibility of a diplomatic agreement, much less a lasting peace, with 
Israel. It was only in 1988, at the PLO leadership conference in Algiers, 
that the organization endorsed the principle of “land for peace” and a 
two-state solution to the confl ict. The organization also condemned the 
use of terrorism in service of this goal; an agreement should be reached 
through diplomatic means (Meital 2006: 33; Rasler 2000; Segev 1998: 89). 
Prior to that point, the offi cial position of the PLO was that its goal was 
the liberation of all of Mandatory Palestine. Because this territory in-
cluded all existing Israeli territory, this goal amounted to a call for the 
elimination of a Jewish national home. Although the “land for peace” 
 1. There were also multiple external infl uences, such as the neighboring Arab countries of 
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, whose diplomacy and foreign policies would be necessary for any 
complete account, but which I do not deal with here. 
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formula would require Israel to leave the West Bank and Gaza, the Pales-
tinian acceptance of this principle as the basis for agreement amounted, 
in their eyes, to a signifi cant concession—a state constituting only 22 per-
cent of what they regarded as rightfully Palestinian territory. The new 
policy was tantamount to a recognition of the right of Israel to exist, a 
revision of the 1968 PLO Covenant (Meital 2006: 33; Segev 1998: 89). The 
move strongly parallels the initiative of the German realists in 1925 in 
which Stresemann offered France a nonaggression pact and simultane-
ously conceded that Germany had lost the territory of Alsace-Lorraine. 
 The new positions were pushed by PLO groups with all the character-
istics of pragmatic realists, in particular a high level of epistemic motiva-
tion relative to their more rejectionist colleagues. In addition to purely 
egoistic considerations, they stressed the importance of prioritizing vital 
interests over peripheral considerations and the need to make painful 
trade-offs; self-consciously adopted an objective and unemotional ap-
praisal of their environment, including the interests of other parties; and 
emphasized the necessity of thinking in terms of steps toward a long-
term goal. 
 These pragmatists actively tried to understand the Israeli position and 
complained of the refusal of their peers to do so. In his memoirs, Mah-
moud Abbas, the future successor to Arafat as Palestinian president and 
perhaps the most important Palestinian leader other than the chairman 
of the PLO during this period (also known by his  nom de guerre , Abu 
Mazen), writes of his colleagues, “I discovered that none of them [mem-
bers of Palestinian National Council, PNC] knew what they were talking 
about, that their knowledge of Israel was limited to the simple fact that it 
was the enemy against whom continuous war should be waged” (1995: 14). 
Ahmed Qurie (also known by his  nom de guerre , Abu Ala), who later be-
came prime minister of the Palestinian Authority, complained of Pales-
tinians’ cognitive closure “The majority of Palestinian leaders and 
opinion-makers adhered nevertheless to their old slogans, maintaining 
rigid positions which were based on confusion between politics and ide-
ology” (2006: 35). He writes, “There was no intellectual dialogue and no 
attempt to understand” (Qurie 2006: 8). Abbas writes, “Our quarrel is 
with those who see the world from their own perspective and perceive 
history through their inherited dogmas” (1995: 39). 
 Abbas had some time before set out to better understand the Israeli 
position and to establish contact with more sympathetic Israelis, making 
him suspect in the eyes of many Palestinians (1995: 14). 2 By learning 
 2 . “Foolishly, knowing nothing of the enemy was turned into a virtue, as if willful ignorance 
would somehow reduce his potency. Reading material about Israel was interpreted as 
evidence of Zionist tendencies,” said Abbas (in Beilin 1999: 168). 
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about Israel, Qurie explains, the pragmatists “understood better than 
ever before Israel’s hyper-sensitivity to the security issues which it held 
sacrosanct. We were ready to respond more positively to the internal 
fears with which Israel was obsessed” (2006: 75). This contrasted with 
the rejectionist view in which (in Abbas’s words) “Israel was thought of 
as all-powerful, as the source of the disaster which had befallen the Pal-
estinian people, as the Devil,” (in Beilin 1999: 168). 
 Abbas was hardly sentimental or genuinely empathetic toward Israel. 
He and others had a proself motivation and based their position “on the 
basis of realities.” The acceptance of “land for peace” “emanated basi-
cally from Arab impotence and the inability of Palestinians to liberate 
their homeland single-handedly,” not a genuine sympathy or under-
standing of the Jewish position (Abbas 1995: 12). He did not complain 
that his compatriots did not commiserate with the Israeli plight, only 
that the “slogan, ‘Know Thine Enemy’ . . . was not acted upon” (Abbas 
1995: 12). The empathy of the pragmatists was instrumental. Abbas 
writes of how he “let my views on how to deal with enemies infi ltrate 
and to suggest ways of attaining our goal” (1995: 14). His position was 
realist, not liberal. 
 The Palestinian pragmatists also were not wide-eyed idealists. Al-
though they were pessimistic about the chances for diplomacy to bear 
fruit, they did not let their beliefs prevent them from trying, the essence 
of epistemic motivation. “Pessimistically, we supposed that [deadlock] 
would be the most probable result,” remembers Qurie (2006: 72). He 
notes that he “was gratifi ed in theory that I might be able to initiate some 
kind of useful contact, but frankly I had no desire in practice to follow the 
idea through.” He had actually never met an Israeli in person. Yet Qurie 
did not let this deter him: “I later learned the lesson that it was possible 
to reach peace and to cooperate, even with one’s enemies” (2006: 41). 
 The pragmatist position was based on a careful cost-benefi t calculation 
that the Palestinians would gain more through diplomacy than through 
force. Qurie writes, “We knew that many people in Israel had begun to 
feel, today perhaps more than ever before, that the cost of continuous 
confrontation with the Palestinians was too high. Palestinian public opin-
ion had begun to show an inclination to accept a compromise based on 
the 4 June 1967 frontier lines, with a willingness to accept the coexistence 
of the two peoples. . . . An intensifi ed and bloody confrontation would 
only infl ict more pain on both sides” (2006: 73). This conclusion was not 
based on a principled opposition to violence, something made obvious by 
previous PLO actions. As a pragmatist, Abbas and others did not rely on 
only one method but adjusted to the circumstances. “I did not scorn the 
gun,” he writes, but realized that there were other options (1995: 14). The 
means of coercive leverage, such as piggybacking on the spontaneous 
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1987 uprising in the territories, were declining in utility. The intifada (lit-
erally, the “shaking off”) “had already outlived its purpose.” Following 
reprisals by Israel, the “negative effects . . . began to outweigh the Intifa-
da’s benefi ts” (Abbas 1995: 35). There was simply not a military path to 
victory. “Experience has taught us that our continued refusal to recog-
nize the existence of Israel will not bring us the freedom we seek,” Qurie 
explained later (2006: 148). 
 As was the case with Stresemann’s diplomacy, the new position of the 
PLO might be seen as an inevitable surrendering to realities, the recogni-
tion of the overwhelming disparity in power between the Palestinians 
and the Israelis and the impossibility of achieving the overly ambitious 
aims of the PLO. But, just as with interwar Germany, such a crude struc-
tural account misses the crucial point that only a certain moderate fac-
tion of the PLO was willing to admit such hard truths. Institutional 
changes within the PLO as well as the disastrous experience of the Leba-
non War in 1982, in which the PLO was expelled by Israel, empowered 
this group within the leadership and allowed this change in the direction 
of the PLO (Rasler 2000; Qurie 2006: 75). Abbas writes that it “was . . . an 
honest and courageous view, which recognized the international climate, 
the limitations of the Arabs on the one hand and Israel’s strength on the 
other” (1995: 12). Like the pragmatists discussed in previous chapters, 
these Palestinians saw the necessity of making painful concessions for 
long-term gains. There were plenty of members of the PLO, not to men-
tion Islamicist groups, who vigorously opposed this path, often violently. 
Abbas confronted his colleagues who advocated the exclusive use of co-
ercive means, daring a Palestinian compatriot, “Are you prepared to 
think with me without being restricted by ‘red lines’ and worrying about 
what we regard as forbidden?” (1995: 21). 
 The greater epistemic motivation of the pragmatists allowed them to 
more objectively realize their increasingly weaker position. Qurie claims 
that the Palestinians needed to “admit frankly to ourselves that our posi-
tion was in reality infi nitely worse than that of Israel” (2006: 74). His fac-
tion was “more fl exible and receptive to the profound regional and 
international challenges which were under way, all of which had their 
effect on the situation of the Palestinians” (2006: 12, see also 35). The end 
of the Cold War deprived the PLO of its long-standing patron, the So-
viet Union, precipitating a fi nancial crisis. And the organization fool-
ishly backed Saddam Hussein during the fi rst Gulf War, putting it on 
the wrong side of an international coalition against Iraq that included 
most Arab nations. The Kuwaitis and Saudis expelled thousands of 
Palestinians in retaliation. During the Gulf War, the PLO budget de-
clined 56 percent and the fl ow of funds to the territories declined from 
$120 million to $45 million (Rasler 2000; Behrendt 2007: 12, 21–22, 25; 
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Ross 2004: 48–49; Segev 1998: 89; Rabinovich 2011: 23; Barari 2004: 113; 
Qurie 2006: 35). For the pragmatists, this created the imperative to act 
quickly to reverse the decline in Palestinian fortunes. Echoing Strese-
man’s thinking in early 1925, Qurie writes of using the “little leverage 
which remained to it to keep the Palestinian problem on the world 
agenda.” He proposed to “reverse the isolation of the PLO, freeing it 
from the huge political fi nancial burdens it bore as a result of the position 
adopted by the Palestinians in the Gulf War of 1990–91” (2006: 35). 
 The advocates of realistic, pragmatic statecraft understood themselves 
as such. Ahmed Qurie writes of an increasingly “mature national libera-
tion movement, based on realism and moderation” (2006: 10). His faction 
aimed at being “fl exible and pragmatic” (Qurie 2006: 75). Abbas writes of 
the “rational thinking behind the Palestinian peace initiative” (1995: 22); 
Qurie describes a “new Palestinian rationality” (2006: 12). 
 No Settling for Peace: The Coercive 
 Bargaining of the Israeli Right 
 The Palestinians needed a partner, however, and Israeli domestic poli-
tics had been dominated in recent years by Likud, the main Israeli party 
of the right. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, 
Likud approached the confl ict with the Palestinians with a zero-sum 
mind-set, the heuristic that characterizes coercive bargaining (Steinberg 
1995). Shamir viewed a Palestinian state as “an option which we would 
fi ght with all our strength as bearing within it no less than the seeds of 
Israel’s destruction” (1994: 200). Likud supporters were therefore deeply 
pessimistic about the possibility of a negotiated solution to the confl ict 
(Rynhold and Waxman 2008: 22). Shamir demonstrated no empathy with 
the Palestinian cause. Dennis Ross, U.S. diplomat, perhaps the most im-
portant career bureaucratic player in the U.S. administration, writes, 
“[Shamir’s] insensitivity to Palestinian needs and concerns mirrored 
Arafat’s insensitivity and indifference to Israeli needs a decade earlier” 
(2004: 82). 
 Shamir rejected the basic trade-off of “land for peace” as requiring too 
great a sacrifi ce for Israel. He preferred “peace for peace.” 3 To some 
 3 . He complained that “not a year passed without some offi cial proposal being made. . . . 
There were few if any new elements, just old proposals recycled, changed a bit, always 
centering on Israel’s withdrawal from territory. . . . The Arab states and the PLO always 
insisting on what, however it was phrased, amounted to peace in exchange for territory; 
recognition in exchange for territory; never ‘just’ peace” (Shamir 1994: 175). 
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degree, this refl ects Shamir’s conception of Israeli national interests and 
his foreign policy goals. It indicates his satisfaction with the status quo 
and the low price he was willing to pay for peace. In addition, how Likud 
treated the territory issue also refl ects its preferred diplomatic style. 
Shamir sought to increase Israeli leverage by rapidly expanding settle-
ments in the territories, creating a fait accompli that would force the Pal-
estinians to give up any hope for independence and compromise. He 
later admitted, “I would have carried on autonomy talks for ten years; 
meanwhile we would have reached half a million Jews in Judea and Sa-
maria. Without this demographic revolution, there is no reason to hold 
autonomy talks” (in Rynhold and Waxman 2008; see also Rasler 2000: 
713; Kurtzer et al. 2013: 28). The settler movement proceeded more rap-
idly under Shamir than any other previous Israeli government, with the 
prime minister setting a goal of 750,000 settlers, which would forestall 
the possibility of a viable Palestinian state (Segev 1998: 144). Likud was 
the party of the settlers but also the party that used the settlements as 
diplomatic leverage. 
 Shamir saw negotiations with the Palestinians as a game of chicken, as 
is typical of coercive bargainers. “The truth is that, in the fi nal analysis, 
the search for peace has always been a matter of who would tire of the 
struggle fi rst, and blink. Would it be the Arabs, fi nally accepting, as they 
had started to do, Israel’s conditions for a genuine and lasting peace? Or 
one day, might an Israeli government . . . believing in the doctrine of 
‘land for peace,’ giving way to impatience and political ambition, capitu-
late to Arab demands at the possible cost of Israel’s future?” (Shamir 
1994: 259). The prime minister took pride in his “reputation as a tough, 
committed negotiator” (Shamir 1994: 182). As a consequence, Shamir 
found it diffi cult to compromise even on the most minor of issues, much 
less make any major concessions that would be necessary for a long-term 
solution: “I regarded every loophole possibly left unblocked, every pos-
sibility of irrevocable damage being done to us, every yielding for the 
sake of being ‘nice’ or ‘reasonable’ that might constrict or distort Israel’s 
stand as being of the utmost importance” (1994: 230). 
 Shamir demanded that the Palestinians prove their goodwill and in-
tentions fi rst by ending terror and the intifada (1994: 259). But, like 
Poincaré in 1920s France, he was unimpressed by his adversary’s sig-
nals of reassurance, as we would expect given his low level of epistemic 
motivation. “I do not see, nor do I expect, any fundamental change,” 
Shamir said. “They set up their organization to destroy Israel and when 
they conclude that this goal will not be achieved, they will disband” (in 
Abbas 1995: 28). The prime minister engaged in reactive devaluation, 
denigrating the signifi cance of the steps taken by the PLO in Algiers. 
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 The Likud commitment to coercive bargaining is perhaps most evi-
dent in its refusal to consider lifting the legal ban on meeting with any 
representatives of the PLO (Rabinovich 2011: 22; Sassley 2010; Shamir 
1994: 200). Indeed, Shamir also refused to hold a dialogue with anyone 
deported from the West Bank or Gaza, any leader of the intifada, anyone 
who was not a permanent resident of the territories, or anyone from East 
Jerusalem because doing so would undermine the Israeli claim to the 
city. There were very few infl uential Palestinians who fi t this bill (Segev 
1998: 111). A refusal to talk is the antithesis of reasoned dialogue. 
 Republican Realism: U.S. Pragmatic Statecraft and 
Value Claiming over Settlements 
 The beginning of what would become known as the “peace process” 
therefore had its origins in the United States. Following the triumphant 
U.S. victory over Iraq in the fi rst Gulf War, the administration of George 
H. W. Bush tried to consolidate new-found stability in the Middle East by 
bringing Israel and its historical adversaries together for talks (Rabinovich 
2011: 24). The Bush administration was dominated by Republican Party 
moderates naturally inclined toward pragmatic statecraft, best personi-
fi ed by Baker. Aaron David Miller (2008: 94), who participated directly as 
a high-ranking aide for the entire duration of the peace process, notes that 
a Nexus search of post-1989 news stories revealed 390 hits in which Bak-
er’s name appeared within thirty words of  pragmatic or  pragmatism. Baker 
himself wrote that “principles are fi ne, but if you’re going to succeed in 
carrying them out, you need to be pragmatic” (in Miller 2008: 94). 
 Baker had all the characteristics of a realist diplomat. First, he had a 
proself social motivation. As Miller describes him, he was “not an empa-
thetic guy. He didn’t feel your pain. What he felt and intuited was your 
politics, your weaknesses and how to play them” (2008: 202). The Israelis 
agreed; “No sentiment there,” an offi cial said (in Miller 2008: 219). And 
Baker used an array of methods, adapting to the particular situation he 
faced. Miller calls this the “plain commonsense realization that Ameri-
can power and interests are multifaceted and complex and that the 
instruments needed to advance them require a careful, deliberate adjust-
ment depending on circumstances” (2008: 194). Baker used diplomacy 
“to coerce, to reward, and to embarrass,” a “combination of honey and 
vinegar” (Miller 2008: 218–19). Yet, as much as Baker adapted to con-
straints, he also believed in the ability of diplomacy to affect the out-
come. Miller writes that Baker thought that “American efforts could 
actually make a difference and that he could make a deal” (2008:194). 
The secretary of state believed in diplomacy’s value. 
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 Baker used the same tactics as the center-right British government in 
the 1920s. Like Chamberlain, Baker thought of the U.S. role as one of an 
honest broker between the two sides, even if U.S. interests were much 
more closely aligned with Israel, just as British interests had been with 
France. He would criticize the Israelis in his meetings with Palestinians 
and do the opposite when he met Shamir (Miller 2008: 202). His “trash-
talking to the Arabs about Israel helped build confi dence in him,” re-
members Miller (2008: 221). Baker was also hard on both sides. He “used 
both incentives and disincentives to cajole and persuade both Arabs  and 
Israelis” (Miller 2008: 202, emphasis added). Miller recounts one such 
instance: “Having blasted them the night before, he now gathered the 
Palestinians around him, much as a football coach would huddle with 
his players for a pregame pep talk. The yelling had stopped; the reassur-
ing now began” (2008: 223). 
 Baker also urged moderation on both sides based on a realistic and 
objective appraisal of the situation. In a May 1989 speech before the 
 American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), a Jewish lobbying 
group, he called on both sides to make diffi cult admissions. To the Pales-
tinians, he spoke of the “illusion of control over all of Palestine” (in 
Shamir 1994: 202). He advised them to recognize Israel and admit that 
violence will not work (Segev 1998: 109). He urged Israelis to accept the 
principle of “land for peace” and “to lay aside, once and for all, the unre-
alistic vision of a greater Israel” (in Miller 2008: 207; Kurtzer et al. 2013: 
21; Shamir 1994: 202). He did the same privately. Regardless of any moral 
claims that the Palestinians might make, Baker told one of their delega-
tions: “It’s not a question of fairness or what is right. It’s a question of 
reality” (in Kurtzer at al. 2013: 25). He told Shamir to avoid “digging 
one’s heels in” (in Shamir 1994: 200). 
 The combination of the preference of the Israeli right for coercive bar-
gaining and U.S. pragmatic statecraft resulted in value claiming negotia-
tion. Just as the allies Britain and France had struggled to fi nd agreement 
under a French conservative government, strong ties were not enough to 
bring the United States and Israel together over the Palestinian issue. The 
Israelis were prepared for such a confrontation. When meeting Baker for 
the fi rst time, Shamir writes that he told Baker, “I thought he should 
know that he had been described to me as an ‘ever-fl exible pragmatist,’ 
and I suspected that he had been told that I was an infl exible man of 
ideological principle” (1994: 200). Consistent with his coercive diplo-
matic style, Shamir did not back down despite his relative weakness. “If 
Mr. Baker thought for one moment that those Israelis who were deter-
mined not to trade their land for peace . . . would be infl uenced by his 
advice or agree that their vision was ‘unrealistic,’ he had badly misread 
them,” remembers Shamir (1994: 203). Adapting, as pragmatists do, to 
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the diplomatic style of the other side, Baker responded with his own co-
ercive tactics. Expressing indifference and aloofness, he publicly gave the 
Israelis the number for the White House switchboard: “I can only say 
‘Take this number: 202-456-1414. When you’re serious about peace, call 
us” (in Shamir 1994: 203). 4 
 The Americans particularly stressed the need to stop settlement activ-
ity as a necessary condition for any peace deal (Ross 2004: 82). Baker 
said, “I don’t think there is any greater obstacle to peace than settlement 
activity” (in Kurtzer et al. 2013: 23). Bush called the issue “literally min-
iscule in importance compared to the objective of peace” (in Shamir 1994: 
234). The question came to a head following the end of the Cold War. 
Emigration to Israel from the former Soviet Union soared, increasing the 
general population by 20 percent (Ross 2004: 82). The Israelis asked the 
United States for $400 million in loan guarantees that would reduce bor-
rowing costs. Concerned that the Israelis would use the greater fi nancial 
fl exibility to pursue settlement activity and encourage the new immi-
grants to establish homes in the territories, the Bush administration 
asked for assurances that the Israeli government would disclose its ex-
penditures on settlements to make sure they did not increase. 
 The U.S. administration fi gured that, in their position of need, the Is-
raelis would meet their commitments (Ross 2004: 83; Miller 2008: 224). 
But, whereas a more pragmatic government might have done so, the 
Likud government did not comply. The Israeli coercive bargaining in-
duced value claiming negotiations between the two countries. Miller 
writes, “let’s not forget that Shamir was asking the United States for po-
litical backing without extending much reciprocity, particularly given 
Israel’s stonewalling on providing credible information on settlement 
activity” (2008: 229). Bush became angry that the Israelis were allowing 
Soviet immigrants to settle in the “occupied territory” of East Jerusalem, 
a characterization that upset the Israelis (Segev 1998: 115). The pragmatic 
Bush administration then adapted its tactics to Israeli actions. The presi-
dent postponed the consideration of a subsequent request for $10 billion 
in loan guarantees, demanding a freezing of settlements and the Israeli 
 4 . Much as the British realists thought that French and German nationalists were undermining 
their own national interests through their coercive bargaining, the realist-dominated 
Republican administration thought that Shamir’s diplomacy did not actually serve Israeli 
ends. The Bush administration believed that, had Shamir granted tangible steps in the 
direction of autonomy and stopped the most hated of Israeli practices, such as settlements and 
checkpoints, the prime minister might have produced an indigenous Palestinian leadership 
from the territories. This could have served as a viable alternative to the PLO, a long-standing 
goal of Shamir (Kurtzer et al. 2013: 28). 
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endorsement of “land for peace” in exchange for their release. Shamir 
did not relent. He refused this effort at coercive linkage, calling it “black-
mail” (Segev 1998: 131). The prime minister took a hard line, betting that 
he could use the leverage offered by the Jewish lobby in Congress against 
the Bush administration, leaving the Americans no choice but to compro-
mise (Miller 2008: 225). But Bush did not back down either, complaining 
publicly about how a “thousand lobbyists on the Hill are working the 
other side of the question.” “I don’t care if I get only one vote,” he pro-
claimed. “I believe the American people will be with me” (in Shamir 
1994: 234). This cost the Bush administration signifi cantly in terms of 
domestic politics because it provoked the U.S. Jewish community, but 
the Israelis lost the confrontation, as generally happens to the weaker 
side in value claiming negotiations (Segev 1998: 103). 
 Learning to Crawl: The Madrid Conference 
 The Bush administration also had diffi culties in securing its primary 
goal, bringing the two sides (as well as the historical Israeli antagonists 
Syria and Jordan) together for an international conference in Madrid spon-
sored by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1991. Shamir recalls, 
“There were bitter, prolonged disputes at almost every point about almost 
everything including what the gathering itself should be called” (1994: 
239). Through extensive shuttle diplomacy, Baker eventually succeeded, 
but as Shlomo Ben-Ami, the Israeli foreign minister, recalls, “Shamir was 
practically dragged to Madrid by President Bush. The message was force-
fully, by way of pressure and intimidation, brought home to him that he 
could have either America’s friendship or the territories, not both” (in 
Kurtzer et al. 2013: 29). Shamir admits as much (1994: 228). There is una-
nimity among participants and secondary accounts that had it not been for 
U.S. pressure, Israel would never have consented to attending (Behrendt 
2007: 16; Segev 1998: 147; Rasler 2000: 713; Peres 1995: 274; Qurie 2006: 36). 
Shamir worried that such an international gathering would put pressure 
on the Israelis to make concessions that would inevitably lead to the estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state. As a coercive bargainer, he wanted to avoid 
putting himself in a weaker position (Steinberg 1995: 176–80) 
 Despite U.S. pleas for the participants to engage in pragmatic diplo-
macy, however, the conference was marked by its spirit of value claim-
ing (Ross 2004: 80). 5 Abbas writes, “Both sides had to resort to sending 
 5 . In Spain, President Bush pleaded in his opening remarks for each side to practice pragmatic 
statecraft: “Peace will only come as a result of direct negotiations, compromises, give and 
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memoranda to each other expressing their respective viewpoints and 
demands” with little actual deliberation among the parties (1995: 89). 
Qurie complains that it amounted to a “dialogue of the deaf, grinding to 
a virtual halt amid a welter of mutual accusations” (2006: 36). There was 
no reasoned dialogue. Miller, who attended, writes, “Madrid came out 
of an environment in which the sides had no contact, no trust, no agreed-
upon anything. In fact they were openly hostile and disdainful” (2008: 
201). It “had as much warmth and good feeling as a shotgun wedding” 
(Miller 2008: 229). Given that the conference emerged from U.S. pressure 
rather than the combination of diplomatic styles conducive to value cre-
ating negotiation, this is not a surprise. Miller writes, “This time, Shamir, 
Assad and the PLO authorized a conference because they couldn’t afford 
not to, and they weren’t happy about it. Their concessions were made 
not to one another but to America and to Jim Baker” (2008: 203). 
 In the opening speeches, each side played to the cameras at home, re-
peating its grievances with no reference to or consideration of the legiti-
mate needs of the other side. Shamir referred to the rightful claim of 
Israel to the “Land of Israel,” meaning the West Bank. “We are the only 
people who have lived in the Land of Israel without interruption for 
nearly 4000 years. . . . We are the only people for whom Jerusalem has 
been a capital. We are the only people whose sacred places are only in the 
Land of Israel. . . . Only Eretz Israel, the Land of Israel, is our true home-
land” (Shamir 1994: 238). The prime minister expressed no willingness to 
make concessions on territory or settlement activity: “It will be regretta-
ble if the talks focus primarily and exclusively on territory. It will be the 
quickest way to an impasse” (Shamir 1994: 240). Instead of expressing 
consideration for the Palestinian and Arab positions, he accused them of 
pushing “Israel into a defenceless position and . . . to destruction. . . . The 
issue is not territory but our existence” (Shamir 1994: 240). He remem-
bers, “I took my listeners . . . through the history of the Zionist claim to 
the Land of Israel . . . of the armed Arab rejection of it and deadly assaults 
upon the state that came into being and of Arab hostility to Israel’” 
(Shamir 1994: 239). The Palestinians, in turn, did no better. A PLO dele-
gate declared, “We come to you from a tortured land and a proud, though 
captive people, having been asked to negotiate with our occupiers, but 
leaving behind the children of the intifada and a people under occupa-
tion and under curfew, who enjoined us not to surrender or forget” 
take. . . . We come here to Madrid as realists. We don’t expect peace to be negotiated in a day, 
or a week, or a month, or even a year. It will take time. Indeed it should take time.” Consistent 
with the U.S. role as honest broker, he emphasized the legitimate concerns of both sides, the 
Israeli need for security and the Palestinian need for a territorial home (in Segev 1998: 97–98). 
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 (in Segev 1998: 99). They made no promise to call off the intifada as a 
 confi dence-building measure. 
 Even though the Americans had forced Shamir to attend, they could not 
force him to negotiate. Ben-Ami explains that Shamir went to Madrid to 
“protect his possessions, not to negotiate them away” (in Miller 2008: 230). 
Shamir did not even understand the conference as a negotiation. He later 
referred to the “drama of this fi rst historic  confrontation between Israel and 
its neighbors which offered an unparalleled background for the retelling 
of our story to a worldwide audience” (Shamir 1994: 236, emphasis added). 
As the Palestinians saw it, Madrid was “little more than a platform for the 
intransigence of the right-wing Likud government” (Qurie 2006: 36). 
 In the substantive bilateral negotiations that followed in Washington 
between the Israelis and Palestinians, the pattern continued. Each side 
made maximalist and infl ated demands. The Palestinians wanted all the 
land that Israel had seized in 1967, the end to settlements, the right of 
return for all Palestinian refugees, and a capital in East Jerusalem. Israel 
rejected all these demands, even at one point denying the existence of the 
Palestinians as a separate Arab people (Segev 1998: 133). 
 Nevertheless, the Madrid conference was signifi cant and perhaps a 
necessary condition for the diplomatic successes that followed. It was the 
fi rst time that Arabs had sat across from Israelis since the Camp David 
Accords were reached in 1978 (Segev 1998: 101) and the fi rst time ever 
that Israelis, Syrians, Jordanians, and Palestinians had come together at 
the same table (Miller 2008: 195). For his part, Baker never had any illu-
sions that Madrid would lead to any dramatic deals in the short term. The 
secretary of state saw this “as a way to break taboos and create an invest-
ment trap that would keep Arabs and Israelis at the table for a long time” 
(Miller 2008: 217). He later said its “real signifi cance was that it happened 
at all. It was not a substantive breakthrough, but it was a procedural one” 
(in Kurtzer et al. 2013: 30). 
 Baker was trying to lay the institutional foundation for future value 
creating negotiation, much like pragmatic foreign secretary Austen 
Chamberlain’s vision of using the League of Nations as a regular meeting 
place for the French and Germans. This refl ected the long-term perspec-
tive of the Bush administration, characteristic of pragmatic diplomacy. 
“It wasn’t about reaching agreements or wrestling with the tough 
issues,” writes Miller. “In fact, Baker tried to fi nesse or kick down the 
road every contentious issue that might constitute what he called a deal-
breaker.” He told his team, “‘Boys, you need to crawl before you walk 
and walk before you run’. . . . For Baker, the goal on this hunt was to get 
them to the table” (Miller 2008: 21). Baker had a “negotiator’s mindset, a 
tendency to see the world of power and politics in terms of problems to 
be solved, managed or deferred” (Miller 2008: 193). 
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 A Partner for the Palestinians: 
 The Diplomatic Style of Labor 
 U.S. statecraft was responsible for institutionalizing a process that al-
lowed cover, time, and space for diplomacy to continue until domestic 
political conditions in Israel shifted to make the possibility of value- 
 creating negotiation more likely (Miller 2008: 233). The Americans were 
waiting for a new Israeli government with a new diplomatic style (Rabi-
novich 2011: 26). In 1992, the left-wing Labor Party came to power. Miller 
writes that the fact that Baker paid little attention to the post-Madrid 
negotiations until Yitzhak Rabin, the Labor candidate, defeated Shamir 
in June 1992 “was all you needed to know. At best, Madrid was intended 
as a stage-setter” (2008: 195). When Labor replaced Likud, according to 
Dennis Ross, the U.S. envoy to the peace process, “it was if a great weight 
had been lifted off the body politic. Hope was alive again. Expectations 
soared about peace being possible” (Ross 2004: 84). 
 The Palestinian pragmatists were also buoyed (Abbas 1995: 53). “We 
knew that Likud would not take one single step towards a settlement, 
and so we became doubly interested in the preparations for the elections 
that were announced in June 1992,” Abbas recalls (1995: 90). Leading Pal-
estinians had gone so far as to quietly coordinate their activities to ben-
efi t Labor in the election (Segev 1998:135). For instance, Abbas instructed 
Palestinians to avoid raising the issue of Jerusalem because this would 
“do Likud a great service because it can then claim that there is no com-
mon ground for negotiation” (1995: 60–61). He did not anticipate major 
substantial changes to Israeli positions but, rather, a different diplomatic 
approach. “We expected that the victory of Labor and its allies would 
bring in a new style of negotiating and novel ideas to it,” explains Abbas 
(1995: 92). 
 There is universal agreement in the literature on Israeli-Palestinian 
relations that the election of Labor was a necessary condition for prog-
ress in peace talks in the early 1990s. Nevertheless, most accounts stress 
the different foreign policy preferences of the parties involved (Rasler 
2000; Sassley 2010; Abbas 1995: 53; Behrendt 2007: 65; Kydd and Walter 
2002; Hermann and Yuchtman-Yaar 2002; Rabinovich 2011: 28; Segev 
1998: 152; Barari 2004: 104–5; Telhami 1996; Steinberg 1995). Likud, ac-
cording to this argument, was less willing to cede territory in exchange 
for peace because it valued peace less and territory more than Labor 
did. The former was more attached to the notion of  Eretz Israel (“Land 
of Israel”). For Likud, Judea and Samaria (which the rest of the world 
calls the West Bank) rightfully belongs to the Jews by divine mandate. 
This was the site of the biblical Jewish kingdom and the cradle of early 
Jewish civilization. Although Likud leaders frequently argued that 
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ceding any of the West Bank would endanger Israeli security by creat-
ing a base for terrorists and making it easier for a joint Arab attack, the 
real objection of the party to any territorial concessions was the “pro-
found emotional and symbolic value” of the area, which made it more 
diffi cult to let it go. As such, Likud valued the status quo more highly 
(Miller 2008: 209). 
 For Labor, the Land of Israel was, according to Sassley’s (2010), “ex-
pendable,” tradable for other more high-ranking priorities. Yossi Beilin, 
a key Labor fi gure who features centrally in the narrative that follows, 
writes of his early political awakening, “I saw how unimportant the oc-
cupied territories were to us, and how to a great extent we had become 
the prisoners of our own conquests. . . . I decided to work inside the 
Labor Party towards strengthening the peace camp within it” (1999: 11). 
In this view, withdrawing from the territories was a prerequisite for 
maintaining Israel as a liberal democratic state. Maintaining control over 
the Palestinians morally corrupts the Jews, threatening the Israeli com-
mitment to human rights and engendering the hatred of its Arab neigh-
bors (Sassley 2010; Waxman 2008). This was particularly true given the 
demographic changes occurring in the region; that is, the Arab birthrate 
has been much higher than the Jewish birthrate. Evacuating the West 
Bank and Gaza would help bring about peace. 
 If the political parties approached the negotiations differently because 
they had different evaluations of the value of different assets, then this is 
a foreign policy rather than a diplomatic account. There is little doubt 
that there were differences in the Labor and Likud conceptions of Israeli 
foreign policy interests; nevertheless, such differences can also be over-
stated. There has been an increasing consensus between the two parties, 
Labor and Likud, that demographic considerations make a permanent 
annexation of the West Bank impossible (Rynhold and Waxman 2008). 
Certainly Likud liked to claim in the early 1990s that Labor would 
quickly trade away the West Bank for an illusory peace (Shamir 1994), 
but even at that time, the plans offered by the two parties for dealing 
with the issue were remarkably similar. Both endorsed some sort of Pal-
estinian autonomy. Likud leaders said as early as 1986 that “it is our as-
piration that [the Palestinians] will be able to run their affairs by 
themselves” (Shamir 1994: 167). Shamir’s national unity government 
proposed elections in the occupied territories to provide representatives 
with whom the Israelis could negotiate the creation of a self-governing 
administration (Shamir 1994: 195; Segev 1998: 108). 
 Also, the two major Labor fi gures at the time, Yitzhak Rabin and the 
more dovish Shimon Peres, opposed the creation of a sovereign Palestin-
ian state as being too dangerous for Israeli security. This was part of the 
offi cial 1992 party platform (Steinberg 1998: 223). Their positions on the 
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return to the 1967 borders, the disposition of the settlements in any per-
manent agreement, and the indivisibility of Jerusalem were also identical 
to those of Likud (Peres 1995: 262–64; Segev 1998: 152; Barari 2004: 83; 
Behrendt 2007: 64, 72; Ben-Yehuda 1997: 205). Following his election, 
Rabin pledged publicly that he would attempt to conclude an autonomy 
agreement with the Palestinians that would grant the Palestinians local 
authority over internal matters. Elections would be held, as in the earlier 
plans endorsed by Likud and that offered by Shamir’s apparent heir, 
Benjamin Netanyahu (1993: 351–53). Beilin describes the Palestinian po-
sition of establishing a state with Jerusalem as its capital, the return of the 
Palestinian refugees, and dismantling the Jewish settlements as “a pros-
pect which the Labor Party obviously could not countenance” (1999: 21). 
As Wanis-St. John concludes, the Rabin government “held fast to the key 
assumption of the previous Likud government: that Palestinian self- 
 government could only have functional attributes and no territorial sov-
ereignty” (2011: 107). 
 Labor differed substantially, however, in terms of its diplomatic style, 
which was liberal rather than coercive. Rather than feigning indifference 
to draw out negotiations and extort greater concessions, Rabin promised 
the interim agreement within six to nine months. He believed an agree-
ment on elections could be concluded by December 1992 and one on the 
extent of the jurisdiction of the new entity by February 1993, with elec-
tions to be held in May 1993 (Segev 1998: 158). He also gave the Palestin-
ians a fi rm time line for the conclusion of a fi nal status accord. There 
would be a fi ve-year transition period, with fi nal status talks beginning 
three years into the process on the basis of the principle of “land for 
peace” (Abbas 1995: 57; Behrendt 2007: 68, 84; Segev 1998: 149; Rabino-
vich 2011: 29). Shamir had simply proposed to hold elections and talk 
after, holding future concessions as bargaining chips to secure a better 
deal (Ross 2004: 56). Labor also expressed a greater willingness to talk 
directly to the PLO. In January 1993, the government repealed the law 
making it illegal for Israelis to meet with PLO offi cials (Meital 2006: 32; 
Wanis St-John 2011: 90; Behrendt 2007: 66). This contrasted sharply with 
Shamir’s efforts to forestall reasoned dialogue with most of the main po-
litical players in Palestinian politics. 
 Finally, Labor was willing to make preliminary concessions on the 
settlement issue that reduced its bargaining leverage. The Rabin govern-
ment largely froze building upon taking offi ce, cancelling 6,500 new 
housing units that had been approved by Shamir, although it did vow to 
complete the 10,000 units that had already begun and allowed building 
without public fi nancing (Segev 1998: 149, 152; Behrendt 2007: 35, 64, 68). 
Although this was not a blanket ban, the Bush administration subse-
quently allowed the $10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel because of the 
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new diplomatic style of Labor. A senior Bush adviser later stated that 
“the difference in this case was the difference between Shamir and Rabin; 
Rabin demonstrated to us that he was determined to reach a settlement; 
that’s why we were prepared to look the other way”(in Kurtzer et al. 
2013: 34). 6 The pragmatic Americans were reciprocating the prosocial Is-
raeli gesture in a value creating spirit. 
 These behaviors emerged naturally from the prosocial motivation of 
the Labor party and are those we would expect from a leftist political 
party. Foreign Minister Shimon Peres outlines his conception of nego-
tiations as positive rather than zero-sum in character. He remembers, “I 
felt that the peace process until now had been based on a misconcep-
tion: instead of negotiating over the substance of peace and the benefi ts 
that would accrue from it—for all the parties—we had been dealing 
solely with the price to be paid for peace with the decades-old causes 
of the confl ict. I thought that unless our people were given a new sense 
of the situation, it would be hard for them and, therefore, for their lead-
ers to shake loose from the rigid thinking that was still the residue of 
the old world” (Peres 1995: 275). Peres described the essence of liberal 
diplomacy at the time, “Negotiations are an exchange of gestures in-
stead of an exchange of blows. . . . Instead of coming with outstretched 
swords and a mouth full of abuses, you come to negotiations with 
goodwill. We will, of course, be making gestures, and I expect the Pal-
estinians will also do so” (in Behrendt 2007: 76). The foreign minister 
expressed an interest in a deal in which both sides benefi ted: “We defi -
nitely want to persuade our neighbors that we are serious about the 
need to attain an arrangement and to make a decision in the course of 
1993 so as to shorten the suffering of all sides: ours and theirs” (in Beh-
rendt 2007: 77). 
 Yossi Beilin, who became Peres’s deputy foreign minister, also ap-
proached the issue with the mind-set that an agreement that satisfi ed 
both sides was possible but would require active engagement and dis-
cussion with the Palestinians. “My working hypothesis was that the dis-
pute  could be solved, there  was somebody to talk to, namely the PLO, 
and there  was something to discuss if both sides were prepared to be 
creative,” he recounts (Beilin 1999: 46). The Israelis needed to remain 
open to the possibility lest cognitive closure blind them to opportuni-
ties for peace. Beilin writes, “I understood that the concept ‘Nobody to 
 6 . President Bush announced, “I am delighted that we have agreed on an approach that 
would assist these new Israelis, without frustrating the search for peace. . . . The prime 
minister has persuaded me that Israel is sincere about peacemaking. . . . We see a very different 
approach to settlements. We salute the prime minister for his courage. I know it wasn’t easy” 
(in Segev 1998: 156). 
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talk to, nothing to discuss’ developed after the Khartoum conference 7 as 
a new Israeli consensus was correct only in part, and when there  had 
been someone to talk to and something to discuss, we had still been 
trapped in a different mind-set” (1999: 11). Beilin expressed his prosocial 
motivation directly. He has liberal moral foundations: “I always be-
lieved that all human beings were created of the same matter and that 
my rights were in no way superior to those of the boy offering to black 
my army boots in exchange for a few coppers on my way through Gaza.” 
This, however, was not simple capitulation to Palestinian demands. Bei-
lin adds, “Nor was I numbered among those who were so impetuously 
calling for unilateral withdrawal in the immediate post-war period” 
(1999: 10). 
 Prime Minister Rabin expressed these prosocial sentiments publicly in 
a statement before the Israeli Knesset in July 1992 after taking power. He 
addressed the Palestinians directly: “To you, the Palestinians in the ter-
ritories, our foes today and our partners to a peaceful coexistence tomor-
row, I wish to say: We have been fated to live together on the same patch 
of land. . . . We lead our lives with you, beside you, and against you. . . . 
We offer you the fairest and most viable proposal . . . an autonomy, with 
all its advantages and limitations. You will not get everything you want. 
Neither will we. . . . Don’t lose this opportunity that may never return. 
Take our proposal seriously—to avoid further suffering, humiliation and 
grief” (in Segev 1998: 147). 
 Rabin was himself more of a pragmatist than were other key leaders in 
the Labor Party, consistent with his position on the right of his party 
(Makovsky 1996: 87; Steinberg 1995: 187). Rabin and Peres had long been 
the poles of the centrist and more left-leaning parts of the party. There-
fore, it not surprising that, whereas Peres was the “dreamer and vision-
ary,” Rabin was the “pragmatist” and “political realist,” writes Segev 
(1998: 163; see also Ben-Yehuda 1997: 203). No other than Henry Kis-
singer noted how Rabin was “relentless in separating the chaff from what 
is essential” (Segev 1998: 147). Ross also noted his pragmatism (2004: 92). 
Indeed it was Rabin’s centrism that was responsible for his victory over 
Peres for leadership of the Labor Party before the 1992 elections. Party 
members thought he would better attract moderate voters due to his his-
torically harder line on confl icts with Arab neighbors (Rabinovich 2011: 
29; Segev 1998: 143–44; Makovsky 1996: 83; Steinberg 1995: 187). In addi-
tion, Rabin had been the head of the armed forces in the great 1967 Israeli 
military victory. 
 7 . In this 1967 conference, the Arab countries rejected negotiations with, recognition of, and 
peace with Israel, even after their crushing military defeat. 
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 Rabin seems to have come to the conclusion that peace talks were nec-
essary due to practical necessity—out of realism rather than an a princi-
pled commitment to reasoned dialogue. Although as defense minister 
under the national unity government headed by Shamir he had ruth-
lessly repressed the intifada, the experience also seems to have convinced 
him that the status quo was too costly for both sides (Rabinovich 2011: 
31; Rasler 2000; Miller 2008: 259; Makovsky 1996: 84–85, 95). The costs of 
continued confrontation outweighed the potential but uncertain benefi ts 
of peace. While Shamir understood the uprising as indicating again the 
existential threat to Israel, thereby assimilating the events so they were 
consistent with his overall heuristics (Shamir 1994: 182), the more epis-
temically motivated pragmatist Rabin changed his position as a conse-
quence of the experience. He came to understand the intifada as the 
expression of national aspirations that could not be contained forever 
(Sassley 2010). Rabin said that Palestinians “who carry on their shoul-
ders the burden of the intifada deserve our attention. They are our inter-
locutors” (Segev 1998: 147; see also Ben-Yehuda 1997: 210). 
 The Declaration of Principles: Creating Value in Oslo 
 Pragmatists in the Palestinian camp were more open to these signals 
sent by the Israeli government, which we would expect given their 
higher level of epistemic motivation. Qurie told his leadership, “Com-
ing, as they do, after a long history of enmity, confl ict and mistrust, these 
remarks carry a signifi cance that merits your deep and serious consider-
ation, especially after the long period of duplicity on the part of succes-
sive Likud governments” (2006: 45). He judged that a “new level of 
political maturity” had emerged in Israel, “or at least in the Labor Party,” 
and that the opportunity for a deal “might easily be lost if it were not 
grasped at the right time” (Qurie 2007: 73). Abbas agreed that this 
“chance will never be repeated to implement self-rule” (1995: 62). 
 Abbas reached out to Rabin following the election. He wrote the new 
prime minister that the Palestinians “are in complete agreement with 
you about the need for urgent and intensive action in the coming nego-
tiations.” He drew a distinction between Rabin and the previous govern-
ment, having been “disturbed by the announcement of [Foreign Minister 
Moshe] Arens and Shamir that they intend to negotiate for ten years 
without achieving a result” (Abbas 1995: 64). Rather than denigrating the 
signifi cance of his statements, Abbas paid tribute to Rabin’s “courage in 
presenting some positive ideas to achieve a solution during an election 
campaign, which was characterized by demagogy, bigotry and obsti-
nacy” (1995: 63). He informed Rabin that the PLO had “advocated 
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self-restraint on the eve of the elections so that Shamir could not arm 
himself against you” (Abbas 1995: 65). 
 The combination of pragmatic statecraft among key Palestinian leaders 
and prosocially motivated Israelis with their realistic prime minister cre-
ated the conditions for value creating negotiation in 1993. What became 
known as the Oslo process was initiated by Yossi Beilin, the deputy foreign 
minister, who without the knowledge of his superiors authorized unoffi -
cial contacts between two Israeli academics and PLO offi cials to explore 
ideas about the general outlines of an agreement. Beilin was the founder of 
the Mashov Caucus of Labor, a progressive faction that sought to move the 
party to the left on domestic and social issues. For years, he had sought out 
contacts with Palestinians to better understand their positions and identify 
possible bases for compromise between the two sides (Wanis-St. John 2011: 
83; Makosvky 1999: 97–100). He recalls, “My objective at this stage was to 
increase as far as possible the number of ‘kosher’ interlocutors, to identify 
possible common denominators and arrive at informal accords with the 
Palestinian leadership, thus proving to Peres, Rabin and the institutions of 
the Labor Party that agreement really was attainable” (Beilin 1999: 21). Bei-
lin was optimistic: “The investment in talks with the Palestinian leader-
ship in the territories and in Jerusalem had paid dividends in enabling me 
to gain a better understanding of the problems, the emotions, the ‘other 
man’s mind’” (1999: 46). Abbas coordinated the Palestinian team from 
Tunis. Qurie served as the chief Palestinian negotiator in Norway. 
 Both sides approached these secret discussions, made possible through 
the generosity of the Norwegian government, with the mind-set condu-
cive to value creating. Beilin writes, “Our guiding principle throughout 
the talks was to try to avoid conventional negotiating tactics, where the 
parties begin with speeches intended to mark out the distance between 
them and then move towards compromise. We tried to locate the limits 
beyond which the other side could not go, to understand what our own 
limits were, and to strive towards the construction of broader options in 
which both sides would have room to manoeuvre” (1999: 68). Ron Pun-
dak, one of the Israeli academics who began the talks, writes that the 
“goal was to work towards a conceptual chance which would lead to a 
dialogue based, as much as possible, on fairness, equality and common 
objectives. . . . For many years, the two peoples had been locked in a zero-
sum relationship, in which every victory by one side was considered a 
defeat for the other. ‘Oslo’, by contrast, was guided from the start by ef-
forts to create as many win-win situations as possible, notwithstanding a 
balance of power that was tipped heavily in Israel’s favor” (2001: 32–33). 
Qurie writes of the need to “break away from the circle of mutual suspi-
cion which had historically been dominant in the position of both sides” 
Additional Value
[211]
(2006: 80). Abbas, who monitored the process from Tunis and who would 
eventually participate directly, compared these discussions to the offi cial 
and more public negotiations ongoing in Washington that had been fruit-
less up to that point: “We therefore had to devise another style for the 
Oslo channel” (1995: 115). 8 
 The Israelis did not withhold their bottom line in an effort to extract a 
better deal. Pundak described how the Israelis constructed their fi rst pro-
posal: “So we did not draft an Israeli position, we drafted . . . something 
which we believed could be already a fi rst construction for a bridging 
draft and then it became, after amendments . . . the fi rst joint draft decla-
ration of principles” (in Behrendt 2007: 51). Yair Hirschfeld, his colleague, 
noted that they “always strove to emphatically take into account the Pal-
estinian position” (in Behrendt 2007: 51). 
 Based on early successes, Beilin informed his boss, Peres, about the 
existence of the talks. Soon after, Peres informed Rabin, who allowed 
the talks to continue. Two Israeli offi cials were brought in, Joel Singer 
and Uri Savir, making the channel offi cial. It was the fi rst time that the 
Israeli government had ever formally negotiated with the PLO. Rabin 
directed his negotiating team not to engage in the stalling that is part of 
coercive bargaining: “I want you to keep the ball rolling all the time. . . . 
Don’t act in a manner that would halt the negotiations. You have to be 
extremely patient. Try to avoid bogging down on principle issues. On 
the contrary, try to seek formulae that would be fair to both sides. Just 
keep up the momentum” (in Segev 1998: 168). Peres told them similarly 
to “wrap it up fast. . . . Don’t let the Oslo track become like chewing 
gum” (1995: 295). 
 The Palestinians were willing for the fi rst time to separate the peace 
process into a number of stages, negotiating an interim settlement and 
postponing a fi nal deal for a period of time. The earlier insistence on 
knowing the entire contours of a fi nal deal was part of a coercive bar-
gaining strategy. The Palestinians wanted to secure maximum Israeli 
concessions on all the important issues—fi nal borders, a Palestinian 
 8 . Maher el-Kurd, one of the participants, recounts that the Palestinians came to the conference 
with a pragmatic style, focused on tangible issues on which there was actually a chance for 
agreement: “We realized if we want to talk about 1948, about historical rights, 1967, refugees, 
displaced, water rights, then of course we would not get anywhere. In our consideration there 
was a historical brief moment that needed to be utilized. . . . When we had the fi rst meeting 
with Hirschfeld and Pundak we told them: let’s not talk about the past, let’s not talk about who 
occupied the land and who made the aggression. . . . Let’s talk about what we can achieve if 
we can achieve it in the coming fi ve years and create a momentum and an interest on both sides 
in making peace based on the two state solution” (in Behrendt 2007: 50). The Israelis stated the 
same position (Segev 1998: 195). 
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capital in East Jerusalem, the right of Palestinians to return—all up front, 
getting the most from the limited bargaining leverage they had. Other-
wise, they risked the interim settlement turning into a fi nal one (Peres 
1995: 67; Beilin 1999: 67, 132). This time, however, they accepted that 
these contentious issues would be postponed for the fi nal status talks, 
with agreement on the easiest issues fi rst (Qurie 2006: 79). This was in-
dicative of pragmatic statecraft. “We would seize what advantage we 
could in the near future, while never losing sight of our long-term goals,” 
Qurie recounts (2006: 76). 
 The embrace of pragmatic statecraft also enabled the Palestinians to 
accept the principle of “Gaza fi rst.” Instead of the Israelis granting au-
tonomy to the West Bank and Gaza all at once, they would relinquish 
Gaza as a good-faith gesture. The Palestinians had previously denigrated 
such a concession as worthless, a way for the Israelis to appear forthcom-
ing while shedding what was actually a burden (Qurie 2006: 81). The 
Gaza Strip was unimportant for Israeli security, had no historical or sym-
bolic signifi cance for the Jewish people, and had few settlements to dis-
mantle. Qurie explains the worry that “withdrawal from Gaza might 
turn out to be not only the fi rst but also the last step in Israel’s with-
drawal. . . . We were concerned that Israel’s colonial mentality, expan-
sionist policies and devious negotiating strategies might incline it to 
embroil us deeply in the Gaza issue while at the same time strengthening 
its hold on the West Bank and Jerusalem” (2006: 81). 
 However, in the Oslo track, the Palestinian pragmatists decided to 
look at the Gaza issue differently: “We made the effort to set aside our 
suspicion that Israel wanted to hold on to territory at all costs, and to 
believe that Israel’s desire to withdraw from Gaza was real,” writes 
Qurie (2006: 81). It was regarded as a preliminary demonstration of Is-
raeli intentions that would create a precedent that applied to other lands. 
Qurie highlighted the gains rather than the potential perils, such as the 
psychological boost it would provide for the Palestinians. “Our strategy 
was to present withdrawal from Gaza as a move which would have ben-
efi ts both for ourselves and for the Israelis. Thus, we ended the situation 
in which negotiation was seen as a zero-sum game” (Qurie 2006: 82). 
 The Oslo negotiations were marked by the reciprocity so important for 
value creating. Although the Palestinians consented to defer several key 
issues to the fi nal status talks, the Israelis made the concession of discuss-
ing them at all. Even as they stressed, for instance, that Jerusalem would 
remain undivided, the Israelis agreed that the fi nal status of the city 
would be the subject of negotiations. Had they been engaged in coercive 
bargaining, they would have demanded that Palestinians give up any 
claim to East Jerusalem as a precondition for negotiating (Behrendt 2007: 
54; Peres 1995: 287). Beilin writes, “Naturally, we did not guarantee our 
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willingness to compromise on these issues, any more than on those of 
frontiers and Jewish settlements and other questions, but the very fact 
that these issues were now on the agenda was enough to solve a series of 
problems which had prevented agreement on autonomy since discus-
sions on the subject had begun following the 1979 peace treaty with 
Egypt” (1999: 69). 
 To ease Palestinian concerns that “Gaza fi rst” would become “Gaza 
last,” Peres offered a bigger downpayment (Beilin 1999: 65; Makovsky 
1996: 35). As Peres admits in his memoirs, Palestinian suspicions about 
the eagerness of Israel to shed itself of Gaza were not unfounded. The 
region suffered from tremendous overcrowding and poverty and tied up 
large numbers of Israeli troops without increasing Israeli security. “In all 
honesty, nobody wanted Gaza,” he writes (Peres 1995: 278–79). Never-
theless, the Israelis might have held on to Gaza as a bargaining chip had 
they been practicing coercive bargaining. Not only did the Israelis relin-
quish the strip of territory, they suggested that Gaza autonomy be ac-
companied simultaneously by a Palestinian foothold in the West Bank. 
Peres offered Jericho “as a sign of our intent to continue negotiations” (in 
Makovsky 1996: 35; see also Peres 1995: 136; Behrendt 2007: 92; Beilin 
1999: 69; Segev 1998: 180). The area contained a large Palestinian refugee 
population and no Israeli settlements; however, holding the city did 
serve an important security purpose for Israel because it lay on the bor-
der with Jordan. It also had religious signifi cance for Israelis, making the 
offer much more than an empty gesture (Behrendt 2007: 88–92; Segev 
1998: 197, 202). 
 The Israelis also offered an accelerated timetable for granting auton-
omy to Gaza and Jericho, to begin within three months of the signing of 
a declaration of principles, and a fi xed date for the beginning of fi nal 
status talks. The Israelis refrained from using a coercive linkage strategy. 
Beilin wanted to ensure that the transfer of autonomy was  not made con-
tingent on agreement over the framework for the elections to a new Pal-
estinian council that would govern the areas, which would probably 
prove diffi cult to conclude. He also preferred to have a fi ve-year period 
for the conclusion of all outstanding issues written into the interim agree-
ment “so that the [Menachem] Begin ploy, of postponing the permanent 
settlement indefi nitely, would not be repeated” (Beilin 1999: 69). Beilin 
came up with the idea of a “ticking clock”—early withdrawal from Gaza 
and Jericho and the beginning of fi nal status talk after two years, with a 
permanent settlement to be concluded within three years (Beilin 1999: 77; 
Peres 1995: 286). 
 For their part, the Palestinians offered to be fl exible on Israeli secu-
rity (Segev 1998: 198). Although the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) would 
be withdrawn from the major cities as autonomy was granted, they 
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would be allowed to protect the settlers and Israeli citizens, meaning 
that they could reenter evacuated territory without having to secure 
Palestinian consent if this proved necessary to fi ght terrorism (Ma-
kovsky 1996: 67). “My instructions are that in matters of security I am 
to be open to your suggestions. . . . But please . . . don’t declare the en-
tire West Bank a security area,” Qurie told Peres (in Peres 1995: 289; see 
also Segev 1998: 206). 9 Their willingness to make these concessions was 
a key factor convincing Rabin of the possibility of an agreement, which 
was a necessary condition for keeping the track alive. He said, “On four 
or fi ve major issues, they agreed to [things] I had doubted they would 
agree to. . . . First, Jerusalem under Israeli control and outside the juris-
diction of the Palestinians for the entire interim period. Second, [retain-
ing all Israeli] settlements. Third overall Israeli responsibility for the 
security of Israelis” (in Makovsky 1996: 66). 
 The negotiations were not free from coercive bargaining. Consistent 
with my analysis, however, coercive bargaining begat coercive bargain-
ing. After offi cials from the Israeli government took over from the aca-
demics, they objected to some of the provisions in the earlier drafts, the 
most important being the creation of an international trusteeship to gov-
ern Gaza. For the Israelis, this was tantamount to an endorsement of a 
future Palestinian state, which genuinely went past their red lines. The 
Palestinians rescinded some of their concessions, such as giving up the 
ability of East Jerusalem residents to run for positions on the Palestinian 
Council, something the Israelis also could not have accepted regardless 
of diplomatic style (Makovsky 1996: 71). And they demanded control of 
the bridge from Jericho into Jordan and an extraterritorial road between 
Gaza and the West Bank (Qurie 2006: chaps. 10–14; Behrendt 2007: 84–
92; Beilin 1999: 104–5; Abbas 1995: 166–69; Makovsky 1996: 59–64). In a 
new draft, Qurie introduced twenty-fi ve amendments to the offi cial Is-
raeli proposal, claiming that he had the same right to backtrack as the 
Israelis (Qurie 2006: 196). Qurie remembers the “bitter satisfaction”: 
“Now, I thought, they are drinking from the same cup they gave us to 
drink from in past rounds” (2006: 197). The other Israeli delegate, Joel 
Singer, later complained that “instead of moving toward you, like in any 
other negotiation, they move  beyond their opening position, so that you 
are almost at their opening positions as negotiations move on” (in Ma-
kovsky 1996: 60). Qurie denigrated the signifi cance of the Israeli offer as 
“occupation in a different form and using different methods” and 
 9 . The bottom line for Israel on this issue is another indication that the distinction that has 
been made between Labor and Likud on foreign policy goals—with Likud allowing only 
“functional” autonomy and Labor willing to grant “territorial” autonomy—has been 
overstated (Makovsky 1999: 122–23). 
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threatened to “wait ten more years to obtain a reasonable agreement ac-
ceptable to us” (2006: 213). 
 Consistent with my analysis, the value claiming dynamic that emerged 
precipitated crises that almost undermined the negotiations (Beilin 1999: 
105; Makovsky 1996: 61). The Israeli representative, Uri Savir, accused 
the Palestinians of deliberatively crossing Israeli red lines and demanded 
they withdraw the draft. Otherwise, the Israelis would shut down the 
back channel. “We will not accept this method of negotiation,” he said (in 
Qurie 2006: 203). Movement toward an agreement reemerged only when 
the Palestinians stepped back from the brink and returned to value 
creating. 
 The fi nal product of the Oslo negotiations, a Declaration of Principles 
on an Interim Self-Government Arrangement, indicated the intent of the 
PLO and the Israeli government to negotiate an interim framework 
granting autonomy to the West Bank and Gaza via a gradual process 
beginning with the handover of Gaza and Jericho. The fi rst withdrawal 
of the IDF would occur in just three months. Negotiations over subse-
quent withdrawals from the major Palestinian urban centers would 
begin immediately. Israelis promised three “further redeployments,” 
withdrawals from the West Bank, but of unspecifi ed size and timing. In 
“early empowerment,” the new Palestinian government would control 
the six functions of education, health, social affairs, taxation, tourism, 
and internal security, even before elections to the Palestinian Council, a 
legislative body. Once the council was constituted, military government 
by Israel would be dissolved. A mechanism was to be worked out later 
allowing for the participation of East Jerusalem residents in elections, a 
major concession by the Israelis. Final status negotiations on security, 
borders, refugees, and the status of Jerusalem would begin no later than 
the third year of the interim period, to be concluded no later than fi ve 
years after the fi rst withdrawal. During this period, the Israelis would 
also refrain from expanding the settlements but would not remove any 
during the interim period (Segev 1998: 213, 349; Behrendt 2007: 2–3, 85; 
Peres 1995: 293; Wanis-St. John 2011: 110). The announcement of the Dec-
laration of Principles was accompanied by a letter from Arafat to Rabin 
indicating the acceptance by the PLO of the right of Israel to exist, a letter 
from Arafat to the Norwegians calling on the Palestinians to end the vio-
lence, and a letter from Rabin to Arafat recognizing the PLO as the legiti-
mate representative of the Palestinian people. 
 Qurie, the Palestinian negotiator who was present from start to fi nish 
in Norway, writes that Oslo was a “great international event, world-
changing in a way true only of such major events as the fall of the Berlin 
Wall in 1990” (2008: 13). Just as the French and Germans had made refer-
ence to the new type of negotiating that had emerged between the two 
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sides in a neutral location, the spirit of Locarno, so too did the Israelis 
and Palestinians (Pundak 2001: 32). This new “spirit of Oslo” was a re-
markable outcome, particularly for the PLO, whose bargaining leverage 
had been extremely limited. Much as Stresemann had done for Germany 
in the 1920s, the diplomatic style of pragmatic statecraft had brought the 
PLO back from the brink of extinction despite its limited power. There 
was elation on the Palestinian side when agreement was reached: “we 
could hear them cheering and weeping, and we knew that they were 
hugging one another,” reports Peres (1995: 299). Qurie wept at the sign-
ing ceremony in Washington. It was only because of the pragmatists that 
the Palestinians did not succumb to their usual behavior, “to never miss 
an opportunity to miss an opportunity,” as the popular saying went. 
Abbas defended the achievements of his team against opponents with a 
rhetorical question befi tting a realist: “Could you have gotten more?” (in 
Makovsky 1996: 77). 
 Moreover, just as Franco-German cooperation in the 1920s had de-
pended on the liberal diplomacy of France, the Oslo agreement required 
a prosocial partner in Israel. Much as Stresemann had sought out Briand 
at the Locarno Treaty–signing ceremony, Qurie sought out Peres to thank 
him effusively for his efforts. And like Briand, Peres responded to Qurie 
“sincerely [that] we had no wish to rule over the Palestinian people” 
(Peres 1995: 302). Arafat paid tribute to Peres as well. He was “capable of 
saying things and doing things on behalf of the Palestinians that many 
Arab states would neither say nor do” (Peres 1995: 302). The Israelis had 
not coerced the Palestinians when they were at their weakest (Segev 
1998: 215). Shamir, the former Likud prime minister, complained about 
this very aspect of the Labor diplomatic style. 10 An agreement such as the 
Oslo Accords, for better or for worse, probably would not have been pos-
sible with an Israeli government that preferred coercive diplomacy. The 
agreement passed by a single vote in the Israeli Knesset in September 
1993 following a unanimous decision by the cabinet to approve the dec-
laration (Meital 2006: 36). 
 The achievements in Oslo are all the more striking in light of the situ-
ation on the ground in the territories during the talks. The fall of 1992, 
 10 . “Bankrupt, increasingly discredited in the Arab world—his intifada, though hard for 
Israel to bear, solved nothing and was harder yet for the Palestinians, with no prospect of 
success on any front and not even the USSR to help him—Arafat was literally saved by Rabin 
and Peres. I am sure that he knows as well as I do that if Israel had only been a little more 
patient, as I had urged for so long, the PLO would have very soon collapsed in any case—and, 
a bitter foe gone, we would have moved on, along a safer, infi nitely better road to new 
relationships in the Arab world” (Shamir 1994: 260). 
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directly prior to the discussions in Norway, was marked by violence in 
the territories. Rabin, who also served as defense minister, closed off the 
West Bank, preventing 120,000 Palestinians from going to work in Israel, 
and reinforced the IDF presence in the territories (Makovsky 1996: 89–
90). He also cracked down on Hamas and Islamic Jihad militants, deport-
ing four hundred into Lebanon. And when Lebanon refused to receive 
them, leaving them to starve and freeze in the winter cold, Israel suffered 
a monumental public relations crisis (Behrendt 2007: 71; Segev 1998: 132, 
181, 191; Rabinovich 2011: 35). This was not a most promising case for 
diplomatic success. 
 Rabin’s behavior was due to his pragmatic approach, most his high 
level of epistemic motivation, something stressed in every account of his 
decision-making style. Although he was, like Shamir, a long-standing 
opponent of direct dialogue with the PLO, the prime minister had con-
cluded that, realistically, only the PLO had the power to conclude a bind-
ing agreement with the Israelis (Barari 2004: 82, 95; Rasler 2000: 714; 
Segev 1998: 192). This was a painful admission. “This may not be pleas-
ant,” he said, “but it is a fact” (in Ben-Yehuda 1997: 208). Rabin also dis-
trusted Arafat. In 1974, he had even given orders to have him killed. But 
he did not let this impede him from exploring the possibility of value 
creating negotiation between the sides (Segev 1998: 158, 193). Rabin 
asked rhetorically, “What can we do? Peace you don’t make with friends, 
but with very unsympathetic enemies. I won’t try to make the PLO look 
good. It was an enemy, it remains an enemy, but negotiations must 
be with enemies” (in Ross 2004: 92). 11 Rabin was pessimistic, yet in keep-
ing with the high level of epistemic motivation that is part of prag -
matic statecraft, he did not allow this skepticism to create closed- 
 mindedness (Makovsky 1996: 119). He “doubted anything would come 
of Oslo,” writes Peres. “Nonetheless, he gave me, and the talks, a chance” 
(Peres 1995: 285; see also Beilin 1999: 136–37). The prime minister’s stew-
ardship might have been a necessary condition for the Israeli govern-
ment to approve the agreement. Whereas Peres had the vision, only 
Rabin had the credibility at home on security because of his military 
pedigree (Barari 2004: 93; Makovsky 1996: 87). 12 
 11 . The prime minister later described the diffi culty of shaking Arafat’s hand at the signing 
ceremony in Washington: “I knew that the hand outstretched to me . . . was the same hand 
that held the knife, that held the gun, the hand that gave the order to shoot, to kill. Of all the 
hands in the world, it was not the hand that I wanted or dreamed of touching” (in Sassley 2010: 
710). Yet he did exactly that. 
 12 . It was undoubtedly helpful, perhaps necessary, that the Oslo talks were secret because 
this eliminated the public pressure on the participants that probably would have forced them 
to break off discussions in light of this escalation of violence on the ground (Wanis-St. John 
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 The Spirit of Oslo: Negotiating The Interim Agreement 
 Value creating negotiation persisted after the signing of the Declara-
tion of Principles. The Cairo Agreement of May 1994 identifi ed the terms 
of the transfer of Gaza and Jericho to the Palestinians. On July 1, 1994, 
Arafat crossed into the Gaza Strip from the Sinai Peninsula and took 
charge of the Palestinian Authority, marking the fi rst time in Middle 
Eastern history that Palestinians governed Palestinians. The twenty-
four-member Palestinian Authority assumed thirty-one executive and 
legislative functions, including the ability to issue passports and create 
its own police force. It could even have “routine dealings” with foreign 
states and international organizations, although it could have no embas-
sies or consulates abroad (Segev 1998: 359). These had not been easy ne-
gotiations, with strong disagreements, particularly over the extent of 
territory granted in Jericho and concerning control over crossings from 
the border city into Jordan (Segev 1998: 352). 
 In September 1995, the two sides reached agreement on what became 
known as Oslo II. The Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip elaborated the expansion of self-government and established the 
Palestinian Council (Meital 2006: 43). It divided the West Bank into three 
zones with various degrees of Palestinian sovereignty. In Zone A, which 
comprised the major cities of the West Bank, the Palestinians would exert 
full control. In Zone B, 450 small towns and villages where 65 percent of 
the Palestinians resided, the authority would govern but security would 
be jointly administered with the Israeli army. Zone C was to remain under 
Israeli control, the fi nal disposition to be settled during fi nal status nego-
tiations with a series of periodic military redeployments during the in-
terim phase (Segev 1998: 376; Rabinovich 2011: 45). Zone C included 
Israeli military installations and settlements that comprised 70 percent of 
the land but contained only 50,000 Palestinian residents. This was a value 
creating solution because the land most vital for Israeli security contained 
the fewest Palestinians. Although the peace process is often regarded as a 
failure, there were, as Miller notes, “real gains made on the ground, par-
ticularly Israeli withdrawal from six West Bank cities and towns by the 
end of 1995” (2008: 261). These gains persist today (Meital 2006: 40). 
2011). Nevertheless, it would be wrong to attribute the success purely to the quality of the 
negotiations rather than the nature of the participants. This would miss the fact that the back 
channel owed its existence to the diplomatic styles of the two sides. The talks were initiated 
by Beilin, who was committed to a liberal dialogue. The opportunity was seized by Palestinian 
pragmatists. The originally informal and always highly secretive nature of negotiations was 
endogenous to individual-level psychological attributes of the Palestinians and Israelis. 
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 The achievements are all the more remarkable in light of the backdrop 
of negotiations—a massive escalation of violence. Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad rejected the basic compromise of “land for peace” inherent in the 
Oslo process and sought instead the creation of a Palestinian state con-
sisting of all of Mandatory Palestine. The groups attempted to derail the 
peace process through suicide bombings and other attacks on the Israeli 
military and ordinary civilians. Hamas launched its fi rst series of attacks 
just three weeks after the signing of Oslo I and its second series following 
the signing of the Cairo Agreement (Kydd and Walter 2002). This was a 
level of violence greater than in the days of the fi rst intifada. During 
those six years, 172 Israelis had been killed; during the early days of Oslo 
from 1993 to 1996, more than 300 Israelis died (Rabinovich 2011: 48). 
 In response, the Israelis closed Gaza off from Israel to provide greater 
security, leaving thousands unable to travel to work in Israel, and de-
layed the release of prisoners (Segev 1998: 363). Right-wing Israelis also 
conducted terrorist attacks, most notably the massacre by a former Is-
raeli captain of twenty-nine Palestinian worshippers at the Tomb of the 
Patriarchs in Hebron in February 1994, which precipitated an interna-
tional crisis and the temporary stationing of an international observer 
force (Meital 2006: 39; Rabinovich 2011: 27; Segev 1998: 355). Retaliation 
by IDF made it extremely diffi cult politically for Arafat to secure the two-
thirds support necessary for the revision of the PLO Charter, promised as 
a condition of Oslo I and then Oslo II (Segev 1998: 361). 
 It is diffi cult to judge the Palestinians’ thinking during this period be-
cause the available sources are insuffi cient. It is clear, however, that the 
peace process would have stalled were it not for the diplomatic style of the 
Labor government. The terrorist activities did not lead the Israeli govern-
ment to reverse course because Arafat was not seen as directly responsible 
for the violence (Kydd and Walter 2002). Rather than using a crackdown 
on terror as a precondition for extracting greater concessions from the Pal-
estinians, key Israeli offi cials expressed understanding for Arafat’s plight, 
deserved or not. Peres stated that “although Israel does not expect the 
[PLO] to produce 100 percent success, it would like to see 100 percent ef-
fort” (in Kydd and Walter 2002: 282). Rather than linking the two issues, 
Rabin and Peres promised to “fi ght terrorism as though there is no peace 
process” and “continue the peace process as though there is no terrorism” 
(Segev 1998: 380). As Miller remembers, after Oslo, “For the next two years 
their negotiators solved problems. They lived, laughed, yelled, and cried 
together against the backdrop of missed deadlines, terror, violence and 
continuing mutual suspicion. They became friends . . . [and] pushed the 
Oslo process uphill against the laws of political gravity” (2008: 260). 
 Rabin also faced heavy domestic opposition. Likud took a strong stand 
against the peace process (Rabinovich 2011: 60; Inbar 1998: 39). Benjamin 
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Netanyahu, the Likud leader, claimed it laid the foundation for a Pales-
tinian state that would threaten the existence of Israel. “Arafat will de-
vour Jordan and assimilate its army. . . . You are strengthening our 
enemies and weakening us,” he claimed (in Qurie 2008: 19). Oslo II barely 
passed in the Knesset, and right-wing opponents began major demon-
strations across Israel. Rabin paid for his fortitude with his life; he was 
assassinated by another Israeli, a radical opponent of the peace process, 
on November 4, 1995. 
 A wave of terrorist attacks in February and March 1996, the most sig-
nifi cant since the Cairo Agreement, killed 102 and wounded over 80 Is-
raelis (Kydd and Walter 2002). In less than three weeks, Peres’s lead of 20 
points over Netanyahu, the Likud candidate, in the upcoming prime 
ministerial election evaporated. Promising “peace with security,” the 
Likud leader emerged victorious over Rabin’s heir in the 1996 election, 
largely as a result of the actions of Palestinian spoilers (Rabinovich 2011: 
53; Barari 2004: 59; Steinberg 1998: 210–11). 
 From Shalom to Shlep: The Netanyahu Government, 
the Americans, and the Palestinians 
 The new Israeli government was composed of a coalition whose com-
mon denominator was opposition to the peace process as it currently 
stood. Netanyahu embraced the same zero-sum framing of the situation 
that guided Shamir. The Palestinian issue was a question of the very sur-
vival of Israel: “It will not do to obscure the primacy of this existential 
opposition to Israel as the driving force of the Arab-Israeli confl ict,” he 
wrote (Netanyahu 1993: 331). The Arabs would simply use peace as a bar-
gaining asset of value to trade for something else in a coercive bargaining 
style. “Many Arab leaders who profess a desire for ‘peace’ think of it as a 
 means to an end, such as regaining lost territory or securing military sup-
plies from the West. . . . For much of the Arab world, peace is a coin with 
which one pays in order to get something else” (Netanyahu 1993: 337). 
Rather than explore the possibility of a mutually benefi cial agreement, 
Netanyahu presumed that the terms that would provide Israeli security 
would not be acceptable to the Palestinians (Netanyahu 1993: 284). 13 
 13 . He claimed that if Israeli needs for hot pursuit, control of the Jordan Valley, and early 
warning stations were met, there would be nothing left for the Palestinians. “Israeli’s 
retention of these boundaries is of course incompatible with the incessant calls for a 
Palestinian state on the West Bank,” he wrote (Netanyahu 1993: 343). The Palestinians would 
insist on the right to protect their own borders with their own army and not allow a foreign 
military presence (2). 
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 Like Shamir, Netanyahu had no sympathy for the Palestinian position. 
He rejected the “neat symmetry imposed on their respective needs and 
desires. These commentaries hold that Israel’s demand for Arab recogni-
tion of its right to exist should be met in exchange for various Arab de-
mands, especially for land. Yet to treat these demands as symmetrical, as 
the two sides of an equation, is to ignore both history and causality” 
(Netanyahu 1993: 331). Netanyahu claimed the very notion of “land for 
peace” was unfairly imbalanced, favoring the Palestinians: “What kind 
of a ‘compromise’ is it for one side to renounce one hundred percent of 
its claims and the other side to renounce zero percent?” And his framing 
of the situation was decidedly unpragmatic, stressing the moral superi-
ority of the Israeli position: “What kind of a moral position is it to say 
that the failed aggressor should be given back all the territory from which 
he launched his attack?” (Netanyahu 1993: 292). 
 Again, we might conclude that Netanyahu simply had different pref-
erences based on different foreign policy goals. He was the son of a 
prominent revisionist Israeli scholar who put forward claims to the en-
tire West Bank as rightfully belonging to Israel. Yet, although Netanyahu 
complained about the peace process, before it even had begun he had 
sketched a solution that differed little from what ultimately emerged 
from the Oslo track. In his 1993 book, he endorsed the “fullest possible 
autonomy” for Gaza and self-government in the urban areas where most 
Palestinians lived, with jurisdiction over commerce, education, religion, 
health, and social welfare. He had proposed that sparsely populated ter-
ritory remain under Israeli military control and that the army have ac-
cess to the West Bank to crack down on terrorism (Netanyahu 1993: 
350–53). Two years before Oslo II, Netanyahu had sketched out the same 
agreement. 
 Therefore, to the extent that Netanyahu’s bottom line, and that of Likud, 
differs from that of Labor, the differences between the two sides are gener-
ally overstated. There is a strong case to be made that a major, perhaps the 
most important, division between Labor and Likud is in diplomatic style. 
When he became prime minister, Netanyahu did not seek to dismantle the 
core elements of the Oslo agreements that had already been implemented. 
He recognized “established facts on the ground. I am forced to accept 
them as starting points” (in Rabinovich 2011: 61; see also Inbar 1998: 38). 
Miller, the U.S. diplomat, focuses on Netanyahu’s style rather than his 
substance in distinguishing his government from Labor: “I’ll be more 
grudging and it will take longer, but I’ll hold my base because they’ll see 
how hard I can resist” (2008: 271). Ross says the same: “[Netanyahu] 
hoped he could move very slowly and through attrition give up less than 
the Labor Party—demonstrating that he was superior to others because in 
the end he could manage peace but at a lower price” (2004: 493). 
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 Whereas Labor signifi cantly curtailed settlement activity to send a sig-
nal of cooperative intentions, the Likud government accelerated build-
ing to create facts on the ground that strengthened the Israeli bargaining 
position. On taking offi ce, Netanyahu removed the freeze on new activ-
ity, announcing the building of 1,500 new units in the West Bank with the 
goal of increasing Israeli numbers in the territories by 10 percent (Ross 
2004: 263; Qurie 2008: 20, 52). Qurie complained that “Israel’s underlying 
motive seemed to be . . . continuing to undermine the notion of a truly 
viable independent Palestinian state by covering the Palestinian territo-
ries with more and more Israeli settlements” (2008: 34). 
 In addition, Netanyahu put a break on the peace process. He pledged 
to continue negotiating but refused to begin fi nal status talks as previ-
ously agreed in light of Palestinian violations of their commitments. The 
prime minister insisted on “reciprocity” (Rabinovich 2011: 61; Barari 2004: 
124; Inbar 1998: 40–41; Steinberg 1998). Although at fi rst glance this might 
seem to indicate a prosocial commitment to value creating in which both 
sides would benefi t, Netanyahu used Palestinian noncompliance as a rea-
son to stall the process of negotiations and extract more concessions from 
the Palestinians. Pundak, who had participated in the early Oslo talks, 
writes, “The main weapon in his campaign against the Palestinians was 
the mantra that the Palestinian side was not fulfi lling its part of the agree-
ments; and therefore Israel would not implement its part” (2001: 33). 
Qurie, who negotiated directly with Netanyahu, complains, “When we 
met, Netanyahu had frequently raised the notion of reciprocity, claiming 
it was the Palestinians who never implemented their commitments. . . . 
Whatever he was offered, he would ask for more, or suddenly discover he 
had wanted something else all along, in order to avoid having to agree 
with us on any issue” (2008: 52). He summarizes, “All in all, Netanyahu’s 
three years in offi ce were a wretched time for the peace process. It was a 
nightmare not only for the Palestinians but also for many level-headed 
Israelis” (2008: 19). 
 Beilin criticizes Netanyahu, comparing the Labor conception of reci-
procity with that of Likud. “In any agreement, reciprocity is taken for 
granted; no party wants to fulfi ll its side of a contract without the compli-
ance of the other side. However, in a political agreement, you are both a 
party to the agreement and its judge. It is necessary to sometimes turn a 
blind eye to a minor breach in order to sustain the agreement itself.” This 
distinguished Netanyahu’s coercive bargaining from a style of pragmatic 
statecraft: “It might be acceptable, in private life, to insist on complete 
reciprocity in every interaction. But the truth is that nobody will appreci-
ate this, and you will be seen as an unrealistic person. . . . If you allow the 
other side to breach an agreement in a way that goes against your 
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national interest, then you are not a responsible leader. But if you turn a 
blind eye to something which is marginal because you know that down 
the road there are more important things, then you are a realistic leader” 
(Beilin 2004: 57). 14 
 Just as the shift from a liberal to a coercive bargaining style in France 
following the triumph of Locarno induced a change in the spirit of nego-
tiating that prevailed with Germany, value claiming emerged between 
the Israelis and Palestinians. Although some blame surely also lies with 
Arafat, who never demonstrated the commitment to fi ghting terrorism 
that might have convinced others of his sincere intentions, the diplo-
matic style adopted by Israel is also certainly a necessary component for 
explaining the stall in the peace process that occurred so quickly follow-
ing the ascent of Likud into offi ce. 15 
 Even though the structural circumstances had not changed, the shift 
from value creating to value claiming negotiations undermined the 
peace process. Qurie writes that “we had the depressing sensation that 
our relations with Israel were regressing to the point from which we had 
set out, years before. The relationship between Israel and the Palestin-
ians declined from the modest level of understanding and partial recon-
ciliation that had been achieved into an escalating and debilitating 
 14 . The Americans were not pleased either. Ross describes the period, in which the “shared 
assumptions that had guided U.S. and Israeli policy would no longer exist—Martin [Indyk, 
ambassador to Israel] on a daily basis would now be dealing with people who did not see the 
Palestinians as partners” (2004: 258). The Americans adjusted their expectations. “We 
understood that not much more than interim issues could be worked through with Netanyahu 
and Arafat,” writes Miller (2008: 270). “All of us saw Bibi [Netanyahu] as a kind of speed bump 
that would have to be negotiated along the way until a new Israeli prime minister came along 
who was more serious about peace” (Miller 2008: 274). 
 15 . Statements made by Qurie in his meeting with Ariel Sharon, the Israeli foreign minister, 
echoed those made by Stresemann to the French following Poincaré’s return. Qurie stressed 
that Palestinian diplomacy was premised on receiving tangible benefi ts and that the Israeli 
failure to seriously negotiate would force the Palestinians to reconsider their approach. “The 
progress of the Palestinian Authority is predicated on the end of occupation and cooperation 
over security. The advent of the present Israeli government has placed this project in doubt 
and has held up the developments that were scheduled” (Qurie 2008: 39). When Sharon 
placed blame on the Palestinians, referring to Arab actions even as far back as the 1930s, Qurie 
tried to reorient him toward present concerns: “Last time, we lost. This time, we shall both 
lose. We do not want to argue about who won and who lost” (40). In the face of coercive 
bargaining by the Israelis, the Palestinians also dug their heels in, despite the greater power 
of Israel. “You hold all the cards and have the power on the ground. If you want security, I can 
offer you the arrangements and measures that will guarantee you that. But, I am not prepared 
to cede more land to you, as this is all I have left” asserted Qurie (43). As Sharon detailed the 
list of Palestinian failures, Qurie responded with his own list (Qurie 2008: 57). 
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confrontation with the Netanyahu government over the building of new 
settlements and other issues” (2008: 21). U.S. Secretary of State Made-
leine Albright referred to a “crisis of confi dence between the two sides” 
that “was turning a situation in which each problem seemed solvable 
into one where there was endless dispute over every small detail” (in 
Beilin 2004: 70). Thomas Pickering, U.S. undersecretary of state for po-
litical affairs, put it more colloquially, “We have gone from Shalom to 
Shlep” (in Beilin 2004: 73). Itamar Rabinovich refers to the shift in the 
spirit of negotiations to explain the deterioration: “At the core of the 
original Oslo process had been the idea that time was needed to make a 
transition from confl ict and hostility to a settlement predicated on com-
promise and partnership.” After Netanyahu’s ascent to power, “Any 
concessions made and cooperation secured were offered grudgingly. 
Both parties presumed they were locked in confl ict, and each acted to 
maximize its position in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem” (Rabino-
vich 2011: 76). 
 When the two sides were able to reach agreements, such as the proto-
col of 1997 to implement the long-delayed withdrawal of Israeli forces 
from Hebron while still guaranteeing the security of the small Israeli 
settlement there, Netanyahu quickly offset these concessions by taking 
unilateral steps that would please his right-wing base (Miller 2008: 263, 
271; Ross 2004: 281). To secure the support of his cabinet for this fi rst 
withdrawal from West Bank territory by a Likud leader, the prime min-
ister agreed to the construction of 6,500 housing units for 30,000 Israelis 
in Har Homa near East Jerusalem, a highly infl ammatory move given 
Palestinian aspirations for a capital there (Barari 2004: 123; Beilin 2004: 
63–65; Rabinovich 2011: 66). 
 The other major agreement between the two sides was forced on the 
Israelis by the Americans. The coercive bargaining style of Likud created 
the need for U.S. brokering. “After three years of watching a functioning 
process from the sidelines, we were playing the mediator’s role now,” 
writes Miller (2008: 269; see also Qurie 2008: 70; Ross 2008: 267). 16 Like 
Shamir, Netanyahu did not adjust to structural circumstances, pursuing 
coercive diplomacy even vis-à-vis the powerful Americans. President Clin-
ton complained, “He thinks he is the superpower and we are here to do 
 16 . The diplomatic style of the Labor government had made U.S. involvement somewhat 
superfl uous. Miller writes that “instead of having to push futilely on a door that the fi rst 
Yitzhak (Shamir) slammed shut, Clinton’s team had merely to knock on a door that the second 
Yitzhak (Rabin) had already opened (2008: 247). The Americans were aware of but not 
involved with the Oslo track. Although they hosted the signing ceremony for the Declaration 
of Principles at which Arafat and Rabin famously shook hands in the White House Rose 
Garden, this was the extent of their involvement at the time. 
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whatever he requires” (in Ross 2004: 261). Just as the left-wing Labour 
government in Britain, despite its preference for liberal diplomacy, as-
similated in behavior to the coercive bargaining style of France, its close 
ally, in the late 1920s, so did the Democratic Clinton administration start 
to change its diplomatic style. Coercive bargaining induced coercive bar-
gaining. The Americans began to blame the Israelis for the lack of prog-
ress in the peace process. They complained about Israeli stubbornness on 
the tiniest of concessions and threatened to end their involvement (Beilin 
2004: 75, 89). 
 The United States sought to accelerate the three further Israeli military 
withdrawals that had earlier been promised to the Palestinians before 
the completion of the interim agreement. The president pushed a trans-
fer of 13 percent of West Bank land on the Israelis (Beilin 2004: 75; Rabi-
novich 2011: 78–79; Qurie 2008: 65); the Israelis countered, in coercive 
diplomatic fashion, with 9 percent (Rabinovich 2011: 80). At the Wye 
River Summit, hosted by the Americans in 1998, the Israelis agreed to 
two more redeployments, provided that the Palestinians took further 
steps toward curbing terrorism (Beilin 2004: 76; Qurie 2008: 63). The ne-
gotiations were marked by value claiming between the United States and 
Israel. Beilin describes the scene as “raised voices, crises” with “the Israe-
lis packing their bags to return home, only to unpack and remain” (2004: 
77). The United States called the prime minister’s bluff, making travel 
arrangements for his departure (Qurie 2008: 72). Netanyahu “fl ooded the 
negotiations with unrealistic demands,” even of the Americans, such as 
the release of an American caught spying for Israel (Qurie 2008: 67). In 
the end, the United States prevailed, with Israel accepting an agreement 
almost identical to that which the Americans had proposed. Value claim-
ing favors the more powerful side. 
 Nevertheless, although the Americans could lead the Israeli horse to 
water, they could not make it drink. Netanyahu’s cabinet assented to the 
Wye memorandum only after insisting that it approve each redeploy-
ment sequentially, giving the Israelis greater ability to leverage the pro-
cess for more Palestinian concessions. The prime minister still needed 
Labor votes to approve the agreement in the Knesset. Afterward, Netan-
yahu found it impossible to implement the agreement due to pressure 
from his party and from other right-wing coalition partners in the cabi-
net. When he ordered the fi rst redeployment, the coalition collapsed 
(Miller 2008: 275–76; Barari 2004: 121–26; Beilin 2004: 80–81). Miller 
writes, “It may well be that Wye’s greatest consequence was to bring 
about, quite unintentionally, the demise of Netanyahu’s government, 
which broke apart over the agreement he signed” (2008: 276). This hap-
pened despite the fact that 80 percent of the Israeli public supported it 
(Ross 2004: 461–62). Whereas the Rabin government had been brought 
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down by Palestinian terrorists, the Netanyahu government succumbed 
to internal right-wing opposition. Indeed, Hamas and Islamic Jihad had 
been very quiet for most of the Likud term in offi ce, leading some to 
argue that Netanyahu’s positions slowed the peace process enough so 
that it was unnecessary for the Palestinian extremists to play a spoiler 
role (Rabinovich 2011: 77; Kydd and Walter 2002). 
 Bargaining by Barak: Quasi-Coercive Diplomacy by Labor 
 Elections returned Labor to power in Israel, generating very high ex-
pectations for the new prime minister, Ehud Barak. The former head of 
the Israeli armed forces was considered an heir to Rabin, a military man 
committed to peace while still keeping Israel safe. Abbas said, “We can 
now make peace. These are our natural partners” (in Ross 2004: 492). The 
Americans were optimistic as well. “At the time . . . administration offi -
cials believed there was a historic opportunity for an agreement. “Bibi 
[Netanyahu] was out, Barak was in, and overnight expectations in Israel, 
among the Palestinians, and within our administration were sky-high 
about the prospects for peace. We were back in business,” writes Ross 
(2004: 494). Yet Barak’s diplomatic style was deeply confl icted. On the 
one hand, he was similar to his Labor predecessors in his commitment to 
fi nding a mutually benefi cial agreement; on the other, he was unsure of 
the Palestinian commitment to a fi nal peace deal. 
 Barak promised to “leave no stone unturned and to open all avenues” 
(Meital 2006: 56) and prepared the Israelis for the “painful concessions” 
that would be necessary (Meital 2006: 53). Rather than feigning pessi-
mism, he declared, “I am always optimistic. . . . I do not know of another 
way to deal with life in our region” (in Sher 2006: 5). He was, in Pundak’s 
estimation, “rationally left-wing” with empathy for the Palestinian de-
sire for a state, going as far as to admit that he would have been a free-
dom fi ghter had he been a Palestinian (2001: 37). Behind the scenes he 
told his team, “We are on the brink of some of the most diffi cult decisions 
of this decade, if not of the history of this country. We do not really know 
how far we can go in terms of reaching a reasonable balance between the 
needs of one side and the needs of the other. It is important to be aware 
of the need to change our own perceptions” (in Sher 2006: 25). Like Rabin 
before him, Barak set an ambitious timetable for the conclusion of the 
fi nal status talks long delayed by Netanyahu, hoping for a deal within 
twelve to fi fteen months (Meital 2006: 55; Malley and Agha 2001). At 
Sharm el-Sheikh in September 1999, he secured grudging Palestinian ac-
ceptance to conclude an agreement within a year (Meital 2006: 58; Rabi-
novich 2011: 102). 
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 Barak’s key advisors and negotiators were some of the most commit-
ted doves in Israel, and they approached the negotiations with a liberal 
diplomatic style of reasoned dialogue. Gilead Sher writes, 
 I used to fi rst listen attentively in order to be able to analyze the positions 
of the other side, its interests and intentions. The ability to connect with the 
people sitting across from me did not dilute my mission, which was to 
achieve the best possible results as defi ned in the strategic objectives of the 
leadership. I found out that empathy for the arguments of my interlocutors 
often helped overcome real and imaginary obstacles. Shlomo Ben-Ami and 
I made an effort to be fair and accurate in presenting the positions of the 
other side, as we understood them. By so doing, we attempted to increase 
the chances that they would trust the veracity of the positions we pre-
sented. (2006: 19–20) 
 The team was prepared for a value creating solution satisfactory for both 
sides. “It was clear that the negotiations should be based on a ‘give and 
take’ on the core issues,” writes Sher. “This should be done without com-
promising the vital interests of Israel while looking for the widest possi-
ble common denominator between the members of the Palestinian 
leadership” (2006: 61). 
 Yet Barak was not sure that the Palestinians were willing to make 
reciprocal concessions and did not want to reveal the Israeli bottom 
lines unless he was sure that a deal was at hand (Malley and Agha 2001: 
69). He explained later, “Essentially, I insisted that despite our desire to 
try every chance for an agreement, and perhaps because of it, if we 
reached the last leg of an agreement, it was vital that we know if we had 
a partner before we continued to hand over assets” (Barak 2003: 86–87). 
Barak saw the fi nal status talks as a “window of opportunity” at the 
close of which “we will know where we stand” (in Meital 2006: 55). The 
Israeli prime minister was willing to make tough choices if Arafat was, 
but he was not sure that Arafat would be. Barak had the idea of “un-
masking” Arafat (Meital 2006: 72) to see if he was indeed a “Palestinian 
[Anwar] Sadat” who could end the confl ict (Pressman 2003: 11; see also 
Rabinovich 2011: 88). 
 This uncertainty about Palestinian intentions induced the use of coer-
cive bargaining tactics. Publicly Barak issued his “fi ve Nos,” positional 
commitments on the major issues in the fi nal status talks (Malley and 
Agha 2001: 69; Meital 2006: 57; Sher 2006: 58). There would be no return 
to the 1967 borders, no division of Jerusalem, no systematic dismantling 
of settlements, no foreign army west of the Jordan River, and no right of 
return for Palestinian refugees (Pressman 2003). These positions were 
close to actual Israeli bottom lines rather than a gross infl ation of Israeli 
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demands. Nevertheless, simply making such claims seems to have been 
an effort to drive a hard bargain. 
 In keeping with this strategy, Barak did not initially complete the third 
redeployment promised in the Wye agreement, opting to withhold the 
territory for bargaining leverage in the fi nal status agreements (Meital 
2006: 55; Malley and Agha 2001: 65; Pundak 2001: 31–32). Sher explains, 
“Barak was convinced that Israel’s fi nal withdrawal from the Occupied 
Territories should be tied to far-reaching agreements on the core issues of 
the confl ict, namely territorial boundaries, refugees, Jerusalem, water 
rights and security arrangements. But the magnitude of the gaps be-
tween Israeli and Palestinian positions on these issues led Barak to believe 
that it was wrong to move forward with implementing the Israeli further 
redeployment before the disputed issues were further explored and the 
gaps between the polarized positions narrowed” (2006: 2). 
 Yet Barak, unlike Netanyahu and Shamir, was holding back on Israeli 
positions so that he could ultimately make great compromises. “Pre-
cisely because he was willing to move a great distance in a fi nal agree-
ment (on territory or on Jerusalem, for example), he was unwilling to 
move an inch in the preamble (prisoners, settlements, troop redeploy-
ment, Jerusalem villages),” write Malley and Agha (2001: 63). Sher ex-
plains, “Conceding additional territories without reaching an agreement 
on these core issues would leave Israel without any assets to negotiate. 
The only incentive for the Palestinians to relinquish their claim for the 
Right of Return of Palestinian refugees to Israel, would involve transfer-
ring a substantial amount of territory as part of a comprehensive peace 
agreement. Barak assessed that discussing the Right of Return when 
most of the territory had already been transferred to the Palestinians 
would leave us empty-handed in the negotiation process” (2006: 2). 
 The natural corollary of Barak’s goal of negotiating a permanent settle-
ment that would fi nally uncover Arafat’s true face was to push for a 
high-level summit (Malley and Agha 2001: 67). Sher writes, “It was only 
at this point, [Barak] believed, that Arafat would reveal his true inten-
tions” (2006: 2). Barak instructed his advisors to “tell the Palestinians 
discreetly that we Israelis are built for a settlement ‘in one fell swoop.’ All 
the issues, all the subjects, all the pain . . . we are not built for agreements 
in stages, in which we will have to make continual political down pay-
ments” (in Freilich 2012: 154). This was a “boom-or-bust” approach 
(Miller 2008: 280; see also Rabinovich 2011: 87). The Americans originally 
resisted, feeling that the proper preparation had not been done, but ulti-
mately consented. “We went to Camp David on his word,” remembers 
Secretary of State Albright (in Miller 2008: 280). 
 Barak’s diplomatic style seems to have refl ected both individual char-
acteristics and domestic political pressures. When the prime minister 
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had been in Rabin’s cabinet as the head of the IDF, he had been genuinely 
skeptical of the Oslo process, even abstaining from the interim agree-
ment that ceded territory in exchange only for Palestinian promises to 
curtail terrorism (Freilich 2012: 173; Malley and Agha 2001; Pundak 2001: 
36; Rabinovich 2011: 101; Meital 2006: 53). Barak later wrote of his period 
as military chief, “I stopped a one-sided process that had developed 
since the Oslo accords were signed, a process in which Israel gave up 
tangible assets in exchange for vague promises about the nature of rela-
tions in the future. When I was still a new minister in the Rabin govern-
ment, I campaigned in government votes against that pattern of behavior. 
The Netanyahu government, with Sharon as foreign minister, continued 
to sign agreements that transferred assets for promises (Hebron and the 
Wye River agreement) and even handed over assets (Hebron)” (Barak 
2003: 86). 
 The Labor Party was also much weaker in the Barak government than 
previously under Rabin and Peres. Labor won only 26 seats in the parlia-
ment of 120. Barak’s coalition included a much stronger presence of 
right-wing parties that seems to have signifi cantly affected the diplo-
matic style of his government (Pundak 2001: 36–37; Sher 2006: 43, 48; 
Stinnett 2007). The other left-wing parties did not provide an absolute 
majority in the Knesset, and the prime minister had built a coalition that 
excluded Likud but incorporated a number of religious and right-wing 
parties, such as Shas, the National Religious Party (NRP), and Yisrael 
Ba’aliya, that preferred coercive bargaining (Rabinovich 2011: 88; Barari 
2004: 127). This was also part of a political calculation. “Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Rabin had paid a tremendous political (and physical) price by 
alienating the Israeli right wing and failing to bring its members along 
during the Oslo process. Barak was determined not to repeat that mis-
take,” write Malley and Agha (2001: 63). Barak stressed that “he could 
not allow himself at this stage to sidestep his party colleagues from the 
left” (Sher 2006: 25). In many ways, Barak’s diplomatic style was the per-
fect blend of the tendencies of the parties in his coalition. 
 This partly explains why Barak delayed the third redeployment. “He 
did not want to estrange the Right prematurely or be (or appear to be) a 
‘sucker’ by handing over assets, only to be rebuffed on the permanent 
status deal. . . . If Israelis and Palestinians reached a fi nal agreement, all 
these minor steps (and then some) would be taken; on the other hand, if 
the parties failed to reach a fi nal agreement, those steps would have been 
wasted and would cost precious political capital” (Malley and Agha 
2001: 63). Pressure from the United States led Barak to ultimately con-
cede to a third redeployment in exchange for a Palestinian agreement to 
quickly begin the fi nal status talks (Malley and Agha 2001: 67; Freilich 
2012: 164). Shas abstained from approving this agreement, however, and 
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the NRP voted against it (Meital 2006: 59). Although the redeployment 
was approved by the Knesset, the prime minister delayed the with-
drawal by two months (Freilich 2012: 164). David Levy, the minister of 
foreign affairs and a former member of Likud who had broken away 
from his party, pleaded with Barak not to rush to a summit: “We still 
have nothing and we are tearing the coalition apart” (in Sher 2006: 32). 
Along with Nathan Sharansky, the leader of the NRP and minister of the 
interior, Levy called for red lines at the summit. Sharansky threatened to 
resign if a conference were held (Freilich 2012: 165–69), and Levy pledged 
not to attend (Sher 2006: 56). Sharansky also was responsible for Barak’s 
decision to shut down a back channel negotiation with the Palestinians, 
which had been exploring a fi nal status framework on the basis of the 
terms set out in Stockholm in 1995. The NRP leader publicized its content 
and claimed Israel had conceded too much (Rabinovich 2011: 102; Meital 
2006: 65). 17 
 Ultimately, however, Barak was still unsuccessful in holding the right 
in his coalition, which broke apart before the Camp David Summit even 
began due to differences over the peace process (Rabinovich 2011: 104). 
Shas, the NRP, and Yisrael Ba’aliya all voted to bring down the govern-
ment (Sher 2006: 42). Because the prime minister was directly elected, he 
was not compelled to put together another coalition but was forced to 
call for elections to be held in December 2000. He imagined fi ghting the 
election on the basis of the deal he brought back home from Camp David. 
If Barak won the election, he would put the issue to a public referendum 
(Sher 2006: 48–49; Freilich 2012: 165–67). The need to bring home a deal 
that would win over moderate voters in such a campaign probably also 
affected his diplomatic style, moving it toward coercive bargaining. 
 Masks in Maryland: Value Claiming at Camp David 
 It was in the very nature of the fi nal status talks that they would be 
diffi cult. They dealt with the most sensitive issues, those that the Israelis 
and Palestinians had postponed because they could not yet fi gure out a 
 17. Pressure from the right in the coalition was also responsible for Barak’s decision to delay 
the agreed transfer of three East Jerusalem villages, including Abu Dis, to Palestinian control 
as a confi dence-building exercise favored by the Americans before the summit (Freilich 2012: 
166; Sher 2006: 31; Miller 2008: 294). Clinton was furious at the Israeli actions (Malley and 
Agha 2001: 67). Although Barak blamed the outbreak of violence that had accompanied Al-
Nakba festivities, domestic politics were to blame (Meital 2006: 63–64). The prime minister 
told Sher, “If it will pacify the NRP and Israel B’Aliya, I will not transfer Abu Dis at this stage” 
(in Sher 2006: 48). 
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solution. As a consequence, negotiations were bound to be more distrib-
utive and zero-sum in nature, encouraging value claiming by both sides. 
It is unclear whether there even is a zone of possible agreement between 
the Israelis and Palestinians, a deal that both would prefer to the status 
quo. In any case, the character of negotiations that prevailed at Camp 
David in 2000 did not facilitate its discovery. Diplomatic styles helped to 
undercut the chance for peace. 
 A number of analysts maintain that Barak’s coercive bargaining before 
and at Camp David undermined the Palestinians’ belief that he was will-
ing to make the compromises necessary for peace, encouraging them to 
use a similar diplomatic style. Pundak claims Barak “did not understand 
that while trying to ‘remove Arafat’s mask in order to see if Arafat could 
make tough decisions,’ he actually unveiled an ugly Israeli face which 
had not been conditioned to pay the necessary price for peace” (2001: 39). 
His style “was completely wrong. . . . Barak should have presented the 
principles underlying what eventually became his proposed solutions . . . 
in the early stages of negotiations. . . . Instead, Barak dragged his feet and 
treated the talks like a Persian market . . . fearing he would ‘expose’ his 
positions too early in the game” (Pundak 2001: 39). Arafat was suspicious 
of Barak’s strategy, believing that he was trying to create an atmosphere 
of pressure and impose an unfair settlement (Malley and Agha 2001: 64). 
Should talks break down, Arafat would be blamed (Meital 2006: 66). Mal-
ley and Agha write, “Designed to preserve his assets for the ‘moment of 
truth,’ Barak’s tactics helped to ensure that the parties never got there. 
His decision to view everything through the prism of an all-or-nothing 
negotiation over a comprehensive deal led him to see every step as a test 
of wills, any confi dence-building measure as a weakness- displaying one. 
Obsessed with Barak’s tactics, Arafat spent far less time worrying 
about the substance of a deal than he did fretting about a possible ploy. 
Fixated on potential traps, he could not see potential opportunities” 
(2001: 74). 
 Even Sher partly blames the prime minister: “This pattern of brash 
behavior by Barak would repeat itself numerous times in the upcoming 
months, severely hampering efforts to restore the trust between the two 
sides” (2006: 4). In particular, Barak’s failure to comply with interim 
agreements raised doubts about his willingness to deliver during the 
fi nal status talks. Barak’s policies confused the Palestinians. He appeared 
serious and determined to reach an agreement but also spoke in “right-
wing code” (Pundak 2001: 36). Although Barak’s style is certainly not the 
only factor responsible, it can be safely said that, when the two sides ar-
rived at Camp David, a value creating mind-set was not present. 
 At Camp David, Barak could only hold back the Israeli bottom lines 
while simultaneously presenting Arafat with an attractive ultimatum 
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that would reveal his intentions if Israeli positions were put forward by 
the Americans as U.S. ideas (Meital 2006: 76). Clinton administration 
offi cials therefore shuttled between the cabins of the two sides broker-
ing the talks. Arafat and Barak met only once at Camp David during 
the several weeks of negotiations (Rabinovich 2011: 82). The Israelis 
deemed any commitments they made as hypothetical and revocable in 
the absence of a reciprocal concession (Rabinovich 2011: 107; Malley 
and Agha 2001: 67). Barak’s team negotiated on the basis that “nothing 
is agreed until everything is agreed” (Sher 2006: 2; Pressman 2003: 7). 
The Israelis were obsessed even before Camp David with leaks that 
could reveal the compromises that they were willing to make, under-
mining public support for peace. Consequently, they wrote very little 
down (Sher 2006: 42; Freilich 2012: 171; Meital 2006: 83). For all these 
reasons, as Malley and Agha write, the Palestinians saw Barak’s gener-
ous proposals as “neither generous, nor Israeli, nor, indeed, as an offer” 
(2001: 62). 
 Although accounts differ, the Israelis offered the Palestinians (indi-
rectly through the Americans) all of the West Bank save an annexation 
of somewhere between 9 and 10 percent of territory so that 80 percent 
of the Israeli settlers could be incorporated into Israel. The Israelis did 
not offer a one-to-one exchange of land, although they were ready to 
cede 1 percent of current Israeli territory as compensation. This was a 
better deal than had been discussed in Stockholm, where the Israelis 
proposed a 12 percent annexation with no territorial swaps (Rabino-
vich 2011: 106; Freilich 2012: 163). The Israelis wanted a temporary mili-
tary presence in the Jordan Valley, including early warning stations but 
reduced their demand that the Israeli military presence last for twenty 
years. Palestine would be demilitarized. The Israeli position on refu-
gees, however, had not changed. Committed to the preservation of the 
Jewish character of Israel, representatives refused to recognize a right 
of return but were willing to concede to a family reunifi cation program 
that would allow a small number of Palestinians to return to their an-
cestral homes. Other refugees would be free to settle in the new Pales-
tinian entity and other Arab countries (Pundak 2001: 40; Freilich 2012: 
159–62; Pressman 2003; Malley and Agha 2001: 69; Rabinovich 2011: 
107; Meital 2006: 78). 
 Barak’s most striking concession, however, was on Jerusalem. Previ-
ously committed, like all Israeli leaders before him, to the indivisibility of 
the city, Barak was willing to give the Palestinians a capital in East Jeru-
salem with sovereignty over the Christian and Muslim quarters of the 
old city and “permanent custodianship” of (although not sovereignty 
over) the Temple Mount, known to Muslims as Haram al-Sharif, the 
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third holiest site in Islam (Pundak 2001: 40; Freilich 2012: 159–62; Press-
man 2003; Malley and Agha 2001: 69; Rabinovich 2011: 107; Meital 
2006: 78). 
 For their part, the Palestinian delegation wanted a return to 1967 bor-
ders with the possibility of territorial swaps on an equal, one-to-one 
basis. East Jerusalem would be the Palestinian capital, and Palestinians 
would exert sovereignty over the Temple Mount, although they were 
willing to concede ownership of the Western Wall and the Jewish Quar-
ter of the Old City to the Israelis. Although the Palestinians wanted an 
Israeli recognition, in principle, of the right of return, they were willing 
to limit it in practice out of respect for the demographic and security in-
terests of Israel (Pundak 2001: 40; Freilich 2012: 159–62; Pressman 2003; 
Malley and Agha 2001: 69; Rabinovich 2011: 107; Meital 2006: 78). 
 The Palestinians never responded defi nitively to the “U.S.” proposals. 
The Palestinians expressed no appreciation for Barak’s concessions on 
Jerusalem, seeming to pocket the concession with reciprocation. Ac-
counts seem to indicate that personal rivalries among the negotiating 
team, a lack of preparation, and Arafat’s indecision contributed to their 
passiveness (Dajani 2005). In any case, whether this was the intent or not, 
the Israelis and Americans understood Palestinian behavior as coercive 
bargaining. Barak complained, “[Arafat] did not negotiate in good faith; 
indeed, he did not negotiate at all. He just kept saying ‘no’ to every offer, 
never making any counterproposals of his own” (Pressman 2003). 
Shlomo Ben-Ami, an Israeli negotiator recalls, “The whole time [at Camp 
David] we waited to see them make some sort of movement in the face 
of our far-reaching movement. But they didn’t” (in Pressman 2003: 12). 
Even Pundak, whose account is generally more sympathetic to the 
Palestinians, accuses the Palestinians of “foot-dragging, passivity and 
contradictory positions” (2001: 41). “Throughout the negotiations, the 
Palestinian team conveyed a feeling that there was no end to Palestinians 
demands and that this pressure would continue to increase as an agree-
ment came closer,” a tactic “designed to extract every possible conces-
sion prior to signing” (Pundak 2001: 43). The Americans also faulted 
Arafat. Ross remembers, “Throughout the course of the Oslo process, 
Chairman Arafat was extremely passive. His style was to respond, not 
initiate ideas. That is a good tactic, especially for a weaker party that feels 
it has little to give. If it was only a tactic, it should have stopped when 
serious ideas or package proposals were put on the table” (Ross 2001). 
Arafat expressed indifference to reaching a deal. When Albright stressed 
that Arafat was losing the opportunity to create his own state, he re-
sponded, “I already have state. . . . If Barak does not want to recognize 
this now, I do not care if it is recognized even in twenty years. Our 
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situation is like the one in South Africa, the whole world supports me” 
(Sher 2006: 67). Palestinians even expressed doubts about the holiness of 
the Temple Mount for Jews, going as far as to claim that there was never 
a Jewish temple on the site (Pundak 2001: 43; Haberman 2001). 18 
 The combination of coercive bargaining by both sides produced value 
claiming negotiations in which both refused to reveal information and 
dug their heels in (Miller 2008: 202). “Bottom lines and false bottoms: the 
tension, and the ambiguity, were always there,” write Malley and Agha 
(2001: 69). “Barak feared that everything he would say would be commit-
ting himself, and Arafat would say nothing at all,” Ross summarizes (in 
Haberman 2001). Malley and Agha write, “Barak’s strategy was predi-
cated on the idea that his fi rmness would lead to some Palestinian fl exi-
bility, which in turn would justify Israel’s making further concessions. 
Instead, Barak’s piecemeal negotiation style, combined with Arafat’s un-
willingness to budge, produced a paradoxical result” (2001: 72). Value 
claiming led to a game of chicken in which each side was waiting for the 
other side to make the fi rst move. Barak said at the summit, “If we put 
our fi nal positions on the table, there will be no way back. But if they 
would move toward us, we would move forward” (in Sher 2006: 70). 
Arafat felt the same. “The mutual and by then deeply entrenched suspi-
cion meant that Barak would conceal his fi nal proposals, the ‘endgame,’ 
until Arafat had moved, and that Arafat would not move until he could 
see the endgame” (Malley and Agha 2001: 72). The deadlock could not be 
broken. 
 Following the breakdown of negotiations at Camp David, the Clinton 
administration launched a last-minute effort to secure a deal before the 
president left offi ce. In the end, however, time ran out. The second inti-
fada began in October 2000. Street action was accompanied by devastat-
ing suicide bombings starting in December 2000 (Pressman 2006; Kydd 
and Walter 2002). The Barak government continued to negotiate with the 
Palestinians in the early days of the uprising, but the prime minister suf-
fered a crushing election loss to Ariel Sharon in February 2001. As was 
 18 . Although President Clinton, personally mediating between the two sides, expressed 
frustration with the Israelis, he was more upset with the Palestinians for their diplomatic 
style. Clinton said to Ahmed Qurie, “Don’t simply say to the Israelis that their map is no good. 
Give me something better! . . . This is a fraud. It is not a summit. I won’t have the United States 
covering for negotiations in bad faith. Let’s quit! . . . If the Israelis can make compromises and 
you can’t, I should go home. You have been here fourteen days and said no to everything. 
These things have consequences” (in Malley and Agha 2001: 71). At another point, when 
Qurie repeated the well-rehearsed Palestinian case for rightful return of all land held in 1967, 
Clinton exploded, “You are not acting with integrity . . . and you are breaking my agreement 
with Arafat and Barak. You are not acting in good faith. This is no way to manage negotiations!” 
(in Sher 2006: 68). 
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the case with Netanyahu, Sharon’s victory had been thought unlikely 
before the increase in violence (Barari 2004: 132). But given the blood-
shed, combined with the Israeli public’s strong reaction to Arafat’s per-
ceived lack of good faith at Camp David, Sharon won by almost a 
two-to-one margin. The Israeli public was almost unanimous in its belief 
that the Palestinians had initiated the violence to extract additional con-
cessions, exploiting Barak’s willingness to make historic concessions 
(Bar-Tal and Sharvit 2007). By the end of 2000, 70 percent believed that 
the Palestinians did not accept the very existence of Israel (Hermann and 
Yuchtman-Yaar 2002; see also Waxman 2008). 
 The violence of the second intifada was less spontaneous and pro-
ceeded with more active leadership from Arafat’s political party, Fatah, 
than the fi rst had. The actual role of key Palestinian leaders in planning 
the uprising is the subject of dispute, but it is clear that Arafat did exploit 
it and made no effort to suppress it (Rabinovich 2011: 109). The Al-Aqsa 
brigades, declaring themselves the military wing of Fatah, fought along-
side Hamas and the Islamic Jihad. This explains why, although support 
for the peace process declined across the political spectrum, polls show 
that the fall was particularly precipitous for the left. This is another ex-
ample of the behavioral assimilation in diplomatic style that occurs when 
the other side is regarded as not reciprocating. Barak believed that Arafat 
walked away from a deal very close to Palestinian demands and deliber-
ately turned to terrorism (Pressman 2003: 10). He later echoed the impor-
tance of reciprocity in value creating negotiation: “We don’t have a 
partner. Frustrating or not, that’s a fact. Peace and agreements are like a 
tango. They take two. In war, all it takes is the will of one side” (Miller 
2008: 329). Shlomo Ben-Ami, the foreign minister under Barak, later wrote, 
“We . . . did not expect to meet the Palestinians halfway, not even two-
thirds of the way, but we expected to meet them somewhere” (in Rabino-
vich 2011: 115). Following the failure at Camp David, Barak became the 
fi rst Israeli leader to publicly propose the construction of a security barrier 
between the Israeli and Palestinian populations (Waxman 2008). 
 Ariel Sharon ruthlessly repressed the intifada, using targeted assassina-
tions of Hamas offi cials, regular military incursions into autonomous Pal-
estinian territory, checkpoints and curfews, home demolitions, and mass 
arrests. After a bombing of a Passover seder dinner in March 2002, the 
IDF retook areas that had been given full sovereignty under the Oslo II 
agreements and surrounded Arafat’s headquarters in Ramallah. The sec-
ond intifada was far more deadly than the fi rst, with 3,189 Palestinians 
and 92 Israelis losing their lives. In addition, the Palestinian economy was 
destroyed (Pressman 2006). Sharon also began the construction of the 





 Searching for Stresemann 
 The Lessons of the 1920s for Diplomacy and  
 the Middle East Peace Process 
 There is a reason why scholars of international relations have not de-
voted signifi cant attention to the 1920s. The maelstrom of the 1930s sucks 
up all the intellectual oxygen. It is somewhat natural that some, if not the 
most, cataclysmic events in world history—the Great Depression, the 
eliminationist Nazi regime, and World War II—attract more interest. Yet 
there is a lot to learn from the 1920s as well, both about what could have 
been in Europe and what could still be in the Middle East. 
 It is by no means certain that had Germany, France, and Britain contin-
ued down the diplomatic path forged by Stresemann, Briand, and Cham-
berlain, that Europe and the world at large would have avoided the rise 
of fascism in Germany. Their actions surely could not have averted the 
Great Depression and perhaps not even rise of nationalism that followed 
in its wake. And it seems that there was no deal that would have left 
Adolf Hitler satisfi ed, short of war. The Führer was sui generis. The 
world had never seen such a destructive force before and will, it is hoped, 
never see anything like it again. The problems of Europe in the late 1930s, 
after Hitler’s rise, did not have diplomatic solutions. 
 Nevertheless, I contend that, if there had been an alternative historical 
path that preserved the peace, it would have followed the lines drawn by 
those three statesmen, supported at home by those who embraced their 
diplomatic styles. Germany was particularly important. The greatest 
chance for peace was the preservation of that domestic coalition in Ger-
many that had supported Stresemann’s rapprochement with Western Eu-
rope, a Baptist-bootlegger alliance of the left and the center-right. It was 
across this domestic tightrope that Stresemann is seen guiding Germany 
on the cover, trying to bring Germany safely across the abyss toward 
peace. If there is to be a lasting peace between Israel and the Palestinians, 
Searching for Stresemann
[237]
recent history shows that a similar partnership in Israel will be a neces-
sary (although not a suffi cient) condition. 
 As detailed in chapter 4, Stresemann did his best to attract the support 
of the nationalist right, which preferred a coercive diplomatic style to 
reach the same goals—an alteration of the eastern borders of Germany, 
new colonies, and the end of occupation by France. He was unable to do 
so. Instead he had to rely on the center-left, in particular the Social Demo-
crats. Stresemann’s center-right did not have the numbers he needed in 
the parliament without the German left. And in such a polarized political 
climate, both internationally and domestically, the Social Democrats alone 
could not pull it off. It required the cover provided by Stresemann, who 
could credibly claim to speak for those Germans who were not “interna-
tionalists” in any ideological sense. He and his DVP could not be accused 
of being traitors to Germany (although the nationalists tried). This is the 
great virtue of a diplomatic coalition that crosses the political spectrum. 
 That Stresemann was able to attract the support of the SPD indicates the 
distinction made between liberals and realists in international relations 
theory is overdrawn. Historically in international relations theory, realism 
is contrasted to liberalism. The two form the bookends of courses on inter-
national relations. Michael Williams calls it “one of the oldest and most 
pervasive contrasts” (2005: 129). Classic realists in the fi eld—Edward Carr 
(1964), Hans Morgenthau (1948), and Robert Osgood (1953)—situate their 
arguments against liberal utopianism. Despite this, liberal reason and 
pragmatic rationality are similar in that they both involve careful delib-
eration to see things as they really are, as opposed to unthinking, noncal-
culating, emotional, subjective, and passionate decision making (Berki 
1981). The two diplomatic styles differ in that the former involves a genu-
ine consideration of, although not a capitulation to, the interests of others 
in a genuine effort to reach a mutually benefi cial outcome (Zacher and 
Matthew 1995). Nevertheless, where state interests align, realists would 
offer identical advice about the merits of diplomacy. Realism is ultimately 
more pessimistic than liberalism about the ability to transcend the nature 
of power politics (Zacher and Matthew 1995; Rathbun 2010); however, 
this does not foreclose the possibility of, many times, there being signifi -
cant mutual interests among states other than alliances against a common 
foe. All realists should agree that confl ict can be needlessly expensive and 
distract from the core vital interests of a country. A. J. H. Murray writes of 
realism, “the national interest is defi ned so as to incorporate an obligation 
to self-limitation and tolerance. The statesman is obliged to defi ne inter-
ests in terms compatible with those of other states” (1996: 104). Realists 
are, in terms used by Ken Booth and Nicolas Wheeler, not “transcenders” 
of state confl ict, nor are they “fatalists.” Rather, they are “mitigators” of 
state confl ict (Booth and Wheeler 2008: 11). 
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 Although in theory realism and liberalism might be very different, in 
practice they are often on the same side. The true opponents of a liberal 
diplomacy (and foreign policy) are the nationalist advocates of coercive 
bargaining. Center-right realists, although sharing the egoistic orienta-
tion of the far right, often have more in common with the left in terms of 
their policy agendas. In practice, we should not think of realists in crude 
terms as militaristic saber-rattlers, as we often mistakenly do but, in-
stead, as the shrewd pragmatists they are. They are often the best friends 
to liberals who need to shore up their domestic political base. 
 Neglecting the qualitative difference in diplomatic style between prag-
matic realists and coercive bargainers leads to faulty empirical conclu-
sions. In the case of 1920s Germany, both constructivists and structural 
realists have argued that Stresemann was ultimately no different from 
other nationalist politicians of his era and would have backed Hitler’s 
rise to power, as other prominent conservatives did. Stresemann was 
“fairly typical,” according to Jeffrey Legro (2005: 96). “It is not diffi cult to 
imagine the pragmatic Stresemann, had he lived and remained in power, 
traveling the same path to Hitler that the Heinrich Brüning, Franz von 
Papen, and Kurt von Schleicher governments followed” (Legro 2005: 96). 
If this assessment is true, Stresemann and the DVP were not practitioners 
of pragmatic statecraft, and Briand and the Cartel des Gauches had no 
real epistemic motivation but, rather, were idealistic dupes tricked by the 
cagey foreign minister into believing what they wanted to believe. 
 Both Legro (2005) and Dale Copeland (2000) argue that the 1920s dem-
onstrate a seamless continuity with prewar nationalist and militaristic 
policies of Germany (and those of Hitler afterward). Legro attributes this 
to cultural factors; Copeland attributes it to structural pressures derived 
from geography and the balance of power. From this, Legro concludes 
that, even under Stresemann, the return of Germany to great power sta-
tus “would ultimately rest on the renewal and use of military power in 
the service of territorial expansion” (2005: 94). Copeland states that “it is 
hard not to conclude that this ‘man of peace’, had he commanded the 
military power of Germany in 1939, would have reignited the heroic  Drang 
nach Osten ” (2000: 124). 
 Both are wrong. Legro and Copeland reach their empirically indefen-
sible conclusions because they lack the proper conceptual tools. They are 
unable to distinguish realism from nationalism and pragmatic statecraft 
from coercive bargaining. As a consequence, international relations schol-
ars are still searching to establish an accurate picture of Stresemann. 
 Stresemann was not a genuine advocate of European integration. The 
hagiographies of the early 1930s after his untimely death were indeed off 
the mark. The foreign minister was pursuing only national goals, not 
European ones. But this does not make him a likely ally of fascism. That 
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is a false dichotomy. As Jonathan Wright explains, “Stresemann did not 
believe that the League had transformed the nature of international rela-
tions. . . . He distinguished his policy from the illusions of those on the 
left as well as the right” (1995: 127). Stresemann did want major changes 
in the postwar system; however, that is something different entirely from 
arguing that the foreign minister was a wolf in sheep’s clothing. 
 Legro makes reference to Stresemann’s acknowledgment that Ger-
many had no choice but to pursue a peaceful policy of revision given the 
heavily skewed distribution of power; however, this is hardly equivalent 
to Stresemann’s advocating another war had Germany been stronger. In 
fact, there is almost no evidence that the foreign minister had such a 
strategy in mind and much evidence that he did not. Stresemann was 
contemplating peaceful solutions when he spoke of the “free hand” 
(Stresemann, Vol. 2: 88–95) he would have in the east after any rap-
prochement with the west (Wright 2002: 313; Cohrs 2006: 228). France 
and Britain would provide the diplomatic backing to negotiate border 
changes; “I am not thinking of war in relation to the eastern question,” he 
stated (in Wright 2002: 345). Wright argues, “He never tried to predict 
that future in detail, though there are [no indications] that he thought of 
a new German military empire in Europe” (2002: 378–79). 
 In fact, Stresemann thought more could be accomplished through di-
plomacy than through force. He said privately to his DVP allies, “The 
only policy which can succeed is that which aims to become a worth-
while ally for other nations, so as at the moment of becoming a useful 
ally to receive from the other side  what you never get with old, buried 
guns” (in Wright 2002: 285, emphasis added). Stresemann opposed the 
use of force not out of principled reasons, of course, but from pragmatic 
and utilitarian ones consistent with his realism. That does not make him 
a Hitler or even a garden-variety German nationalist of the type that 
populated the DNVP. He wrote, “One could imagine a German foreign 
policy which is based on forgetting nothing and having only one goal: to 
recover Germany’s old position. Even if Germany were a military power, 
one would have to be clear in conducting such a policy that one would 
thereby bring back to life an alliance of the whole world against Ger-
many” (Stresemann, Vol. 2: 157–59; Wright 2002: 325). Those few allu-
sions by Stresemann to the use of force as the ultimate arbiter were 
always made in the same context, in efforts to gain adherents on the na-
tionalist right to his style of diplomacy, as in conversations with military 
leaders such as General Hans von Seeckt (Wright 1995: 121–29). In his 
infamous letter to the crown prince, he identifi ed a number of long-term 
objectives for Germany, including unifi cation with Austria (Stresemann, 
Vol. 2: 159, 503–6). This should not be surprising. After all, as a rightist 
politician, he had a proself motivation in diplomacy. Nevertheless, 
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Stresemann never made any commitment to a forceful change. Even be-
fore nationalist crowds, he spoke of a “carefully considered policy to fi nd 
a way, working with other nations, to re-establish the right of self- 
 determination where it is violated” (in Wright 2002: 378; ADAP, B1/2: 
665–69). As a consequence, von Seeckt and those like him disliked and 
distrusted Stresemann immensely and frequently spoke of removing 
him from power (Gatzke 1954: 13, 37–38). 
 It is true that “by design” (Copeland 2000: 123) the Locarno treaty did 
not lock in the eastern borders of Germany. But Stresemann was always 
upfront with his interlocutors about wanting those lines redrawn. He 
just did not imagine that force was necessary to do so. The very fact that 
Stresemann negotiated such a treaty indicates that he did not view it as 
merely a scrap of paper. If the foreign minister truly had had such de-
signs, why did he not simply negotiate a treaty guaranteeing the status 
quo in the east, thus lowering the guard of the allies, and strike when 
Germany was ready? 
 Stresemann did, indeed, know about the limited covert rearmament 
programs of the Reichswehr, but he put little stock in it. “I consider all 
the elaborate games to recover power secretly as total nonsense. You can-
not produce heavy artillery or build a thousand planes secretly, that 
damages our foreign policy without bringing us anything,” he said at the 
time (in Wright 2002: 285). Stresemann tolerated the covert programs so 
as not to provoke a powerful domestic adversary. For the foreign minis-
ter, the merits of limited rearmament lay in repressing a potential inter-
nal socialist revolution, not in overturning the geographical status quo 
(Gatzke 1954: 25). 
 The foreign minister’s biographer, Jonathan Wright, concludes, “It is 
unthinkable that he would have embarked on the same policy, which 
was a denial of everything he stood for.” Stresemann said of Hitler in 
1923 that the future Führer was “only able to destroy” (in Wright 1995: 
131). Legro and Copeland are confused by what Wright calls his “con-
summate blend of statesmanlike argument and nationalist rhetoric” and 
distracted by the latter (2002: 346). 
 Israel is still searching for its Stresemann, or more broadly, for a strong 
party backing pragmatic statecraft on the center-right. The search for 
Stresemann’s true nature as historical fi gure is ultimately an academic 
debate, but fi nding his equivalent in Israeli politics could go a long way 
toward ending the protracted confl ict with the Palestinians. With the 
Labor Party decimated in parliamentary strength, some pragmatic state-
craft is the best hope on the Israeli side for a fi nal status agreement with 
the Palestinians. 
 In the early years of the new millennium, it appeared that Israel might 
indeed have found such a political fi gure and force in the form of Ariel 
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Sharon. Even as he ruthlessly repressed the intifada, the new prime min-
ister plotted a political exit strategy. While the peace process was frozen, 
Prime Minister Sharon announced in December 2003 a signifi cant unilat-
eral move—a total withdrawal of the IDF from the Gaza strip and the 
dismantling of all settlements there as well as four settlements in the 
northern West Bank. This disengagement would require relocating thou-
sands of settlers (Rynhold and Waxman 2008: 35). This was a signifi cant 
departure from the coercive diplomatic style of previous Likud adminis-
trations in that it released a bargaining chip without a concession from 
the Palestinians (Freilich 2012: 177; Rynhold and Waxman 2008: 33; Bar-
 Siman-Tov and Michael 2007: 275). Sher Arian and Michael Shamir write, 
“The call for unilateral actions negated decades of Zionist demands for 
recognition and negotiation as conditions for concessions” (2008: 700). 
 Sharon’s actions were indicative of a commitment to pragmatic state-
craft, a different diplomatic style (Waxman 2008; Rabinovich 2011: 129; 
Arian and Shamir 2008: 700). The prime minister had come to the conclu-
sion that demographic realities made it impossible for Israel to continue 
to hold the territories while still retaining the Jewish identity of Israel 
(Freilich 2012: 180; Bar-Siman-Tov and Michael 2007: 264–65). “Disen-
gagement recognizes the demographic reality on the ground specifi cally, 
bravely and honestly,” said Sharon (in Rynhold and Waxman 2008: 25). 
Ehud Olmert, his ally and the mayor of Jerusalem, said of his plan, 
“Above all hovers the cloud of demographics” (in Rynhold and Waxman 
2008: 23). The prime minister had also determined, in light of the second 
intifada, that the Palestinians could not be suppressed forever (Freilich 
2012: 180; Bar-Siman-Tov and Michael 2007: 264–65). Palestinians and Is-
raelis were in a deadlock detrimental to both sides. Sharon famously de-
clared, “I think the idea that it is possible to continue keeping 3.5 million 
Palestinians under occupation . . . is bad for Israel. . . . Controlling 3.5 
million Palestinians cannot go on forever” (in Waxman 2008). 
 Sharon was carefully ranking priorities. He distinguished between 
“goals worth fi ghting for, because they are truly vital, like Jerusalem, the 
big settlement blocs, the security areas and preservation of Israel’s char-
acter as a Jewish state, as opposed to objectives which we all clearly 
know will not be achieved and which most of the public is justifi ably 
unwilling to sacrifi ce a great deal for” (Freilich 2012: 179). Disengage-
ment from these areas would allow Israel to focus its interests on “trying 
to save as much as possible of Judea and Samaria” (Freilich 2012: 179). 
The prime minister was pragmatically cutting Israeli losses. 
 The prime minister’s decision was particularly surprising given Sha-
ron’s history as a patron of the settler movement and a hard-liner when 
it came to dealing with the Palestinians and other Arab adversaries 
(Rabinovich 2011: 129). When he was foreign minister, he had urged the 
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settlers to “run and grab the hills” after the Wye agreement (Rynhold 
and Waxman 2008: 26). In this way, he was very similar to Stresemann, 
who during World War I had been a virulent German nationalist. 
 There had been signs of Sharon’s pragmatism in his earlier stint as 
foreign minister under Netanyahu. In discussions with Qurie, he said, “I 
am inclining towards a restricted but defi nite objective that would be 
achievable. This will not be peace, but a stage below it, a kind of truce. 
We need an entity made up of geographically linked territories under the 
Palestinian Authority” (Qurie 2008: 45). Sharon was settling for coexis-
tence not peace, confl ict management not confl ict resolution (Rynhold 
and Waxman 2008: 26). Israelis would take the bird in the hand. 
 Sharon’s plan created a huge division in the Likud Party between 
party moderates and the right wing, suggesting the familiar divide 
based on epistemic motivation observed in previous chapters. The cen-
ter-right embraced Sharon’s pragmatic statecraft, whereas the far right 
did not (Rabinovich 2011: 130; Miller 2008: 322; Kurtzer et al. 2013: 159). 
The prime minister submitted his plan to the Likud Party for a referen-
dum, which it rejected in May 2004. Netanyahu and four other cabinet 
ministers had issued a joint statement opposing disengagement. An 
amended plan, in which the cabinet would decide whether and which 
settlements to dismantle in four consecutive steps, was passed (Freilich 
2012: 184–88; Bar-Siman-Tov and Michael 2007: 267–72). This was the 
same staged solution, preserving bargaining leverage, that had emerged 
from the Likud cabinet deliberations after the Wye River summit. Even 
so, the Knesset held two votes of no confi dence in which fi fteen of forty 
Likud members defected, voting against Sharon. In the fall, Netanyahu 
resigned from the cabinet and contested the Likud leadership on a pro-
gram of opposition to disengagement. The rebel ranks included half of 
the Likud parliamentarians. 
 Sharon’s diplomatic style of pragmatic statecraft therefore required 
left-wing support. Sharon brought Labor into a national unity coalition 
in December 2004 when the right-wing NRP resigned (Freilich 2012: 188–
89). As was the case in Germany in the 1920s, the Israeli left and center-
right formed a Baptist-bootlegger coalition against the right based on 
differences in diplomatic style. Labor had fought the 2003 elections on a 
program of disengagement in light of its belief that it no longer had a 
Palestinian partner (Arian and Shamir 2008; Rynhold and Waxman 2008; 
Freilich 2012: 178). Dov Waxman writes that the alignment “took the 
policy of territorial withdrawal from the Left, and the Right’s skepticism 
about the possibility of achieving Israel-Palestinian peace and pessimism 
about the ability of Israelis and Palestinians to live together” (2008: 89). 
By September 2005, 8,000 settlers had been removed from twenty-one 
settlements in Gaza and four in the West Bank, some through force. 
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 The divisions in Likud were so profound that in November 2005 the 
prime minister announced his departure from Likud and the creation of 
an alternative party, called Kadima. Public opinion polls showed that 
voters who defected from Likud to Kadima had a different diplomatic 
style than those who stayed with the traditional Israeli party of the right. 
Kadima supporters were only slightly less pessimistic about the likeli-
hood of reaching an agreement with the Palestinians than were Likud 
loyalists but were much more skeptical than Labor voters. Yet, like Labor 
voters, they largely endorsed Sharon’s disengagement plan, whereas 
Likud voters did not. Kadima voters were a “specifi c combination of the 
Left and the Right: a growing willingness for compromise from the Left 
together with deep mistrust of the Palestinians . . . from the Right.” It was 
a “pragmatic middle ground” (Shamir et al. 2008). 
 Sharon’s gamble paid off, but he was not able to enjoy the victory. Be-
fore the 2006 Knesset elections that yielded a plurality for his party and 
ultimately a governing coalition with Labor and Shas, he suffered a de-
bilitating stroke. In yet another parallel between the two periods, the 
poor health of this unlikely leader of the pragmatic center-right deprived 
him of his chance to make history (Stresemann died in 1929 at the rela-
tively young age of fi fty-one). In Israel, Ehud Olmert took up the posi-
tion of prime minister and head of the new party. The former mayor of 
Jerusalem, along with Tzipi Livni, his new foreign minister, and others, 
had shifted his diplomatic thinking based on pragmatism—what he per-
ceived as irreversible demographic trends and the lack of a viable mili-
tary solution to the confl ict (Freilich 2012: 180). “Above all hovers the 
cloud of demographics,” he said before becoming prime minister (in 
Miller 2008: 23; Rynhold and Waxman 2008: 23). Aaron Miller describes 
him as “smart, centrist, and pragmatic” (2008: 356). 
 Under Kadima leadership, the Israelis announced a “convergence 
plan,” withdrawing from the outer settlements in the West Bank and 
consolidating an Israeli state with the large settlement blocs closer to Is-
rael proper (Rabinovich 2011: 163–64; Kurtzer et al. 2013: 214). Ideally 
this was to be negotiated with the Palestinians; however, Olmert would 
go forward unilaterally as well. In November 2007, the Israelis came to 
the table with the Palestinians in Annapolis, Maryland, under the tepid 
and inattentive brokering of the George W. Bush administration (Kurtzer 
et al. 2013: 226). Subsequent talks nevertheless demonstrated fl exibility 
on both sides. Olmert was willing to consider accepting up to 15,000 Pal-
estinian refugees in exchange for a Palestinian pledge to end the confl ict 
as well as to place the Holy Basin (the Old City of Jerusalem and the ad-
jacent area) under the control of a trusteeship of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, 
the United States, Israel, and Palestine. The differences between the two 
sides on territory narrowed considerably, with Israel indicating a much 
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greater willingness to swap land in exchange for annexing major settle-
ment blocs (Rabinovich 2011: 176–80; Kurtzer et al. 2013: 228–31). 
 Abbas, now the president of the Palestinian Authority, never formally 
responded to the Israeli proposals, and before the peace process could 
gain momentum, Olmert was forced to resign due to corruption charges. 
With Livni unable to form a coalition, new elections were held in Febru-
ary 2009 that, although yielding another plurality for Kadima, saw Ben-
jamin Netanyahu return as prime minister. 
 Early in his new tenure, Netanyahu for the fi rst time endorsed a two-
state solution to the confl ict with the Palestinians. Were diplomacy only 
about foreign policy goals and not at all about style, this might have led 
naturally to negotiations and a fi nal peace settlement. As I have argued, 
however, diplomatic style is also crucial, and Netanyahu embraced the 
coercive bargaining approach that was evident in his fi rst term as prime 
minister. The fi rst few years of his second stint were marked by very 
public disagreements with U.S. President Barack Obama about ending 
Israeli settlement activity as a precondition for starting peace talks that 
bring to mind the disputes between Shamir and President George H. W. 
Bush in the early 1990s. If Netanyahu is to bring peace, he will have to 
disassociate himself from the political right he has always called home 
and stake out a new political base allowing for pragmatic diplomacy. 
 Of course, this is not the only major problem to be solved before there 
can be a fi nal peace agreement. The control of Hamas over Gaza looms 
large over any negotiations. And any progress is likely to precipitate a 
new wave of violent spoiler behavior from Palestinian extremists, which 
will tempt the Israelis to respond forcefully. 
 Observers generally believe that any fi nal agreement between the two 
sides will approach that put together by President Clinton in his last 
days of offi ce. Clinton proposed a Palestinian state consisting of 94–96 
percent of the territory of the current West Bank with a compensation of 
1–3 percent of Israeli territory so that the major Israeli settlements could 
be incorporated into Israel. Jerusalem would be divided, with the Pales-
tinians controlling the Arab and Christian parts of the city and the Israe-
lis the Jewish parts. The Temple Mount, however, would be under 
Palestinian sovereignty, with the Israelis holding the Western Wall. Is-
rael would recognize the suffering of the refugees but would not be 
obliged to see to their return (Rabinovich 2011: 111–16; Meital 2006: 83–
88; Malley and Agha 2001: 74; Pressman 2003). Indeed, that bridging 
proposal bears a striking resemblance to the Abbas-Beilin framework 
that arose in 1995 (Beilin 1999: 155; Rabinovich 2011: 51). Beilin writes of 
those talks, “The best solution for either side is one that the other cannot 
accept. So, in the end, a solution has to be found whereby each side con-
cedes part of its dream. Not all of it. . . . In the Stockholm track we tried 
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to square this circle. Our aim was to grant to each side what it consid-
ered most important, so long as this did not damage the interests of the 
other” (1999: 187). The talks were value creating in nature, demonstrat-
ing “remarkable creativity while protecting the core interests of each 
nation” (Beilin 1999: 155). 
 This should make us cautiously optimistic. Differences in interests are 
sometimes impossible to bridge, thereby imposing a structural impedi-
ment to peace that no agency can alter, at least not in the short to medium 
term. In contrast, diplomacy is something over which decision makers 
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